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Abstract
This dissertation contributes to the debate on the decline and transformation of mass 
production in the 1970s and 1980s by analysing the case of the Italian car manufacturer 
Fiat. In particular, the thesis addresses the question whether the company's restructuring 
led to a discontinuity in management. The established literature on Fiat depicts the 
company as one of the first movers in the development of flexible manufacturing systems, 
and traces the move towards flexible mass production back to the late 1970s. In doing so, 
the literature implies a discontinuity between the group of managers who had developed 
Fordist production at Fiat in the 195Os and 1960s and the set of managers who gradually 
came to dominate the company after 1973.
Crucially, the established literature on Fiat is locked in a circular argument. Firstly, 
it explains the deployment of robotics as a move in the quest for production flexibility, 
and then uses the deployment of robotics as compelling evidence that the Fiat production 
setting during the 1980s was flexible. This dissertation breaks this circularity by testing 
the flexibility of Fiat production system during the 1980s against an independent variable, 
namely the rate of capacity utilisation of the production lines.
This dissertation demonstrates that during the 1980s, Fiat production remained 
inflexible. It also shows that Fiat did not maximise flexibility because the output-mix 
optimisation strategy pursued by the management did not require the maximisation of 
flexibility. The new contribution of the thesis to the international literature emerges from 
three key elements. Firstly, the thesis departs from common wisdom by showing that the 
managerial culture underpinning the restructuring of the company and its recovery from 
the crisis of the 1970s was essentially “Fordist”. Secondly, the thesis investigates 
flexibility by analysing the behaviour of the utilisation rate of both robotised and 
traditional lines. The methodology has been implemented for the first time, thanks to a set 
of unpublished data discovered during extensive fieldwork in the Fiat Archives, and is 
based on the assumption that the main drive for investment in flexible manufacturing 
systems is the stabilisation of the utilization of production lines at about the optimal rate. 
Finally, the thesis underlines the complex relationship between technological change, 
product development and output-mix optimisation, which has been often overlooked by 
the post-Fordism debate.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
Fiat is the largest Italian industrial group, and car manufacturing is its core business. 
Since the company was founded in 1899, it has played a key role in Italian 
industrialisation. In particular, during the “Golden Age” (1950-1973), Fiat was one of 
the most important “engines” of Italian economic growth. The company’s expansion 
path in that period recalls closely Chandler’s paradigm of big business growth, where an 
exceptionally stable managerial structure drove the company towards “Fordist” mass 
production and the maximisation of scale economies. As was the case with many car 
manufacturers in the 1970s, Fiat experienced a long period of crisis that ended only in 
the early 1980s after extensive restructuring. Therefore, Fiat offers a valuable case study 
in the debate about “post-Fordism” and the response of industrial economies to the crisis 
of the 1970s.
This thesis addresses the question whether the intangible capital accumulated by the 
firm from the post-war period to the late 1960s impeded the restructuring of physical 
capital during the 1970s and early 1980s, or whether it enabled the ownership and top 
management to address restructuring in an effective way. In general, the literature 
dealing with post-Fordism and the car industry suggests, either implicitly or explicitly, 
that the shift from Fordism to new organisational and technological settings implies the 
substitution of intangible capital, since the “Fordist culture of mass production” is seen 
as a constraint on the development of new managerial paradigms. The bulk of literature 
on Fiat echoes this view by assuming, rather than proving, a substantial discontinuity in 
the managerial culture that gradually came to dominate the company after 1973. On the 
other hand, Amatori has recently suggested that more research is needed in the case of 
Fiat to explore how much of the managerial culture accumulated by the firm during the 
“Golden Age” was left after the restructuring of the 1970s.1 This thesis attempts to fulfil 
the research agenda set by Amatori and to explore the hypothesis that the restructuring
1 F. Amatori, ‘Gli uomini del Professore. Strategic, organizzazione, management alia Fiat fra anni Venti e 
anni Sessanta’, in C. Annibaldi and G. Berta (eds), Grande impresa e sviluppo italiano. Studiper i cento 
anni della Fiat (Bologna, 1999), pp. 257-343.
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of Fiat after the crisis of the 1970s was a process in which cumulative intangible 
knowledge affected strategic planning and ensured long-term success. This view is 
inspired by Chandler’s paradigm of big business development and survival, and finds 
theoretical support from the Nelson and Winter evolutionary theory of economic 
change.2
The established literature on Fiat assumes that the managerial turnover at the top end 
of the hierarchy during the 1970s led to a shift from a process- to a market-oriented 
approach to the car business. This included a shift from inflexible to flexible mass 
production, and from a strategy based on dominating the bottom end of the market to a 
strategy based on the ability to compete in any segment of the market. This view implies 
a huge discontinuity in the way management intended to pursue both functional and 
strategic effectiveness, which, in turn, implies a huge discontinuity in the business 
culture underpinning the strategic and functional thought of Fiat management.3 Finally, 
the shift from process- to market-oriented manufacturing should imply a shift in 
decision-making power, from production engineers, who typically dominate process- 
oriented structures, to marketing managers.
This thesis focuses on technological change and output-mix optimisation from 1960 
to 1987, presenting empirical evidence that over that period, discontinuity did not occur 
to the extent underlined by the literature. The work shows that the firm's owners did not 
change the basic criteria used for strategic choice, and that production engineers 
remained influential in the process of decision-making in spite of the managerial 
turnover at the top end of the hierarchy. Even after 1973, production managers identified 
the main source of competitiveness as the containment of the cycle time and complexity 
costs, rather than the flexibility of the system. New production technologies, such as 
robotics, were developed in order to maximise production speed rather than product-mix 
flexibility. Moreover, by controlling product renewal, engineers enforced an output-mix
2 See: R. S. Nelson, S. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory o f Economic Change (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
1982).
3 Functional effectiveness is defined as the way companies improve labour relations, process of 
productions, products and marketing structures. Strategic effectiveness is defined as the way companies 
shift from declining markets to growing ones. A. D. Chandler, Scale and Scope. The Dynamics o f 
Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge Massachusetts, 1990), p. 8.
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strategy that maximised the specialisation in the production of small cars rather than the 
ability to compete in a wider range of market segments.
Thanks to a new set of data and unpublished documents collected during extensive 
fieldwork in the company’s archives, it has been possible to pursue an empirical 
analysis of flexibility in manufacturing, as well as an empirical approach to output- 
optimisation strategies at Fiat. As far as the issue of production flexibility is concerned, 
the new set of data has enabled empirical analysis of the way Fiat management used 
flexible production lines based on robotics. This data includes output per model, per 
month, per plant, per line (all unpublished), data on the optimal utilisation rates of each 
line (some of these have already been published while others are new findings), and data 
concerning the cycle time of both robotised and traditional welding stations 
(unpublished). As will be explained in the subsequent paragraphs of this chapter, the 
new information shows that Fiat used robotics to reduce the cycle time of the process, 
by removing the bottlenecks generated by the old technological set in the spot-welding 
shop, rather than by profiting from the deployment of robotics in order to maximise 
flexibility. As far as output-mix optimisation strategy is concerned, the new data set has 
enabled an analysis of output structure over time. Moreover, unpublished evidence of 
managerial thought has been utilised to identify the principles underpinning the output- 
mix optimisation strategy of Fiat. The analysis of both qualitative and quantitative 
evidence shows that: a) Fiat adjusted its production mix upmarket in the early 1970s, 
but shifted back downmarket in the early 1980s, whereas the traditional view suggests 
continuity in the output mix up to the late 1970s and discontinuity in the 1980s; b) the 
temporary shift upmarket during the 1970s was not a genuine attempt to break with the 
traditional specialisation of the firm in small cars, but an opportunistic and temporary 
move made possible by a temporary suspension of price competition.
The analysis of both technological change and output-mix optimisation strategy 
shows continuity in managerial thought among the production engineers, who remained 
the most influential group within the firm throughout the period analysed.
12
Technological change at Fiat 1960-1987
As far as technological change is concerned, the thesis looks at the introduction and 
development of robotics in the spot-welding shop at Fiat between 1970 and 1987, 
though the process of automation during the 1960s is also analysed. This thesis argues 
that: 1) internal factors (i.e. optimisation of the existing processes) drove the 
introduction and development of robotics during the 1970s; 2) the increased tool 
flexibility brought about by robotics did not change the way Fiat management responded 
to changes in the structure of demand for Fiat models during the 1980s. This view is 
opposed to the common interpretation of technological change, which maintains that, 
from 1972 onwards, flexible manufacturing systems (henceforth FMS) such as the 
Robogate were introduced by the new management in order to cope with the increasing 
need for output-mix flexibility caused by changes in the structure and dynamics of 
demand. In the literature, the flexibility paradigm has replaced the industrial relations 
approach, which was dominant in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and saw robotics as 
the managerial response to the strategy of the unions. On the contrary, from the mid- 
1980s the literature on Fiat started to focus on working conditions, quality, efficiency 
and flexibility, to justify the implementation and development of robotics. Crucially, 
flexibility could be improved only by implementing the specific technology based on 
robotics, whereas quality, efficiency, and working conditions could be improved also by 
developing traditional technology. Therefore, according to the established literature, 
flexibility drove the choice of that specific technology. Furthermore, the established 
literature maintains that output-mix flexibility was achieved.
The interpretation of technological change as a response to the increasing need for 
flexibility4 implies that, within the new technological settings, the management of 
production developed in a way antithetical to “Fordism”. Within a flexible- 
manufacturing framework, production is determined by the inputs coming from the 
marketing department, so that product differentiation is preferred to product 
standardisation. Actually, the introduction of robotics brought the possibility of rejecting 
the pattern of routines constructed around the Fordist principle of product
4 The Robogate system was the most advanced example of a flexible manufacturing system for 
monocoque welding at the time.
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standardisation and cycle-time minimisation, to favour the introduction of a set of 
routines aiming for flexibility maximisation and product differentiation. This thesis, 
nonetheless, shows that the introduction of robotics during the 1970s did not cause a 
change in the pattern of routines defining production management, because engineers 
kept their grip on the process of technological change, orienting the development of new 
technologies towards the achievement of their goals. Production engineers aimed to 
reduce and equalise the cycle time of each stage of production as had been postulated by 
Taylor and Bedaux, whose theories were the root of a set of routines developed by Fiat 
management from the post-war period onwards.
As far as methodology is concerned, the issue of product flexibility cannot be 
approached through the narrow comparison between single versus multi-model 
production functions, but has to be analysed in relation to the issue of production line 
utilisation rates. In fact, Fordism does not prevent multi-product manufacturing. The 
inflexibility of the system, on the other hand, can make multi-product manufacturing 
inefficient, because the adjustment of output mix to demand might well generate spare 
capacity. As already said, within the Fordist technological set, managers aimed to reduce 
the lead time of production (the time needed to produce a complete car) by cutting the 
cycle time of each stage in the process of manufacturing. The minimisation of the cycle 
time was obtained through the hyper-segmentation of the process and the specificity of 
tools. Thus, each manufacturing line was model-specific. Therefore, for a multi-model 
producer, the adjustment of the output mix to the structure of demand depended on the 
implementation of short time or overtime. Output-mix flexibility was obtained by 
changing the capacity utilisation rate of each line to offset changes in the stock levels of 
each model produced. This required a certain amount of spare capacity. On the other 
hand, FMS aims to achieve product-mix flexibility and to keep constant the utilisation 
level of each line. By reducing tool specificity, two or more models can be processed 
simultaneously on the same line in different proportions. Because the reduction in 
demand for one model can be offset by producing other models on the flexible line, and 
the availability of several flexible lines enables management to optimise output 
distribution over the whole production set, capacity utilisation can be stabilised at the
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optimum level. In theory, therefore, if a production setting is flexible, the capacity 
utilisation of each line will remain stable at around the optimum level.
By elaborating upon a new set of unpublished data concerning output per model, per 
plant, per production line, output capacity range per line, and the cycle time in the 
monocoque spot-welding process, this thesis shows that in spite of a massive 
deployment of robotics in the spot-welding shop, between 1978 and 1987 some Fiat 
plants were under-utilised while others were often over-utilised. This shows that in spite 
of robotics, production output could not be optimally allocated over the whole 
production setting.5 On the other hand, evidence is provided that robotics allowed 
engineers to minimise the cycle time of some stages of monocoque welding. 
Furthermore, through interviews with technical management, and through qualitative 
and quantitative evidence, it has been shown that because engineers addressed 
technological change according to their “process-oriented needs”, innovation was 
localised only where traditional automation was inefficient. As a result, between 1972 
and 1987 the overall process remained inflexible, so that it proved difficult to spread 
output among different lines in an optimal way.
Output-mix optimisation and the regime of competition
The second variable analysed by this work is the output-mix optimisation strategy. In 
a multi-production function, output-mix optimisation consists of the choice of the 
product mix that best maximises total contribution margins This is because the larger 
the total contribution margin, the larger the total operating profits. In the absence of 
constraints, the total contribution margin tends to increase along with a shift of the 
output-mix towards the units with larger contribution margins. In the case of car 
manufacturing, each producer supplies different types of cars, competing in different 
segments of the market. The cost structure changes across segments, because of changes 
in quality benchmarks. Selling prices vary across segments too, so that shifts in output 
mix affect average costs and revenues. It is commonly thought that upmarket units 
provide larger per unit margins of contribution, because the demand for upmarket units
5 The set of data used in this thesis is the most detailed available so far, and makes possible the analysis of 
the utilisation rate of production lines.
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tends to be income rather than price elastic, whereas the demand for downmarket units 
is price elastic. For this reason, the difference between average costs and prices in the 
case of upmarket units is expected to be wider then the difference between prices and 
costs of downmarket units.6
In theory, therefore, the more the output mix shifts towards the upmarket units, the 
more the total contribution margin increases, and total operating profits are maximised. 
Actually, within competitive markets, manufactures specialised in the production of 
upmarket units set price/quality benchmarks, which represent the barrier to entry for less 
specialised manufacturers. In fact, if in order to shift upmarket the less efficient 
manufacturer is forced to set the price of its upmarket units at too low a level, the 
difference between average costs and prices will shrink. Because average costs of 
upmarket units are larger than those of downmarket units, the shift upmarket will have a 
detrimental effect on total contribution margins. In the real world, thus, management has 
to maximise the output mix in the face of many constraints, such as capacity, design and 
manufacturing expertise, the structure and quality of the component supply chain and so 
on. Ultimately, specialisation (the pattern of routines around which the manufacturing 
process is organised) represents a constraint to the shift upmarket, and manufacturers 
have to maximise sales in the segment of the market in which they are more specialised 
and competitive.
The literature on Fiat emphasises that one of the major elements of weakness of the 
company during the 1970s was a product mix skewed towards lower segment units.7 On 
the contrary, during the 1980s Fiat acquired the ability to compete in the upper segments 
in spite of the traditional specialisation of the firm in the manufacturing of small cars.8 
Flexibility, therefore, was seen by the established literature not only as the ability to 
concentrate, on each flexible line, the production of a range of different models
6 Pricing in car manufacturing is based on mark-up pricing (average costs plus margins) rather than 
marginal cost pricing. This is because economies of scale are substantial, which means that average costs 
are in excess of marginal costs. Therefore, by applying marginal cost pricing, prices will be lower than 
average costs.
7 A. Enrietti, G. Fomenego, II Gruppo Fiat. D all’inizio degli anni Ottanta alle prospettive del mercato 
unificato del 92 (Roma, 1989), p. 172; A. Mosconi, D. Valeo, Crisi e ristrutturazine del settore 
automobilistico (Bologna, 1982), p. 61; G. Volpato, II caso Fiat. Una strategia di riorganizzazione e di 
rilancio (Torino, 1996), p. 141.
8 Volpato, II Caso Fiat, pp. 161-164.
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competing in the same segment of the market, but also as the ability to compete in any 
segment of the market, with the possibility of implementing a much more flexible 
output-mix optimisation strategy. In the first case, the advantage of flexibility was the 
stabilisation of production lines, as described in the preceding section of this chapter. In 
the second case, the aim of flexibility was the optimisation of the output mix. This view 
assumes that during the 1980s, many of the constraints represented by the company’s 
specialisation in small cars had been removed. Interestingly, though, the established 
literature failed to support the view of Fiat moving away from the specialisation in the 
manufacturing of small cars with the empirical evidence. On the other hand, by 
elaborating on the output database, this thesis shows that output-mix strategy was rather 
different from what the literature put forward. During the 1970s, Fiat actually changed 
its production mix from that of the 1960s, putting more emphasis on the middle and top 
ranges. In fact, from 1972 onwards, the share of Fiat's total output in the upper segments 
(C, D and E) fluctuated between 45% and 50% compared to 30% in the 1960s. By 
contrast, it was between 1980 and 1987 that the sum of the shares of segments C, D, and 
E dropped again to about 30%.9 Therefore, if  there was any discontinuity in the output- 
mix optimisation strategy of the company, it occurred in the 1970s, while the output mix 
of the 1980s resembles that of the 1960s.
This finding raises the question of why Fiat shifted upmarket during the 1970s, and 
shifted back downmarket during the 1980s. The issue is connected with the process of 
routine confirmation and rejection, and with the role of different actors operating within 
the managerial hierarchy, which might have influenced decision-making. The thesis 
provides evidence that engineers and marketing management had different views 
concerning the best output-mix optimisation strategy, and since the 1960s the two 
groups started to confront each other in this field. Engineers wanted to maximise the 
competitive advantage of the firm in small cars, whereas marketing management wanted 
to maximise revenues from the sales of the medium and top range units. The divide 
between engineers and marketing staff illustrates the problem of the confirmation or
9 In general, the market is structured in segments indicated by different letters (A, B, C, etc.) according to 
the cubic capacity of the engine. The lower segments are A (500-900 cc.) and B (900-1100 cc.), while the 
upper segments are C (1100-1300 cc.), D (1300-1600 cc.) and E (1600-2200 cc.).
17
rejection of routines. The firm's specialisation emphasised by engineers, and the market 
opportunities for increasing revenues from sales stressed by marketing managers, can be 
seen as justifications for confirming or rejecting the pattern of routines developed 
around the specialisation of the firm in the manufacturing of small cars.
Engineers (the techno-structure) were the most influential group in the Fiat hierarchy. 
This thesis shows that the techno-structure remained fairly stable throughout the period, 
in the sense that internal appointees usually replaced retired engineers. Moreover, 
technical managers were very influential within the Administration Board, and advised 
the Board and the owners of the company to follow the strategic advice of the techno­
structure. This work shows that in the first half of the 1960s technical management had 
developed a criterion regulating output-mix decision-making. This was that Fiat should 
focus on the lower end of the demand spectrum unless price competition was inhibited. 
Only if it were the case, engineers would have agreed with marketing managers to shift 
upmarket, advising the top management to pursue that strategy. Fiat, therefore, shifted 
upmarket during the 1970s because the market was characterised by collusive 
behaviours, where in each national market the largest manufacturer was the price setter 
and competitors were following upward. Vice versa, when price competition was in 
place, top management followed the advice of engineers to shift back downmarket in 
order to maximise the firm’s specialisation in the lower segments of the market.
The rationale for such behaviour can be found in the fact that German and French 
manufacturers were much more specialised than Fiat in the manufacturing of medium 
and large cars, so that Fiat would have not met the quality benchmarks of competitors in 
the top range at competitive costs. For this reason, engineers were concerned by the 
possibility that the adjustment of the output mix upmarket would have put upward 
pressure on total production costs, which in conjunction with price competition from 
German and French manufacturers would have considerably squeezed profits. The 
argument was strong and top management and the owners tended to support the 
engineers’ point of view unless price competition was inhibited. In fact, if in each 
national market competitors were adjusting their prices above the price level set by the 
national leader, specialisation was to some extent less important in driving the output- 
mix strategy.
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In 1980, Silva et al. showed that during the 1970s, price competition was de facto 
inhibited in all the largest European markets.10 Based on a wide set of unpublished data 
and primary sources, this thesis shows that during the 1970s Fiat management was 
aware of the suspension of price competition, and adjusted the output mix upmarket as 
wished by the marketing staff. Moreover, the thesis shows that given the price levels set 
by Fiat, upmarket units achieved higher contribution margins and operating profits than 
lower market units. On the other hand, by elaborating on price behaviour, the thesis 
shows that price competition was restored from the early 1980s. At that time, Fiat 
shifted back to an output mix skewed toward the lower segments of the market.
In general, the output mix is affected by the product renewal strategy, since the latter 
determines the expansion in sales for specific models and, therefore, for specific 
segments. During the 1970s, product renewal was concentrated mainly in the upper 
range of both the Fiat and Lancia brands,11 whereas in the 1980s, it concentrated mainly 
on the bottom range of the two brands. This product-renewal strategy is quite surprising 
considering that Fiat forecasts of the early 1980s had predicted that the medium 
segments would experience the most remarkable growth during the decade.12 As a 
consequence, more emphasis in the renewal of the medium, rather than the lower model 
range should have been expected. The priority given by Fiat to the lower, range, 
therefore, denotes the managerial will to compete mainly in the bottom end of the 
market, maximising specialisation.
The analysis of the Fiat output-mix optimisation strategy underlines two important 
points. Firstly, as already mentioned, the output mix of the 1980s was still skewed 
towards lower-range units and, therefore, reflected the traditional specialisation of Fiat. 
Secondly, the discontinuity in output-mix optimisation occurring during the 1970s was 
more apparent than real. Actually, the temporary adjustment of the output mix upmarket 
was an opportunistic move driven by the regime of competition, rather than a genuine 
attempt to shift away from the traditional specialisation of the firm. A genuine long-term 
strategy of shifting upmarket, in fact, would have required the restructuring of the whole
10 F. Silva, M. Grillo, M. Prati, II mercato italiano del’auto nel contesto europeo (Milano, 1982).
11 Lancia had been taken over by Fiat in 1969.
12 Introductory relations to the 1982 Fiat Auto Balance Sheet, p. 14.
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process, including the redefinition of the design and manufacturing routines towards 
quality, along with the reorganisation of the components supply chain.
In this respect, it is important to highlight the relationship between the output-mix 
optimisation strategy and technological change. Since during the 1980s Fiat 
management intended to compete mainly in the lower end of the market, to which the 
larger part of financial resources for product renewal was allocated, extra flexibility was 
not actually needed. On the contrary, the minimisation of the cycle time was a central 
element of the strategy, considering the scale of production required in order to supply 
the lower end of the market, and a progressive reduction in the working time occurred 
during the 1970s. Both technological change and an output-mix optimisation strategy 
were coherently inspired by the knowledge accumulated by Fiat management during the 
1950s and 1960s, and, therefore, by the pattern of routines defining the company’s 
specialisation, in the manufacturing of small cars.
Thus, it is interesting to see whether the strategy of Fiat during the 1980s was the 
best profit-maximising one. As already observed, during the 1980s, Fiat fully recovered 
from the crisis of the 1970s. Nonetheless it could be argued that an output mix more 
skewed towards upmarket units might have brought even better profits. The exploration 
of the argument would require a counterfactual based upon the projection of expected 
contribution margins for each model at various levels of output. Such a set of data, 
obviously, does not exist. However, the available data suggest that the output-mix 
optimisation strategy of Fiat during the 1980s was the best profit-maximising strategy. 
Not only did Fiat realise substantial profits (as shown in balance sheets) during the 
1980s, but also the containment of complexity costs enabled the company to maximise 
profits, whereas a higher level of flexibility and a shift of the output mix towards 
upmarket units would have caused an expansion of complexity costs, which, in turn, 
would have put downward pressures on profits. This is an important point, because 
within the evolutionary theory of economic change, management confirms or rejects 
routines according to expected profits.13 Crucially, management has to estimate a trade­
off between flexibility and complexity costs, and if  the information is not entirely 
available or assessable, the decision is affected by knowledge and experience.
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Ultimately, though, the market determines whether the confirmation or rejection of 
given routines was the best choice. According to the available information, it seems that 
at the end of the 1970s, Fiat management guessed right in focusing on the lower end of 
the market, and continuity paid off.
The structure of the thesis
This thesis consists of eight chapters including an introduction and conclusions. 
Chapter 2 highlights the dominant approaches in the historiography on the car industry, 
and provides a review of the relevant bibliography on Fiat. It explains that the Italian 
literature concerning the restructuring of Fiat after 1973 implies the same discontinuity 
in management and technology assumed by the international literature on post-Fordism 
regarding the restructuring of the world car industry after the two oil crises. In the case 
of Fiat, though, this discontinuity has not been demonstrated, so that there is scope for 
further analysis, by testing the alternative hypothesis that the Fiat restructuring was 
actually inspired by the knowledge accumulated over time by the techno-structure. This 
hypothesis has its theoretical foundation in the Nelson and Winter evolutionary 
approach to economic change, and is more compatible with the Chandler paradigm of 
big business growth, as compared with the view of discontinuity often implied by the 
established literature.
Chapter 3, drawing mainly on secondary sources, examines the crisis of the 1970s 
and the recovery of the 1980s. Moreover, the evolution of the company from the post­
war period to the late 1980s is analysed, by focusing on changes in management, 
organisational structure, and production facilities. The chapter ends by suggesting that 
the established literature is not convincing when it assumes that the managerial turnover 
and organisational restructuring experienced by Fiat in the second half of the 1970s led 
to a drastic change in the pattern of routines regulating production management and 
competitive strategy. In fact, managerial turnover occurred at the top end of the 
structure, and did not affect the composition and role of the techno-structure within the 
company.
13 Nelson and Winter, An Evolutionary Theory, p. 18.
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The conclusion of chapter 3, therefore, suggests that the empirical analysis of specific 
variables is the most appropriate way to find and evaluate elements of continuity and 
discontinuity in the management of Fiat before and after the first oil crisis.
Chapter 4 is the first of the core chapters of the thesis and, therefore, is mainly based 
on unpublished data. The chapter focuses on the first of the two variables analysed in 
this work, namely technological change, by looking at how Fiat management developed 
production technology before and after the first oil crisis. By focusing on the process of 
car manufacturing and analysing technological change in the spot-welding shop, the 
chapter demonstrates that the introduction and development of robotics at Fiat aimed to 
resolve the bottlenecks generated by the previous technological setting, without 
radically changing it, and without changing the routines regulating production 
management. This hypothesis departs from the current literature, which maintains that 
technological change at Fiat from 1972 was the result of a marked change in the 
production management towards flexible mass production.
One of the distinguishing features of the chapter is the empirical assessment of the 
level of flexibility achieved by the production shops in which robotics had been 
deployed. As already mentioned, the analysis is based on the assumption that if  product- 
mix flexibility is fully exploited, it enables the capacity utilisation rate of each flexible 
line to be stabilised at about the optimum level. This is the level of output within the 
output range,14 which maximises the production function for each production line. The 
stabilisation of production at the optimum level has been indicated by the literature, and 
by several Fiat internal documents,15 as one of the principal justifications for investing 
in robotics. The chapter, therefore, compares the utilisation rate of robotised and 
traditional lines between 1984 and 1987. The exercise shows that throughout the period 
considered all the Fiat production lines, be they based on robotics or on traditional 
technology, experienced marked fluctuations in the capacity utilisation rates. This
14 By output range is meant the range of different output levels comprised between the minimum 
economically viable, and the maximum technically achievable amount of output, for each production plant 
or line. See: M. Moroni, Production Process and Technical Change (Cambridge, 1992), p. 147.
15 See P. Bianchi, G. Volpato, ‘Flexibility as the Response to Excess Capacity: The Case of the 
Automobile Industry’, in C.W.F. Baden-Fuller (ed.), Managing Excess Capacity (Oxford, 1990), pp. 215- 
246. See also Fiat Department of Production Technology Development and Assessment, ‘The Robogate’, 
internal document, pp. 1-16.
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indicates that the adjustment of output to demand for specific models was still obtained 
by over/under-utilising each single line, rather than shifting production from the over­
utilised line to the under-utilised ones. This finding leads to the conclusion that the 
production management of the robotised lines was not different from that of the 
traditional lines organised around the “Fordist” principle of hyper-specificity of 
production tools.
Chapter 5 is descriptive and mainly based on secondary literature. It concerns 
industrial relations and is related to the issue of technological change. The aim of this 
chapter is to instruct the reader on the development of industrial relations at Fiat, 
explaining, at the same time, why it seems correct to interpret technological change at 
Fiat using technical arguments, such as those proposed in chapter 4, rather than 
industrial relations arguments. It is shown that the most recent literature on industrial 
relations at Fiat attributes the defeat of the unions in 1980 to political rather than 
technological factors. Moreover, it is shown that given the characteristic and limits of 
the deployment of robotics, and given the nature and the scope of the industrial conflict 
at Fiat during the 1970s, management had no theoretical or practical reasons to assume 
that the localised deployment of robotics in the spot-welding shop would have had a 
short or medium-term impact on industrial relations. This is an important point because 
given the state of industrial relations at Fiat during the 1970s, at first glance it could be 
thought that technological change was actually responsive to industrial conflict.
Chapter 6 opens the section of the thesis concerning output-mix optimisation strategy 
and is mainly based on unpublished documents and data. This section reconstructs the 
output-mix optimisation strategy of Fiat during the 1970s and 1980s, testing the 
hypothesis that the principle regulating output-mix decision-making did not change over 
time. The literature, on the other hand, assumes that in the late 1970s the company 
shifted from process to market-oriented approaches to car manufacturing. This caused a 
change in the principle regulating output-mix maximisation. Chapter 6 shows that since 
the mid-1960s, the marketing staff started to question the output-mix optimisation 
strategy of Fiat, which was characterised by an output structure skewed towards the 
bottom range of the market. This output structure reflected the production-oriented 
culture developed by technical management since the inter-war period and, therefore,
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the specialisation of the firm. The incentive for questioning that output-mix strategy had 
been provided by the progressive abolition of tariffs by EEC countries. The new 
scenario compelled management to decide whether to reinforce the Fiat position as a 
supplier of small cars, or compete with German and French manufacturers for market 
shares in the medium and upper segment of the market. Those segments were expected 
to develop in Italy as they had already done in the French and German markets. At first 
glance, the new approach seems to be a radical departure from the production-oriented 
approach of engineers, which tended to favour the manufacturing of small cars, where 
Fiat could exploit its competitive advantage. From the analysis of documents, though, it 
emerges that the Italian management contemplated the possibility of shifting upmarket 
under the assumption that Fiat “retained price leadership privilege”, and that 
competitors adjusted their price upwards in a predictable way. This means that 
management did not conceive the shift in the output mix upmarket in the broader 
context of a radical re-thinking of the design expertise and manufacturing routines 
towards increasing cost efficient quality manufacturing. On the contrary, the move was 
seen as an opportunistic strategy to exploit higher margins from the sales of large cars, 
under the assumption that Fiat set price levels according to its own cost structure, and 
competitors adjusted their prices upward, without exploiting the competitive advantage 
deriving from their specialisation in the medium and upper segments of the market. The 
chapter describes the reasons why Fiat management expected that the abolition of tariffs 
would not trigger severe price competition among European manufacturers. Then, by 
supporting the conclusions reached by Silva in his analysis of the Italian car market 
during the 1970s with evidence from company internal documents, the chapter shows 
that during the 1970s, the Italian market was actually characterised by a regime of 
competition resembling implicit collusion, and that Fiat management was aware of this. 
The chapter also shows that during the 1970s, Fiat shifted upmarket and that given price 
levels, management expected the upper range units to perform better than lower range 
ones, in terms of contribution margins.
By contrast, chapter 7 shows that during the 1980s, price competition was restored, 
while Fiat shifted the output mix back downmarket. In the late 1970s, there were already 
signals that collusion was not going to hold for long, while in 1981 it became evident
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that competitors were no longer available to follow Fiat's pricing upward. The policy of 
product renewal reflected this expectation, with Fiat allocating resources to the renewal 
of models competing in segments A and B, where new models were developed, starting 
from the design of new model-specific platforms and engines. By contrast, in segments 
C and D new cars were developed from old platforms and engines, which were shared 
by relatively large numbers of models of both Fiat and Lancia ranges. This was a 
production rather than marketing-oriented policy, aiming to reduce costs, and it led to 
the limited commercial success of Fiat in those segments. Finally, the product renewal 
in segment E was postponed to 1984-1985, while the entire Lancia range was shifted 
downmarket.
The last part of chapter 7 shows that the available data suggest the output-mix 
optimisation strategy of Fiat was the best profit-maximising strategy. By applying 
average per segment production costs of the European car industry to the Fiat output 
structure, it emerges that the more the mix shifted downmarket the more costs were 
reduced. The methodology is not ideal but it seems to be indicative of the soundness of 
the Fiat strategy, because European average costs are expected to be higher than the 
actual Fiat costs in the lower segments and lower than the Fiat costs in the upper 
segments. Therefore, if  the same exercise were repeated applying the real costs of Fiat, 
the cost saving deriving from the shift in the output mix downmarket should be even 
higher.
The last chapter of the thesis synthesises the conclusions reached by the empirical 
analysis of the two variables considered by this work. In the case of both technological 
change and output-mix optimisation, a substantial continuity emerges, due to the fact 
that, in spite of the managerial turnover at the top end of the hierarchy occurred during 
the 1970s, the techno-structure remained substantially stable. This enabled production 
engineers to keep their grip on technological change and output-mix decision-making 
and to maximise the technical specialisation of the company in the manufacturing of 
small cars. This, in turn, prevented the maximisation of both the flexibility of 
production lines and the flexibility in approaching output-mix optimisation. Therefore, 
this work departs from the existing literature, which maintains that after the first oil
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crisis Fiat shifted from process to market oriented car manufacturing, implying a marked 
discontinuity in management.
Archives and sources
This thesis is based on unpublished qualitative and quantitative sources collected 
during an extensive fieldwork in the Fiat Archive. Interviews with members of Fiat 
technical management have also been conducted in order to collect data and information 
concerning production technology and organisation between 1960 and 1987.
The Fiat Archive16 is administered by the External Relations Department of the Fiat 
Group. Each department within the Group keeps its own records for five years. After 
this period, documents are sent to the Fiat Archive. The director of the department 
issuing each document decides upon the disclosure period, which usually ranges from 
five to fifteen years. In any case, access to documents after the disclosure period has to 
be authorised by the Director of External Relations.17
Qualitative sources consist mainly of two sets of documents: a) verbatim minutes of 
the Administration Board Meetings from 1960 to 1967; b) a series of studies, internal 
correspondence and memos produced by various Fiat departments. In particular, this 
thesis includes documents from Fondo Pedrana (Pedrana File), Fondo Crescimone 
(Crescimone File) and Fondo Fiat Societa Capogruppo (Fiat Core Companies File), 
which includes the majority of managers’ and top executives’ memos.18
The principal strength of these sources is that the documents were produced 
exclusively for internal use. They are very detailed and provide information which is 
much more complete and explicit than any other document edited for external relations 
and public exposure purposes. These sources, therefore, enable the process of decision
16 Along with the main archive located in the ‘Centro Storico Fiat’ (Fiat Historical Centre), there are two 
secondary locations namely ‘Archivio di Corso Ferrucci’, (Corso Ferucci Archive) located in the Fiat 
Avio Head Quarter, and ‘Archivio di Mirafiori’ (Mirafiori Archive), located in the Mirafiori plant, the 
main production premises of Fiat Auto. The latter contains only files concerning the activity of Fiat in the 
car sector. All the locations are in the urban area of Turin, the Italian city where the Fiat Headquarters is 
located.
17 The authorisation to access documents depends upon two criteria: the protection of the company’s best 
interests, and privacy protection of individuals either formerly or currently employed by Fiat, or involved 
with the company as clients, suppliers, partners etc.
18 Pedrana is the name of the Director of the International Affairs Department between 1960 and 1973. 
Crescimone is the name of the Director of the Lingotto plant from 1960 to 1978.
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making at Fiat to be thoroughly analysed. However, verbatim minutes of the 
Administration Board Meetings need to be analysed with care in order to fully exploit 
the information they contain. In particular, the reader has to take into account the 
managerial culture of the Fiat management during the 1960s to correctly interpret the 
text. Such a culture had been developed over half a century of managerial stability and 
was shaped by a strong sense of respect for the company and its leadership. This 
involved a number behavioural codes that managers had to understand and apply when 
they came to report to the Board. These codes have to be taken into account when the 
verbatim minutes of the Administration Board Meeting are analysed. Two elements are 
of particular interest: a) Valletta, (the president of Fiat and Chairman of the Board from 
1946 to 1966), customarily presented his personal view as a matter of corporate fact; b) 
since failure could not be contemplated by the managerial culture at Fiat, junior 
managers had to choose the appropriate way to report on problems to the board. For 
example, if a car was not enjoying commercial success and needed major re­
development, the manager in charge would have probably reported to the board that the 
decision to start major development was driven by the will of Fiat designers to push 
harder and pursue further commercial success. Usually, figures in the annex to the 
minutes help to interpret correctly what managers said during the meetings. Moreover, 
in order to appreciate and understand the communication codes of the minutes, it was 
necessary to read through the entire series of documents from 1899 to 1967. Finally, the 
book written by a former designer of Fiat, Dante Giacosa, Progetti alia Fiat prima del 
computer provides very useful insights on how the managerial culture of Fiat 
management affected communications among members of the Board and between 
owners and executives.19 From both the minutes and the Giacosa book, it emerges that 
the way information was presented to the board was not designed to mislead the top 
management, which was clearly capable of decoding information to ascertain its exact 
meaning.
19 D. Giacosa, Progetti alia Fiat prima del computer (Milano, 1978).
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The main quantitative sources consist of the ‘Libro dei numeri di matricola delle 
vetture prodotte’ (Fiat Production File), and Fondo Sepim (Sepim file). The production 
file consists of the serial numbers of all vehicles produced by Fiat from the late 1950s to 
the present although for the purpose of this thesis only the data up to 1987 have been 
disclosed by Fiat. From January 1967 onwards the serial numbers are arranged by 
month, by plant and by production line. Since each serial number refers to the last 
vehicle of a given type produced each month, by subtracting each number from that of 
the subsequent month it is possible to work out the monthly production per model per 
line. Therefore, by using serial numbers it was possible to construct an unpublished data 
set, the relevance of which should not underestimated. The output data published so far, 
in fact, show only annual totals. The new figures for line output per month along with 
figures for the optimum, maximum and minimum capacity utilisation rates of each 
production line, and data on the number of working days and shifts actually performed 
by Fiat each month enabled us to test the flexibility of the Fiat production setting against 
an independent variable, namely the regime of utilisation of production lines. The 
methodology and the theoretical concepts utilised in this work are explained in chapter 
4. At this stage it is important to emphasise that the data set utilised in this work allowed 
us to pursue the kind of empirical analysis of production flexibility that the literature on 
car industry has failed to pursue so far. Finally, the new output data permitted an 
analysis of changes in the structure of the Fiat output overtime, which along with 
qualitative evidence provided important insights on output-mix optimisation strategy.
As far as the Sepim file is concerned, it provides data of employment concerning 
enrolled workers per plant, numbers of working hours, number of workers effectively 
present each month and the number of hours effectively performed by the workers. 
These data allowed us to examine productivity in the manufacturing sector before 1978, 
whereas the data usually available from published sources do not allow us to single out 
workers in the manufacturing sector from the total number of workers in the Fiat Group 
before 1978.
Finally, important data and information were gathered by interviewing two Fiat 
technical managers who contributed to the deployment and development of ‘Robotgate’,
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the robotised system for spot-welding, at the Cassino and Rivalta plants from 1976 to 
1987. Antonio Malandri is a mechanical engineer currently working in the Department 
of New Technology Development at Fiat Auto. Francesco Scimone is a skilled worker 
who started his career at Fiat working in the maintenance and repair of spot-welding 
tools at the Mirafiori plant and then was gradually promoted to different roles up to a 
middle management position in the Department of New Technology Development.
The two managers provided data concerning the optimal capacity utilisation of all 
Fiat production lines in the spot welding-shop, be they based on robotics, or on the 
Robogate technology or indeed on non robotised technology. These data were provided 
along with a detailed technical description of various technological settings and the time 
cycle of the various stage of spot-welding process according to the various technologies 
deployed. Finally, Malandri explained the various definitions of flexibility used by Fiat 
and various problems faced by the company while developing the spot-welding 
technology. All the information provided by Malandri and Scimone has been 
incorporated in chapter 4.
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Chapter 2
Interpreting Fiat restructuring: Continuity versus discontinuity 
Introduction
This thesis addresses the question whether the restructuring of Fiat during the 1970s 
and early 1980 caused the progressive displacement of the intangible and the physical 
capital accumulated during the age of Fordism or, on the contrary, whether the 
restructuring was inspired by the collective knowledge that Fiat management had been 
accumulating over time. The question relates to two different but interconnected 
debates, namely the “international” debate about post-Fordism and the third industrial 
revolution, and the debate within the Italian Business History and Business Economics 
literature about the crisis and restructuring of Fiat. This chapter clarifies in which way 
this work contributes to the debates mentioned above, and explains why the analysis 
focuses on changes in production technology and output-mix optimisation strategy.
When it comes to analysing the car industry in terms of production modalities, the 
whole body of literature on post-Fordism, including the neo-Fordist school of thought, 
assumes that after the two oil crises, the world car industry shifted to flexible mass 
production. The entire literature on Fiat accepts this assumption for the company. On 
the other hand, this chapter maintains that the shift to flexible mass production implies a 
discontinuity in management and, therefore, a discontinuity in managerial knowledge 
that has not yet been demonstrated. The thesis argues that for Fiat in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, the shift to flexible mass production was more theoretical than practical, 
and that the managerial “culture” underpinning technological change and output mix 
optimisation strategy remained rather stable over time. In this sense, the Fiat case study 
requires the adoption of interpretative frameworks from outside the school of post- 
Fordism. These are provided by authors such as Chandler and Nelson and Winter.
This chapter is organised as follows. The first section sets the issue of discontinuity 
and specifies the characteristics of Fordism that have to be considered in order to make 
sense of the debate on post-Fordism. The second section summarises the debate on post- 
Fordism by describing the different schools of thought that have contributed to the 
debate and providing a taxonomy of Fordist and post-Fordist production modes. Then,
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by building on the arguments of Chandler and Nelson and Winter, the subsequent 
section of the chapter sets the theoretical foundation of the continuity paradigm. The 
fourth section summarises the Italian literature on Fiat, and underlines the scope for 
further research. The fifth section analyses the paradigm of market maturation and its 
limits in justifying the views of discontinuity in management at Fiat after 1973.
Section one 
Fordism, post-Fordism and discontinuity
This section focuses on the problem of discontinuity in the transition from Fordism 
to post-Fordism, and looks at the various approaches to the analysis of these two forms 
of industrial organisation. In so doing, the section defines the scope of the debates to 
which this thesis intend to contribute.
The problem of discontinuity
There is a widespread, though not uncontroversial, consensus that the mid-1970s 
represent a transition from one distinct phase of capitalist development to another. The 
nature and direction of this epoch-making change is at the heart of the post-Fordism 
debate. This debate is, of course, intrinsically affected by the debate about Fordism. 
Although there is a general agreement on the nature of Fordism, both in terms of 
production organisation and institutional frameworks, its diffusion is more 
controversial. Jessop emphasises that Fordism, as it had been formulated in theory, was 
actually quite limited in diffusion and never fully realised even in Ford’s own plants.1 
This view finds support from several studies in the field of Business History, showing 
that limits to the diffusion of Fordism reflect social, economic and cultural limits, which 
make it impractical or unacceptable in specific regional and national contexts, as well as
•y
in specific time spans for given contexts.
1 B. Jessop, ‘Fordism and post-Fordism: a Critical Reformulation’, in M. Storper, A. J. Scott (eds), 
Pathways to Industrialization and Regional Development (1992), pp. 46-69.
2 A number of case studies on Fordism adaptation are provided by: J. Zeitlin, G. Herrigel (eds), 
Americanisation and its Limits: Reworking US Technology and Management in Post-War Europe and 
Japan (Oxford, 2000).
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Indeed, the fact that the debate about the nature and diffusion of Fordism is still open 
questions the very notion of post-Fordism.3 Nevertheless, over the last twenty or thirty 
years, the academic world has produced many different definitions and specifications of 
post-Fordism, with applications for the whole spectrum of academic disciplines from 
Economics to Production Management, from Industrial Relations to Urban Sociology. 
Economic and Business History were, of course, also affected by the debate. Business 
History, in particular, seems to be the discipline with the highest potential both to profit 
from and add to the debate about post-Fordism, in the same way it has both profited 
from, and added to the debate about Fordism. Because Business History is intrinsically 
based upon case studies, it represents the ideal field of research in which 
conceptualisations developed within the post-Fordism debate can be tested against the 
available evidence. Moreover, by focusing on case studies over a wide time span, the 
origin of production and industrial relations settings can be traced back, highlighting the 
backward linkages between current and preceding settings and, therefore, the specificity 
of each industrial organisation. Thus, to analyse a specific firm through a Business 
History approach is likely to yield interesting empirical results, which can, in turn, help 
to refine the models of Fordism and post-Fordism, by addressing the specificity of each 
industrial system. In contrast, conceptualisations developed within Business 
Management, Economic Geography and Business Economics often, though not always, 
fail to capture backward linkages between the systems they analyse and previous 
organisational and technological settings, missing the specificity of the units analysed.
Jessop emphasises that the chronological prefix “post” preceding the word Fordism 
implies major discontinuities that, nevertheless, should be demonstrated.4 The 
discontinuity issue links the debate about post-Fordism to several core issues in the 
theory of economic and technological change. The hypothesis of post-Fordism as a 
discontinuous process of technological and organisational change resembles Solow’s 
neo-classical growth model, where technological change is seen as a shift of the
3 Lewchuk, for example, poses that the decline of the UK motor industry was due to the refusal of unions 
to adopt American technology of mass production. Such a view is clearly asymmetric with respect to the 
idea that the crisis of the motor car industry during the 1970s coincided with the crisis of Fordism. The 
reference is to W. Lewchuk, American Technology and The British Vehicle Industry (Cambridge, 1987).
4Jessop, ‘Fordism’, pp. 46-69.
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production function leading to an increase of output per unit of input, and technology is 
considered as exogenous.
Accordingly, post-Fordism cannot be reconciled with the evolutionary theory of 
economic change developed by Nelson and Winter, which puts great emphasis on 
localised and path-dependent innovation. In this respect, it is important to stress that the 
literature on the evolutionary theory of economic change and the literature on path 
dependency are deeply connected to each other. Path-dependency refers to the situation 
in which an industry is locked into an inferior technology, due to a number of possible 
factors, including high sunk-costs, managerial inertia, and uncertainty over the 
development of the external environment. The classical example of lock-in is the 
QWERTY keyboard developed in the 1880s.5 The initial condition driving the 
QWERTY design was the necessity to minimise key jam, which was a relevant problem 
associated to typewriter technology in the late 19th century. The QWERTY keyboard 
became the standard one, although it was sub optimal in terms of pure typing 
practicality and speed. When the typing jam problem was sorted out, the QWERTY 
layout remained unchanged. In fact, the replacement of that layout would have required 
the re-training of a large number of people already trained in touch-typing techniques 
based on QWERTY.6 This, in turn would have increased switching costs. This took 
away any incentive for typewriter suppliers to try to change the original design. It is 
worth noting that the classical QWERTY example highlights the relationship between 
capital and knowledge accumulation, which also underpins the evolutionary theory of 
economic change and its core concept of routines.
5 P. David, ‘Clio and the Economics of QWERTY’ in U. Witt (ed.), Evolutionary Economics (Aldershot, 
1993). See also L. Magnusson and J. Ottoson (eds), Evolutionary Economics and Path Dependence 
(1997).
6 The issue of learning costs is a critical one also in the literature on First Mover Advantages, which is 
clearly related to that on Path Dependency. On the relationship between learning curve and first mover 
advantages see: B. Lieberman and D.B. Montgomery, ‘First Mover Advantages’, Strategic Management 
Journal, V. 9, Special Issue (1988), pp. 41-58.
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The divide between the evolutionary theory of economic change and path 
dependency on one side, and the literature on post-Fordism on the other concerns not 
only technological and organisational change but also the transfer of technological and 
organisational capabilities. Generally speaking, it is possible to say that the post-Fordist 
paradigm reckons that not only technology, but also organisational and managerial 
capabilities, can be imported from outside the firm. With the possible exception of the 
Flexible Specialisation paradigm,7 post-Fordism implicitly considers organisational and 
managerial capabilities as driven by neutral techniques, where new techniques and 
technologies combined together produce a new production paradigm. On the other hand, 
Nelson and Winter have shown that technological change is often localised and path- 
dependent, and based on research and development conducted within the firm. Thus, 
innovation is embodied not just in new devices and tools but also in the organisational 
routines of companies. This concept leads to two important consequences. Firstly, 
internally generated and context-specific innovation is not easily importable or 
exportable. At least, the importability or exportability of systems cannot be taken for 
granted. Secondly, technological change is not separable from the accumulation of 
managerial capabilities and technical knowledge that, in Chandler’s view, represent the 
prominent feature and the reason of success of managerial corporations.
The overall idea underpinning this work is to focus on two specific variables, 
representative of the way Fiat management intended to pursue long-term company 
survival, and to analyse them from 1960 to the late 1980s in order to trace elements of 
continuity and discontinuity in management and practices before and after the 1970s. 
The two variables are: technological change, and the strategy of output mix 
optimisation. The aim is to see whether the restructuring of Fiat during the 1970s and 
early 1980s involved a shift to a new paradigm of production organisation and 
marketing, or simply the adaptation of new technologies to the existing production and 
marketing framework, aiming to remove bottlenecks previously generated by the Fordist 
system of mass production. Therefore, this work tries to contribute to the debate about
7 The asymmetry of Flexible Specialisation in respect to other schools o f thought within post-Fordism will 
be discussed in the subsequent section of this chapter.
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post-Fordism by addressing the specific issue of continuity and discontinuity posed by 
Jessop.
In this study, contributions from the Business History literature, such as the classic 
work of Alfred Chandler, and from the Business Economics literature, such as the work 
of Nelson and Winter, will provide the framework to focus on Fiat's tangible and 
intangible capital accumulation during the 1960s, when the company expanded its mass 
production capability by building upon technical and managerial structures developed 
from the immediate post-war period onwards. Nelson and Winter provide the 
conceptualisation needed in order to analyse the implications of tangible and intangible 
accumulation on firms' long-term strategies and, therefore, the theoretical framework to 
predict "non-discontinuous" developments in big business. Such predictions will be 
tested against the case of Fiat during the 1970s and early 1980s. The literature on post- 
Fordism, on the other hand, offers conceptualisations that help to define the alternative 
production setting that might have been expected to emerge, had Fiat departed from 
Fordist mass production and shifted towards flexible mass production during its 
restructuring from the second half of the 1970s onwards.
However, this thesis not only aims to address the international debate on post- 
Fordism in the motor car industry, but also to contribute to the specific debate on Fiat. 
Much of the literature on the Italian company, in fact, tends to interpret Fiat as a 
successful case of transition from Fordism to post-Fordism, where the recovery from the 
crisis of the 1970s was due to the deployment of new managerial and production 
paradigms underlining product flexibility rather than production specialisation. Yet, 
sufficient evidence to support this view has not been provided by empirical studies, so 
that no consensus has emerged. As Amatori has recently pointed out, “Forty years of 
[Valleta’s]8 managerial leadership [from 1926 to 1966] contributed strongly to the 
building up of Fiat's organisational capability, [and] its genetic patrimony. How much 
has been left of such a patrimony after 1970 is an important question for historians still 
to be addressed”.9
8 Valletta was General Director of Fiat from 1926 to 1946, and President of the Company from 1946 to 
1966.
9 Amatori, ‘Gli uomini del Professore’, pp. 342-343.
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By exploiting a new set of unpublished data and documents, as well as by using 
extensive published documentation, this thesis adds to the debates concerning Fiat and 
post-Fordism by showing that restructuring during the 1970s and early 1980s was driven 
by a pattern of technical and business knowledge substantially similar to that which had 
characterised the growth of the company during the 1960s. This knowledge represents 
the intangible capital accumulated by the company during the age of Fordism. Despite 
the implementation of new technology (i.e. robotics), intangible capital, rather than new 
technology, shaped both production organisation and output-mix decision-making in the 
1980s, where process specialisation rather than product flexibility was still seen by Fiat 
senior management as the basis of the company's profit maximisation strategy.
In this sense, this work supports the view of Fiat restructuring as a continuous 
process of development and contributes to the fulfilment of the research agenda set by 
Amatori, providing a different view from that proposed by the major part of the Italian 
literature on Fiat. Furthermore, the research concludes that the managerial decision to 
contain complexity costs attached to flexibility turned out to be the best profit- 
maximising strategy for Fiat. This finding suggests that the emergence of consumerism 
during the 1980s, which according to the paradigm of post-Fordism drove the 
development of flexible production systems, did not necessarily displace the old pattern 
of specialisation, in which there were few dominant actors in each segment of the 
market.
Specifying Fordism
Henry Ford never made any secret of the production technology developed by his 
company. On the contrary, during the 1910s, technical delegations, mainly from 
European car manufacturers, were invited to visit Ford production facilities. During the 
1910s and 1920s, Fordism was at the core of technical exercises of production 
management in many European firms. Ever since, not only did the term "Fordism" enter 
the official dictionary of almost every language, but it was also clear that, given the 
implications in terms of labour control, the debate about Fordism was going to be a 
debate about society, rather than a mere debate about the scientific principles of 
production management. This might generate confusion in the debate about Fordism and
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post-Fordism, unless specific and clearly defined areas of investigation are addressed. 
Jessop distinguishes four areas of investigation, corresponding to different specifications 
of Fordism as a mode of production, a mode of regulation, a regime of accumulation, 
and a mode of socialisation.10 This work is mainly concerned with the first two. As far 
as the modes of regulation are concerned, it focuses on organisational structures and 
strategic management, rather than industrial relations.
As a production process, Fordism refers to a specific configuration of the technical 
division of labour, involved in mass production of standardised goods. Technical 
division of labour is typically organised along Taylorist lines, the speed of which 
depends upon the technology implemented (for example automation, process 
segmentation etc.). The system is based on the supply-based principle that the 
production process must be continuous in order to secure long-run economies of scale. 
The speed of the work process is, indeed, the main feature of Fordism around which the 
staging of the process and the transportation system are designed.11 However, in 
discussing the speed of the production flow, it is important to distinguish two technical 
concepts, namely lead time and cycle time. The former is the duration of the process 
from the first to the final stage of the process (i.e. the time taken for an engine to be 
produced or a car to be assembled), while the latter is the duration of each stage of the 
production process.
The lead time is a function of the cycle time of each stage of the manufacturing 
multiplied by the number of stages of the process, and the time needed to move a 
component from an assembly station to the subsequent one. Therefore,
Lt = (Tc*ZSn) + (Tt* ISn) = ESn*(Tc+Tt)
where Lt is lead time, Tc is cycle time, Tt is the time required to move a component 
from station to station, and ZSn is the sum of n stations. The longer the Lt, the larger the 
work in progress and the relative inventory costs. Moving technology per se is not
10 See: Jessop, ‘Fordism’, pp. 46-69.
11 See, for example, B. Coriat, ‘Microeletronica, robotica e lavoro operaio nelle industrie di montaggio’, 
in A. Dina (ed.), Modello Robot (Roma, 1984), pp. 154-167.
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sufficient to speed up production because it would affect only Tt, whereas Lt is also a 
function of Tc and ESn.
In order to understand the technical principle of Fordism, the relationship between 
the cycle time, the complexity of each component and its design, and the segmentation 
of the process is of interest. Different components involve different levels of 
complexity. Taking the example of car manufacturing, to produce chassis sub­
components (for example the floor) by stamping is a much easier and quicker operation 
than the welding of the floor to the chassis. To avoid bottlenecks in the flow, each stage 
of the process has to absorb the same amount of time. Such a standard time is called the 
basic cycle time, which, ideally, is equal to the cycle time of the fastest stage of the 
process. If, for instance, the shortest cycle time in the process of chassis making 
corresponds to that of floor stamping, the welding of the chassis must be hyper­
segmented up to the point that the duration of each sub-stage of the chassis welding 
equals that of the floor stamping. Sometimes, however, the equalisation of cycle times is 
not technically achievable, so that parallel lines or intermediate buffers must be 
deployed in order to avoid bottlenecks in the process.
The basic cycle time must be set at the fastest speed possible in order to maximise 
output. In fact, daily output is equal to
P= Wt/tc,
where P is output, Wt is the daily time available to production and Tc is the basic cycle 
time. Mass production, therefore, minimises the cycle time in order to maximise output. 
However, an equilibrium must be found between the minimisation of the cycle time and 
the hyper-segmentation of the process. The minimisation of Tc requires the hyper­
segmentation of the production process of the most complex components, which in turn 
causes the number of stations - ESn - to increase. Hyper-segmentation, therefore, will 
lead to an increase in the lead time with a relative increase in inventory costs, unless 
engineers control and reduce the complexity of each component, limiting the 
segmentation of each stage of the production process, and manage to keep Tc constant. 
The standardisation of operations, components, and complete products is the way 
engineers minimise complexity and, therefore, try to find the optimal equilibrium
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between Tc and Lt. The minimisation of complexity obtained through product/process 
standardisation helps a great deal to minimise the cycle time. This is the reason why the 
Fordist firm tends to be process-oriented rather than market-oriented.
Containment of complexity and the reduction of the cycle time are the principal 
sources of productivity growth and, therefore, the most important sources of cost 
savings in the Fordist system of mass production. Excessive process/product 
standardisation, though, has also negative side effects. If a shift in the demand curve 
occurs, or macro-economic shocks make demand erratic, investment in fixed assets 
usually associated with mass production can no longer provide the expected returns. 
Usually, mass producers set up multiple production for different types of products, for 
example different types of vehicles. This involves multiple lines. However, to run 
multiple Fordist lines producing different types of cars may generate inefficiency when 
some lines must be over-utilised and others under-utilised in response to shifts in 
demand from one product to another. Over/under-utilisation is determined by the fact 
that in a multi-product Fordist setting, the production of the most required model cannot 
to be shifted from the saturated line to the under-utilised one because each product 
requires its own tools and its own segmentation of the process.
Tool specificity and process hyper-segmentation induce specialisation in specific 
segments of the market. As already pointed out, the mass production of small cars 
requires the deployment of technology, product and process design skills, and labour 
skills very different from those needed to produce relatively small batches of medium 
and large cars. Although car producers usually have a relative wide product range, they 
tend to specialise in the sense of favouring process/product renewal in those segments in 
which they perform better, rather than dispersing energy in trying to catch up in all 
segments.
The Fordist organisation of labour requires a separation between workers and
managers, with the latter responsible for decision-making. The techno-structure is
1 0responsible for the standardisation of procedures. Because the standardisation of 
procedures and product is the most important source of productivity, the techno-
12 For the definition of techno-structure see H. Mintzberg, Mintzberg on Management (1989), pp. ISO- 
133.
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1 “Xstructure effectively influences top management in decision-making. Since the techno­
structure has a critical role in the accumulation of tangible and intangible capital (with 
the latter referring to routines and knowledge, which within the Evolutionary Theory of 
the Firm are regarded as the “genetic stock” of the firm), it could be tempted to 
influence the process of decision-making in order to preserve its own accumulated 
knowledge, when changing market conditions suggest rejecting the established pattern 
of routines.
Regulatory framework
Discussing the relationship between principal and agents within the firm, the analysis 
of Fordism has to shift to modes of regulation, which involve all aspects of the Fordist 
organisation of production within and outside the firm including internal/external 
relations, financial relations and State regulation. Here the focus is mainly on internal 
relations, although the other aspects will be briefly mentioned.
Within the Fordist system of mass production, the wage scheme is designed around 
the role of semi-skilled and unskilled workers who represent the core of the labour force 
in large plants. Managers recognise unions for collective bargaining, while unions, in 
turn, recognise job organisation and corporate strategy as prerogatives of management. 
The foundation of the social pact consists of wages being indexed to productivity. In 
theory, because increases in productivity are driven by progress in technology, design 
and routines, the concentration of knowledge and organisational decision-making in the 
techno-structure should not be not questioned by unions or workers. In practice, there is 
plenty of historical evidence showing that the social pact described above holds as long 
as job organisation is rational, tasks are not excessively alienating and production plans 
are made according to available production resources. Otherwise, labour reacts by 
substituting engineering-led routines with routines inspired by shop-floor experience, or 
by rising levels of absenteeism, or by opting for open conflict, when excessive control 
prevents the first two strategies from being implemented.
13 Ibid.
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As far as the structure is concerned, the typical Fordist firm is a large company in 
which ownership and control are separated. Multi-divisional structures are dominant, 
with decentralised division overseen by a central board engaged in long-term planning. 
The achievement of commercial and financial targets is a concern of divisions. The 
development of multi-divisional organisations is usually considered as depending upon 
an increasing complexity in decision-making,14 along with increasing development of 
market-oriented strategies.15 Nonetheless, if we accept the argument that in the Fordist 
firm the techno-structure retains much of the decision-making power, it also has to be 
accepted that, regardless of the formal structure adopted, a Fordist organisation remains 
product- rather than market-oriented, unless marketing management displaces engineers 
from the decision-making leadership. The actual functioning of structures, in other 
words, is likely to depend upon the relative power of agents within the firm rather than 
depending upon the formal structure adopted. This is an important point to be 
considered when discussing continuity in production organisation, where the literature 
on post-Fordism tends to ignore the capacity of managerial structures to resist pressures 
for change.
As far as the regime of accumulation is concerned, the main source of profits for 
Fordist enterprises is the surplus value derived from continuous increases in 
productivity and economies of scale. Firms are engaged in mark-up pricing (costs plus 
margins), and market shares are also affected by non-price elements, such as product 
renewal, advertising, quality of the product and after-sales services.16 Within growing 
markets, price competition drives pricing behaviour, whereas within mature markets 
non-price competition tends to prevail. Non-price competition refers primarily to the 
case in which manufacturers compete by renewing product and improving quality. This 
form of competition usually leads to an upward adjustment in prices. Crucially, non­
price competition will disguise implicit collusion, if prices of all competitors increase 
more than quality. The regime of competition depends mainly on macro-economic 
conditions and waves of product renewal.
14 See the introductory chapter in A. D. Chandler, Strategy and Structure. Chapters in the History o f the 
American Industrial Enterprise (Cambridge Massachusetts, 1962).
15 Se: Jessop, ‘Fordism’, pp. 46-69.
16 Ibid.
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The domestic market is extremely important for mass production because export- 
related costs are substantial, so that large market shares in the domestic market are 
critical in ensuring cost reductions driven by scale economies, as the basis for price 
competitiveness abroad. Typically, the early stage of mass production in a specific 
country is protected by tariffs, which are gradually removed as soon as the industry 
achieves the minimum efficient size in an international context. Specialisation is 
induced by the technical minimisation of the cycle time, along with consumer tastes and 
income in the domestic market. European mass producers tend to be more specialised in 
the manufacturing of small (compact) cars whereas American mass producers 
manufacture large cars. Since the internal market is so important for Fordist mass 
producers, the regulatory role of the State has a huge impact on the efficiency of the 
Fordist industry. Welfare state schemes might promote a virtuous economic circle by 
stabilising demand for consumption goods through income transfer, enabling capital 
intensive and product specific assets to be utilised at optimal levels of capacity 
utilisation, which, in turn, gives firms sufficient confidence to re-invest profits in 
applied R&D.17
The Fordist regulatory framework involves the banking system as the financial 
engine of the supply and demand mechanism. Both consumer and industrial credit are 
important to sustain the market and finance long-term investments and daily operations, 
particularly in the case of industries producing cars or white goods. For such industries, 
the link with banks and financial institutions specialising in financing hire purchasing is 
critical. Stable interest rates, therefore, are vital to ensure the Fordist virtuous circle, 
with central banks playing a pivotal role in masterminding stable demand.
17 The Keynesian welfare state is a typical example o f welfare policy supporting the development of mass 
production.
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Section two 
The paradigm of post-Fordism
The literature on post-Fordism should be seen as an ongoing debate rather than an
1 ftachieved or universally accepted theory of transition. Differences between various 
contributions to the debate on post-Fordism concern mainly the compatibility of new 
production settings and technological paradigms with the existing Fordist regulatory 
framework. The principal question addressed by the post-Fordism literature, in fact, is 
whether the new production settings emerging from specific technological progress are 
compatible with the Fordist regulatory framework, or are likely to change the 
framework, or are totally in contrast with it. On the other hand, when the analysis shifts 
to specific production settings or specific technology, a common implicit view emerges 
within the post-Fordism debate, which is that technological and managerial changes 
have been leading, from the mid-1970s onwards, to a completely different technical 
setting, supporting a completely new way of approaching production management. Post- 
Fordism considers flexibility as the benchmark for the new best practice, and predicts 
that those firms that fail to shift to flexibility are destined to become marginal.
The following paragraphs suggest that the shift to flexible mass production implies a 
discontinuity with Fordism because flexible manufacturing is not compatible with the 
knowledge accumulated by the Fordist techno-structure over time. New production 
settings might be considered either compatible with the old regulatory settings, as 
suggested by the neo-Fordist approach, or incompatible with Fordist labour relations 
and managerial structures, as suggested by other approaches within the debate on post- 
Fordism. However, once new production settings are analysed in relation to the 
production mode per se, they appear to be inevitably discontinuous with respect to the 
Fordist technical production mode they have replaced. As a consequence, the paradigm 
of post-Fordism suggests, either implicitly or explicitly, that new technology and 
flexible production displace the old set of tangible and intangible capital stock. The 
following paragraphs of this section address the various schools of thought in the debate
18 A. Amin, ‘Post-Fordism. Models, Fantasies, and Phantoms of Transition’ in A. Amin (ed.), Post- 
Fordism: A Reader (Oxford, 1995), pp. 1- 40.
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on post-Fordism, focusing in particular on the issue of discontinuity in the production 
mode.
Long wave theory (LWT)
The theory was developed in the mid-1970s in order to explain long-term waves in 
economic development. In particular, Christopher Freeman and Carlotta Perez have 
analysed the relationship between technology and social structures, conceptualising it in 
terms of a “techno-economic paradigm”. The successful transition from one wave to 
another depends upon “quantum leaps” in industrial productivity, deriving from the 
diffusion of cutting-edge technologies. In their early stage of development, though, new 
technologies are unlikely to ensure increases in productivity because of limited diffusion 
and leaming-curve-related costs. In the process of transition, therefore, a key role is 
played by institutions, which ideally should be organised to sustain the development and 
diffusion of new technologies. According to Freeman and Perez, the passing age of 
Fordism corresponds to the fourth Kondratiev wave. Fordism, during the 1970s, became 
a constraint on the diffusion and development of new technologies, new production 
tools, and a new organisational framework, because Fordist institutions tended to use 
advances in new technologies to optimise existing processes and products rather than to 
develop new ones. The prediction of the two authors, however, was that the 
development of micro-electronics and information technologies would have in any case 
triggered the growth of new typologies of firms developing new processes and products, 
which eventually would have displaced the old pattern of process and products, 
fostering an adaptive response of institutions.
Two criticisms of the Freedman/Perez theory soon emerged, namely the 
technological determinism pointed out by the Flexible Specialisation school, and the 
fact that the origin of technological change was not specified, where new technologies 
tend to appear on the scene as a deus ex machinal9 Indeed, in the LWT, the reason why 
new technologies should be stronger than old institutions in shaping the new techno- 
economic paradigm is not theoretically justified. LWT, nevertheless, has had a long
19 K. Hoffman, R Kaplinsky, Driving Force. The Global Restructuring o f Technology, Labour and 
Investment In the Automobile and Components Industry (1988), pp. 34-35.
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lasting impact on the post-Fordism debate, particularly in regards to the emphasis on 
systemic and “revolutionary” innovation in the shift from a declining period to a new 
stage of development. In this respect, the various schools of thought in the post-Fordism 
debate do not deviate significantly from the LWT formulation, where differences 
emerge in regard to the impact of technological change on institutions.
Flexible specialisation
The idea of flexible specialisation was formulated and elevated to a paradigm of 
socio-economic interpretation of industrial history by the work of Bergen, Piore and 
Sabel and Zeitlin and Hirst.20 At the heart of the approach lies the claim that since the 
nineteenth century two industrial paradigms, namely craft and mass production, have 
existed and opposed each other, and neither has ultimately demonstrated its superiority 
over the other. A first industrial divide occurred at the beginning of the century when 
mass production started to become dominant, developing in the inter-war period and 
becoming the leading form of production organisation in the post-war period, as it was 
sustained by Keynesian policies of demand stabilisation. Nevertheless, craft production, 
though limited to some specific regions, did not disappear. On the contrary, networks of 
small industries organised in industrial districts showed a distinct capability to absorb 
employment and achieve high levels of output at the aggregate industry level. 
Furthermore, craft production was better suited to cope with those segments of demand 
in which product differentiation matters. Within the flexible specialisation paradigm, 
therefore, the concentration of production in big plants was seen as the outcome of a 
socio-political choice, reflecting the supremacy of specific social groups (not necessarily 
social classes), rather than an organisational development purely enforced by economic 
rationale. The weaknesses of mass production emerged during the 1970s.
The crisis of the 1970s featured a two-fold problem. Firms had been suffering from a 
slowdown in the rate of growth of output due to the instability of the world economy
20 The seminal works for the definition of the Flexible Specialisation are S. Bergen and M. Piore (eds), 
Dualism and Discontinuity in Industrial Society (Cambridge, 1980); M. Piore and C.F. Sabel, The Second 
Industrial Divide (New York, 1984); C. Sabel, J. Zeitlin, ‘Historical Alternative to Mass Production: 
Politics, Market and Technology in Nineteenth- Century Industrialization’, Past and Present, 108 (1985),
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caused by instability in the oil prices, instability in the exchange rate, world wide 
inflation, the large US public debt, and widespread social unrest. Moreover, firms had 
been suffering, and were going to suffer even more in the future, from changes in the 
pattern of consumption caused by the rise of consumerism and the differentiation of 
demand associated with it. Thus the long-term prospects for Fordism were bleak even if 
economic stability was to return. The 1970s, therefore, marked the threshold after which 
Keynesian intervention no longer would have guaranteed economic stabilisation within 
a system dominated by mass production. During the 1970s, on the other hand, those 
areas in which institutions had favoured the deployment of new technologies in small 
firms, had clearly outperformed areas in which mass production was the prevailing form 
of labour organisation. This superiority was not only evident in terms of per capita 
income, but also in terms of quality of life. Those regions became an example of the 
social and production framework defined as Flexible Specialisation, based on small 
firms deploying computerised and flexible production technologies.
Flexible specialisation has been widely discussed and criticised by a number of 
authors.21 One of the most common criticisms of the flexible specialisation theory is that 
it fails to capture the diversity existing in both craft- and mass-production paradigms. 
Also, it is not entirely clear whether the shift from craft to mass production at the end of 
the nineteenth century occurred entirely for socio-political reasons, such as the will of 
the political and economic establishment to concentrate production factors in big plants 
to better control the labour force and revenue distribution, or because of an internal 
superiority of mass production in terms economic efficiency in a situation when demand 
expands rapidly. Moreover, it is not entirely clear whether the shift to flexible 
specialisation should occur for socio-political reasons (redistribution of production 
factors and revenues) or because of the crisis of mass production. Furthermore, Sabel 
and Piore have been accused of underestimating the capability of big corporations to 
persist and adapt to new circumstances, and to remain competitive in respect to small 
firms by exploiting their grip on finance, market outlets, distribution networks,
pp. 133-176; P. Hirst and J, Zeitlin, ‘Flexible Specialisation Versus Post-Fordism: Theory, Evidence, and 
Policy Implication’, Economy and Society, 20/1 (1991), pp. 70-115.
21 A review of the various voices of criticism addressing Flexible Specialisation is provided by. Amin, 
‘Post Fordism’, pp. 1-41.
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advertising and so on. Finally, in many cases the development of networks of small 
firms disguised the mere downsizing and decentralisation of production promoted by 
big corporations.22
As was the case with long wave theory, the flexible specialisation approach also 
implies technological discontinuity. Within flexible specialisation, in fact, new 
technologies are no longer developed to maximise the hyper-segmentation of the 
production process and the standardisation of the product, as was the case with mass 
production, but are developed in order to maximise flexible production within small 
firms. As a consequence, both intangible capital and tangible assets accumulated by 
mass producers over time are not going to be re-utilised in the new production 
framework resulting from the process of shift from mass production to flexible 
specialisation.
The Regulation approach
The regulation approach was initially pioneered in France in the early 1970s and then 
developed world wide, mainly within political economics and industrial relations 
debates. At the heart of the regulation approach, there is a recognition of the paradox 
inherent within the capitalist system. This is the tendency towards instability and 
cyclical change, combined with a relative stability of the institutional set of regulations 
supporting the production system. As is the case with the other school of thought 
engaged in the post-Fordism debate, the regulatory theory reckons that long-term 
renewal of the capitalist system requires a radical change in both institutions and 
production frameworks. Nevertheless, this approach is rather reticent in predicting the 
features of the system to follow Fordism as opposed to the certainty of the long wave 
and flexible specialisation theories, which clearly define the characteristics and the 
name of the new era. The regulation theory stresses that the system emerging from the 
crisis of Fordism will result from the dialectic and the uncertain confrontation among 
different systems of production. Therefore, it prefers to concentrate the conceptual effort 
on defining a pattern of hypotheses to be investigated, rather than defining the
22 In this respect see B. Harrison, Lean and Mean: The Changing Landscape o f Corporate Power (New 
York, 1994).
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characteristics and name of the new era. The hypotheses are that of flexible mass 
production, and that of neo-Fordism. The difference between the two hypotheses regards 
the evolution of the regulatory framework. While flexible mass production is defined as 
a gradual but discontinuous and irreversible resolution of both the Fordist production 
system and the pattern of regulation underpinning Fordism, the emergence of neo- 
Fordism is regarded as the development of new flexibility-oriented production 
frameworks within a substantially stable regulatory framework. This would still involve 
hierarchical firms based on the separation of management and labour, industrial 
relations based on unions engaged with wage bargaining but not with production 
organisation, and political institutions ensuring appropriate welfare policies. Therefore, 
both hypotheses maintain that in the aftermath of the crisis of mass production occurring 
during the 1970s, the production mode gradually shifted toward flexibility. This means 
that both hypotheses assume a discontinuity in production management. This thesis 
refers mainly to the regulatory school of thought because this is the approach that 
focuses more closely on the production mode.
The flexible mass production approach has been developed by Benjamin Coriat, who 
argues in favour of a discontinuous approach to transition, by suggesting that from the 
early 1980s onwards, industrial societies have been witnessing a melding of traditional 
mass production, automated robotics technologies, and flexibility. New technologies 
such as robotics and computer-aided design and manufacturing systems have been 
dramatically transforming production into a new manufacturing model. Flexibility of the 
production system allows management to effectively exploit opportunities in 
differentiated markets, where shares change continuously, calling for continuous 
adjustments of total output and output mixes. Discontinuity, therefore, emerges in the 
way management has to deal with competitive strategies and product development. In 
order to achieve flexibility, the supply-oriented Fordist system of mass production has to 
be overruled.
The impact of new technologies on the broad industrial organisation has been also 
analysed by Martin Kenny and Richard Florida, who argue that the main characteristic
23 B. Coriat, L ’Atelier et le Robot: Essai sur le Fordism et la Produsion de Masse a I’Age de I’ 
Eletronique (Paris, 1990).
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of Fordism was the separation between R&D and production. The development of cad- 
cam technologies and the emergence of R&D-oriented manufacturing, on the other 
hand, have caused a radical change in human capital, where labour re-skilling and the 
intellectual enrichment of labour are the main features of the emerging production 
paradigm that the two authors define as Innovation-Mediated Production.
Dohse, Jurgens and Malsh24 have taken a less discontinuous approach, identifying in 
the Toyota system of mass production a development of the traditional mass production 
framework, which allows the recomposition of some stages of the process without 
reducing the speed of the production process. In this sense, there is no break with the 
principle of Fordism, although the new system allows for product-mix flexibility. Such a 
neo-Fordist approach, however, has been partially revised by the authors, after the 
success of works edited within the MIT International Automotive Project,26 fostering the 
view that the Toyota production setting should actually be seen as an example of a 
flexibility-oriented system totally discontinuous with Fordism.
Fordism and Toyotism
Not surprisingly, a substantial part of the literature on post-Fordism has focused on 
car manufacturing. In particular, the Toyota system of production has attracted the 
attention of a significant number of scholars, who were intrigued by the extraordinary 
catching up of the Japanese manufacturer, not only in terms of output, but also in terms 
of technology, quality and product differentiation. This has been explained by the 
diversity of the Toyota system in respect to Fordism. As a result, the term Toytotism has 
become synonymous with post-Fordism in the same way that Fordism had become 
synonymous with mass production.
According to common wisdom, the most important feature of the Toyota system was 
the decentralisation of the production system, including not only the supply of electrical 
and mechanical components, but also the decentralisation of the production of
24 See: K. Dohse, U. Jurgens, T. Malsh, From Fordism to Toyotism? The organisation o f the Labour 
Process in the Japanese Automobile Industry, Politics and Society, 14/2 (1986), pp. 45 - 66.
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components such as chasses and complete engines, the process of which is capital 
intensive and, therefore, usually internalised and concentrated in large plants. The 
system was based on a network of suppliers producing a relatively small batch of 
components. The relatively small size of suppliers and their capital stock is thought to 
facilitate re-set time minimisation, which in turn leads to maximum flexibility. The 
supply chain in such a complex network required a careful planning of the production 
flow, which forced Toyota to find a way to optimise logistics. This was achieved 
through the kanban, the most important feature of which consists in the decentralisation 
of the component purchase at the level of each production line which, therefore, 
purchases only the quantity of components required by the daily production. The 
transaction related to order and delivery takes place between the shop-floor and the 
specific supplier attached to each specific plant or line. Provided the delivery occurs just 
in time, the system has also the advantage of eliminating buffers. Finally, in order to 
achieve the same level of quality among the different suppliers, quality control 
procedures are standardised by Toyota for all suppliers.
As already stated, Dohse, Jurgens and Malsh have interpreted the Toyota system as a 
refined form of Fordism, minimising the bottlenecks deriving from excessive hierarchy 
and process segmentation.27 In fact, the institutional framework remains substantially 
Fordist, in the sense that Toyota management exercises significant control over the 
Toyota workforce, in order to maximise the speed of the production process and, 
therefore, labour productivity. Moreover, Toyota exercises total control over the 
suppliers, not only by enforcing quality and productivity standards, but also by setting 
component prices.
On the other hand, several authors associated with the MIT International Motor 
Vehicle Program reached a different conclusion. This is that the Toyota system 
represents a new paradigm of production organisation, lean production, which is totally
25 See: U. Jurgens, T. Malsh, K. Dohse, Breaking from Taylorism. Changing Forms o f Work in the 
Automobile Industry (Cambridge, 1993).
26 A. Altshuler, (ed.), The Future o f the Automobile: The Report o f  MIT's International Automobile 
Program (1984).
27 See Dohse, Jurgens, Malsh, From Fordism to Toyotism?, pp. 45-66.
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incompatible with mass production, and inherently superior. The prophets of the new 
paradigm predicted that by shifting to lean production, the European and American car 
industries would recover from their structural crises and start a new virtuous circle. 
Womack, Johnes and Ross pick up the same technical aspect of the Toyota system 
already underlined by Dohse, Jurgens and Malsh, but draw the conclusion that the 
Toyota system is lean because stocks are kept to minimum levels, the production of each 
model is calibrated on demand, while spare capacity is close to zero thanks to a high 
degree of product-mix flexibility.
Womack, Johnes and Ross prefer to ignore the institutional and endogenous features 
of the Japanese system, which on the contrary were at the centre of the analysis of 
Dohse and his colleagues. This is because the prophets of lean production try to 
demonstrate that Toyotism is exportable and, in order to do so, they must overlook all 
the issues related to the Japanese industrial relations system, which, in the aftermath of 
the unions' defeat in the 1950s, features the displacement of independent unionism in 
favour of an ethic of the firm entirely constructed around the unquestionable power of 
managers. Such a system of industrial relations is difficult to export to Western 
countries, but was indeed one of the sources of Toyota’s competitive advantage. Most of 
the many criticisms of the International Motor Vehicle Program and the idea of 
Toyotism as a universal benchmark of a perfect production framework are based on the 
concept that the higher complexity costs faced by Toyota in running flexible production 
are actually compensated by a relatively low cost of labour. Interestingly, Williams 
shows that both Ford’s Highland Park (1915-1916) and Toyota’s Takaoka (1980-1990) 
kept the labour share of added value lower than 45%.30
Elaborating on these criticisms, it seems worth turning attention to the relationship 
between Toyota and its suppliers. These are usually divided into primary, secondary and 
tertiary suppliers. Toyota has permanent relationships with primary suppliers, which 
therefore plan their output over the long term. On the other hand, primary suppliers
28 J. P. Womak, D. T. Jones, D. Ross, The Machine That Changed the World (New York, 1990).
29 In this respect, see M. A Cusumano, The Japanese Automobile Industry. Technology and Management 
at Nissan and Toyota (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1985), pp. 137-185.
30 The respective labour shares of added value are 39% for Ford and 42% for Toyota. K. Williams, C. 
Haslam, S. Johal, Cars. Analysis, History, Cases (Oxford 1994), p. 18.
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choose among secondary suppliers, which therefore compete against each other by 
setting lower prices for their output. The same relationship exists between secondary 
and tertiary suppliers. The more suppliers are peripheral, the more labour is flexible 
both in terms of entering into and exiting from the production process. Therefore,
^  i
peripheral wages are more flexible as well. Arguably, if  Toyota’s primary suppliers 
obtain lower prices from secondary and tertiary suppliers by shifting their purchases 
from one supplier to another, some spare capacity must exist somewhere in the system. 
Womack and his colleagues do not address this problem, although, in order to be 
convincing, they should have shown that production at Toyota is really lean, in the sense 
that there is no spare capacity, either at the Takaoka plant, or anywhere else within the 
network of suppliers.
From the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, the literature was inclined to identify 
Toyotism rather than Fordism as the best practice. The relevant question, therefore, was 
whether or not Toyotism could be exported to Europe and the US. In the late 1990s, the 
literature seemed more inclined to depart from the “best practice” approach, where the 
shift from Fordism to flexibility is seen as a selective adaptation of Toyotism in 
combination with a range of different possible options. Lean production, in other 
words, was not seen as the outcome of a single model of production organisation. 
Moreover, it was recognised that the effort to identify “the model” for car production 
was, in a way, pointless. However, even the most recent literature on the car industry 
admits, either implicitly or explicitly, that flexibility is the most important factor 
distinguishing the old from the new production system. Therefore, it is important to 
establish when and to what extent a given firm became flexible. This is the reason why 
this thesis focuses on Fiat, testing the hypothesis that the company shifted to flexibility 
in the 1980s against an independent variable, namely the behaviour of the rate of 
utilisation of production lines.
31 For a description of the Toyota supply chain organisation see: M. J. Smitka, Competitive Ties. 
Subcontracting in the Japanese Automotive Industry (New York, 1991).
32 R. Boyer, E. Charron, U. Jurgens, S. Tolliday, ‘Transplant, Hybridisation and Globalisation: What 
Lesson for the Future?’ in R. Boyer, E. Charron, U. Jurgens, S. Tolliday (eds), Between Imitation and 
Innovation, (Oxford, 1998), pp. 374-379.
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Flexibility and discontinuity
In general, the regulation school suggests that over the last twenty years, in each 
industrialised country new institutional and technical paradigms of production have 
been developed, with varying degrees of differentiation and autonomy. Therefore, the 
tendency to identify the new production mode as the Japanese system, suggested for 
example, by Hoffman and Kaplinsky,34 and, in other ways, by the group linked to the 
International Automotive Program, has found less support within the Regulation School. 
In spite of such a variety of views, when the focus shifts to the relationship between 
production technology, production management and marketing strategy, a common 
pattern of concepts emerges in the various schools of thought within post-Fordism. This 
pattern is organised around the idea that product-mix flexibility is the key factor in 
international competition. New technologies, including numeric control tools and 
robotics, are deployed to support flexible production, where high speed lines are capable 
of processing a range of products simultaneously, with product mixes randomly set and 
reset during the shift.
Flexible technology is meant to minimise spare capacity and intermediate buffers. 
Since the product mix is determined by inputs received from the marketing department, 
the whole organisation of production is determined by a random variable (the demand 
for specific products) to which production has to adapt. By contrast, in the Fordist 
system production was a function of a pre-determined plan. Within flexible 
manufacturing, neither is the standardisation of the production process the focus of the 
techno-structure effort, nor is the techno-structure the centre of the decision-making, nor 
is the product developed in order to minimise complexity and, by that, lead times. On 
the contrary, products are developed continuously in order to follow, and when possible 
to change, the taste of consumers. The product mix shifts according to the shifts in 
opportunity from one segment of demand to another, regardless of the direction this 
opportunity might take (i. e. up- or downmarket).
33 Amin, Post-Fordism, pp. 7-9.
34. Kaplinsky and Hoffman, Driving Force, pp. 34-35.
35 'Randomly set' means that output-mix setting and tolls resetting occur according to inputs provided by 
the marketing department. From the point of view of production management, therefore, the output mix is
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The entire process, when set to maximise flexibility, leads to a total departure from 
the Fordist system of mass production, because the intangible capital stock accumulated 
around the principle of standardisation is displaced along with the physical capital stock 
developed around the principle of tool specificity and task fragmentation. When it 
comes to discussing the production framework, therefore, the whole body of literature 
on post-Fordism, including neo-Fordism, implies a marked discontinuity between 
Fordism and the production frameworks that gradually replaced it in the various 
industrialised countries. Such a discontinuity is constructed around a pattern of concepts 
underpinning flexible mass production, which have been summarised in table 2.1 and 
which indeed emerge constantly in the debate about post- Fordism.
Table 2.1: Fordism and post-Fordism production features
Fordism post-Fordism
Decision-making Centralised and supply- 
oriented
Decentralised and demand- 
oriented
Technological
change
Incremental - endogenous Systemic - exogenous
Aims of technological 
change
To improve the existing 
process/product
Either to improve or change 
process/product
Use of technology for Cycle time and lead-time 
minimisation
Flexibility maximisation
Job content Minimal Intellectually relevant
Labour features Unskilled; unaware of the 
entire process; 
interchangeable without 
training
Skilled; aware of the whole 
process; adaptable to different 
complex tasks
Labour development Towards progressive de­
skilling
Featuring constant re-training
Product features Standardised Customised
Product development Supply-driven Demand-driven
Product quality Benchmarked on competitors Tied to theoretical possibilities 
offered by cutting edge 
technologies
Source: Elaboration of the author.
determined by a random variable (orders for specific products), rather than a constant (predetermined 
production plan).
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The case study approach enables researchers to see whether and when specific firms 
shifted to flexibility, experiencing the discontinuity suggested either implicitly or 
explicitly by post-Fordism. Alternatively, the case study approach could show that such 
discontinuity is more apparent than real, in specific contexts or time spans, adding 
valuable insights to the debate. The next section of the chapter introduces the paradigm 
of continuity as a way of interpreting the restructuring of Fiat during the 1970s as a 
continuous process of development, not only in terms of regulation, as suggested by 
most of the literature on the company, but also in terms of production framework and 
marketing strategy, where new technologies were utilised to maximise a system still 
dominated by a pattern of routines developed in the age of Fordism.
Section three 
The paradigm of continuity
This section highlights the set of conceptualisations underpinning the view of 
continuity. This considers the response of industrial firms to the crisis of the 1970s as a 
process of development, in which the technical and managerial knowledge accumulated 
by firms in their quest for optimising Fordist mass production played a central role. The 
view of continuity departs from the approaches developed within the post-Fordism 
debate, which imply the substitution of the intangible capital stock as a condition to shift 
from Fordism to new forms of industrial production.
Firms and the accumulation of intangible capital
The paradigm of continuity is constructed around the relationship between 
investments in managerial structures and the accumulation of knowledge in the form of 
developments of routines. The evolutionary theory of economic change refers to 
routines as established and repetitive practices within a given firm. Routines play the 
role that genes play in the biological evolutionary theory. They are hereditary features of 
the firm and are selectable in the sense that firms with certain routines may do better 
than others, and, if so, their relative importance in the population is augmented over
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time.36 Routines especially affect the process of decision-making, in particular the 
search for new techniques. The development of routines can be defined as a process of 
intangible capital accumulation, which occurs concurrently with the accumulation of 
physical capital.
The relationship between the accumulation of tangible and intangible capital is at the 
heart of both the Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change and the Business History 
paradigm developed by Chandler. The last-mentioned author identifies the dynamic 
element of modem capitalism in the development of managerial hierarchies.37 
Managerial structures enable firms to co-ordinate the input/output flow, to co-ordinate 
R&D for product/process development, and to organise multi-product manufacturing 
and distribution. Those activities, in turn, enable the firm to maximise economies of 
scale and scope. Investments in managerial structures bring about intangible capital 
accumulation which, in turn, enables corporations to maximise both strategic and 
functional effectiveness. Strategic effectiveness means the ability of a firm to acquire a 
monopolistic position in its own market, or in leaving declining markets for expanding 
ones. Functional effectiveness means the ability to compete for market shares in a 
mature oligopolistic industry. Both strategic and functional efficiency develop within 
the firm, along with the expansion of assets and hierarchies. The significance of 
cumulative knowledge, be it technical or managerial expertise, explains why, in 
Chandler’s view, the large corporations, which, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
exploited first-mover advantages by investing in production distribution and managerial 
structures, were still dominant in the second half of the 20th Century38.
The expansion of managerial hierarchies leads to the increasing complexity of the 
information flow between departments, which in turn leads to the standardisation of 
practices and standardisation of knowledge. A theory of routines rejection or 
confirmation is necessary in order to explain long-term company survival in changing 
market conditions. In those conditions, the accumulated knowledge of a firm might or 
might not become a constraint on development. Nelson and Winter identify the routine-
36 Nelson and Winter, An Evolutionary Theory, pp. 14 -18.
37 A. D. Chandler, and H. Daems (eds), Managerial Hierarchies: Comparative Perspectives on the Rise o f  
the Modem Industrial Enterprise (Cambridge Massachusetts, 1980).
38 Chandler, Scale and Scope, pp. 3-13.
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changing process of a given firm as the most important of all routines, determining the 
probability distribution of new routines. Those are found by a search process, which is 
determined by a number of variables (for example R&D expenditure) which might be a 
function of the size of the firm. Companies judge new routines by using a set of criteria, 
among which the most common is expected profits. Expected profits link the process of 
routine selection within the firm to the external environment (market). This is an 
important element in the Nelson and Winter theory, because routines are created within 
the firm, but are ultimately selected by the external environment.
This leads to the issue of defining the nature of strategic firms. William Lazonick and 
Mary O’ Sullivan have focused on corporate governance, trying to recompose the 
dichotomy between the concept of cumulative knowledge and that of strategic firm. This 
dichotomy stems from the fact that if the company development is entirely dictated by 
cumulative knowledge, then strategic management and innovation are de facto inhibited. 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan insist that the process of technological change can be 
characterised as cumulative, collective and uncertain. Technological change is a 
cumulative process because the possibility to change technological and market 
conditions depends on the development of those conditions in the past. It is a collective 
process because the transformation of technological and market conditions involves the 
commitment of a large number of individuals. Finally, technological change is an 
uncertain process because the elements that can transform market and technological 
conditions in an optimal way are not fully known at the moment in which the
Q
commitment in new technologies is made. Hence, according to the two authors, the 
innovative firm is strategic firstly, and overall, in the way it engages in cumulative and 
collective learning, and secondly in the way it moves in the market.
This thesis refers to the pattern of conceptualisations, rather than the pattern of 
formal models developed by Nelson and Winter. The process of routines 
rejection/confirmation is referred to the deployment of a specific technology (robotics), 
as well as the to the implementation of a specific strategy of output-mix optimisation.
39 W. Lazonick, M. O’Sullivan, ‘Organisation, Finance and International Competition’ Industrial and 
Corporate Change, 5/1 (1996), pp. 1-49. M. O’Sullivan, ‘The Innovative Enterprise and Corporate 
Governance’, Cambridge Journal o f Economics, 24/4 (2000), pp. 393-416.
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Such use of the concept of routines exceeds the boundaries of technological change, 
which seems to be the main concern of the evolutionary theory of economic change. 
Nonetheless, the definition of a strategy as a routine and the identification of strategic 
decision-making as a process of routine rejection/confirmation seems to be justifiable on 
the ground that both strategic and technology-related decision-making are determined by 
expected profits. In both cases, expectations are affected by the accumulated knowledge 
of managers, which affects the way in which management weighs risks involved in 
strategy/technology rejection, vis-a-vis risks involved in strategy/technology 
confirmation.40
The confirmation/rejection of routines is a central issue in the discussion of the crisis 
of Fordism and the response of industrial economies to the crisis of the 1970s. The 
debate on post-Fordism, including the school of neo-Fordism, suggests that new 
technologies enabled firms to achieve flexibility in manufacturing. This view implies 
the rejection of a pattern of technical routines related to standardisation and costs 
reduction. The flexible manufacturing paradigm, in fact, assumes that the expansion in 
complexity costs is compensated by the possibility to run production lines at the 
optimum capacity level. Profits in this case are expected to derive from production 
stabilisation and from the possibility offered by flexible production to compete in a 
range of different market segments, shifting up/downmarket every time such a shift is 
needed. The shift to flexibility implies a discontinuity in production management with 
respect to Fordist manufacturing.
Within Chandlerian multi-divisional structures, the process of routines 
rejection/confirmation is extremely complex and is affected by several elements 
including, arguably, the power of different groups within the firm and the kind of 
information different actors can access, in order to support their business view. A shift 
towards flexibility might be desired by marketing mangers under the pressure of 
expected changes in the pattern of demand, whereas engineers, who had developed 
Fordist routines related to standardisation and cycle-time minimisation, might oppose 
the shift towards flexibility. Top managers might support marketing managers, if  they
40 Nelson and Winter, An Evolutionary Theory, pp. 14 -18.
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think the pattern of consumption is going to change, or they might support engineers if 
they think otherwise.
This thesis suggests that after 1973, Fiat confirmed a pattern of routines which 
defined the aim of technological change and output-mix optimisation strategy. 
Technological change, and in particular the deployment of robotics, aimed to minimise 
the cycle time of critical stages of manufacturing, such as spot welding, rather than 
output-mix flexibility. Such a development was consistent with the output-mix strategy 
that aimed to maximise the company expertise in the manufacturing of small cars. This 
development was the result of the prevalence of the engineers over the marketing 
managers.
Section four: 
The literature on Fiat
This section provides the reader with an overview of the Italian literature on Fiat. 
Moreover, the section shows that the Business Management literature on Fiat mirrors 
the view of a discontinuous development of industrial firms after the crisis of the 1970s, 
emerging from the debate on post-Fordism.
The Italian literature on Fiat: An overview
The literature on Fiat is vast. The bibliographical directory edited by Archivio Storico 
Fiat,41 contains 1510 references to monographs and articles, covering a wide range of 
disciplines. Business History-oriented studies refer mainly to industrial relations,42 
whereas technological change and corporate strategy have been mainly the object of 
studies in the field of Business Management.43 Even the latest work of Castronovo in 
Business History, which analyses Fiat from 1899 to 1999, has its principal focus on 
industrial relations and political history, while the analysis of the post-1973 strategic and 
technical developments of the firm builds upon the Business Management literature. 
Those authors suggest, either implicitly or explicitly, a marked discontinuity with
41 C. Annibaldi, M. R. Moccia (eds), Bibliografiat (Torino, 1998).
42 S. Musso, ‘Le relazioni industriali alia Fiat\ in Annibaldi and Berta (eds), Grande impresa e sviluppo 
italiano, pp. 165-231; V. Castronovo, Fiat 1899 - 1999: cento anni di storia italiana (Milano, 1999); G. 
Berta, Conflitto industriale e struttura d ’impresa alia Fiat 1919 -  1979 (Bologna, 1998).
43 See: Enrietti and Fomengo, Ilgruppo Fiat', Volpato, II caso Fiat.
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respect to the Fordist system of mass production developed by Fiat in the post-war 
period. In fact, these authors assume that, after 1973, Fiat shifted to flexible mass 
production, and deployed a new and discontinuous output-mix optimisation strategy. 
Therefore, by following a Business History approach, this thesis aims to criticise the 
view of discontinuity expressed by the Business Management literature on Fiat.
In contrast with the 1970s and 1980s, the pre-1973 history of Fiat has been analysed 
by various business historians, who have covered a variety of aspects of the company 
over time. Castronovo and Bairati have focused mainly on the political and social 
history of Fiat through the reconstruction of the role of leading personalities such as 
Giovanni Agnelli Senior and Valletta in Italian political history.44 Sapelli has carried out 
extensive research on the role of Fiat management in the development of technical 
knowledge and corporate culture in Italy, as well as extensive analysis of unionism in 
the inter-war period.45 Bigazzi has analysed Fiat in both the inter- and the post-war 
periods, with reference to management, technical organisation, multinational activities 
and overseas investments. His work on the development of large-scale production at the 
Lingotto and Mirafiori plants addresses the transfer of American technology into the 
Fiat production system, highlighting the complexity involved by the adaptation of that 
technology to the Fiat shop-floor.46 Finally, Amatori has reconstructed the development 
of the Fiat structure from a Chandlerian perspective, from the inter-war period to the 
late 1960s, suggesting that further research is needed in Business History, to see whether 
or not the business culture developed by Fiat over a very long period of managerial 
stability survived the events of the 1970s.47 From such a suggestion, it emerges that the 
conclusions reached by the Business Management literature do not appear completely 
convincing to Amatori, who, therefore, still considers the 1970s as an open field for 
further research, which is the starting point of this thesis.
44 See V. Castronovo, Giovanni Agnelli (Torino, 1977); P. Bairati, Vittorio Valletta (Torino, 1983).
45 G. Sapelli, ‘Gli organizzatori della produczione tra strattura d’impresa e modelli culturali’, in Storia 
d ’ltalia. Annali. Vol IV: Intellettuali e potere (Torino, 1981), pp. 591-696. See also G. Sapelli, 
Organizzazione, lavoro e innovazione industriale nell’Italia tra le due guerre (Torino, 1978).
46 D. Bigazzi, ‘Struture della produzione: il Lingotto, L’America, L’Europa’, in C. Olmo (ed.), II 
Lingottol915-1939. L ’archittettura, I’immagine, il lavoro (Torino, 1994), pp. 281-336; Bigazzi, 
‘Mirafiori’, in Zetlein, Herrigel (eds), Americanisation and Its Limits, pp. 163-211.
47 Amatori, ‘Gli uomini del Professore’, in Annibaldi and Berta (eds), Grande impresa e svilluppo 
Italiano, pp. 257-343.
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This work explains the introduction and development of robotics as an incremental 
and evolutionary process aiming to remove the technical bottlenecks of the existing 
Fordist system of production, whereas the Business Management literature explains the 
introduction of robotics as a process of systemic innovation aiming to shift from 
Fordism to flexibility. Furthermore, the idea of discontinuity expressed by the Business 
Management literature will be also criticised in relation to output-mix optimisation 
strategy.
Although this work relates mainly to the Business Management literature, industrial 
relations are also considered. The most recent literature on industrial relations tends to 
deny that technological change in the late 1970s and early 1980s was the result of a 
managerial determination to weaken the unions by the implementation of technological 
means. This thesis accepts this view without adding to the debate, explaining how the 
hypothesis has emerged, why it seems convincing, and why it seems reasonable to look 
at arguments beyond industrial relations to analyse technological change at Fiat.
The Industrial Relations literature
During the 1970s, Fiat experienced a regime of quasi-permanent conflict between 
management and workers. This had started in 1969, with the wave of strikes of the so- 
called “Hot Autumn”, and ended in the autumn of 1980, when after 32 days of strike, 
the unions had to accept the Fiat plan for major redundancies.48 A good deal of the 
literature, therefore, refers to the long-lasting confrontation between workers and 
management. Although this thesis does not intend to deal directly with industrial 
relations, the events of the 1970s and early 1980s have been summarised in chapter 5, in 
order to make the reader aware of such an important aspect of both the history of Fiat, 
and the history of contemporary Italy. At the same time, that chapter shows that the 
engineering-led and evolutionary view of technological change argued in this thesis 
does not conflict with the literature on industrial relations developed over the last fifteen 
years, which refused any form of technological determinism in explaining the defeat of 
the unions in 1980, turning its attention instead to political and social explanatory 
variables.
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This was an important development, because some of the Industrial Relations 
literature during the 1970s had portrayed restructuring and technological change as a 
“technocratic” response by management to the increasing power of the rank and file in 
its quest for greater control over production. This argument was initially put forward in 
1974 by extreme-left unionists such as Guidi, Bronzino and Germanetto.49 At that time, 
experiments with robotics had just begun in spot welding, and robotics was rather an 
unknown subject, as was its potential for accelerating the replacement of workers by 
capital. Those authors, therefore, expressed concerns that robotics would be used to 
weaken the unions, by pursuing a massive substitution of capital for labour. In the early 
1980s, Collida and Negrelli50 reached the conclusion that organisational and 
technological changes were not to be seen as the only factors affecting a change in 
industrial relations. On the other hand, the two authors maintained that the 
determination of management to undermine union power was one of the factors 
explaining technological change.51 The new technology, in their view, not only created 
the conditions for a reduction in labour input, but also for a change in the overall 
technological content of the process, so that the ability of unions to influence production 
planning and technological developments was going to be undermined by the 
knowledge gap brought about by the new equipment. Moreover, the deployment of new 
technologies accelerated the turnover of workers, because new specialisation and 
professional profiles among workers were needed to support the deployment of robotics. 
Because new workers were more skilled and knowledgeable than the old workers, the 
social and cultural distance between new workers and engineers was reduced, which in 
turn helped to reduce the gap between management and new labour and to create a 
divide between new and old workers.
Even in Collida and Negrelli’s refined formulation, however, the “technocratic 
response argument” contains the unavoidable shortcoming that the localised 
implementation of robotics in the spot-welding and painting shops at Fiat could not
48 Details o f this event will be provided in chapter 5.
49 G. Guidi, A. Bronzino, L. Germanetto, Fiat: struttura aziendale ed organizzazione dello sfruttamento 
(Milano, 1974).
50 A. B. Collida, S Negrelli, La transizione nell’industria e nelle relazioni industriali: I'auto ed il caso 
Fiat (Milano, 1986).
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prevent workers from creating artificial bottlenecks elsewhere in the process, 
particularly in the final assembly, which at least up to 1988 remained labour-intensive. 
The relationship between robotics and the decline of unions at Fiat, therefore, should 
have been demonstrated rather than assumed. In fact, it has always been assumed, but 
never demonstrated. This is not to deny that, in the long term, organisational and 
technological change, along with changes in the composition of the labour force, had a 
significant and positive impact on the broad context of industrial relations at Fiat. The 
question, though, is whether such a development o f industrial relations was the 
predictable - and predicted - outcome of the specific process of technological and 
organisational change taking place at Fiat during the late 1970s. As will be shown in 
chapter 5, during the 1970s Fiat management had few reasons to believe ex-ante that 
technological change would have had a huge impact on the unions' ability to create 
artificial bottlenecks in production, in order to put pressure on management.
The technocratic response argument was developed to explain the reason why Fiat 
management developed robotics in the 1970s. Interestingly, the Industrial Relation 
literature dealing with the defeat of the unions in 1980 does not give much credit to the 
idea that the defeat was the outcome of technological change. On the contrary, during 
the 1980s, industrial relations experts within and outside the academic community 
became increasingly sceptical about the correlation between technological change and 
changes in the pattern of industrial relations, because the crisis of the unions appeared 
too widespread and deep to be explained solely by technological change. At that stage, 
the debate no longer asked whether robotics had been developed to weaken the unions. 
Therefore, the technocratic response argument was never openly criticised by using the 
counter-argument mentioned above that the Fiat management had neither theoretical nor 
practical reasons to expect that robotics would cause a decrease in the unions’ ability to 
stop production. Chapter 5 will fill this gap.
As early as 1981, Enzo Mattina52 emphasised the progressive detachment of workers 
from the unions. This detachment was caused by the inability of union leaders to depart 
from an ideological approach to unionism, and to adopt a more pragmatic and orthodox
51 Ibid, pp. 165 and 210-228.
52 E. Mattina, Fiat e Sindacati negli anni 80 (Milano, 1981).
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bargaining framework. Other authors on union matters, such as Mana and Valvo, have 
analysed the Fiat restructuring from a business management perspective,53 giving an 
overall positive assessment of the restructuring including technological change. They 
imply that the decision to downsize the workforce, which had caused the 32-day strike 
in the Autumn of 1980, was an undesirable but necessary course of action to be taken, in 
order to regain competitiveness.54
Bonazzi has argued that in the long term robotics had a positive effect on the 
relationship between managers, foremen and workers, helping management to normalise 
industrial relations.55 However, the author seems to reject the hypothesis of any pre­
planned strategy of systematic use of technology in order to weaken the unions. 
Moreover, along with Business Management authors, Bonazzi tends not to consider 
working conditions as a sufficient explanation for the deployment of robotics, because 
in theory, it was possible to improve working conditions by improving traditional 
automation. In practice, though, traditional automation would have prevented the 
development of flexible manufacturing. Therefore, the author maintains that the most 
important drive for investing in robotics was flexibility.
The most recent Business History literature on industrial relations at Fiat, including 
the work of Berta, and the history of Fiat written by Castronovo,56 tends to explain the 
defeat of the unions in 1980 in terms of their increasing internal weaknesses, as already 
suggested by Mana, combined with a change in the overall political climate, and a 
revived determination of management to exploit those factors in order to regain the 
power to manage. The internal weakening of the unions was due to the inability of the 
three largest Italian organisations, CGIL, CISL and UILL, to control the shop floor, 
where union representatives were often bypassed by dissident ultra-left extra- 
parliamentary groups, imposing their decisions over both management and the rank and 
file by using undemocratic or even violent methods. Such uncertainty and, in many 
cases anarchy, not only put the future of the company in jeopardy, but also led to a 
deterioration of overall working conditions, which in turn led to the progressive
53 F. Mana, T. Valvo, Fiat Auto anni 80. Organizzazione, professionalita ’ e salario (Milano, 1985).
54 Ibid, pp. 69-78.
55 G. Bonazzi, II Tubo di Cristallo (Bologna, 1994), p. 104.
56 Berta, Conflitto industriale, pp. 40-70; Castronovo, Fiat, pp. 1199-1535.
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detachment of workers from the unions. This phenomenon was concurrent with a 
progressive decrease in power of the Christian Democrat Party, and a change in the 
attitude of the Communist Party. During the late 1960s and 1970s, both parties had 
given strong backing to the unions in their struggle against Fiat management, though 
with different motivations and modalities of action. Following Berta and Castronovo, 
Stefano Musso shows that in the early 1980s, restructuring, and in particular 
technological change could be successfully completed because of the defeat of the
C*7
unions. In this way, the author turns the old “technocratic response argument” upside 
down, in the sense that the recovery of the managerial power was a pre-requisite for the 
implementation of new technology.
The Business Management literature
At the beginning of the 1980s, thus, the Industrial Relations literature started to 
gradually shift its focus from technological and organisational changes to the unions' 
internal dynamics within the broader political context, in order to explain the defeat of 
the unions in 1980. At the same time, a number of authors in the Business Management 
area, most notably Mosconi and Valeo, Volpato, Merli, Dina and later Enrietti and
CO f
Fomenego, shifted the main focus from industrial relations to other factors to explain 
technological change, and more generally, the restructuring of Fiat. No longer was Fiat 
analysed in the relatively “narrow” context of the Italian social and political 
environment. On the contrary, the process of restructuring was analysed in the broader 
context of changes in the international pattern of car demand and supply.
As far as the relationship between technology and labour relations is concerned, the 
Business Management literature mirrors the Industrial Relations literature of the mid- 
1980s, by taking the view that technological change contributed to the improvement of 
working conditions in the long term and, therefore, to the stabilisation of industrial 
relations after the unions were defeated in 1980. Of course, this literature acknowledges 
also the unquestionable view that improvements in industrial relations after 1980 proved
57 Musso, ‘Le relazioni industrial! alia Fiat’, p. 225.
58 See: Mosconi, Valeo, Crisi e ristrutturazione\ G. Volpato, L ’industria automobilistica internazionale, 
(Padova, 1983); A. Dina, ‘Introduction Notes’ in Dina (ed.), Modello Robot, pp. 11-31; Enrietti and 
Fomengo, II gruppo Fiat.
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to be a critical factor in the recovery of Fiat from the crisis of the 1970s.59 The Business 
Management literature, nonetheless, introduces the argument that the introduction of 
robotics in the mid-1970s would have occurred anyway, even in a context of 
collaborative industrial relations, because of market factors. The implementation of 
robotics in spot welding, and particularly the development of the system called 
“Robogate”, was necessary in order to increase the degree of product-mix flexibility - 
the capacity to produce a pattern of cars wiith the same set of tools and to change the 
product mix according to shifts in demand for different models.60 The need for such 
flexibility had been generated by expectations of a progressive maturation of the 
European market. Mature markets, in fact, are usually associated with rapid changes in 
consumers' preferences for specific models and instability in the relative size of market 
segments and market shares within specific segments.61 The concept underpinning 
product-mix flexibility is that when a range of cars is processed on the same production 
line, with the possibility to change the output mix without stopping production, the 
likelihood that the capacity utilisation rate of that production line is stabilised at about 
the optimal utilisation rate increases considerably. In the Fordist organisational model, 
technological change achieved increases in productivity at the expense of flexibility. 
The Business Management literature underlines that robotics was able to realise 
increases in productivity by increasing the speed of the process, along with the 
flexibility of the process. Moreover, flexibility was as important as the increase in the 
speed of production precisely because productivity could be maximised only if the 
production lines operated at about the optimum rate of capacity utilisation. Moreover, 
given the instability in the demand for specific models typical of mature markets,
59 Actually, in one of his various essays on Fiat, Volpato even maintains that among other factors 
industrial relations ‘have been a strong stimulus in the automation of process at Fiat and Alfa Romeo’, but 
offers neither evidence nor a theoretical argument to support the statement. See :G. Volpato, ‘The 
Automobile Industry in Transition: Product, Market Changes and Firm Strategies in the 1970s and 1980s’, 
in S. Tolliday and J. Zeitlin (eds), Between Fordism and Flexibility (Cambridge, 1987), p. 218. In other 
works, he seems to put less emphasis on the direct relationship between technological change and 
industrial relations. See: Bianchi, Volpato, ‘Flexibility as the Response to Excess Capacity’, in Baden- 
Fuller (ed.) Managing Excess Capacity, pp. 215-246.
60 Dina, ‘Introduction Notes’ in Dina (ed.), Modello Robot, p. 15. See also F.Silva P. Bianchi, ‘Robots, 
Employment and Industrial Relations in the Italian Automobile Industry’, in S. Watanabe (ed.), 
Microeletronics, Automation and Employment in the Automobile Industry (Chichester, 1987), table 6, p. 
139.
61 See : Volpato, ‘The Automobile Industry’, pp. 217-218.
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production stabilisation could be achieved only when production lines were so flexible 
as to be able to shift production from one model to another without stopping the 
process.
The interesting question for business historians is whether Fiat actually achieved 
such a production stabilisation. If not, the question is whether through process 
innovation, engineers were actually pursuing goals other than flexibility, such as the 
mere minimisation of the cycle time. The matter will be addressed in chapter 4 of this 
thesis. Here it is important to emphasise that the interpretation of technological change 
suggested by the Business Management literature clearly resembles the view emerging 
in the debate on post-Fordism, that the rise of consumerism from the late 1960s onwards 
compelled manufacturers to shift from inflexible to flexible mass production. 
Accordingly, the Business Management literature implies the same kind of 
discontinuity, which emerges in the post-Fordism debate, in regard to the shifts from 
Fordist manufacturing to new modalities of production. In fact, from the mid-1980s, 
authors such as Volpato have been increasingly mirroring the views fostered by the 
International Automotive Project, which incorporated many concepts developed within 
the post-Fordism debate, translating and simplifying those concepts into the “new ethos 
of flexibility” as opposed to the “old ethos of standardisation” embodied by the Fordist 
system of mass production.62
According to the Business Management literature, technological change at Fiat was 
part of the company’s broader shift from a process- to market-oriented approach. The 
new managerial paradigm was introduced into the firm via managerial turnover, and in 
this sense, it was “exogenously generated”. In contrast, the process-oriented culture of 
Fiat engineers, which had been dominant in the company up to the first oil crisis, had 
been “endogenously developed” in a context of extraordinary managerial stability. The 
pre-1973 managerial paradigm had been developed around the increasing need for 
increasing product/process standardisation, whereas the new technological framework 
reflected the need to expand flexibility. Accordingly, the new managerial paradigm 
contemplated the possibility of competing in any segment of the market, as opposed to
62 This is implied by the concept of flexibility as the mean to reduce excess capacity, as expressed by 
Bianchi and Volpato, ‘Flexibility as the Response to Excess Capacity’, pp. 215-246.
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the old managerial paradigm, which had been constructed around the principle of 
specialisation in the manufacturing of small cars.
The restructuring of Fiat, as described by the Business Management literature, 
implies the complete rejection of the routines developed within the Fordist system of 
mass production, where the hyper-segmentation of the process towards cycle-time 
minimisation, and the containment of complexity towards the reduction of lead times 
were the leading elements of decision-making in both technological trajectory choice 
and output-mix optimisation strategy. This view, therefore, implies that the old set of 
routines was not confirmed by new management, which, on the contrary, expected 
profits to by maximised by a new set of routines constructed around flexible production 
and the enhanced capability to design, manufacture and sell cars in almost any segments 
of the market. This last point highlights the complexity of the product-mix flexibility 
issue. Market segments are usually classified according to cubic capacity. So is the 
output range. In the case of mass manufacturers, the lower output range includes 
segments A (500-900 cc.) and B (900-1100 cc.), whereas the medium/upper range 
includes segments C (1100-1300 cc.), D (1300-1600 cc.), and E (1600-2200 cc.).63 The 
structure of costs and revenues for each segment varies considerably across the market 
spectrum, so that variations in the output mix affect the profitability of the operation. 
Output-mix flexibility, understood as the technical ability to produce different models 
on the same line at the same time, is intimately connected with the company's ability to 
design and manufacture models in different segments of the market at competitive costs 
and quality levels. Although the company had been always producing a wide range of 
cars, from the 1920s to the 1960s, the bulk of production had invariably consisted of 
lower segment units, for which Fiat had traditionally enjoyed competitive advantage. 
Such a specialisation was reflected in the knowledge accumulated by the company. 
Therefore, according to the Business Management literature, the introduction of flexible 
manufacturing systems at Fiat also meant a shift from a regime of product specialisation 
to a regime based on the strategic ability to compete in any segment of the market, and
63 Note that such a classification applies strictly to the European market in the 1970s and 1980s, since the 
correspondence between segments and cubic capacity can vary considerably across time and across 
countries.
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to go upmarket, had such a move been considered profitable by management. Actually, 
a large part of the Business Management literature of the beginning of the 1980s 
expected Fiat to adjust its output mix upmarket, under the assumption that such a move 
would have increased the total margin of contribution. In the late 1980s, such 
expectations proved to be fallacious because the output mix was still skewed towards 
downmarket units. Yet, according to Enrietti and Fomengo, the output mix during the 
1980s had been driven by demand,64 since from the supply side Fiat had acquired not 
only the production capability to adjust the output mix to demand composition, but also 
the design ability to compete in any segment of the market.
Of course, not all authors are convinced that during the 1980s, Fiat had fully 
developed product-mix flexibility. According to Negrelli and Loke,65 the pattern of 
demand during the 1980s not only forced Fiat to keep focusing on the lower end of the 
demand spectrum, as implied by Enrietti and Fomengo, but also affected investments in 
retooling. In their view, the flexible capability developed in the late 1970s by Fiat 
exceeded actual needs, so that in the 1980s Fiat management seemed to reintroduce 
some forms of inflexible automation, such as the automated engine production line at 
the Termoli plant. The view was partly criticised by Bonazzi, who pointed out that 
during the 1980s, Fiat was still in a stage of transition, where several different 
technological and organisational options had to be investigated. In this transitional 
phase, flexibility had been achieved, although the production setting was still relying on 
large intermediate stocks.66 The Termoli plant seemed to be a diversion from the path 
towards flexibility, but in reality it was just a “mistake” in the process of learning how 
to maximise flexibility, by minimising intermediate stocks in the process. Management 
ended up creating a rather inflexible system for engine manufacturing, in the attempt to 
achieve such a reduction of intermediate stocks. Dina puts forward the same view, that 
car manufacturers during the 1980s were in the middle of an uncompleted and uncertain 
process. Flexibility enhancement was in many cases hampered by the fact that flexible 
tools were often deployed along with traditional tools, or within an outdated plant
64 Enrietti and Fomenego, II Gruppo Fiat, pp.70-75, and 79-83.
65 R. Loke, S. Negelli, ‘II caso Fiat Auto’, in M. Regini and C. Sable (eds), Strategie di riaggiustamento 
industriale (Bologna, 1989), pp. 61-94.
66 Bonazzi, H tubo di cristallo, pp. 78-80.
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layout. It is worth noting, though, that Bonazzi and Dina do not reject the Volpato 
argument that technological change in the late 1970s was inspired by the quest for 
flexibility. Neither do Loke and Negrelli, though these authors are simply less optimistic 
than Volpato about the actual achievements of Fiat in terms of flexibility. Nonetheless, 
they explain under-achievements by an ex post set of circumstances, namely 
developments in the pattern of demand limiting the need for flexibility in the case of 
Locke and Negrelli, or managerial and technical constraints in the case of Bonazzi and 
Dina.
In general, the literature on Fiat is rarely based on quantitative empirical evidence. In 
that respect, the most interesting research is that carried out by Bonazzi, which, 
nonetheless, is almost exclusively based on interviews with Fiat managers and therefore 
does not seem free from “inherent company bias”. So is the work of Volpato, Enrietti 
and Fomengo, who use data and information from the department of external relations. 
Those data unequivocally point in the direction of flexibility. This is not surprising, 
given that it is in the interest of car manufacturers to reassure the financial market about 
the industry’s ability to cope with the erratic demand of mature markets. With regard to 
the international literature on the automotive industry, the same criticism may be 
suggested for the whole International Automotive Project, which was also inspired and 
financed by many manufacturers in the industry.
For this reason, this thesis pursues a more quantitative approach, as has been 
described in the methodological section. Rather than arguing on the ex post argument of 
whether or not Fiat used its flexible capacity during the 1980s, this work establishes that 
Fiat did not maximise flexibility, and poses the ex ante argument that management 
chose to maximise specialisation instead. In this work, it is suggested that production 
engineers kept their grip on process/product development, in spite of the managerial 
turnover in the upper level of the hierarchy, and managed to confirm the pattern of 
routines “endogenously” developed around the principle of Fordism. As a result, the 
Fiat product-mix optimisation strategy aimed to exploit the competitive advantage 
deriving from specialisation in the manufacture of small cars, rather than the potential 
flexibility in shifting the output mix upmarket. Finally, the work suggests that by 
maximising specialisation rather than flexibility, Fiat was able to contain complexity
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costs and, therefore, to maximise profits in the price competitive scenario of the 1980s. 
This view resembles the typical evolutionary pattern, in which the confirmation of 
routines enables a firm to survive over time, because routines happen to be compatible 
with the business environment, in the same way that the genetic patrimony of evolving 
organisms happens to be compatible with the natural environment at a given point in 
time.
Section five 
Demand and discontinuity in management
According to the post-Fordism literature, the discontinuity in operations and strategic 
management occurring after the two oil crises was triggered by a discontinuity in the 
pattern of demand caused by the maturation of the European market. The Management 
literature on Fiat holds a similar view. This section explores the relationship between 
market maturation and the shifts towards flexible mass production. In doing so, it 
criticised the assumption underpinning the paradigm of discontinuity that within mature 
markets firms have to shift towards flexible mass production and flexible output-mix 
strategies if  they want to survive.
The discontinuity paradigm, and market maturation
The business management literature relates to the vast debate on post-Fordism, 
sharing with it the underpinning concept that the crisis of Fordism as a production mode 
is a consequence of the rise of consumerism during the 1970s and 1980s. This is the 
shift in consumer preferences from cheap standardised to quality-customised products. 
Such a shift is typical of relatively high-income countries, where the bulk of demand for 
a given product tends to shift from first-time buyers to second-time buyers replacing an 
old good with a new one. Second-time buyers have higher disposable income than first­
time buyers, so that they are in the position to pay a premium for the intrinsic qualities 
of the product they purchase, whereas first-time buyers tend to minimise costs generated 
by acquiring and using the goods they need. The shift in consumer preferences causes a 
shift in the structure of supply, towards quality and customised goods. Suppliers, on 
their part, tend to stimulate replacement by product renewal, otherwise second-time
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buyers would delay their second purchase up to the durability limit of the item they have 
to replace, which would in turn considerably slow down output growth. Because 
demand growth depends mainly on product renewal, high-income consumer markets are 
also defined as mature markets. Within a regime of oligopolistic competition, product 
renewal is a critical factor in competing for market share in a mature market.
The general concept of market maturation as described above applies to all markets 
characterised by oligopolistic competition. Yet, the market for cars is also characterised 
by the interconnection between the new vehicle market and that for second-hand cars. 
Given the relative long-term durability of automobiles, in the stage of maturity the car 
market is characterised by an abundant stock of second-hand vehicles, which are usually 
traded in by second-time buyers to finance part of their second purchase, so that first­
time buyers’ demand is, to a significant extent, satisfied by the supply of used cars. 
Therefore, the individual decision to replace a car does not necessarily imply the 
scrapping of the old vehicle, whereas in the market for white goods, for example, 
individual replacement usually implies individual scrapping. The textbook definition of 
maturity for the car market, therefore, refers to the whole stock of vehicles, rather than 
the decision of individuals to replace their old car. By definition, the market for cars 
reaches the maturity stage when replacement demand outweighs new demand.67 New 
demand means the portion of demand that exceeds scrapping, whereas replacement 
means the portion of demand that equals scrapping.68 New demand, therefore, makes the 
entire stock of cars increase. In theory, markets reach saturation when new registrations 
equal scrapping, although in practice saturation is never reached. Markets for cars reach 
maturity at a level of car density of between 400 and 600 cars per 1000 inhabitants. In 
the case of the US, this density was reached in the early 1960s, while in Europe it was 
reached between the early 1970s and the early 1980s, according to the GDP levels of the 
various countries.
67 Note that in the car industry literature the term demand is widely used as synonymous with registrations, 
although the concept of actual registrations differ from that of demand. For example, registrations do not 
coincide with the actual demand for cars when there is a supply shortage that leaves some demand 
unsatisfied.
68 For a detailed discussion of the topic see: K. Bhaskar, The Future o f the World Motor Industry (1980), 
chapter 3.
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In infant markets, the increase in GDP leads to a proportional increase in car density. 
In mature markets, where car density is already high, it tends to grow at a slightly slower 
pace than GDP.69 Because car density increases slowly, the entire car stock grows 
slowly too. Replacement demand is a percentage of the whole stock of cars, so that a 
slow growth of the vehicle stock causes the slow growth of replacement, which is the 
main component of demand. The result of the process is the slowing down of the yearly 
rate of growth of total registrations. That is the reason why suppliers tend to accelerate 
replacement by speeding up product renewal and widening the product range. The other 
characteristic of mature markets, as opposed to infant markets, is that demand 
fluctuates, both in terms of total demand as well as demand for specific models within 
each segment. The fluctuations in the demand of specific models are the reason why the 
literature stresses that the maturation of markets compelled manufacturers to shift 
towards flexibility.70
One obvious reason for fluctuations in total demand is that replacement can be 
postponed if economic conditions are not ideal.71 Also, given that hire purchasing is 
prevalent, car demand is affected by expansions and contractions in borrowing. 
Furthermore, even if  economic conditions are stable, an expansion of replacement is 
usually followed by a period of stagnation, since car owners tend to own a car for a 
relatively long period before replacing it. The ageing of the car stock, thus, introduces a 
cyclical element into the fluctuations of replacement demand. Finally, Manufacturers 
usually introduce incentives in order to sustain demand during downswings, mostly in 
the form of interest-free consumer credit,72 but in general they try to sustain demand by 
speeding up product renewal, and by widening the product range in the hope of 
encouraging replacement and multiple purchases. Of course, there are many limits to the 
acceleration of product renewal, not only from the supply side, where many different 
factors could prevent time-to-market minimisation, but also from the demand side,
69 For a detailed discussion of the topic see: G. Bos, The Demand for Private Cars (Rotterdam, 1970).
70 Volpato, II caso Fiat, pp. 171-173; Volpato, ‘The Automobile Industry In Transition. Product, Market 
Change and Firm Strategies in the 1970s and 1980s’, in Tolliday and J. Zeitlin (eds), Between Fordism 
and Flexibility, pp. 193-223.
71 In this regard see Bhaskar, The Future, chapter 3; for the effects of regulation polices on demnd see 
Foreman-Peck, Bowden, McKinlay, The British Motor Industry (Manchester, 1995), chapter 7.
72 Public funds have often been made available by various EC Members, to finance accelerated scrapping.
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where clients do not generally appreciate a model with a too-short life cycle, as this is 
usually associated with a rapid depreciation of the model and, therefore, has a negative 
effect on the overall cost of replacement. Nonetheless, manufacturers try to renew each 
model every 4 or 5 years.
Product renewal causes fluctuations in the demand for specific models because 
new models are likely to capture market shares at the expense of old ones. Critically, car 
manufacturers compete in a range of different segments of the market, supplying a range 
of models in each segment, and experiencing fluctuations in demand for their products 
both within each segment and across segments. Of course, manufacturers renew their 
models at different points in time, so that fluctuations in output occur with various 
frequencies. This is the reason why the literature on post-Fordism, and the Business 
Management literature on Fiat both emphasise that the maturation of the market 
compelled manufacturers to deploy flexible manufacturing systems. The underpinning 
assumption is that the flexibility of production tools enables manufacturers to minimise 
reset times and retooling costs. Because of the low level of tool specificity, the 
manufacture of the whole range of models is spread across the whole set of production 
lines. By doing so, all lines can operate at a utilisation rate close to the optimum level. 
In fact, the decrease in production of a given model can be offset by the high production 
levels of new models. Moreover, small batches of niche products can be produced along 
with large production models in a more efficient way. Also, shifts in the output mix up- 
or downmarket are more efficiently pursued.73 In the capital-intensive stages of the 
process, product-mix flexibility depends upon the kind of tools utilised, whereas in the 
labour-intensive stages of production flexibility depends upon the capacity of labour to 
work on different cars, which implies a wide range of labour skills, and the flexibility of 
individual workers. It is not surprising, therefore, that robotics and labour organisation 
are two of the most developed topics within the debate on post-Fordism.
In theory, the paradigm of “market-maturation-driven” discontinuity seems to be 
convincing. In practice, it has to be tested against historical evidence, to establish 
whether and when the path toward flexibility started and the discontinuity in 
management implied by such a shift actually occurred. The conventional wisdom
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indicates the second half of the 1970s as the period in which the problem of flexibility 
was foreseen by management and investments in flexible capacity started to increase 
within the industry, because in that period managers started to realise the implications of 
market maturation and increasing competition from Japan.74 If this were the case with 
Fiat, the company would have shifted towards flexible mass production a decade earlier 
than the rest of the Italian manufacturing sector, which, according to Bartezzaghi and 
Turco, started to shift towards the flexibility managerial paradigm in the late 1980s.75 
Moreover, as already said, Negrelli and Locke have shed doubt on the view that during 
the 1980s, the maximisation of flexibility was as urgent as much of the literature on the 
car industry assumes.
The view that the maturation of the markets triggers the shift towards flexible mass 
production is based on the assumption that there is a necessary trade-off in shifting 
toward flexibility. This is not necessarily true, since flexible manufacturing involves 
higher complexity costs that might well offset the economic advantage of running 
production lines at the optimum capacity level. Moreover, if  flexibility is used to shift 
production from a given model to another competing in a different segment of the 
market, both cost and revenue curves shift upwards, but revenues might or might not 
shift more than costs. The decisions whether or not to shift to flexibility or whether to 
shift the output-mix upmarket, are taken on the basis of assumptions involving a certain 
degree of uncertainty. This uncertainty offers room for discussing strategies among the 
various actors, such as engineers, marketing mangers or owners, who are involved in the 
process of confirmation or rejection of routines. Long-term company performance will 
depend upon the decisions emerging from the dialectic between various actors in the 
firm in relation to uncertain scenarios, and upon how well those decisions fit with the 
actual development of the market.
The literature on Fiat fails to capture the complexity of the decision-making process, 
assuming the simplistic view that managerial turnover at the pinnacle of the structure
73 This is the model suggested by both Altshuler and Volpato.
74 See: Volpato, ‘The Automobile Industry in Transition’, in Tolliday and Zeitlin (eds), Between Fordism 
and Flexibility, pp. 191-192.
75 E. Bartezzaghi, F. Turco, ‘Flessibilita ed Efficienza nel Manufacturing’, L ’Impresa (July, 1989), pp. 60- 
67.
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was sufficient to introduce a radically different business approach. This thesis, on the 
other hand, focuses on the role played by different actors within the firm (top 
management, ownership, production engineers and marketing staff) in the process of 
decision-making regarding the confirmation or rejection of routines. Engineers were the 
actors who had actually developed the production management culture based on cost 
reduction through process/product standardisation. However this work shows that by the 
mid-1960s, marketing management started to question this culture, by increasingly 
suggesting that the best output maximisation strategy was to gradually shift upmarket, in 
order to maximise revenues from sales. Production engineers, on the other hand, insisted 
that given the specialisation of Fiat in the lower segments of the market, the 
comparative costs of Fiat upmarket units were higher than those of its German and 
French counterparts. Therefore, higher revenues from sales were not necessarily going 
to turn into higher profits. This depended upon the price level set by the most efficient 
competitors, which means that the shift upmarket was a risky move. This work shows 
that the criterion for routine selection held by the top management was essentially based 
on the regime of competition. According to such a criterion, Fiat shifted upmarket 
during the 1970s, when, in each domestic market, the domestic champion set prices, and 
foreign competitors followed upward in a way that resembled collusive behaviours. The 
suspension of price competition represented the medium-term response of the industry 
to the upward instability in the price of inputs that characterised the 1970s. This 
situation enabled Fiat management to be sufficiently confident to actually adjust its 
output mix up-market, because the company could mark up prices according to its cost 
structure, knowing that competitors would follow upward, and that given price levels, 
upmarket units would provide better margins of contribution. The shift upmarket, 
therefore, was an opportunistic behaviour, rather than the outcome of a deeper 
rethinking of the whole production organisation towards upmarket production and 
flexibility.
This approach links this thesis to the macro-economic literature on the Italian car 
industry, and in particular the work of Silva on the competitive structure of the Italian 
and European markets during the 1970s. By implementing the input/output analysis 
based on quarterly data from inter-sectoral tables, Silva demonstrated that after 1975,
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the Italian car industry reversed the trend, started in 1969, towards decreasing 
contribution margins. This reflected the suspension of price competition, which enabled 
Fiat to sustain selling prices and offset the effect of increasing input prices. By building 
upon the Silva results, and complementing his findings with new qualitative evidence, 
this work will show not only that Fiat management was confident about the 
predictability of the their competitors' pricing behaviour, but also that given the price 
levels set by Fiat, the shift upmarket would maximise the contribution margin. When, in 
the late 1970s, Fiat managers perceived that in the 1980s price competition was going to 
be restored, they focused product renewal on small cars. This ultimately caused the 
output mix to shift back downmarket, where Fiat was confident of keeping its market 
shares and set the price, which would have maximised its contribution margin.
Conclusions
This thesis suggests that when robotics was introduced and developed by Fiat during 
the 1970s, engineers decided to use the new technology to minimise the cycle time 
rather than opt for flexibility, because production managers intended to optimise the 
whole process for the production of small cars. Engineers, in fact, perceived the shift 
upmarket pursued by the company during the 1970s as a temporary and opportunistic 
move, fostered by a temporary suspension of price competition. Accordingly, the 
restructuring of Fiat during the 1970s is seen as a case of maximisation of the 
intellectual capital accumulated by the firm in the age of Fordism. This view finds its 
theoretical foundation in an interpretative framework based upon the Chandlerian 
paradigm of big business development, and upon the evolutionary theory of economic 
change.
Thus, the interpretation of Fiat restructuring suggested by this thesis departs from the 
view emerging from the post-Fordism debate, that the business organisations developed 
in the aftermath of the crisis of the 1970s were inherently discontinuous in respect to the 
Fordist organisation of mass production. It is worth noting that even the school of 
thought usually referred to as neo-Fordism, which implies a continuity with the passing 
age of Fordism in terms of institutional frameworks, implies nonetheless a discontinuity 
in the knowledge underpinning the organisation of production, caused by the shift to
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flexibility. The majority of the Italian literature on Fiat mirrors the neo-Fordist 
discontinuity in production management. The contribution of this work to the current 
literature on Fiat consists of showing that such a discontinuity did not actually occur 
after 1973, particularly with regard to the use Fiat management intended to make of new 
production technologies, and in regards to output-mix optimisation strategies. If 
discontinuity occurred, it emerged in the 1990s, when the Italian company developed its 
own lean production scheme and expanded its product range into niche market. Given 
the significance of Fiat in the world car industry, such a finding is also a contribution to 
the international debate on post-Fordism, in relation to the dating of the development of 
new production frameworks that effectively departed from Fordism.
78
Chapter 3
From growth to crisis, and from crisis to recovery: Fiat, 1960-1987 
Introduction
This chapter describes the development of the Fiat organisation from 1960 to 1987. 
After 1973, Fiat witnessed a remarkable acceleration in managerial turnover at the top 
end of the hierarchy. Moreover, some of the new appointees came from outside the Fiat 
Group, as opposed to the pre-1973 period, during which managerial turnover had 
traditionally occurred through internal mobility. Therefore, the question arises whether 
the new management rejected the old pattern of routines, or whether new managers 
integrated into the existing structure and maximised the stock of available knowledge. 
The latter hypothesis has been rather overlooked by the established literature, which has 
generally accepted the discontinuity view. By reviewing Fiat restructuring, this chapter 
suggests that there are no obvious reasons to believe that new managers replaced the old 
set of supply-driven routines (which had enabled Fiat to exploit a rapidly growing 
market during the Golden Age), with new market-oriented routines designed to deal 
more efficiently with market maturation. This leads to the analysis conducted later in 
this thesis, where the new contribution consists of showing that the principles 
underpinning technological change and output-mix optimisation strategy in the late 
1970s and early 1980s were similar to those that had inspired strategic decision-making 
during the 1960s.
The chapter is organised in three main sections. The first summarises the growth of 
the Fiat Group from the 1950s to the 1990s, and addresses the issue of market 
maturation, questioning the paradigm of discontinuity, and the way the paradigm has 
been applied to Fiat. The second deals with the development of managerial capabilities 
at Fiat during the Golden Age, and analyses the company's restructuring during the 
1970s. This section shows that there is no evidence to suggest that the restructuring of 
managerial hierarchies during the 1970s led to a replacement of managerial knowledge. 
The final section deals with the crisis of Fiat during the 1970s and addresses the impact 
of the oil shock on the Italian company. This section points out that the crisis of the 
1970s might well have encouraged the Fiat management to reinforce rather than reject
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the old set of routines, in order to exercise a more effective control over costs. What 
emerges from the three sections is that the mere analysis of Fiat’s transformations 
during the 1970s provides no clear indications as to the direction that the new 
management was going to take in order to compete during the 1980s. Therefore, it 
would be wrong to simply assume that the strategy was new because the management 
was new.
Section one 
Fiat and the paradigm of discontinuity
This section analyses the development of Fiat between 1950 and 1990, providing the 
reader with general information on the Italian company. Furthermore, the following 
paragraphs criticise the view of discontinuity in Fiat development after 1973.
Fiat growth, 1950-1990. An overview
The evolution of Fiat from the post-war period to the 1980s resembles the textbook 
pattern of the Western economies from the expansion of the “Golden Age” to the crisis 
of the 1970s and the recovery of the 1980s. Figure 3.1 displays the turnover, net profits 
and employment of the Fiat group from 1950 to 1990. During the 1950s, profits 
expanded more rapidly than turnover and labour, indicating that the expansion of the 
group was led by gains in productivity, something that was to be expected in the Golden 
Age. On the other hand, profits decreased after the peak of 1961. After the trough of 
1964, profits increased again, but exceeded the 1961 level only in 1968. In comparison 
with the previous decade, labour input increased much faster than turnover and profits, 
which indicates a reverse trend in productivity.
80
Figure 3.1: Gross turnover, net profits (in constant 1993 prices) and employment 
of Fiat Group, 1950-1990
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Source: Archivio Storico Fiat, Fiat: le fasi della crescita. Tempi e cifre dello sviluppo azietidale 
(Torino, 1996), pp. 100-101. See: table A 3.1 in the appendix.
In 1969, profits decreased remarkably although the turnover increased slightly. The 
first six years of the 1970s, unsurprisingly, show the signs of deep crisis. Turnover 
stagnated, while labour expanded at an unprecedented rate, in the aftermath of a marked 
shortening of the working week. Profits collapsed. From 1977, turnover expanded quite 
rapidly, but profits recovered to the 1969 level only in 1984. From 1981 to 1984, profits 
increased whereas the turnover decreased, indicating a steady expansion of productivity. 
Finally, from 1985 to 1990 profits and turnover increased with the former expanding 
more rapidly than the latter. Only in 1987 did turnover expand more than profits.
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As will be shown in the third section of the chapter, the crisis of the 1970s was 
caused by many different factors, including the increase in the per unit cost of labour 
input, the expansion of the payroll, high levels of absenteeism and the high frequency of 
industrial conflicts.1 The oil crisis and the upward trend in the price of raw materials 
helped make a bad situation worse. Fiat had to increase the price of output to offset 
increases in the price of inputs. This put downward pressure on demand, which was 
already stagnating because of the oil crisis. In contrast with the 1970s, the 1980s 
witnessed the normalisation of industrial relations, along with the stabilisation of the 
prices of inputs, and the recovery of demand. Those factors undoubtedly stimulated the 
recovery of Fiat.
It is commonly agreed that the crisis of the 1970s contributed to the speeding up of 
restructuring, by giving more urgency to the transformation of a structure that had 
already been proving increasingly inefficient in the late 1960s. According to the 
established literature, managerial turnover was not simply the replacement of incapable 
managers by capable ones. Compared with those they had replaced, the new managers 
were different rather than better. The point stressed by the literature is that during the 
Golden Age management had been very effective in interpreting Fordist principles of 
mass production. Those principles were compatible with the social, political and 
economic conditions in which Fiat was operating, and enabled the company to cope 
with the rapid expansion of demand.3 On the other hand, socio-economic conditions 
changed dramatically during the 1970s, so that the Fordist principle of mass production 
was no longer adequate to cope with the changing pattern of demand. Had Fiat replaced 
its management, without changing the managerial paradigm in the process, the company 
would have not been able to profit from the improvement of industrial relations and the 
macro-economic conditions that characterised the 1980s. In particular, Fiat would not 
have been able to cope with changes in the pattern of demand caused by the maturation 
of the European market. Based on this assumption, the established literature is inclined
1 Industrial relations will be approached in chapter 4.
2 See V. Comito, La Fiat tra crisi e ristrutturazione (Roma, 1982), pp. 57-58. See also A. Mosconi, ‘Fiat 
1968 -1977: gli anni del cambiamento’, in A. Mosconi, E. Rulliani, II gruppo nello sviluppo dell’impresa 
industriale. Con un analisi del caso Fiat (Milano, 1978), pp. 69-70.
3 Volpato, II Caso Fiat, pp. 67-89.
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to believe that a discontinuity in the market brought about a discontinuity in 
management.
The next part of the section will address the question whether the conceptual 
framework on which the paradigm of discontinuity is based is sufficiently sound. It will 
define discontinuity in demand, and will criticise the idea that discontinuity in demand 
leads necessarily to discontinuity in supply management.
Market maturation and new registrations, 1950-1990
This section looks at vehicle registrations in the four largest European markets, 
namely Germany, France Italy and the UK,4 and describes the process of market 
maturation, which characterised the end of the Golden Age. As already explained in 
chapter 2, the cause and effect relationship between market maturation and the 
emergence of flexible manufacturing systems is at the centre of the inter-related debates 
on post-Fordism and the restructuring of the world-wide motor vehicle industry. This 
paragraph discusses and criticises the widespread idea that demand discontinuity in the 
form of market maturation inevitably causes a shift from Fordist mass production to 
flexible mass production, which, in turn, implies discontinuity in production 
management.5 On the contrary, it is suggested that the nature and direction of 
restructuring has to be analysed case by case, and that in the case of Fiat a discontinuity 
in management has not been yet sufficiently demonstrated.
Infant markets are characterised by the rapid growth of new registrations and, 
therefore, of the car stock. By contrast, in mature markets, the rate of growth of new 
registrations is much slower because car density is much higher. The rate of growth of 
vehicle registrations, therefore, can be used to describe the process of market 
maturation, identifying the period of time in which markets shift from infancy to 
maturity. Table 3.1 displays the rate of growth of vehicle registrations by decade, from 
1950 to 1990, in Italy, Germany, France and the UK.
4 The largest national markets in Europe in terms of vehicle registrations.
5 See: Volpato, ‘The Automobile Industry in Transition’, in: Tolliday and Zeitlin (eds) Between Fordism 
and Flexibility, pp. 191-192.
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Table 3.1: Rate of growth of vehicle registrations. 1950-1990, selecited countries
Italy Germany France UK
1950-60 16.9% 20.0% 13.9% 19.8%
1960-70 13.5% 8.0% 7.3% 3.1%
1970-80 1.1% 1.4% 3.7% 2.9%
1980-90 4.0% 2.2% 2.0% 2.8%
Source: Calculations based on data from ANFIA (Italian Association of Car Manufacturers and 
Traders), L ’automobile in cifre (Torino, 1996), pp. 232-238. For the data set, see table A 3.2 in the 
appendix.
In the 1950s, the rate of growth of new registrations ranged from 13.9% per year in 
the case of France to 20.0% per year in the case of Germany. In the 1960s, the rate of 
growth started to slow. At the centre of the distribution, there were Germany and France 
with growth rates of 8.0% and 7.3% per year respectively. At the upper end of the 
distribution there was Italy, still growing at a rate of 13.5% per year, while the UK was 
at the lowest end with a far slower pace of growth, namely 3.1%. The rate of growth of 
the Italian market during the 1960s was exceptional, since it matched that of France 
during the 1950s. In the 1960s, therefore, Italy was still in its phase of infancy, and Fiat 
profited from that. Between 1960 and 1970, domestic demand expanded by 3.6 times, 
and Fiat output expanded by 3 times.6
During the 1970s, however, the rate of growth of the Italian market decreased 
sharply. This time Italy was at the bottom end of the distribution, with a rate of growth 
of only 1.1% per year, while France was at the top end with 3.7%. The striking decrease 
is partly explained by the normal trend towards maturation, and partly by the severe 
effect of the oil crisis on demand. In fact, the Italian market exceeded the pre-oil crisis 
vehicle registrations only in 1980, whereas Germany recovered in 1975, France in 1976 
and the UK in 1979.7 Thus, the fact that the oil crisis occurred exactly when the process 
of transition of the Italian market from infancy to maturity started made the transition 
less gradual than in Germany and France. As will be shown in the following paragraphs, 
the established literature maintains that the relatively late and rapid maturation of the
6 See tables A 3.2 and A 3.3 in the appendix.
7 See table A 3.2 in the appendix.
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Italian market explains why after 1974 Fiat saw a marked acceleration of managerial 
turnover, which in turn brought about discontinuity in management.
During the 1980s, Germany and particularly Italy experienced an increase in the 
growth rate of new registrations as compared with that of the previous decade. Actually, 
the Italian market exceeded the French growth of the previous decade and, of course, 
this helped the recovery of Fiat during the 1980s. The recovery of vehicle registrations 
in the Italian market was partly a consequence of the prolonged downswing experienced 
by the Italian market between 1974 and 1980. In that period, second-time buyers tended 
to delay the replacement of their cars up to the point when their old vehicles had to be 
scrapped. This led to the ageing of the car stock, which in turn caused the acceleration 
of replacements in the 1980s. Moreover, because of the ageing of the car stock in the 
late 1970s, during the 1980s first-time buyers preferred to buy new rather than second­
hand cars, which, in mature markets, usually provide a large proportion of first-time 
purchases. A further busting factor was that new vehicles were expected to substantially 
lower running costs.8 The fact that first-time buyers preferred brand new vehicles 
explains why during the 1980s new demand - the portion of vehicles that makes the car 
stock grow as opposed to replacement, which is the portion of demand equal to 
scrapping - remained a substantial part of total registrations, as shown by figure 3.2.
8 The Fiat Uno is a good example of a car designed to minimise running costs. It was fitted with the new 
lOOOcc. F.I.R.E. engine, which was substantially more efficient than the previous 903 cc engine fitted in 
the Fiat 127. Thanks to improvements in its design, the new power unit consisted of a substantially 
reduced number of components, which contributed to lower maintenance costs.
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Figure 3.2: The structure of demand in the Italian m arket 1960-1990
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Source: Calculations based on data from ANFIA, L ’automobile in Cifre, pp. 334, 340. New 
demand is the portion of demand that makes the vehicle stock to grow. Replacement demand is 
the portion of demand that equals scrapping. For the calculation of new demand and 
replacement, see table A 3.4 in the appendix.
This is an important element to keep in mind when discussing output mix 
maximisation strategies. The relevance of new demand in the structure of the Italian 
market during the 1980s indicates that in that period the lower end of the demand 
spectrum had remained very important, in spite of the fact that the Italian market was 
advancing towards maturity.
Market maturation and managerial turnover at Fiat
In general, the literature on motor car manufacturing tends to see the restructuring of 
the European industry during the 1980s as a response to the maturation of the market. 
The argument is as follows. Because mature markets are characterised by slow growth,
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and by a large portion of demand absorbed by replacements, firms have to stimulate 
replacement through increasing product renewal and differentiation. This requires the 
maximisation of flexibility in production.9 In the preceding chapter, this view has been 
criticised, in that it establishes a rigid cause and effect relationship between market 
maturation and the decision of managers to maximise flexibility. The criticism was 
based upon the consideration that flexible production might increase the level of 
complexity of both the production process and product development. This means that 
the potential advantage of flexibility, namely a stabilisation in the rate of plant 
utilisation, and an expansion of the product range, might be outweighed by an increase 
in complexity costs. Managers, therefore, may or may not decide to maximise flexibility 
according to their estimates of costs and benefits. This implies that the shift to flexible 
production during the 1980s cannot be taken for granted, but has to be empirically 
verified case by case. This consideration is even more important for Fiat, given that 
during the 1980s its domestic market was still characterised by very large demand for 
lower market units, for which price was the most relevant element of competition.
The established literature on Fiat, nonetheless, takes it for granted that the company 
fits into the paradigm of market discontinuity. The literature underlines three points. 
Firstly, although the restructuring process had already started in 1967, it was slow and 
ineffective until 1973, while it accelerated enormously after 1974. Secondly, while 
before 1973 the restructuring consisted mainly of the reshuffling of the hierarchy by 
internal appointments, after 1974 managers were appointed from outside the firm. 
Finally, new management accelerated the process of technological change, in order to 
increase output-mix flexibility and, in so doing, to acquire the ability to implement a 
more flexible output-mix optimisation strategy, and to cope with the shift upmarket of 
demand that is normally expected in mature markets. According to the established 
literature, therefore, the abrupt transition from infancy to maturity compelled the 
company to accelerate the process of restructuring, which therefore resulted in the 
abrupt replacement of old managerial paradigms with new ones. The first oil crisis 
functioned as a catalyst for the entire process of restructuring, primarily because of the
9 See chapter 2, pp. 67-74.
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psychological impact the crisis had on the Fiat owners, who felt that restructuring could 
not be postponed any longer. Another factor was that the crisis put downward pressure 
on new registrations, and this was expected to be long lasting. Therefore, managers 
expected competition for market share and niche markets to become even more severe 
than expected before the first oil crisis.10
As already mentioned, the literature based on the paradigm of discontinuity is not 
convincing because it assumes - without demonstrating it through cost/benefit analysis - 
that car manufacturers should respond to the maturation of the market by shifting 
towards flexible mass production. Moreover, that literature assumes - without 
empirically demonstrating it through the monthly analysis of production line operations 
- that the car industry, including Fiat, shifted, or attempted to shift towards flexibility. 
On top of that, the way the paradigm of discontinuity has been applied to the case of Fiat 
seems to contradict the very assumptions underpinning the paradigm. The argument that 
the Italian market matured later and more rapidly than the other main European markets 
has been used by the literature to explain why Fordist management remained fairly 
stable until 1973, and why it was replaced fairly quickly after the first oil crisis, when, 
according to the established literature, Fiat had to introduce new paradigms of 
production management in order to compete in a much more competitive environment. 
At the same time, the literature emphasises that the new management was successful in 
managing the shift towards flexibility, and that during the 1980s Fiat was in step with, if 
not more advanced than, other European competitors in the development of flexible 
mass production.11 The contradiction lies in the fact that, precisely because the Italian 
market was the last one to reach maturity, the paradigm of discontinuity should predict 
that the Italian car industry would be the last one to accumulate the “intellectual capital” 
necessary to develop new paradigms of production management. As will be shown in 
the following paragraphs, the fact that new appointments in the upper end of the 
hierarchy had been made by recruiting managers from outside the firm does not resolve 
the contradiction, given the technical background of those managers. In addition, these 
had developed their careers in Italy, so it is not clear why they would have developed a
10 Volpato, II Caso Fiat, pp. 137-188.
11 Ibid.
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flexibility-oriented business culture, or a business culture in any way different from that 
of the old management. Given these considerations, it seems wise to test the hypothesis 
of discontinuity against the hypothesis that new managers integrated into the existing 
structure, and utilised new technology to optimise rather than change production 
management, in order to optimise rather than change the output mix optimisation 
strategy of the company. According to the hypothesis of continuity, the strategy of Fiat 
proved effective because, as shown by figure 3.2, during the 1980s in the Italian market 
- the main outlet of Fiat output - new demand was still a significant share of total 
demand. Therefore, the lower segments of the market, where competition was mainly 
based on price, and in which Fiat was traditionally more specialised, still represented an 
important share of demand for the company. In this sense, the hypothesis of continuity 
reflects the evolutionary theory of economic change, according to which firms select 
routines under the influence of accumulated knowledge, while the market determines 
the survival of the firm according to the compatibility of the selected routines with the 
structure and trend of demand.
The following chapters of the thesis will test the continuity hypothesis. Meanwhile, 
the next paragraphs of this chapter analyse the evolution of the Fiat structure from the 
post-war period to the 1980s. The aim is to provide the reader with all the information 
necessary to understand the arguments developed in this thesis. At the same time, the 
question is addressed whether, from the information used by the established literature, it 
is actually possible to infer that the new managers were really different in terms of 
business culture from the management they replaced, and whether there is evidence that 
the restructuring of the top management influenced the accumulated knowledge of the 
firm as a whole.
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Section two 
Fiat’s managerial structure, 1946-1987
This section looks at the Fiat structure from 1946 to the late 1980s. Firstly, it 
analyses the development of the company, its organisation, and the managerial culture 
developed during the Golden Age. Secondly, it addresses the restructuring occurring 
during the 1970s.
1945-60: From the end of the War to the Growth of the 1960s
Between 1946 and 1966, Fiat enjoyed exceptional managerial stability. The bulk of 
the managerial structure was designed by Giovanni Agnelli, the founder of the 
company,12 in the inter-war period, and was later developed by Vittorio Valletta, 
President and Chairman of the Board from 1946, who had been Agnelli's right hand man 
since 1922.13 When Valletta retired in 1966, he was replaced by Giovanni Agnelli junior 
(the grandson of the company's founder). However, many key managers appointed by 
Valletta remained in charge, while others were replaced by internal appointments. 
Moreover, Gaudenzio Bono, Valletta's right hand man since 1946, retired in 1972. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to say that the managerial culture of Fiat in the early 1970s 
reflected the business knowledge accumulated by the firm during the 1950s and 1960s.
Immediately after his appointment as Fiat president, Valletta started a reorganisation 
of the company, in order to recover from the disruption brought about by the war, and to 
get ready to profit from the expected stabilisation of the economy and recovery of 
demand in the post-war period. In practical terms, Valletta rationalised the functional
12 Fiat was established in 1898 in Turin by Ludovico Scarfiotti, Emanuele Cacherano di Bricherasio, 
Giovanni Agnelli and others. By 1908, though, Giovanni Agnelli acquired the complete control of the 
company. During the inter-war period, Fiat diversified its activities, becoming an industrial group. Around 
the core business, namely vehicle manufacturing, Fiat was engaged in aircraft production and shipbuilding 
as well as in non-manufacturing activities such as banking and consumer credit. Fiat also participated in 
the ownership and control of several companies in both the manufacturing and service sectors. In 1927, 
Agnelli established IFI (Istituto Finanaziario Italiano), a financial company owning 70% of the shares of 
the Fiat Group. Since then, the Agnelli family controlled Fiat by controlling IFI. For the structure of the 
Fiat Group see G. Piluso, ‘L’evoluzione dell’azionariato Fiat: assetti proprietari, struttura di gruppo e 
alleanze finanziarie’, in Annibaldi and Berta (eds) Grande impresa e sviluppo italiano, p. 221. For the 
structure of the ownership see F. Barca et al., ’La trasformazione societaria di Fiat, Pirelli e Falck dal 
1947 ad oggi’, in F. Barca (ed.), Storia del capitalismo italiano (Roma, 1997), table 3, p. 164. For the 
establishment of IFI, see Castronovo, Agnelli, pp. 444-462.
13 Valletta became president of Fiat following the death of Giovanni Agnelli senior, and because his 
grandson, Giovanni Agnelli junior, was too young to take over the leadership of the group.
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structure already in place in the inter-war period. The structure set up in 1948 is 
represented by chart 3.1, although for simplicity not all the divisions are represented.
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Chart 3.1: The Fiat managerial hierarchy in the car sector. 194814
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Source: Archivio Storico Fiat, file “Fiat Capogruppo, delibere e documentazioni varie”, quoted in 
in Amatori ‘Gli uomini del Professore’, in Annibaldi and Berta (eds), Grande impresa e sviluppo 
italiano, pp. 323-324.
14 As far as the Steel Division is concerned, in the archives there is no information concerning
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The term 'division' was used to mark the hierarchical relationship between divisions 
and departments within divisions,15 but in reality, Fiat was a long way from deploying a 
multi-divisional M-form organisational structure of the kind implemented by General 
Motors, where divisions were in charge of both the achievement of production targets 
and strategic decision- making. Actually, Fiat was a departmentalised structure (U-form 
structure) in which decision-making was centralised and operation managers executed 
plans drawn up by top management.16 Decision-making was centralised in two 
structures: the Comitato Tecnico (Technical Committee) for the development of process 
and product; and the Direzione Generale (General Director’s Consulting Committee) for 
strategic planning.
The “distribution of expertise” in the managerial structure is of interest. Apart from 
Valletta, who was an economist, both the Comitato and the Direzione were dominated 
by production engineers such as Bruschi, Bono and Genero. On the other hand, design 
engineers such as Giuseppe Gabrielli and Dante Giacosa, respectively the director and 
deputy director of the Divisione Tecnica, had no seats in the Comitato or the
1 7Direzione. The Comitato Technico decided which products had to be produced and 
what resources had to be allocated, with the role of Divisione Tecnica being limited to 
product design according to the cost target set by the Comitato. Therefore, neither
1 ftGabrielli nor Giacosa were involved in the decision-making process in 1948. 
Moreover, managers such as Genero and Bono had an almost hostile attitude towards 
designers.19
management in 1948.
15 Here the word department translates as the Italian word sezione.
16 Mintzberg’s Machine Organisation is a particularly suitable definition for Fiat. Machine Organisation, 
in fact, features centralised bureaucracy, formal procedures, specialised work, sharp division of labour, 
functional groupings, extensive hierarchy, with a key role for the technostructure. See Mintzberg, 
Mintzberg on Management, pp. 130-133.
17 Dante Giacosa is the 'father' of almost all Fiat cars from the late 1940s to the late 1960s, including the 
500, which became synonymous with Fiat all over the world.
18 A few years later, Gabrielli was included in the General Director’s Consulting Committee, and 
appointed member o f the Board. Giacosa, in contrast, was never appointed to the Board, and was 
appointed an ‘added member’ of the Technical Committee only in 1960.
19Amatori, ‘Gli uomini del Professore’ in Annibaldi and Berta (eds), Grande impresa e sviluppo italiano, 
p. 333.
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The hierarchical structure reflected a precise managerial view that Valletta had been
sharing with Giovanni Agnelli during the inter-war period. This was that the design
team had to be controlled by the production team, in order to avoid over-engineering
• 20 •leading to excess complexity and extra production costs. As Giacosa pointed out, since 
the 1910s, when Agnelli split the technical direction of the workshop away from the 
technical direction of the design department, power had always been in the hands of 
production engineers. Moreover, the actual power of managers was defined by an 
informal ranking rather than by their formal position in the hierarchy. A good example 
of this was the relationship between the Technical Division and the Automobile 
Division. In theory, Giuseppe Coriziato, the production manager responsible for the 
Automobile Division was subordinate to Giacosa, who was the vice-director of the 
Technical Division (see chart 3.1). In fact, the decision-making power of the 
Automobile Division was much greater than that of the Technical Division. Coriziato, in 
fact, was frilly in charge of the Ufficio Tempi e Metodi (Time and Methods of 
Production Department), a sub-section of the Automobile Division. That office decided 
methods of production, and set the cycle time of each operation. If a particular design 
involved overlong cycle times, and therefore high costs, Coriziato asked for a 
modification of the design, knowing that Bono and Genero would have supported him 
on the grounds that cost control had priority over any other consideration. For this 
reason, Giacosa submitted a project to Bono only after the approval of Automobile 
Division.21 The incentive for Coriziato to reject any project involving high complexity 
was quite strong, because the simpler the product, the easier the process and, therefore, 
the easier it was to reach production targets set by Bono and Genero. Therefore, 
Valletta, Bono and Genero could be reasonably sure that Coriziato's informal power 
over Giacosa was the best way to control costs.
The power exercised by production engineers over designers was the main element of 
continuity between the company run by Giovanni Agnelli Senior and that administrated 
by Valletta. In the inter-war period, the hierarchical relationship between production 
engineers and designers had been designed to make sure the latter delivered projects
20 D. Giacosa, Progetti alia Fiatprima del computer (Milano, 1979), p. 67.
21 Ibid.
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involving the lowest possible level of process complexity and, therefore, requiring the 
least possible amount of raw materials, which were almost all imported and, therefore, 
extremely expensive.22 When, in the post-war period, Fiat introduced and developed 
mass production technology, production engineers instructed the design team not only to 
address the minimisation of raw material input, but also the minimisation of the cycle 
time in the manufacturing of each component designed. The efficiency with which Fiat 
pursued the minimisation of costs and the maximisation of economies of scale enabled 
the company to supply the latent demand for cheap vehicles that characterised the Italian 
market in the stage of its infancy during the 1950s and 1960s. The structure set up by 
Valletta, therefore, enabled the company to pursue the strategy of expansion, launched 
in 1946, which, in turn, was compatible with the size of the Italian market and its 
potential for expansion. The adoption of “Fordist” techniques of mass production in the 
1950s fitted well into the overall Fiat strategy, and was favoured by the important fact 
that a significant quantity of American production machinery came with Marshall Aid.
The Fiat structure remained substantially unchanged throughout the 1950s and 
1960s.24 The long-term stability of the techno-structure set up by Valletta, of course, 
contributed to the consolidation of a corporate culture among young engineers, whose 
skills were measured according their capacity to conform to the production-oriented 
approach of the techno-structure. This means that the business culture generated by
22 In general, process complexity is proportional to the complexity of the component manufactured. The 
more complex the components, the more complex the process and the larger the quantity of material and 
labour input utilised. Moreover, the more complex the process, the larger the amount of material lost as 
process waste.
23 However, as pointed out by Bigazzi, the adoption of American technology and techniques was selective 
for several reasons, including the composition of the workforce, the availability of skilled workers, and the 
fact that some engineers who had visited the GM and Ford plants during the 1950s had not found them 
particularly efficient in terms of stock management. Bigazzi, ‘Mirafiori’, in Zetlein and. Herrigel (eds), 
Americanisation and Its Limits, pp. 163-211.
24 In 1954, the Divisione Technica was replaced by the Ufficio Tecnico Autoveicoli (Automotive 
Technical Office), and the Comitato Tecnico was transformed into the Comitato Studi e Ricerche 
(Research and Technical Analysis Committee). Dante Giacosa became the director of the Ufficio Tecnico 
but was excluded from the Comitato Ricerche e Studi and, therefore, had no decision-making powers. 
Amatori, ‘Gli uomini del Professore.’, in Annibladi and Berta (eds), Grande impresa e sviluppo italiano, 
pp. 327-334.
25 Mintzberg defines technostructure as the group of analysts which, according to the type of firms, serves 
to effect certain forms of standardisation. The Fiat technostructure was formed by the kind of industrial 
engineers that Mintzberg defines as work-study analysts, in charge of the work process standardisation. 
See H. Mintzberg, Structures in Five. Designing Effective Organisation (1983), pp. 15-16.
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such stability was likely to survive in the firm for many years, because of the training 
process young engineers had to pass through in the design and production departments.
Although Fiat was engaged in the production of a wide range of models, the 
efficiency in designing, engineering and producing small cars is one of the most 
important characteristics of the techno-structure set up and developed by Valletta. This 
feature of the Valletta management was obviously affected by the structure of demand 
of the Italian market, which, during the 1950s was massively skewed downmarket.26 
Nonetheless, there was also an internal reason why the Fiat technical team performed 
much better in the design and engineering of small cars. This was that both lower- and 
upper-range models were designed according to the strict cost targets set by production 
engineers. As a result, the Fiat upmarket range was inferior to that of Lancia, Alfa 
Romeo, and German manufacturers in terms of overall quality. Therefore, Fiat was able 
to acquire and defend market shares in the upper segments mainly because of the 
protection of the domestic market and the relatively small production capacity of 
domestic competitors. On the other hand, the quality of the Fiat bottom range was 
comparatively higher than that of competitors. As the design team found it easier to 
reach the Comitato's cost targets for small cars, and was indeed judged according to its 
ability to reach the targets, Giacosa was keen to persuade Bono to allocate most of the 
resources at his disposal to small rather than large car projects. Because the comparative 
advantage of Fiat derived from small car manufacturing, the Comitato was keen to 
allocate resources according to Giacosa's requests.
After Valletta: The search for a new structure
Under the guidance of the managerial structure set up by Valletta, Fiat grew at a 
remarkable rate. Production in the car sector expanded from 108,700 to 513,300 units 
between 1950 and I960.27 Moreover, the Valletta management masterminded and 
implemented the expansion plan that led to the establishment of the Rivalta plant in
26 As pointed out by Volpato, with the introduction of the 600 and the 500 in the second half of the 1950s, 
Fiat captured the latent demand for cheap cars represented by scooter drivers wishing to upgrade their 
transportation means. Volpato, II caso Fiat, p. 47.
27 See table A 3.3 in the appendix.
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1967. It was a giant facility, at least by Fiat standards, with an area of 2,000,000 m2, 
including 300,000 m of shop floor. It was as big as Mirafiori, and twice the size of 
Lingotto, the other two Fiat plants at that time. Consequently, production reached 
1,506,847 units by 1970.28 The strategy of expansion pursued by Valletta will be 
analysed in the following chapter of the thesis. At this stage, the focus is on the 
transformation of the managerial structure, which occurred before and after 1966, when 
Agnelli replaced Valletta as president of Fiat.
Table 3.2 shows the composition of the Fiat Administration Board from 1946 to 
1970. The change from Valletta to Agnelli brought about little change in the Fiat 
managerial structure. The group of production engineers representing the bulk of the 
Valletta management, such as Bono, Ugo Camuri, Vittorio Bonade’ Bottino, Alessandro 
Genenro and Domenico Taccone, stayed on until 1969, with Bono remaining until 1972. 
Giacosa did not become a member of the board. Nonetheless, the appointments to the 
board of Enrico Minola in 1963 and Niccolo Gioia in 1969 deserve attention.
28 Ibid.
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Table 3.2: Composition of the Administration Board, 1946-1970
Name Degree 1946-50 1950-55 1955-60 1960-66 1966-70
V. Valletta Economics P/C P/C P/C P/C/HP
G. Agnelli Law VP VP VP VP/C P
R. Bruschi Engineering MB MB MB
V.B. Bottino Engineering MB MB MB MB MB
G.Bono Engineering C C C/GD C/GD VP/C
A.G. Cavinato Engineering MB MB MB MB MB
A. Genro Engineering MB MB MB MB MB
C. Ghiglione Engineering MB MB MB MB
D. Taccone Engineering MB MB MB MB MB
G. Gabrielli Engineering MB MB
E. Minola Engineering MB
A. Fiorelli Engineering MB MB
C. Ciuti Engineering MB
N. Gioia Engineering MB
Source: Archivio Storico Fiat, Reports of the Administration Board Committee, various 
years, in Amatori, ‘Gli uonini del Professore’ in Annubaldi and Berta (eds), Grande impresa 
e sviluppo italiano, pp. 322-342. P = President; C = Chairman; VP = Vice President; GD = 
General Director; HP= Honorary President; MB = Member of the Board.
Minola started his career at Fiat in 1924. In 1927, he was appointed Director of Fiat 
Deutsche, in 1957 became Director of the Divisione Commerciale (Commercial 
Division). He retired in 1967.29 Although Minola was an industrial engineer, during his 
career in the commercial sector he developed a market-oriented approach to car 
manufacturing. In 1957, with the help of Giammario Rossignolo, a newly-appointed 
young economist, Minola tried to transform the Commercial Division from a mere 
logistical division managing the distribution network, into a proper marketing division 
capable of analysing trends in demand and consumer behaviour and of providing the 
design and production teams with substantial feedback on demand. Minola's 
appointment to the board reflected Valletta's need for more precise feedback about
29 Amatori, ‘Gli uomini del professore’, in: Annibaldi and Berta (eds), Grande impresa e sviluppo 
italiano, p. 334.
98
demand, in a context in which decreasing tariffs were expected to bring about more 
competition in the domestic market and to cause an increase in exports. Whether this 
feedback was used by Fiat management to shift towards a more market-oriented 
approach to car manufacturing, or whether Valletta intended to use market information 
to lobby the Italian Government to reintroduce forms of market protection had 
competition become too severe, is a question that will be approached in chapter 6. At 
this stage, it is important to point out that the appointment of Minola to a board 
dominated by production engineers was not likely to promote a shift from a product- to 
a market-oriented approach in the short term. Nonetheless, it gave the opportunity to 
managers like Rossignolo to make their way through the Fiat hierarchy and confront 
their business views with those of production engineers.
The appointment of Niccolo Gioia to the board in 1969 is also extremely important. 
Gioia was the manager chosen by Agnelli to develop a multi-divisional M-form 
structure, as opposed to the U-form departmental structure set up by Valletta. Given the 
continuous expansion of production and the integration of the process, by 1966 the 
structure set up in 1948 had become much more complex. Chart 3.2 shows the first four 
levels of the hierarchical structure. Below the fourth level, which was organised in 
divisions, there were more than a hundred sub-divisions with production, sales, and 
accounting and finance functions.
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Chart 3.2: Fiat structure, 1966
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Production divisions were responsible for the monitoring of actual costs, while sales 
divisions monitored revenues from sales. Cost and revenues were then analysed by the 
General Director’s Consulting Committee. According to the results of the analysis, the 
Consulting Committee set the cost and sales targets, and decided how to reach the 
target. Moreover, the General Director made strategic decisions concerning new 
products and markets, and issues such as mergers and acquisitions. Therefore, there 
were more than a hundred divisions and only one centre of decision-making. Moreover, 
sub-divisions were organised by function rather than product. For example, within the 
vehicle division, the production function of cars and lorries and special vehicles was co­
ordinated by the same sub-division. It was in this context that in 1966 Agnelli 
commissioned a study from Boston Consulting to redesign the entire structure and 
decentralise part of the decision-making. The aim was to set up a multi-divisional 
structure, organised by product lines rather than by function, in which decisions 
concerning product improvements and cost targets were taken at the divisional level, in 
accordance with the budget allocated to each division at the central level. Long-term 
strategic decisions and budget allocation remained under the control of the General 
Director’s Consulting Committee.
In 1967, Gioia was appointed as supervisor of a group of five divisions, namely car, 
lorries and industrial vehicles, steel, marketing and railway equipment. Moreover, all the 
companies controlled by Fiat, such as OM and Autobianchi were co-ordinated by a 
section of Fiat called “Gruppo Societa Controllate” (Controlled Companies Group).30 
Meanwhile, a group of managers who had served in Valleta’s team, including Genero, 
Fiorelli, and Enrico Minola, all retired due to old age. Vincenzo Buffa replaced Fiorelli 
as director of the Car Division, while Giammario Rossignolo became director of the 
Marketing Division, and afterward, director of the Direzione Studi, Pianificazione e 
Controllo (Strategic Planning Office).
30 As will be shown in the following paragraphs of the chapter, the separation of car and lorry 
manufacturing and the establishment of the GSC were the first steps towards the establishment of Fiat 
Holding and the formation of an independent floated company in each of the manufacturing sectors in 
which Fiat was involved. The transformation occurred during the 1970s.
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At first glance, the restructuring started in 1967 brought about a large discontinuity, 
and there is little doubt that the new multi-divisional structure of Fiat aimed to change 
the functioning of the company and, therefore, the managerial style of the directors. 
However, the change was neither smooth, nor rapid or effective. Gaudenzio Bono 
remained the General Director of the company until 1972. Gioia and Buffa, the two men 
ultimately responsible for car manufacturing, were production planners who had 
developed their career within the Fiat Group. Rossignolo was one of the few managers 
who tried to introduce a different managerial style. He become one of the most 
influential managers when Agnelli become President of Fiat and, in fact, he inspired all 
the strategic moves undertaken by the new President, including the decentralisation of 
production in Southern Italy, the take-over of Citroen and the transformation of Fiat into 
an industrial holding.31 Overall, during his entire career at Fiat, Rossignolo tried to 
establish a marketing-oriented approach to the business. However, as will be shown in 
the subsequent chapters of the thesis, during the 1970s Rossignolo faced the opposition 
of production engineers such as Gioia and Ghidella, in the same way that Minola had 
faced the opposition of Fiat engineers during the 1960s. Because of this opposition, and 
in spite of his personal relationship with both Giovanni and Umberto Agnelli, 
Rossignolo left Fiat in 1972. He returned to the Fiat Group as General Director of 
Lancia in 1976, but resigned again in 1978. The contrast between Rossignolo and the 
production engineers underlines to what extent production managers remained 
influential in the post-1973 Fiat as opposed to marketing managers. Moreover, the 
contrast suggests that the business culture of production engineers could not easily be 
reconciled with the market-oriented approach of innovative managers such as 
Rossignolo.
31 See the profile of Giammario Rossignolo in P. Gennaro and G. Scifo, Parabole di imprenditori ed 
imprese in cinquant’anni di sviluppo italian, (Milano, 1997) pp. 79-88.
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The strategy of growth
According to the established literature, the long-term strategy set by Agnelli featured 
elements of continuity as well as elements of discontinuity, in respect to the strategic 
thought of Valletta. The expansion of Fiat into Eastern Europe and South America is 
usually seen an element of continuity. On the other hand, the decentralisation of 
production to Southern Italy is considered an element of discontinuity, since Valletta 
and his staff had always ruled out any major investment outside the Turin hinterland. 
Moreover, Agnelli pursued horizontal growth, trying to take over upmarket brands, 
whereas Valletta had pursued vertical growth. The analysis of the international strategy 
of Fiat is beyond the scope of this work. On the other hand, it seems appropriate to refer 
briefly to investments in Southern Italy and the attempt to take over upmarket brands, 
because both moves were connected to production organisation and the strategy of 
output-mix optimisation, which form the main focus of this thesis.
In 1967, Fiat took the decision to establish a number of production plants in Southern 
Italy. The structure developed by Valletta before 1967 resembled the Fordist model of 
vertical growth, in which an integrated cycle of production profited from the 
concentration of all the operations of the cycle within the same plant, or within the same 
geographical area. A rather superficial interpretation of Fiat investments in Southern 
Italy suggests that by decentralising production in that area of the country, the company 
intended to move away from the Valletta organisational model of strong vertical 
integration and geographical concentration of manufacturing.32 However, as will be 
shown in chapter 4, production plants in Southern Italy replicated exactly the same 
production model of the parent plants in Northern Italy, with an even lesser degree of 
flexibility. Moreover, there is enough evidence that the investment policy was driven by 
a number of clearly identifiable factors, not directly related to production organisation.33 
These include: a) the overcrowding of the Turin suburbs, with the lack of infrastructure, 
housing, and social services, all of which had been already highlighted by the last wave
32 S. Mariotti, L. Treves, ‘Grande impresa e Mezzogiomo: la presenza della Fiat’, in Annibaldi and Berta 
(eds), Grande impresa e sviluppo italiano, pp. 299-239. On the topic see: A. Dal Monte, A. Gianola, II 
mezzogiomo nell’ economia italiana (Bologna), 1978; V. Zamagni, Dalla periferia al centro (Bologna, 
1990).
33 See Castronovo, Fiat 1899-1999, pp. 1087-1097, 1166-1169, 1238-1239.
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of mass migration caused by the establishment of the Rivalta plant; b) increasing 
pressure from the Government to contribute to the regional development of the Italian 
South; c) the increasing availability of funds; and d) investments by the rival company 
Alfa Romeo in Southern Italy.34
Along with the domestic competition from Alfa Romeo, funding seems to be one of 
the most important factors behind the strategy of decentralisation. Without incentives, 
Fiat could have allocated investments elsewhere in the North or even in other areas of 
Piedmont. Until the early 1960s, incentives and subsidies had been provided to small 
and medium-sized industry, through a special incentive and subsidy scheme called the 
Intervento Straordinario per il Mezzogiomo (Extraordinary Intervention for the Italian 
South). From 1965 onwards, however, incentives and subsidies were gradually 
extended to large firms. The extension of the Intervento Straordinario to big business 
was part of the wider industrial development policy of the centre-left Government, and 
was based on the involvement of the car industry in the development of the Italian 
South.36 In 1967, Alfa Romeo planned to expand output. The state-owned industrial 
holding IRI, which controlled Alfa Romeo, approved the project with the support of the 
government. This support was determined by the fact that Alfa Romeo, as all the IRI- 
controlled enterprises, had to allocate at least 40% of investments in Southern Italy. 
Initially, Fiat argued against the IRI decision, stressing that the Alfa Romeo investment
34 Alfa Romeo was the second Italian car manufacturer. At that time A. R. was controlled by Istituto per la 
Ricostruzione Industriale (I.R.I), which was an industrial holding owned by the State through the Ministry 
of Treasure and directed by management appointed by the Government. I.R.I was established in 1933 in 
order to finance the restructuring of firms in crisis.
35 There were also significant direct investments of state-owned companies, in the heavy industry sector, 
as well as direct state investment in infrastructures.
36 The first attempt of the Government to involve the car industry in the process of industrialisation in 
Southern Italy traces back to 1962. When the construction of Rivalta was announced, the Government, 
under the guidance of the Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani, tried in vain to persuade Fiat to invest in 
Southern Italy rather than in the Turin hinterland, where Rivalta was located. The attempt had the double 
aim of transferring some production capability to the South, and avoiding the congestion of the Turin area 
that the arrival of hundred of thousands of families from Southern Italy would have caused. In order to 
facilitate the relocation of Fiat to Southern Italy, funds were made available for investments in 
infrastructure. However, the Fiat management was adamant in rejecting the plan, because it was not 
compatible with the vertically integrated and geographical concentrated structure that allowed Valletta and 
his management to exercise strict control over the entire process. See Castronovo, Fiat 1899-1999, pp. 
1166-1169.
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would have led the Italian industry to run over capacity.37 However, soon after Alfa 
Romeo started to implement its plan, Fiat decided to invest 250bn Lire in its own 
pattern of facilities. These included the Bari plant for the production of components, the 
Termoli plant for engines, and two plants for the manufacturing of cars, Termini 
Imerese in Sicily, and Cassino in Lazio: the former able to produce 500 cars per day and 
the latter 1400. Half of the whole investment was subsidised.
By investing in Southern Italy, Fiat tried to prevent the state from allowing further 
investment by Alfa Romeo. At same time, it profited from the funds made available by 
the Italian state to create the extra capacity Fiat needed, in order cope with the expected 
increase in demand during the 1970s. According to Fiat forecasts, between 1970 and 
1980 demand was expected to grow by 2.2% per year in the EC area, while the 
aggregate demand of the EC and EFTA areas was expected to grow by 2.9% per year.38 
Due to investment in Southern Italy the theoretical capacity of Fiat increased from 7000 
cars per day in 1970 to 8900 cars per day in 1980, thus by 2.4% per year, which was in 
line with forecasts.
Take-overs represented perhaps the most important element of the Agnelli strategy. 
In the late 1960s, the president of Fiat shared the view, quite common at the time, that 
within twenty years only six or seven car producers would be left.39 A sound strategy of 
mergers and acquisitions was therefore essential, in order to ensure the long-term 
survival of Fiat. Because the company was already prominent in the bottom end of the 
market, the obvious move was to take over companies more specialised in the 
manufacturing of medium/high quality cars. The strategy would have provided Fiat with 
the ability to respond effectively to the increase in the relative size of upmarket 
segments, which is generally expected in mature markets. In this regard, the acquisition 
of Lancia and the attempt to take over Citroen made perfect sense. In 1969, Fiat took
37 In 1967, Fiat tried to persuade the government not to allow Alfa Romeo to invest in new capacity, partly 
because the Alfa Romeo strategy was to expand output in segment C, which would have transformed it 
into a direct competitor of Fiat, whereas up till then it had produced mainly upmarket units for segments D 
and E.
38 See table A 3.5 in the appendix.
39 See: Servizio Commissioni Parlamentari della Camera dei Deputati, Situazine e prospettive 
dell’industria automobilistica Italiana (Roma, 1971).
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over Lancia40 with the blessing of the Italian Government and without any effective 
opposition from the Lancia management. By contrast, after having acquired a substantial 
share of Citroen stocks, Fiat faced the increasing reluctance of the Michelin family to 
give up the control of the company, so that Fiat withdrew its bid in 1973. In an interview 
with Volpato, Giovanni Agnelli explained that the failure of the operation depended 
largely on the fact that the Citroen management held a strategic view substantially 
different from that of the Fiat management.41 At the core of Fiat strategy there was the 
maximisation of economies of scale, by sharing platforms, engines and other mechanical 
components between Citroen, Lancia, and the top range of Fiat, whereas Citroen 
managers wanted to preserve the technical identity of the French brand. Agnelli 
describes this as a “technical culture divide”. Actually, it was a “business culture” 
divide. Fiat managers held a production-oriented approach, where the sharing of 
components enables manufacturers to maximise economies of scale and reduce process 
complexity. The French management, on the other hand, thought that technical 
differentiation through the implementation of complex technologies, such as the 
hydrolastic suspensions, was a key factor to effectively compete in the upper end of the 
market. Thus the loss of technical distinction between the Fiat and Citroen brands would 
have led to decreasing Citroen market shares, with detrimental effects on both the Fiat 
and Citroen performance. Ultimately, the market-oriented business culture of the 
Citroen management was not compatible with the production-oriented business culture 
of the Fiat management. Interestingly, within Fiat, Rossignolo held the view that Lancia 
should have kept its technical autonomy distinct from Fiat, but this was not what the 
technical management aimed for, and thus from 1970 onwards, all the new Lancia 
models were equipped with Fiat engines and gearboxes. This was one of the reasons for 
disagreement between Rossignolo and the Fiat technical management.
40 Lancia was established in Turin in 1908 by Vincenzo Lancia, a former Fiat employee. The company 
developed as an innovation-driven manufacturer and specialised in the manufacturing of upmarket 
technically sophisticated cars.
41 Interview with Gianni Agnelli in Volpato, II caso Fiat, pp. 389-390.
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Managerial turnover and Fiat restructuring, 1973-1983
The reshuffling of the managerial structure, started in 1967, did not bring the 
expected changes in the management style. Although innovative managers such as 
Rossignolo and Antonio Mosconi42 were pushing for radical changes, decision-making 
was still influenced by production engineers such as Gioia, Buffa and, of course Bono. 
In 1972, though, Bono retired, while Nicola Tufarelli joined Fiat from Olivetti as 
Director of the Finance and Control Division.43 Tufarelli replaced Gioia at the head of 
the Car Division in 1974. Considering that lifetime employment, internal mobility and 
internal training of top management had characterised the development of managerial 
hierarchies at Fiat during the previous forty years, the appointment of Tufarelli and his 
rapid advancement within the hierarchy represented a considerable change in the 
routines regulating human resources management at Fiat. As director of the Car 
Division, Tufarelli tried to reorganise the division according to a “management-by- 
objectives scheme”.44
In 1974, Cesare Romiti, a financial manager from the state-owned industrial sector, 
was appointed as General Director of Fiat. The structure of control now included three 
chairmen, Umberto Agnelli, brother of Giovanni, Romiti and Carlo De Benedetti, the 
former chairman of Gilardini.45 Gianni Agnelli remained the President of the Company. 
The appointment of De Benedetti and Romiti, thus, continued the trend towards the 
renovation of Fiat management through external appointments. However, the new 
structure proved rather unstable. After replacing Tufarelli as director of the Car 
Division, De Benedetti asked Rossignolo to resign due to divergent views concerning
42 In 1970, Rossignolo became responsible for the Direzione Studi Pianificazione e controllo (Strategic 
Planning Office), and Mosconi was a member of his staff.
43 Tufarelli had left Olivetti in 1972 to take the position of Director of the Strategic Planning Department 
at Fiat. Two years later, he became Director of the Car Division. See Volpato, II caso Fiat, pp. 119-121.
44 This is a matrix scheme involving two vectors in the decision flow. The vertical vector, from the top to 
the bottom of the hierarchy, describes the flow of decisions concerning output and costs targets. The 
horizontal vector, on the other hand, describes the process of decision-making by which the directors of 
divisions optimise the process. Managers of each division or sub-division decide how to optimise the 
functioning of the whole structure, by collaborating with their colleagues from other divisions, in order to 
reach the common objectives of the various departments. For example, in order to increase sales, the 
design, production and marketing divisions must co-operate in order to improve the quality and meet the 
need of clients more effectively.
45 Gilardini is a company of the Fiat Group specialised in components for cars.
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the restructuring of the component sector.46 Moreover, De Benedetti and Romiti held 
different opinions about the strategy to follow to recover from the undergoing crisis. In 
particular, De Benedetti saw product renewal as the most urgent priority, whereas 
Romiti was concerned with reducing costs and consolidating the expanding debt47 
Because of this divergence, De Benedetti resigned, and Tufarelli was temporarily 
restored to his former position, but he had no further input into the restructuring of the 
Car Division. Moreover, Rossignolo returned to Fiat as General Director of Lancia.
The restructuring of the top management was connected with the transformation of 
the Fiat Group into an industrial holding. This was the most important transformation at 
Fiat since 1946. The introduction of a multi-divisional structure that Agnelli had been 
pursuing since 1967 was meant to be the first step towards the division of Fiat into 
several independent companies, specialised in different products and processes, and 
responsible for their own competitive strategies. Those firms would be controlled by an 
industrial holding (Fiat Group) responsible only for long-term financial strategies. To 
achieve this target, it was necessary to separate the various production activities within 
Fiat, and to decentralise decision-making in the first place. The plan had been 
masterminded by Rossignolo and Mosconi in 1970 but proceeded slowly until 1972, 
when Fiat accelerated the reorganisation of the lorry and agricultural machinery 
division, leading to the establishment of IVECO in 1975.48 The de-integration of the 
commercial vehicle sector into an independent stock company was a huge step towards 
the rationalisation of manufacturing operations at Fiat, and there is little doubt that the 
new General Director Romiti had substantial input into this process. Similar operations 
followed in the machine tools sector with the foundation of COMAU in 1977, in the 
steel and foundry sector with the establishment of Teksid in 1978, and in the 
components sector, where Magneti Marelli acquired the control of all companies 
producing components within the Fiat Group 49 Finally, Fiat Auto was established in 
1979. Chart 3.3 shows the new set-up in 1981. At the top, there were two industrial
46 Gennaro and Scifo, Parabole di imprese, p. 140.
47 See Volpato, 77 caso Fiat, pp. 122-123.
48 IVECO (Industria Veicoli Commerciali) was the industrial group incorporating all the companies 
involved in lorries manufacturing within the Fiat group, including OM, Magirous and UNIC.
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holdings, Fiat S.p.a., and IHF (International Holding Fiat). The former controlled the 
companies registered in Italy, while the latter controlled the companies registered 
abroad. IHF itself was registered in Switzerland. Both holdings were responsible for the 
financial co-ordination of their companies, including the procurement of funds, with 
particular regard to venture capital. Both were controlled by I.F.I.50
49 Magneti Marelli is a company producing electrical and electronic components founded in 1919. In 
1967, Fiat bought 100% of the Magneti Marelli shares.
50 A detailed description of the Fiat Group at that time has been provided by Enrietti and Fomengo, II 
gruppo Fiat, pp. 13-56.
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Chart 3.3: The Fiat Group, 1979
Fiat S.p.A.
I.F.I.
IHF SA
Fiat Auto S.p.A.
Fiat Trattori S.p.A. 
Teksid S.p.a.
Fiat Componenti S.p.A. 
Fin-Comau S.p.A. 
Impresit S.p.A.
Fiat Ferroviaria S.p.A. 
Fitur S.p.A 
Fiat Ttg S.p.A 
Fiat Aviazione S.p.A 
Telettra S.p.A 
Itedi S.p.A 
Fidis S.p.A
Iveco BV 
Fiat Allis BV 
Bioengineering BV 
Heston Corp 
Fiat France SA 
Deutsche Fiat GnbH 
Fiat do Brasil SA 
Fiat Concord SA 
Fiat USA Inc.
Fiat Finance Corp. BV 
Fiat Credit France SA 
Fiat Kredit Bank GmbH
Source: Enrietti and Fornengo, U Gruppo Fiat, p. 28.
Fiat’s transformation of internal operations into joint companies was responsive to 
the increasing need for venture capital, under the pressure of increasing competition.51 
Fiat S.p.A and I.H.F. retained the controlling share of each individual company, but 
allowed external investors to enter the ownership structure of each individual company. 
The main incentive for the external investors was the fact that the transformation of the 
Fiat Group into an industrial holding had increased the degree of separation between the
51 Barca et al., ‘La trasformazione societaria ’ in Barca (ed.), Storia del capitalismo italiano, pp. 155-185.
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Agnelli family, which remained the largest shareholders of I.F.I, and the professional 
managers, who were fully responsible for the strategic decision-making of individual 
companies. This was expected to increase the rapidity and effectiveness of decision­
making, and the efficiency of resources allocation, with positive effect on profits and 
dividends. Moreover, the strategic independence allowed the companies producing 
components and production tools, such as Magneti Marelli, COMAU and Teksid, to sell 
their products not only to other companies controlled by the Fiat holding, but also to 
competitors, with clear advantages in terms of economies of scale. This made those 
companies even more attractive for investors.
The in-depth analysis of the transformation of the Fiat Group during the 1970s in 
terms of distribution of property assets goes beyond the scope of this research.52 In the 
context of this thesis, the relevant question is whether it is reasonable to assume that 
managerial turnover and group restructuring experienced during the 1970s caused a 
different managerial style to emerge at Fiat Auto. Chart 3.4 shows the managerial 
structure of Fiat Auto S.p.A in 1979.
Chart 3.4: Fiat Auto Managerial Structure, 1979
Production 
Engineering 
Department 
R. Ferrero
Personnel 
Department 
F. Falco
Product 
Engineering 
Department 
E. Cardiano
Commercial 
Department 
F. Falco
President: Cesare Beccaria; 
Chairman: Vittorio Ghidella
Source: Volpato, U caso Fiat, p. 125.
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Beccaria came from IVECO, while Ghidella come from Riv SKF, a company with 
strong links with the Italian group, but had previously developed his career within Fiat 
and by education was a production engineer. As far as the techno-structure was 
concerned, it was based on three engineers: Caridiano Ferrero and Falco, who kept the 
same positions they previously held in the Fiat Car Division. In other words, the 
technostructure inherited by Ghidella in 1978 was the same that Tufarelli had inherited 
from Gioia in 1974.53 Therefore, the instability of the top managerial structure between 
1972 and 1979 was in striking contrast with the stability of the technostructure in the 
Car Division.
Among the top managers appointed between 1972 and 1979, Tufarelli, Romiti and 
De Benedetti were external appointments. However, Romiti was involved in the 
financial management of the group and in long-term planning, while De Benedetti was 
at the head of the Car Division for less than a hundred days. The leadership of Tufarelli 
was undermined by the fact the Umberto Agnelli replaced him with De Benedetti, and 
even when Tufarelli was reintegrated into his former role after the resignation of De 
Benedetti, he could have no real impact on the transformation of the Car Division. 
Ghidella was a production engineer who had developed his expertise within Fiat. Thus, 
the restructuring of the Fiat organisation and the turnover of top management during the 
1970s do not seem to be sufficient to suggest a discontinuity between the management 
style of Fiat Car Division and that of Fiat Auto S.p.A after 1974.
The appointment of Ghidella as chairman of Fiat Auto caused Rossignolo to depart 
as General Director of Lancia. In fact, Ghidella decided to incorporate Lancia into Fiat 
Auto. The move aimed to maximise synergy deriving from the use of common 
platforms and mechanical components. Cost reduction and process maximisation, rather 
than product differentiation, were the two elements underpinning his strategy. This 
move was clearly inspired by the “production engineering background of Ghidella”, and 
was not compatible with the marketing strategy of Rossignolo, which was based on 
technical and commercial diversification between Fiat and Lancia, with the latter
52 See Enrietti and Fomengo, II Gruppo Fiat, pp. 13-56.
53 This results form a comparison of the technostructure of the Fiat Car Division in 1974 with that of Fiat 
Auto in 1979, as described by Volpato, II caso Fiat, pp. 121, 125, figures 27 and 28.
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competing upmarket.54 Interestingly, the rift between Rossignolo and Ghidella was 
motivated by the same difference in business approach that a few years earlier had led to 
the rift between Fiat and Citroen management. This is a strong indication that the 
production-oriented business culture of the Fiat management had actually survived the 
changes occurring in the Fiat structure after the first oil crisis.
Section three 
Crisis and recovery of Fiat, 1973-1983
This section describes the crisis of the 1970s and the recovery of the early 1980s. 
Once again, the analysis suggests that there is no obvious reason to assume that Fiat 
management regarded a shift towards flexible mass production as the way to recover 
from the crisis of the 1970s. On the contrary, it is reasonable to assume that the financial 
crisis experienced by the Italian company compelled management to minimise 
complexity and maximise its specialisation in the production of small cars.
The crisis of the 1970s and the problem of labour productivity
As has been already pointed out, those authors who apply the paradigm of 
discontinuity to Fiat see the oil crisis as the catalyst for the restructuring of the 
company's top management. Other authors such as Comito, though, hold the opposite 
view that the crisis of the 1970s actually had the effect of delaying managerial and 
technical restructuring. According to Comito, the oil crisis generated confusion among 
Fiat managers and owners about the long-term perspective of the car manufacturing 
business.55 This led to a lack of strategic planning in the car-manufacturing sector, and 
to the postponement of investments in product renewal. This section of the chapter 
analyses the crisis of Fiat, and shows that after 1973 managers and owners of the 
company had no other option than to tackle the financial crisis of the company before 
setting any other strategy. In this respect, the appointment of a financial manager such as
54 Interestingly, Rossignolo started the co-operation with Saab, which would lead to the design of the 
Lancia Thema and Fiat Croma, namely the two models competing in segment E from 1984 onwards.
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Cesare Romiti to the role of general director was certainly a sensible move. At the same 
time, the financial crisis of Fiat, which was particularly acute between 1974 and 1978, 
explains the lack of decision-making in the car sector much more than the scepticism of 
prominent members of the board about the future perspective of the car industry.56 
Moreover, this section makes the point that the financial crisis of Fiat provides another 
reason to be sceptical about the literature emphasising discontinuity in management. 
Given the scarcity of financial resources, it seems to be perfectly reasonable to assume 
that Gianni Agnelli and Cesare Romiti instructed the technical management to be over 
rigorous in terms of cost control. Also, it seems reasonable to assume that the renewed 
attention of Fiat management to cost control was likely to result in the rationalisation of 
existing routines, as opposed to the development of new ones, which would have 
introduced uncertainty in terms of costs containment.
The crisis of the 1970s was indeed a complex phenomenon, embodying demand 
recession, financial constraints, and adversarial industrial relations. The crisis was 
characterised by exogenous factors, such as instability in the price of raw material and 
inflation, and by endogenous factors, such as decreasing productivity. The complexity of 
the Fiat crisis in the 1970s stems from the interrelations between endogenous and 
exogenous factors. In 1970, Fiat had already experienced a “wage shock”, since real 
wages increased by 16.4% as compared to 1969. Between 1970 and 1973, wages kept 
growing faster than living costs, while in 1974 real wages decreased by 4.9% as 
compared with the previous year. This was caused by inflationary pressure in the 
aftermath of the first oil crisis, causing prices to grow faster than wages. However, 
already in 1975 real wages recovered almost entirely the loss of the previous year and 
kept growing in the subsequent two years (see table 3.3).
55 Comito, Fiat tra crisi e ristrutturazone, p. 57.
56 According to Comito, Umberto Agnelli was the manager most sceptical about the future of the car 
industry. Ibid.
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Table 3.3: Annual wage increase (blue collar) relative to inflation at Fiat 1969-
1977
Years 1969-70 1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77
Wages + 21.7% + 13.4% + 8.3% + 16.9% + 20.4% + 15.6% + 24.5 + 20.5 %
Living
Cost
+ 5.3% + 4.7% +7.3 % + 12.2% + 25.3% + 11.1% + 21.8% + 14.9%
Source: Volpato, II caso Fiat, p. 113.
Crucially, the increase in wages was not correlated with an increase in productivity, 
which, on the contrary, did not increase between 1969 and 1972, and, after 1973, started 
a negative trend that was reversed only from 1982 onwards (see figure 3.3).
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Figure 3.3: Productivity index, direct labour, 1960-87 (car sector only, 1960 =
100)
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Source: for data sources, see table A 3.6 in the appendix.
The various factors explaining the behaviour of the index will be analysed more in 
depth in the next two chapters of this w ork.57 At this stage, it is sufficient to mention 
that the drives for productivity gains and losses changed from time to time over the 
period considered. From 1960 to 1969, productivity gains had been driven by both 
stable industrial relations and technological change towards automation. At beginning of 
the 1970s, on the other hand, labour-management relations became increasingly 
adversarial, while the Fiat technological setting seemed to have exhausted the scope for
ro
major productivity improvements. From 1974 to 1977 both output and labour input 
decreased, so that the index remained fairly stable, with the exception of 1975, when 
output decreased faster than labour input.59 After 1977, an inappropriate human 
resources policy led to an expansion of the labour force,60 while industrial relations 
deteriorated even further despite the relative calm of the 1974-1976 period.61 Finally,
57 The technological development of Fiat from 1960 to 1987, and the effects on productivity will be 
analysed in chapter 4. Labour management and industrial relations will be analysed in chapter 5.
58 This element will be analysed in chapter 5.
59 See table A 3.6 in the appendix.
60 Collida, Negrelli, La transizione nell’industria, pp. 185-203.
61 See table A3.3 in the appendix.
116
after 1982, improved industrial relations, the rationalisation of the process, and the 
massive implementation of robotics enabled Fiat to resize the working force and 
improve productivity by a remarkable extent.
The index captures the productivity of the man-hour units performed during each 
year, and refers to workers in the car sector. Data have been disentangled from the rest 
of the direct and indirect labour force of the Fiat Group. Unfortunately, before 1979, the 
capital stock deployed in the car sector cannot be disentangled from the whole capital 
stock of the Fiat Group. Therefore, before the establishment of Fiat Auto, capital 
productivity of the car sector cannot be calculated. Volpato looks at annual losses in 
total output, in order to give a quantitative indication of the impact of strikes on capital 
productivity.62
Table 3.4: Hours lost per labour unit and output lost (units), 1969-1977
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
273,000 88,300 87,300 70,000 146,300 92,900 52,000 91,000 85,900
Note that from 1974 onwards, the number of hours lost includes those lost for the implementation 
of the temporary redundancy scheme (cassa integrazione). Source: Volpato, II caso Fiat, pp. 111-
112.
As shown by table 3.4, the impact of strikes on output between 1969 and 1977 was 
quite significant. However, after 1974 the data quoted by Volpato include the units not 
produced due to the implementation of short time and temporary redundancies, in 
response to the contraction in the demand for Fiat cars. The very fact that Fiat had to 
implement such measures indicates that after 1973 the company ran an oversized stock 
of unsold vehicles, in spite of the underutilisation of plants caused by strikes. This 
indicates that after 1973 the impact of the demand crisis on capacity utilisation 
overshadowed that of strikes.
62 Volpato, II caso Fiat, pp. 108-111.
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The Fiat financial crisis
When the first oil crisis occurred, the profitability of Fiat had been already reduced 
by the wage shock, stagnating productivity and adversarial industrial relations. The oil 
crisis triggered a downward demand shock and an upward interest rate shock. Italy was 
almost totally dependent on raw material imports. The upward shock in the price of 
imported materials after 1973 generated a deficit in the balance of payments, which, 
combined with the already existent budget deficit, triggered the crowding out effect.63 
The simultaneous expansion of interest rates and material costs, combined with 
decreasing demand, decreasing productivity and increasing labour costs brought Fiat to 
the brink of collapse in 1975.
Another element that exacerbated the combined effects of increasing input prices and 
decreasing sales in the short term was the government’s package of extraordinary 
measures to contain inflation, such as the price freeze on several goods, including cars. 
The freeze was lifted at the end of 1974, but it caused major concern to the 
management, since it deprived Fiat of the only possibility to reduce its losses. This was 
to raise selling prices and maximise earnings from the portion of demand that was 
income elastic, rather than price elastic, namely replacements that could be not 
postponed. In this sense, the price freeze was not at all good news for Fiat.64
Between 1973 and 1975, sales (domestic plus export) decreased by 41.2%.65 Over the 
same period, output decreased by 27.6%. Therefore, the stock of unsold vehicles 
increased by 13.6%. In January 1974, in the immediate aftermath of the oil crisis, the 
stock rose up to 300,000 units, which was 21.5% of the 1973 output, worth 450 billion 
current lire.66 Considering the financial exposure of Fiat due to the ongoing investments 
in Southern Italy and Brazil, the impact of the shock on Fiat’s financial stability was 
huge. In October 1974, cash needed by Fiat to finance its cash flow exceeded the budget 
by 127%. Total debt increased from 168bn ITL in 1973 to 651bn in 1974 and 764bn in
63 Mosconi, and Valeo, Crisi e ristrutturazone del settore automobilistico, pp. 51-54.
64 As will be shown in chapter 5, the Fiat management was concerned about the price freeze, because Fiat 
would have lost its price leadership privilege, had the freeze lasted. As already mentioned, during the 
1970s competition was characterised by collusive price leadership.
65 See tables A 3.3 and A 3.7 in the appendix.
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1976.67 Short loans represented 60% of the whole debt. Short-term loans were those 
with the highest interest rates.68 Moreover, at least in theory, there was the risk that 
banks would respond to uncertainty by asking Fiat for immediate repayment of the 
existing debit and refusing further credit.
Between 1974 and 1979, Cesare Romiti's priority was indeed to ensure the financial 
stability of the company, while carrying on with the restructuring of the group. The first 
move was the consolidation of the short-term debt by linking the loan repayments to the 
reduction of the stock. Banks, including the state-owned Banco di Roma agreed to the 
Romiti proposal, but the move had to be approved by Banca d’ Italia, the Italian Central 
Bank. In fact, to link the short-term loans to the absorption of the stock technically 
meant to transform short-term debt into long-term debt. In this way, short-term debt 
decreased from 60% to 30% of the total. Meanwhile, Fiat accelerated the cashing in of 
the outstanding credit by asking dealers to pay for cars immediately, instead of within 
the customary three months. Moreover, the company placed 70,000 employees 
throughout the group in temporary redundancy. Direct labour in the car sector decreased 
by 11,200 units between 1973 and 1977.69
A more articulated and wider financial strategy, though, was needed in the medium 
term, in order to ensure the long-term rescue of Fiat. The long-term debt had to be 
refinanced in order to carry on with the investment programme. This required an even 
more complex exercise of financial engineering, given the company's crisis, and the 
wide uncertainty surrounding the car industry. In theory, Fiat could increase the level of 
financial commitment of the Agnelli family through a direct investment by I.F.I, and 
then issue shares in the hope that the commitment of I.F.I. would convince investors to 
channel financial resources into Fiat. Actually, neither the increase in capital nor the 
issuing of shares was an easy option.
To issue shares was not a viable solution for two interrelated reasons, namely the 
decreasing value of the existing Fiat shares, and the determination of the Agnelli family 
to retain control of the company. In 1972, the ratio equity value to capital was 1.6, but it
66 Volpato, II caso Fiat, pp. 118-119.
67 Ibid, pp. 197-201.
68 Ibid.
69 See table A 3.6 in the appendix.
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decreased to 0.6 in 1974 and to 0.2 in 1979. This automatically undermined the 
confidence of stock market operators, so that nobody would have subscribed to new 
shares, unless agents were interested in acquiring the control of the company. However, 
Agnelli had ruled out this option. As far as the commitment of I.F.I. is concerned, the 
Agnelli family proved insufficiently confident to risk its own money. This of course
7 0made it even more difficult to bring in venture capital. .
In this context Romiti, together with Enrico Cuccia and Mediobanca, masterminded 
the so-called “Operation Lafico”, which involved the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank.
71 •Politically, the Libyan Bank was not an optimal partner. The participation of Lafico in 
Fiat, in fact, met with little enthusiasm in US financial and political circles. Precisely for 
this reason, though, the Libyan Bank was an ideal partner, financially speaking. In order 
to gain a role in the Western financial establishment the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank was 
able to inject huge amounts of cash into Fiat, in order to finance the increase in social 
capital and investments, without claiming a role in strategic management or a 
controlling share. The overall conditions to which the operation was subjected, 
therefore, proved attractive for the Fiat management and for the Agnelli family.
The financial conditions of the loan were extremely attractive too. In the first stage of 
the operation, Fiat issued 20 million new ordinary shares and 10 million preference 
shares at a nominal value of 500 Lire each. Lafico, nevertheless, paid a premium of 
5500 Lire per share, which was an outstanding premium, considering that the market 
value of ordinary Fiat shares in 1976 was about 2000 Lire for the ordinary shares and 
1300 Lire for the preferences.72 In the second stage, Fiat issued convertible bonds for 
90bn Lire at an interest rate of 9.50% per year. Lafico actually converted bonds into 
shares, for which the bank paid the same premium of 5500 Lire. Finally, Fiat subscribed 
to a Lafico loan of $104m at an interest rate of 9.50%.73 I.F.I. and the other majority 
shareholders did not lose control of the company. Lafico was indeed an important 
shareholder with two representatives on the Administration Board. Nevertheless, the
70 See Comito, La Fiat, p. 216.
71 Enrico Cuccia was the Chairman of Mediobanca, an investment bank established in 1946. For the role 
of Mediobanca in the Lafico operation, see S. Ori, Stone di una dinastia. Gli Agnelli e la Fiat (Roma, 
1996), pp. 270-279. Se also Castronovo, Fiat 1899-1999, pp. 1399-1408, 1572-1576.
72 Volpato, II caso Fiat, pp. 197-201.
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agreement included a form of “no strategic interference” clause, by which the Lafico 
representatives were prevented from interfering with strategic decision-making.
In terms of rescue strategy, there is little doubt that the Lafico operation was a 
success. As pointed out by Silvio Ori, nevertheless, the agreement became increasingly 
difficult to manage from a political point of view. The clashes between the American 
Administration and Libya forced Fiat to withdraw from the agreement in 1986, through 
a buy-back operation, which increased the level of Fiat debt. Moreover, Mediobanca put 
the shares Fiat had buy back from Lafico on the market. This led to a decrease of the 
share value, which resulted in a net loss for small shareholders. This is the reason why 
Ori is very critical about the final outcome of the whole operation.74
Out of the crisis
Investments in car manufacturing between 1974 and 1978 concerned mainly the 
process, whereas extensive product renewal was undertaken only after fresh capital was 
injected into the company. Between 1974 and 1978 only one new model was presented. 
This explains the lack of competitiveness of Fiat models in the late 1970s, which 
resulted in domestic market shares decreasing by 13% between 1970 and 1980. From 
1979 onwards, Fiat Auto was able to carry out both investments on production 
technology and product development, and to present eight new models in six years. As 
shown by table 3.5, in 1983, Fiat Auto announced sizeable profits for the first time since 
its establishment in 1979.
73 Ibid.
74 Ori, Storie di una dinastia, pp. 329-336.
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Table 3.5: Performance indicators of Fiat Auto, 1979-1986
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Employment 
(direct and 
indirect)
139,949 110,112 100,611 89,751 83,600 79.277 75,358 75,995
Output*
(units)
1,309,777 1,297,667 1,119,891 1,162,453 1,216,921 1,388,276 1,316,228 1,580,637
Investments 
(Billions of 
current Liras)
342.5 336.1 326.4 810.4 758.4 885.8 667.9 762.4
Operating 
Profits/losses 
(Billions of 
current Liras)
-97.2 -130.1 - 154.5 -79.7 + 80.6 + 234.9 + 402.4 + 457.1
Source: Archivio Storico Fiat, balance sheets, also in Enrietti, and Fornengo, II gruppo Fiat, p. 81. 
*Output data have been amended by using figures data from Fiat Archives, ‘Libro dei numeri di 
matricola dei veicoli prodotti’ (Production File), which are slightly different from the figure shown 
by the original table of Enrietti and Fornengo.
The most interesting features shown by the table is the remarkable reduction in the 
break-even point. Profits were made in 1983 although output was 13.5% lower than in 
1979, when Fiat made operating losses. This is consistent with the reduction in the 
number of employed over the period, and with the recovery in productivity already 
shown by figure 3.3.
The established literature assumes that the reduction of the break-even point was 
achieved by maximising flexibility. The assumption is that the deployment of robotics 
enabled Fiat to concentrate production of the entire range of different models on number 
of flexible lines, which therefore were always utilised at optimum capacity. This enabled 
Fiat to lower the break-even point of each single model, to produce more efficiently 
relatively small batches of upper-range units and niche products, and, ultimately to 
lower the break-even point of the whole Fiat operation. Those advantages offset the 
increase in costs caused by the complexity of flexible manufacturing relative to 
traditional Fordist management of mass production. Moreover, because of flexibility, 
Fiat was in the position to adopt a more flexible output-mix optimisation strategy, with 
the possibility to adjust output mix upmarket, and meet the expected requirements of 
demand in mature markets. In other words, according to the relevant literature, flexible
75 Bianchi and Volpato, ‘Flexibility as the Response to Excess Capacity’, in Baden-Fuller (ed.), Managing 
Excess Capacity, pp. 215-246.
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mass production enabled Fiat to achieve the double goal of lowering the break-even 
point and shifting from process- to market-oriented manufacturing.
However, the adoption of flexible production and a flexible output-mix optimisation 
strategy would have required a complete change of production management at Fiat. This 
would have required a shift in strategic emphasis from production to marketing, where 
management should have set production targets according to the feedback from the 
marketing department. Above all, management should have ensured that all the 
resources of the firm, from investment in retooling to investments in car design and 
development were oriented towards the satisfaction of the requirements set by the 
marketing department. The pre-1973 techno-structure of Fiat was indeed process- 
oriented, and thus the transition towards market-oriented approaches could have been 
carried out only by a “traumatic” replacement of management, leading to the 
replacement of the stock of intangible capital accumulated by Fiat during a long period 
of managerial stability and smooth managerial turnover. However, when looking at 
managerial turnover at Fiat during the 1970s, it is far from clear that the new 
management brought in a market-oriented culture. On the contrary, marketing experts 
such as Rossignolo resigned after disagreeing with the Ghidella strategy, which he saw 
as more concerned with controlling the costs of the joint production of Lancia and Fiat 
models, than with the differentiation of the two brands, aiming to design different 
products for different markets. The search for synergy, aiming to control industrial costs, 
is perfectly consistent with the fact that during the 1970s, the company faced a serious 
financial crisis.
In this light, it is important to consider whether the containment of process and 
product complexity was the actual drive for the lowering of the break-even point shown 
by table 3.5. This interpretation implies that, rather than pursuing flexibility, Fiat 
management developed robotics to resolve the bottlenecks generated by the previous 
technology, achieving further reductions in the cycle time of automated operations. 
Also, management favoured product renewal and development of the lower segments of 
the market in which Fiat had comparative advantage over its competitors, minimising, at 
the same time, costs generated by product complexity. If it was the case, routines 
confirmation, rather than routines rejection and substitution, was the key strategic
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element of the Fiat rescue. The high rate of growth of the Italian market relative to the 
other main European markets during the 1980s, and the fact that expansion demand 
remained considerably large in the structure of the domestic market provided a positive 
environment for the Fiat strategy. The next chapters of the thesis will address the issue 
of continuity in production management at Fiat before and after the crisis of the 1970s, 
through the empirical analysis of technological change and output-mix optimisation 
strategies.
Conclusions
The established literature maintains that Fiat responded to the maturation of the 
Italian and European markets by shifting from process-oriented to market-oriented 
manufacturing. At the core of this change lay the deployment of flexible mass 
production technology, and the implementation of flexible output-mix optimisation 
strategy. The change required the replacement of management, which in turn led to the 
replacement of the stock of intangible capital that the company had been piling up in the 
age of Fordism. By describing the restructuring at Fiat during the 1970s, this chapter 
shows that in spite of critical changes in organisation and management, there are no 
obvious reasons to believe that new management brought in a corporate culture different 
from that of the previous set of managers. On the contrary, there are suggestions that 
new managers retained a production-oriented approach to manufacturing.
The established literature seems to have set a two-stage circular argument, in which 
the underpinning assumption (stage a) provides the evidence for the outcome (stage b). 
The argument is that a) Fiat changed its management and technology to shift to 
flexibility; and b) it is possible to say that Fiat shifted to flexibility because it had 
changed its management. In order to break the circularity of the argument, the following 
chapters will proceed to the empirical analysis of technological change and output-mix 
optimisation strategy.
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Chapter 4
Robotics at Fiat, 1970-1987: A strategy for product-mix flexibility? 
Introduction
The closing note of the previous chapter emphasised the need for further empirical 
analysis, to see whether the managerial turnover of the 1970s brought about 
discontinuity in production and strategic management at Fiat. Based on primary 
unpublished sources, this chapter analyses changes in production technology between 
1960 and 1987, focusing, in particular, on the introduction and development of robotics 
in the spot-welding shop. At the core of the chapter lies the concept that within the 
Fordist production framework, the basic routine driving the search for new technologies 
and techniques prioritises cycle-time minimisation above any other drive for 
competitiveness. The analysis carried out in this chapter aims to see whether 
technological change after 1973 coincided with a rejection of the Fordist routine 
regulating the search and choice for new technological trajectories.
Like the majority of European car producers, Fiat used spot welding since the early 
1950s to produce chassis-less vehicles. The platform was welded to the body to form a 
single rigid structure called the monocoque, on which mechanical components were 
assembled. From 1972 onwards, Fiat had been increasingly using robotics in spot 
welding, and although this was a common trend in the world car industry, the company 
was considered a pioneer in the development of systems with a low level of tool 
specificity and capable of processing two or more models on the same line at the same 
time.
As already pointed out in the second chapter of this thesis, since the mid-1980s the 
literature moved away from the industrial relations approach in order to interpret what 
seemed to be a remarkable process of technological change. For many observers, this 
was driven by increasing market segmentation, the instability of demand structure, and 
the instability of demand for specific models within each segment that shaped the EC 
market from 1973 onwards. Flexible manufacturing systems (FMS) allowed 
management to minimise the effects of changes in demand structure and size on
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capacity utilisation.1 As will be explained in the following paragraphs, the implication 
of this view would be that the introduction of robotics not only led to a drastic change in 
the technological trajectory of the company, but also to a discontinuity in the paradigm 
of production management at Fiat. This chapter discusses this view and argues that: 1) 
internal factors (i.e. the optimisation of the existing processes) drove the introduction 
and development of robotics during the early 1970s; 2) the priority behind the 
implementation of robotics was cycle-time minimisation rather than flexibility 
maximisation. As a consequence, during the 1980s, robotics did not change the way Fiat 
management responded to changes in the structure of demand for Fiat models (i.e. by 
changing the rate of utilisation of various plants or lines rather than relocating the 
production of the most requested model to low output lines). On this basis, this chapter 
departs from those who maintain that the company fully achieved flexibility during the 
1980s, seeing the development of FMS as one of the major factors explaining the 
recovery from the crisis of the 1970s.
At this stage of the thesis, industrial relations have been intentionally overlooked. 
The issue will be treated in the next chapter, which shows that technological change 
cannot be convincingly seen as a “technocratic response” to the power of the unions. As 
will be shown, the argument is complementary to, rather than conflicting with, the 
incremental development argument proposed by this chapter. In any case, the empirical 
analysis of the impact of robotics on production flexibility represents a new contribution 
to the literature, whereas the analysis of industrial relations will be based mainly on 
secondary literature, without representing the main focus of this work.
The chapter is organised as follows: the first section syntheses part of the debate 
about FMS, provides a set of definitions for flexibility, describes methods of measuring 
flexibility, underlines the methodology used in this thesis, and finally provides an 
overview of the quantitative development of robotics at Fiat between 1972 and 1990. 
The second part deals with the long-term developments in the spot-welding shop at Fiat 
in more depth, analysing the reasons why the company started to experiment with 
robotics. The last part analyses flexible manufacturing systems at Fiat and presents 
conclusions that depart from the established literature, as they provide evidence that the 
possibility of using the same production lines to process different models at the same 
time and in a random sequence (plant flexibility) did not totally enable Fiat to stabilise
1 Volpato, II caso Fiat, pp. 171-173. See also Bianchi and Volpato, ‘Flexibility as the Response to Excess
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the rate of capacity utilisation for each line in a context of changing output structure 
(product-mix flexibility).
Section one 
The context of the debate
This section defines the context in which the issue of flexibility has been analysed 
and highlights the relationship between output-mix flexibility and the stabilisation of 
capacity utilisation.
Technological change and “managerial culture”
During the 1970s, the influential managerial theory developed by Skinner and in 
general by the Harvard School assumed that there was a trade-off between product and 
process quality, product and process flexibility, and economic efficiency, so that 
management had to choose its priority target and to define the firm’s specialisation path. 
According to Bartezzaghi and Turco, Italian managers questioned the theory of trade­
offs in the decade 1975-1985, when firms gradually realised that both process and 
product quality were necessary conditions to achieve economic efficiency. In the 
subsequent decade, 1985-1995, firms would realise that there is no trade-off between 
product/process flexibility and economic efficiency, because the former is the pre­
condition for achieving the latter. Therefore, according to Bartezzaghi and Turco, a 
second wave of structural and inter-structural innovation would shape this decade after 
the restructuring occurring between 1975 and 1985.
Structural innovation refers to tools and technology, while inter-structural innovation 
refers to layout, job organisation issues and incentive systems. However, Bartezzaghi 
and Turco pointed out that “managerial innovation” should occur ex ante structural and 
inter-structural innovation, in order to take on the “flexibility challenge”. By managerial 
innovation the two authors refer to a drastic change in goals the management would 
have to pursue given the competitive environment. In the new managerial paradigm, 
reset-time minimisation replaces process speed maximisation, while production
Capacity’, in Baden-Fuller (ed.), Managing Excess Capacity, pp. 218-219.
2 Bartezzaghi, Turco, ‘Flessibilita ed Efficienza’, p. 64. The two authors refer to the Italian case, without 
implying that Italy was an exceptional case as compared with the rest of Europe.
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stabilisation is more important than plant saturation. Time-reset minimisation is the 
pre-condition for production stabilisation, because it enables firms to shift production 
according to demand. At the same time, plant saturation and process-speed 
maximisation are the interrelated dogmas of the Fordist system of mass production 
called into question by the new cultural paradigm, in order to pursue both quality and 
flexibility.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Fiat deployed the Robogate, a system for 
monocoque welding capable of processing two or more different models of monocoques 
simultaneously, the proportion of which could be changed on a daily basis. Volpato,4 
has interpreted the development of FMS as the response to the increasing segmentation 
of demand. In addition, Volpato, following Altshuler et al (1984),5 assumes that the two 
oil crises speeded up the process of market maturation, which is responsible for the 
increasing segmentation and volatility of demand.6 Therefore, the earlier change in the 
nature of competition after 1973 fostered managerial innovation at Fiat from the mid- 
1970s. Innovative management enabled Fiat to direct technological change towards 
flexibility. If this was the case, then Fiat would have experienced developments towards 
flexibility much earlier than Bartezzaghi and Turco have suggested for the 
manufacturing industry as a whole. This would imply that since the mid-1970s, Fiat 
experienced the “managerial innovation” of the kind suggested by the two authors, 
leading to investment in FMS.
Nonetheless, the previous chapter has shown that there is little or no evidence that 
during the 1970s conditions occurred for Fiat to change managerial trajectories. This 
part of the thesis suggests that the introduction of robotics should not be seen 
exclusively either as a strategy responsive to discontinuity in the structure of demand 
within the European market, or as the effect of drastic change in the Fiat managerial 
approach to mass production. On the contrary, it puts forward the point that 
technological changes in the spot-welding shop were led by the need to optimise 
existing processes. Management understood optimisation as the improvement of the 
process speed and reliability. Indeed, process optimisation reduced tool specificity to a
3 Ibid, p. 65.
4 Volpato, II caso Fiat, pp. 171-173; Volpato, ‘The Automobile Industry In Transition’, in Toliday and 
Zeitlin (eds), Between Fordism and Flexibility, pp. 193-223.
5 Altshuler et al., The Future o f Automobile, p. 15.
6 The car market becomes mature when replacement outweighs new demand (namely demand from first­
time buyers) at high levels of car density. Replacement demand is associated with hyper-segmentation and 
the volatility of segments.
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huge degree, but flexibility was neither the initial factor driving the deployment of 
robotics, nor the main drive for subsequent developments. In order to demonstrate the 
point, this chapter analyses the way in which management responded to changes in the 
demand for specific Fiat models during the 1980s. The analysis tries to understand 
whether or not robotics enabled management to maximise product-mix flexibility, 
namely the capacity to adjust output to demand for specific models without changing the 
level of capacity utilisation of each line. This is central to the problem of continuity in 
the managerial practice. In this regard, the concept of flexibility itself needs to be 
approached in relation to the capacity utilisation issue.
Defining flexibility
In general, flexibility is defined according to three features: “plant flexibility”, 
“product mix flexibility” and “process flexibility”.7 “Plant flexibility” is achieved when 
an existing plant can be re-utilised to produce a new model range with limited or no 
retooling, and should therefore maximise investments in fixed assets. “Product-mix 
flexibility” is achieved when a range of cars is produced on the same line, and the 
product mix can be changed in real time. This kind of flexibility should minimise the 
effects of demand segmentation and segment share volatility on capacity utilisation by 
reducing tool specificity. Finally, process flexibility is reached when a delay in one stage 
of the process does not prevent the entire process from being carried out. This should 
minimise either the effects of partial strikes or the effects of a machinery failure at a 
given stage of the process, or the temporary shortage of skilled workers for a particular 
task.8
One possible way to measure flexibility is to apply a model for investment 
justification analysis measuring equipment flexibility in terms of idle cost, which is the 
opportunity cost of under-using the equipment, product flexibility in terms of set up cost
7 R. Merli, ‘II Robogate nella produzione della Fiat Uno’, in Dina, (ed.), Modello Robot, p. 139. Fiat 
management distinguished between strategic and operational flexibility, with the former referring to plant 
convertibility and the latter referring to both process and product mix flexibility.
8 The pattern of definitions provided by Fiat management broadly reflects definitions developed by 
academics. Park and Son have divided flexibility into four categories: a) equipment flexibility; b) product 
flexibility; c) process flexibility; d) demand flexibility. The difference between the Park and Son and the 
Fiat management definitions is that the latter includes equipment flexibility and product flexibility in the 
category of plant flexibility. In addition, Park and Son refer to system flexibility as process flexibility. 
C.S. Park, Y.K. Son, ‘An Economic Evaluation Model for Advanced Manufacturing Systems’, 
Engineering Economics, 34 (1990), pp. 1-26.
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reduction as a function of set-up time reduction, process flexibility as a reduction in 
work in progress, and demand flexibility as a reduction in inventory costs.9
The investment justification approach is essentially a cost accounting approach, 
where the lack of information drastically hampers the viability of the methodology for 
historical research proposes. However, the thesis does use a set of data made available 
for the first time. This includes monthly production for each model, each plant, and line, 
as well as optimum capacity utilisation for each line. Using those data, it is possible to 
see whether or not during the 1980s the Fiat management was able to stabilise 
production in any facility by shifting production from one model to another and from 
one plant to another, or whether the over/under utilisation of plants was still the fastest 
way to respond to changes in demand.
Within the Fordist technological set, in which each line was model specific, the 
capacity to adjust output to demand structure (product-mix flexibility) depended on the 
implementation of short/extra time, which caused the output of each production line to 
change according to demand for the model produced. Demand was monitored by 
controlling final stocks. Thus, flexibility was obtained by changing the capacity 
utilisation rate for each line, and therefore required a certain amount of spare capacity. 
On the other hand, flexible manufacturing systems aim to reach product-mix flexibility 
by reducing tool specificity. In theory, reduced tool specificity (plant-flexibility) allows 
the firm to shift production from one model to another according to demand, without 
stopping production or changing the utilisation rate of lines. In fact, two or more models 
can be simultaneously processed on the same line in different proportions. The 
stabilisation of production is one of the most important justifications for investments in 
flexible manufacturing systems. In the case of Fiat during the 1980s, production was 
organised on double shift 5 days per week. Therefore, the optimal utilisation range of 
lines was given by an utilisation rate going from 80% to 100% of capacity on double 
shift. The implementation of the third shift (extra time) was not consistent with an 
economically efficient use of production factors given extra costs involved with higher 
depreciation and labour costs.
This chapter provides evidence that between 1978 and 1987, Fiat failed to exploit the 
whole potential flexibility of robotics. It will show that, in spite of robotics, some plants 
were under-utilised while others were often, or even consistently, saturated by
9 See M. J. Chandra, C. M. Armonosky, ‘Analytical Techniques for Justification o f Manufacturing
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implementing extra time, which is exactly what flexible manufacturing systems are 
supposed to avoid or minimise.
Given those findings, the question arises why Fiat invested in robotics after 1972. By 
looking at a set of unpublished documents concerning production management and by 
analysing unpublished data concerning the cycle time of the monocoque welding 
process for various technological sets, this chapter shows that robotics was implemented 
to resolve the bottlenecks created by the process of automation during the 1960s without 
changing the overall functioning of the system.
Robotics at Fiat: an overview
In 1976, Fiat introduced a new robotised and computerised monocoque production 
system called Robogate, although the initial implementation of robotics dates back to
1972. Until the early 1970s, the production framework was based on “hard 
automation”.10 Some stages of the process, such as the platform welding and part of the 
body assembly, were highly automated, but production tools were dedicated to a single 
model. The implication was that in order to reset tools and change product, it was 
necessary to stop the process. On the other hand, according to the Fiat management, one 
of the most important gains generated by robotics was flexibility. In particular, through 
the Robogate system, Fiat achieved the ability to switch production from one model to 
another without stopping the process or adding new production facilities.11 Overall, 
according to Fiat official publications, the system enabled the company to change the 
output structure from day to day and even from shift to shift. For this reason, the Fiat 
management defined the Robogate as one of the most advanced examples of “flexible 
manufacturing systems”.12 In general, the literature has echoed this official view, 
overlooking the real question of whether production management maximised the 
potential flexibility of robotics.
The continuous development of robotics during the 1980s led to the establishment of 
one of the most technologically advanced production lines in the world, which started to 
operate at the Cassino plant in 1988. However, the difficulty in setting up the robotised
Systems’, in: H. R. Parsei, A. Mital (eds), Economics o f Advanced Manufacturing Systems (1992), p. 114.
10 Emietti, Fomengo, II Gruppo Fiat, p. 79.
11 Archivio Storico Fiat, Dipartimento Personale ed Organizzazione, ‘II Robogate’, working paper, 
(1984), p. 7. See also: Fiat Ufficio Stampa (ed.), La curva di produzione ed il suo connubio con V 
elettronoica (Torino, 1977).
12 Archivio Storico Fiat, ‘II Robogate’, p. 11.
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final assembly forced management to re-establish a more labour intensive assembly 
system at the Melfi plant (1992). This combined robotics in the welding shop and in the 
assembly of mechanical components with the employment of skilled workers for the 
final assembly, along with the optimisation of flow through the implementation of JIT 
(Just in Time) and TQM (Total Quality Management) techniques.13 At any rate, 
Robogate remained the core of production technology at Fiat.
Table 4.1: Total number robots at Fiat Auto, 1972-1987
1972-74 1975-77 1978-
82
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Welding 20 60 180 180 452 532 526 549 662 830
Mechanical Assembling 112 129 133 158 163 158
Painting 20 20 74 74 100 100 108 138
Total 20 60 200 200 638 735 759 590 933 1,126
Welding robots/total 
robots
100% 100% 90% 90% 70% 72% 69% 56% 71% 74%
Source: Fiat, Dept. Personnel and Organisation. Source: Enrietti, Fornengo, II gruppo Fiat, p. 83.
The quantitative development of robotics at Fiat between 1972 and 1990 is 
summarised by Table 4.1. Unfortunately, between 1975 and 1980 there are no available 
data on robots in the painting shop. However, it seems clear that spot welding is the 
technological area in which robotics has been implemented to the largest extent. 
Robotics obviously affected labour intensity although the quantification of automation 
on the employment trend is based on information made public by Fiat. According to Fiat 
estimates, between 1972 and 1979 around 1400 workers were replaced by automation in 
several stages of the process.14 The two Robogate lines at Cassino and Rivalta replaced 
110 workers each in the monocoque welding shop (15.7% of the total).15 However, as 
has been already pointed out in the previous chapter, after 1977 the trend towards labour 
downsizing, which had started in 1973, was reversed as Fiat had misjudged its
13 On the process o f restructuring leading to the pilot plant of Melfi, see Bonazzi, II tubo di cristallo.
14 P. Buran and R. Lanzetti (eds), Dossier auto. L ’industria automobilistica italiana verso le nuove sfide 
(Torino, 1989), p. 80.
15 Volpato, ‘The Automobile Industry in Transition’ in Tolliday and Zeitlin (eds), Between Fordism and 
Flexibility, p. 219.
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manpower planning and had recruited labour above its actual need. Technology-driven 
unemployment, therefore, did not occur. Between 1980 and 1982, 1600 workers were 
replaced by automation, or 7.6% of labour downsizing. Finally, according to Fiat 
estimates, between 1982 and 1987 each robot in the spot-welding shop replaced 1.5 
workers per shift. Since production was organised on double shift, each robot replaced 
three workers. The number of robots increased from 452 to 830 units, thus, 1134 
workers were replaced by technological innovation in the spot-welding shop.16 This was 
7.3% of the total labour downsizing in the period. If we accept the replacement rate of 
1.5 workers per robot per shift, then the conclusion should be that technological 
innovation was not the main driving force behind labour downsizing between 1972 and 
1987. Fiat estimates seem to be in line with those from other car manufacturers in the
1 7same period. Nonetheless, Silva noted that the highest rates of labour reduction during 
the 1980s occurred in those plants with a higher deployment of robotics, casting doubts 
over the replacement rate suggested by Fiat, which might underestimate the effect of 
robotics on employment levels.18
Section two
Technological change at Fiat in monocoque welding, 1960s to the 1980s
This section deals with technological change at Fiat between 1960 and 1977 in the 
welding shop. It first provides a general description of the monocoque assembly process, 
and then moves on to look at why traditional technology had to be replaced after the 
early 1970s, and how and to what extent specific innovations have influenced further 
developments. The conclusion is that the introduction of robotics in 1972 was the 
logical consequence of the innovation process started by the company during the 1960s 
in the spot-welding shop. In this sense, the shift to robotics was a technical solution to a 
technical problem and should be considered as the consequence of the new competitive 
environment of the 1970s.
16 Buran and Lanzetti (eds), Dossier auto, p. 81.
17 For an international comparative outlook of the impact of robotics, see Watanabe, Microelectronics.
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Monocoque assembly: The process segmentation
The main non-mechanical component in a modem car is a rigid structure called the 
monocoque. The monocoque consists of two sub-components (see Figure 4.1). The 
platform includes the floor to which are welded supports for the engine, suspension and 
transmission, while the body comprises the sides, the pillars supporting the doors and 
those supporting the top. When the platform and the body are welded together, the car 
assumes its shape, and those characteristics, such as size and wheelbase, which 
determine the market segment in which the car is going to compete. After painting, the 
monocoque is assembled with mechanical components. Therefore, semi-finished cars go 
through the final stage of the process (dressing), which consists of the assembly of 
electrical components, wheels, internal components (seats, dashboard etc.) side doors, 
rear and front bonnet tops.
Figure 4.1: The monocoque and its components
Side (body)
Top (body)
Rear 
framework 
'  (body)
Front
framework
(platform) Side
(body)
Floor (platform)
The monocoque welding is performed in two different stages: basting and finishing. 
Basting is the stage in which the platform and the body are linked together by welding
18 F. Silva et al, ‘Robots, Employment and Industrial Relations in the Italian Automobile Industry’, in 
Watanabe (ed.), Microelectronics, p. 143.
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the two sub-components at a number of points.19 This stage does not confer much
rigidity on the monocoque but gives it the shape (geometry) according to the design. 
Finishing is the spot welding of the body to the platform along the edges of each sub­
component. This step of the process confers rigidity on the monocoque, in that the links 
between platform and body are engineered to sustain the stress caused by torsion forces 
and mechanical vibrations. The process is described by chart 4.1.
Chart 4.1: Spot-welding shop and the process of monocoque segmentation
L X t r p  JLVUJg
Source: Based on information from Malandri and Scimone, Interview with the Author, 18-03-1999.
Basting and finishing must be performed in different stages for a simple but 
important reason: before the basting, detached platforms and bodies are rigidly linked to 
a three-dimensional metallic frame to prevent the monocoque assuming an imperfect 
shape during the basting. This frame impedes welding in any direction inside the 
monocoque, so that only a limited number of welding spots can be executed. However, 
after basting there is no need to keep the monocoque fixed to the frame. Thus, the 
monocoque is detached from the frame and fixed to a simpler fixture that enables 
welders to be operated freely inside, in order to perform the finishing. Because basting 
involves a relatively small number of welding spots compared with finishing, the latter 
must be more segmented than the former, in order to equalise the cycle time of each 
stage.
Monocoque technology was a totally new design approach compared to the traditional 
way in which cars were assembled until the late 1930s. This consisted of bolting or 
welding the body to the chassis, a rigid framework completed with the engine and power
.Floor,
Monocoque Monocoque! f
i  Basting : v Basting i
■; Finishing >
Body
19 Technical literature often refers to basting as tack-welding.
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train. Since the body did not contribute to the overall rigidity, it was possible to 
assemble several different bodies on the same chassis, provided links between body and 
chassis were standardised.20 On the other hand, with the monocoque technology both 
platform and body impart the structural rigidity. Consequently, any change in the shape 
of the body must be carefully engineered in order not to change the overall rigidity of 
the monocoque. This was one of the reasons why manufacturers basing their process on 
monocoque technology became increasingly inflexible even where welding was 
performed using manual multi-purpose welders.
The monocoque technology was made possible by progress in spot welding. This 
technique allowed a better ratio between rigidity and weight to be achieved in car 
design. Since a lighter design led to the more efficient adoption of small engines, it 
affected the segmentation of the European market, by creating a new market for very 
small cheap cars.
Spot-welding technology at Fiat before automation (1950s)
Until the beginning of the 1960s, the sequence of operations involved in the assembly 
of the monocoque was performed manually. Steel sheets and panels were fixed on rigid 
supports and welded to form platforms and body sub-components such as the floor, the 
rear and the front frameworks for the platform, sides and roof for the body. Supports 
holding the steel panels were usually moving on a truck conveyor. Some workers had to 
fix steel panels on supports, while others had to weld them by using manual welders 
while the conveyor was moving. Manual welders were heavy and their handling 
precarious. When demand was exceeding the expected quota, it was usual practice to 
weld sub-components off track by fixing them to rigid supports tied up on the floor. In 
this case, the same worker had to fix the steel sheet on the fixture and weld it.
The subsequent step was the parallel assembly of platforms and body. The former 
was assembled by welding the front and rear framework to the floor, while the body was 
made by welding the sides to the top. These operations were performed while sub­
components were attached to a moving truck conveyor.
The final stage of the spot welding process was the assembling of the monocoque. 
The platform and the body were fixed to a three-dimensional framework, called the
20 This was the way GM differentiated production during the 1920s.
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mascherone, by four or five workers.21 At this stage, basting was performed by a couple 
of workers. Afterwards, the monocoque was detached from the mascherone and fixed to 
a much simpler frame that allowed the finishing to be performed. The monocoque was 
transported from basting to the finishing stations by a truck conveyor. The finishing 
process was performed in different stages. Both basting and finishing were performed 
by workers operating heavy manual welders. In order to pass from basting to finishing, 
each monocoque was detached from its support (mascherone) and fixed to another 
framework.
In spite of the fact that welders were multi-purpose tools, the process was inflexible, 
in that each model of car required its own mascherone, so that in order to switch 
production, it was necessary to substitute this device, having first stopped the entire 
production process.
The “hard automation” of the 1960s.
At the beginning of the 1960s, the degree of automation of the Fiat production 
process was rather low. A step towards automation was made in 1961, when the 
retooling for the new model 1300/1500 (segment D, 1300-1600 cc.), led to the 
implementation of highly automated welding systems at the Lingotto and Mirafiori 
plants. This was to produce platforms, the components of which were automatically 
fixed to supports moving on a conveyor. Automatic multiple weldersexecuted the 
welding of the rear and front frameworks to the floor. The only manual operation was 
the charging of the sub-components on the head side of the conveyor and the 
discharging of the assembled chassis on the end side. In 1966, Fiat moved another step 
forward in terms of automation. Automatic multiple welders were installed to produce 
the body of the 124 model (segment C, 1100-1300 cc.) at the Lingotto and Mirafiori 
plants and, subsequently, the entire basting of the 124 and the 127-128 models (segment 
B 900-1100) at the Rivalta plant. Thus, in 1970, finishing remained the only manual 
operation. As far as the process is concerned, the introduction of automated multiple 
welders added another element of inflexibility to the system. In fact, while the manual 
welders could be used indiscriminately for any type of car, the automated multiple 
welders were dedicated to a single model since they were able to perform only a
21 Mascherone literally means large framework.
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sequence of welding spots. Any change in the chassis requiring a different sequence 
needed the resetting, if  not the replacement, of the welders.
The automation of the monocoque welding shop was decided in 1959. The first stage 
of restructuring aimed to expand production from 1600 to 3000 cars per day by 1962, 
while the second stage aimed to reach 4500 per day by 1965.22 Top management and the 
owners were committed to achieving the production target. In 1960, a sum of 180 billion 
Lire was invested, mainly in the car sector. Between 1960 and 1963, extraordinary 
investments plus depreciation reached 500 billion Lire with 310 billion devoted to the 
car sector alone.24 The size of investment was remarkable considering that total sales, 
including lorries, trucks and other products, amounted to 457 billion Lire in 1960 and 
794 billion in 1963.25
On the other hand, the effectiveness of the expansion strategy is contentious. The 
quota of 3000 cars per day was reached only in 1964, two years later than the expected 
schedule. At the end of 1964, production managers set the 1965 production target at 
between 3660 and 3750 cars per day, explaining to the top management and owners that 
the low level of capacity utilisation was justified by prudent expectations about demand 
for 1965. In any case, according to middle management, the technology developed by 
Fiat would enable the company to speed up production if the need arose.26 At the 
beginning of 1966, managers proudly reported to the administration board that in 1965, 
the daily average production had been 3938 cars with peaks of 4250 cars. This was 
between 250 and 562 units below the target set in 1960 for 1964, but still superior to the 
target set at the beginning of 1965 for that year.27 Yet, management was referring to the 
overall Fiat group production, which included the output of controlled companies such 
as Autobianchi and SEAT. In reality, the average daily production of Fiat was 3397 cars 
per day, which means 1100 cars below the 1964 target (see Figure 4.2).
22 Archivio Storico Fiat, ‘Verbali dei Consigli di Ammiiiistrazione’, 30 Luglio, 1960, p. 160, Libro 28. 
From now onwards, this source will be quoted as follow: Unpublished Report of the Fiat Administration 
Board Meeting July the 30th, 1960, p. 160, Book 28.
23 130 million Lire out of 180 million were external funds. Ibid.
24 This figure cumulates depreciation between 1960 and 1963 plus extraordinary investment. Ibid, 
February 4, 1964, p. 99, Book 34.
25 Ibid. January 26, 1965, pp. 185-185, Book 35.
26 Ibid. p. 145.
27 Ibid.
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Figure 4.2: Labour productivity index (direct labour) and daily output (unit),
1960-1973
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7000160
140
120
100
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
Years
Source: Index of ratio output to man-hours (1960 = 100). Calculations based on data from 
Archivio Storico Fiat, Fondo Sepin (employment file) 1960-77, 5/VIII/l/A. Labour input 
includes only direct workers involved in stamping, machining, welding and final assembling. 
From 1960 to 1967, the calculation of output is based on data from Fiat (ed.) Fiat: Le fasi della 
crescita, p. 121. From 1968 onwards, the calculation is based on data from Fiat Archives, ‘Libro 
dei numeri di matricola dei veicoli prodotti’ (Production File). Production refers to Italians 
plants. Daily production has been calculated by dividing output by the number of days in which 
production actually took place each year. Note that figure 3.3 refers to the productivity of all 
workers of the Fiat car sector employed in Italian plants, whereas figure 4.2 refers to selected 
shops.
The reason why management played around with numbers is explained by the 
cultural paradigm developed by the firm under Valletta's direction,28 in which failure 
was not contemplated. Presumably, Valletta had been informally told about the 
problems relating to production, but during board meetings, operative managers always 
had to show their total commitment and an unconditional trust in the human and 
technical resources of the company, as a mark o f respect for the company and its 
chairman.29 In any case, the production target set in 1960 proved unrealistic. The 
downturn in demand in 1964 had hidden the fact that output was not expanding
28 Valletta was the President and Chairman of Fiat from 1946 to 1966.
29 This appears evident from the complete reading of the reports of the Board meetings.
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according to plan. However, in 1965, and particularly in 1966, demand recovered and
middle management could not hide the overwhelming accumulation of outstanding
orders.30 While cars were delivered at the average rate of 66,700 per month, the
1
outstanding orders averaged 60,000 per month.
Only in 1967 was Fiat able to exceed the target set for 1965 (4500 cars per day) by 
317 units, but the company was clearly behind schedule. The daily production set for 
1969 onwards was 7000 cars per day,32 a target that was never reached. In 1973, daily 
production was still about 6788 units (see Figure 4.2). In the whole period in which the 
hard automation of spot welding was introduced and developed, 1960-1973, domestic 
demand grew by 10.8% per year, and daily production rose at the same pace (10.8%.) 
However, demand also expanded in the other European main markets, though to 
different degrees: by 8% in France, 5.8% in Germany, and 5.6% in the UK.33 In this 
context, the fact that Fiat was behind schedule with its production programme was a 
problem.
Investments in automation were supposed to increase labour productivity. 
Nonetheless, between 1960 and 1973, labour productivity increased by 4.4% per year. It 
rose by 5.9% per year between 1960 and 1969 and only by 1% per year between 1969 
and 1973.34 In other words, after 1969, productivity growth slowed down, in spite of the 
fact that the automation of basting had been extended to the whole range of models. 
Moreover, labour productivity slowed its growth at a moment in which Fiat still needed 
to speed up the output growth.
After 1969 industrial relations deteriorated sharply, so that it would be reasonable to 
think that when the production process is not regular each man-hour unit is less 
productive than it would have been, had production been regular. Nonetheless, during 
the 1960s, the productivity peak was reached in 1969, precisely when man-hours lost 
during industrial action also peaked. In spite of the less man-hours performed, more cars 
were produced in 1969 than in 1968.35 Strikes in 1969 were concentrated in the last two 
months of the year, while before the so-called “Hot Autumn” lines had been run at full 
capacity. Yet, daily production was far from the expected 7000 cars per day (see figure
30 Outstanding orders refers to cars already sold but not delivered to clients.
31 Unpublished report of the Administration Board, January 30, 1967, pp. 103-104.
32 Giacosa, Progetti alia Fiatprima del computer, p. 299.
33 Elaboration of Elaboration of data from ANFIA (Italian Association of Car Manufacturers and Traders), 
L ’automobile in cifre (Torino, 1996), pp. 232-238.
34 Calculation based on the productivity index, reported by table A 3.6, in the appendix.
35 See table A3.6 in the appendix.
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4.2). In 1973, also, productivity increased as compared to 1972, in spite of the fact that 
less hours were performed due to strikes and, after September, due to short-time 
implemented in the aftermath of the oil crisis. This is consistent with findings of Jones 
and Paris, suggesting that the direct effect on strikes on productivity is marginal.36 Thus, 
the slowing of labour productivity growth after 1969, and the inability of Fiat to reach 
the production target of 7000 cars per day were in part a consequence of the 
technological saturation of the Fiat production setting. The strategy of Fiat management 
during the 1960s seems to consist of the introduction of automation wherever 
technology allowed it, regardless of the fact that, in an integrated process, production 
speed differentials between the initial and the final stages of the processes are likely to 
produce bottlenecks. Until 1966, basting and finishing were still performed manually, 
which means that the automation of platform and body welding could not improve 
production speed unless more labour units were put into the cycle to increase the 
segmentation of the monocoque welding. In addition, intermediate stocks were 
gradually introduced before basting to avoid production jams.37 The automation of 
basting after 1966 did not improve the situation because finishing - the last step of spot 
welding - remained manual. Again buffers were introduced between basting and 
finishing, and again finishing had to be hyper-segmented. Labour saved in basting was 
re-deployed in finishing instead of final assembly, so that new labour was needed for the 
final stages of the manufacturing process. This explains why the daily production of 
4500 cars per day was exceeded only in 1968, three years later than the expected 
schedule. Moreover, the transfer of workers from basting to finishing contributed to the 
slowing of productivity growth after exceeding the threshold of 5800 cars per day in 
1969.
Asked on this specific point, two managers, who started their career at Fiat in the late 
1960s, have confirmed that the “hard automation” of the platform and body welding, as 
well as the automation of basting during the 1960s led to a vicious circle in labour
* , -io
productivity. To minimise the bottleneck, finishing was hyper-segmented and more
36 D. T Jones, S. J. Paris, ‘Plant Size and Productivity in the Motor Industry: Some International 
Comparisons’, Oxford Bulletin o f Economics and Statistics, 40, No 2 (Oxford, 1977) pp. 123 - 146.
37 Guidi et al, FIAT, p. 47.
38 Interview with the author, March 18, 1999. Mr Malandri is an engineer enrolled in the Department of 
New Production Technologies Development of Fiat Auto. During the 1970s, he was directly involved in 
the process o f shifting from hard to flexible automation, and during the 1980s, he was responsible for the 
Robogate at Rivalta. Mr Scimone is a member of staff at the Department o f New Production Technology
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workers were added to each finishing station so that more welding spots were performed 
in each finishing station. Moreover, the two managers explained that hard automation 
could not be extended to finishing in a profitable way, because automated multiple 
welders could perform only a limited number of welding spots. Because of the 
differential in the number of welding spots needed in basting and finishing, the 
automation of the whole process would have required the hyper-segmentation of 
finishing. Labour productivity would have increased, but the enormous increment in the 
number of multiple automated welders would have created tool reliability problems 
resulting in less efficiency.
The ex post explanation of the two managers is perfectly consistent with what Fiat 
actually experienced with the production line of the 126 model at the Cassino plant in
1973. There, Fiat experimented with the implementation of the automatic multiple 
welders in monocoque finishing, but the system proved to be unreliable and inefficient, 
even though production was organised on four lines to contain the segmentation of the 
finishing and reduce the speed of the process.39 This confirmed that there was no further 
room for increasing productivity within the traditional automated multi-welder 
technology. Thus, the technological stall of the 1960s was that, by the end of the decade, 
the automation of finishing was needed to increase labour productivity as well as total 
output. On the other hand, the current technology did not allow the achieving of the 
target. As will be shown, this fact had a large influence on developments in welding 
technology during the 1970s.
Development, but he started his career at the beginning of the 1970s as a skilled worker in the tool repairs 
and maintenance section of the Mirafiori plant.
39 R. Merli, ‘II Robogate nella produzione della Fiat Uno, in Dina (ed.) Modello Robot, p. 135.
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The 1970s and the early stages of robotics41
The difficulty encountered by Fiat engineers in the setting up of automated finishing 
explains why they experimented with robotics. The use of robotics was pioneered for 
the first time at the Mirafiori plant in 1972. A first batch of 18 robots was set up for the 
welding of the model 132 monocoque (segment D, 1600-2200 cc.). They were Unimate 
machines of the same typology of those “unsuccessfully” introduced since 1970 by 
General Motors at the Lordstown plant.42 However, Fiat did not employ Unimates to 
perform the whole welding process, limiting the use of robots to the finishing stage. 
Chart 4.2 shows the layout of the Unimate station.
According to the Fiat engineer Bessusso,43 the new technology yielded promising 
results in terms of improving the working environment and product quality. He 
explained that initially the company experimented with Unimates in order to improve 
working conditions by liberating workers from some of the more distressing operations 
during the monocoque welding (namely finishing). Only later did engineers start to see 
advantages in terms of flexibility and began to think about a completely new assembly 
system.
41 The following sections of this chapter are based on a variety of sources and data the majority of which 
are unpublished. The description of various technological settings deployed in the spot-welding shop, 
including the Robogate had been provided by Malandri and Scimone during the interview with the author 
given the 18th of March 1999. The layouts displayed in this section have been drawn according their 
information. Malandri and Scimone also provided information concerning the time-cycle performed by 
different technologies in the spot-welding shop, and data concerning the optimum capacity utilisation of 
each welding line form 1978 to 1987. Monthly output data have been calculated on the bases of data from 
‘Libro dei numeri di matricola’ (The Fiat Production File), while the number of working days performed 
per month have been calculated on the bases ‘Fondo Sepim’ (Sepim File). Both Production and Sepim 
files are stored in the Fiat Archive.
42 Dina, introductory notes to Modello Robot, p. 19.
43 Ibid, p. 19.
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Chart 4.2: Layout of the spot-welding shop for the 132 model, Mirafiori plant 
Unimate technology, 1972
Mitiple alternated wkfas 9 robots Ihjmate per acfe
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Mm finishing
Source: Based on information from Malandri and Scimone, Interview with the Author, 18-03-1999.
On the other hand, Unimate technology was heavily criticised as it caused many 
problems.44 First of all, when finishing was performed manually, workers had the 
possibility of intervening on monocoques that had been imperfectly welded during the 
previous stage (basting) and, to a certain extent, to re-perform the imperfect basting 
during the finishing. With the Unimate technology, this was no longer possible with the 
result that monocoques had to be controlled before starting the finishing process. 
Imperfect monocoques were completed by a traditional line parallel to the Unimate 
station (the support finishing line), which was constantly kept on standby. Secondly, 
with the manual welders, workers could check the state of deterioration of the electrode, 
the component of the welder that performed the actual welding, and replace it just in 
time. With the Unimate technology, the deterioration of electrodes could be checked 
only after the finishing by analysing the welding quality of monocoque already 
processed. This involved the scrapping of imperfect monocoques. Finally, in case of 
robot failure, the Unimate station was by-passed and the finishing was performed 
manually through the support line.
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The problems associated with the Unimate technology are extremely important to 
understand the further development of robotics and in particular the reasons why Fiat set 
up the Robogate system. However, before describing the Robogate technology, two 
other innovations need to be described: the pallet and the robocarrier. The pallet was 
introduced with the retooling for the 131 model (segment D, 1300-1600 cc.) in 1974. 
This was a wooden frame on which the platform and body were tied up simultaneously. 
The pallet was moved by a traditional truck conveyor. With the introduction of this new 
device, the monocoque was no longer fixed directly to the three-dimensional 
framework, or mascherone to be processed. It was the pallet that was fixed on the base 
of the framework, while the top of the monocoque was fixed to upper end of the jig 
through automatic pliers. Each specification of the 131 monocoque, such as the two-, 
the four- and five-door versions, had its own specific pallet. On the other hand, the 
framework holding the monocoque during the basting was no longer model-specific. By 
replacing the pallet and pliers, it was possible to fix different specifications of the 131 
model in the same installation. However, basting was still performed by multiple 
automatic welders, which were still model-specific, while only finishing was performed 
by Unimate robots. For this reason, flexibility was limited to the finishing of the two- 
and four-door version of the same model. It is worth noting that the pallet technology 
consisted of a relatively simple modification of the mascherone of the 1960s. It is also 
worth noting that given the introduction of the pallet, imperfectly welded monocoques 
could be taken out from the process much easily than before and reintroduced into the 
process.
Robocarriers were first introduced with the Digitron system at the mechanical 
assembly shop at the Mirafiori plant in 1974. Subsequently, the technology was 
extended to Rivalta and Cassino. Although Digitron is not directly related to the welding 
technology, there was a relevant spill-over between Digitron and Robogate. In fact, with 
Digitron, Fiat experimented with the use of robotics paralleled by the introduction of a 
reticular layout.45 Trolleys, called robocarriers, were used to transport pre-assembled
44 Guidi, et.al, FIAT, p. 40.
45 Reticular layout means the disposition of the working stations according to their function so that they 
form a network. Within the network, different stages of the process can be performed without following a 
given and unchangeable schedule, as is the case with the linear layout.
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mechanical components (engine, transmission and suspension) from depots to assembly 
stations. Robocarriers moved over the floor guided by a series of invisible magnetic 
tracks. The schedule was set up according to the software controlling the system. 
Robocarriers were able to go to different depots and pick up different components (e.g. 
either engines or suspension) of a given model or, alternatively, the same component 
(e.g. engine) for different models. Assembly stations were suitable for different types of 
cars because assembly was performed almost entirely manually by using multi-purpose 
tools (see chart 4.3).
Chart 4.3: Digitron mechanical assembly shop, Mirafori p lan t 1974
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Source: ibid.
The Fiat experiment with flexible transport systems and the reticular layout was 
largely inspired by the failure of Unimate technology. This led to the necessity o f setting 
a parallel traditional line beside the Unimate station. It will be shown that with the 
Robogate system, the reintroduction of imperfect monocoques into the cycle and the 
ability to bypass inefficient welding stations were both maximised through the 
introduction of robocarriers moving on a reticular layout along with the implementation 
of parallel welding and basting stations. A similar kind of process flexibility had been
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already obtained with the Unimate technology, but only at the cost of setting a parallel 
manual line, and facing extra labour and machine under-utilisation costs.
The Robogate system, 1976-1987 46
The Robogate was set up in 1976 to produce the Ritmo model (segment C), at the 
Rivalta and Cassino plants. Capacity was 800 units per day on double shift. At Rivalta 
after 1982, the Robogate was reset to produce the Uno model (segment B) 
simultaneously with the Ritmo and capacity was expanded to 1400 units on double shift. 
In addition, at Cassino the system was reset to produce the Regata simultaneously with 
the Ritmo. Daily capacity rose up to 1400 units on double shift. The Robogate combined 
the transport system already developed in the Digitron set with the extensive use of 
welding robots. The name of the system derived from the fact that it was based on nine 
welding stations called gates, three for the basting and six for the finishing, in which the 
entire welding process was executed by robots (chart 4.4).
46 Source: Archivio Storico Fiat, ‘II Robogate’, Fiat internal paper. Malandri and Scimone, interview with 
the author, 18-02-1999, see footnote 38.
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Chart 4.4: Layout of the Robogate shop, Cassino and Rivalta plants. 1976-1987
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Source: ibid.
The transport system was based on 40 trolleys moving along a magnetic track - 
robocarriers - which were similar to these already experimented with in the Digitron 
system. However, in this case, each robocarrier was completed by an interchangeable 
pallet, a wooden frame conceptually similar to that already introduced in 1974 in the 
production line of the 131 model, on which monocoque sub-components, platforms and 
bodies were fixed before the welding process. While welding gates and trolleys were 
multi-purpose tools, pallets were model-specific. The flexibility of the system derived 
from the possibility of replacing the pallets without stopping production. Each welding 
gate was equipped with two sets of automatic pliers. Thus, bodies and platform that had 
been tied together with very few welding spots before basting were held by the pallet 
from the bottom and by automatic pliers from the top during basting. As usual, during 
the finishing automatic pliers were not needed.
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In 1982, Fiat introduced a different version of the Robogate system at the Mirafiori 
p lant47 Welding gates, similar to those of Robogate, were arranged according to a more 
traditional linear layout (chart 4.5). In this case, pallets were moving on a traditional 
conveyor truck, which was charged with different pallets, each holding simultaneously 
the body and chassis of a different model according to the desired production mix. 
Therefore, after 1984, the Fiat Uno and Croma, and the Lancia Thema and Y10 shared 
the same three welding lines. Again, flexibility derived from the possibility of replacing 
the pallet, and by the fact that each welding station was equipped with two or more sets 
of automatic pliers. The optimum capacity was 850 units per day per line on double 
shift.
A similar system based on robotised welding gates had already been introduced at the 
Termini Imerese plant since 1979 for the production of the Panda, but this system was 
much more simple and much less flexible, because both the transport system and the 
fixtures by which the monocoque was held during the basting were model-specific.
Chart 4.5: Layout of the Robogate shop, Mirafiori plant, 1982-1987
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Source: ibid.
47 The robotised jig.
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The production sequence
The monocoque assembly process (see chart flow 4.4) started from the sub­
components depots, where platforms and bodies of each model (for example the Ritmo 
and Regata) had been fitted into each other and then fixed to the appropriate pallet. This 
stage was not yet a welding stage. Platform and bodies were embedded together by 
fitting fins, set in the bottom edge of the body, into small holes arranged in the platform. 
After this stage, pallets were stored in the pallet depots. A group of three robocarriers 
arrived to the pallet depot and each picked up a pallet. The production of a given model, 
between the two possible choices, depended on the type of pallet picked up. The 
robocarriers then moved on to the welding area, where each stopped first at one of the 
three basting gates, and then at two of the six finishing stations in sequence. In fact, 
finishing was performed in two different stages. Robocarriers entered and exited from 
the front of the stations since the gates were parallel. After having discharged the 
monocoques at the head of the final assembly line, they went back to the pallet depot to 
start another cycle.
In the case, of the Mirafiori Robogate, pallets were carried by a normal truck 
conveyor. Pallets entered the basting gate from the front and exited from the back to 
enter the first finishing station from the front. As already stated, from 1982 onwards, the 
Robogate was set up to produce 1400 cars per day at Rivalta and Cassino. In the first 
case the production mix could range from 800 Uno and 600 Ritmo to 600 Uno and 800 
Ritmo, while at Cassino it was possible to produce up to 1000 Regata and 400 Ritmo or 
vice versa. If, for instance, the Robogate was to process 750 Uno and 650 Ritmo, the 
shift from one model to the other occurred every 30 minutes. In fact, if all the Uno were 
produced first, and then all the Ritmo, the respective sub-component production lines 
would have been slowed down unless huge stocks were arranged.
Each robocarrier was equipped with a system to lift and set the pallet in the proper 
position within each welding gate. All the welding stations, be they basting or finishing 
gates, were equipped with six robots for welding (10 robots after 1982), and two sets of 
automatic pliers, one for each model, which held together the body and chassis during 
the welding. Automatic pliers were dedicated to a single model. Since each gate was
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equipped with two sets of pliers, it was possible to weld two different models without 
resetting the system.
The whole system, from the procession of trolleys to the welding sequence performed 
by each robot, was scheduled and monitored by a computerised system, which was able 
to detect imperfect or missed welding sequences and reintroduce any monocoque into 
the welding process when needed. Moreover, the software was able to change the path 
of trolleys in case one of the gates was temporarily out of order. Every single event of 
the process was recorded so that in case of a temporary crash of the electronic system, it 
was possible to reset robots and restart the process exactly from the point at which the 
cycle had been interrupted. The main difference between the Rivalta and Cassino 
Robogates, and the Robogate introduced at Mirafiori consists of the fact that in the latter 
system it was much more difficult to reintroduce monocoques imperfectly welded into 
the system. This suggests that by 1982, when the Mirafiori welding shop was set up, 
management felt totally confident about the quality of welding performed by robots and 
the reliability of the tools, so there was no longer a need for reticular layouts allowing 
defective stations to be bypassed.
From a technical point of view, it was possible to equip each basting gate with three 
sets of pliers so that, in theory, it was possible to weld up to nine different models at the 
same time, three for each basting gate. Actually, in the period considered in this chapter, 
no more than two models were processed at the same time by each Robogate at Rivalta 
and Cassino. This depended on the minimum scale of production required by the models 
processed in these plants. In fact, an expansion in the number of the models processed 
would lead to a decrease in the output for each model. The scale of production of each 
type of cars depended on the segment of the market in which models were going to 
compete. Accordingly, only the second Robogate line of the Mirafiori plant processed 
three models, two of which were competing in segment E (1600-2200 cc.), and therefore 
were produced in smaller numbers. This is an important point that will be explored in 
more detail in the following section of the chapter.
It should be mentioned that finishing was performed in two different stages by twenty 
robots, compared with the ten robots used for basting. As with traditional systems, this 
reflected the fact that during basting, the number of welding spots performed was
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smaller than that of finishing. In theory, the robots of the basting gates could have 
performed a larger number of welding spots in order to start the finishing of the 
monocoque. Actually, the automatic pliers prevented the robots from moving freely 
within the monocoques. Consequently, because basting was much quicker than 
finishing, the latter had to be segmented into two stages. Therefore, the differential in 
speed between basting and finishing was overcome by the over-segmentation of the 
finishing stage as it was during the 1960s and early 1970s. Thus, the flexibility of robots 
in performing many different welding functions did not lead to a re-composition of tasks 
through the re-composition of basting and finishing.
Some considerations on the Robogate system
In many respects, Robogate cannot be considered a “revolutionary” system. It did not 
lead to a substantial change of the segmentation of the process, nor to a re-organisation 
of its supply flow through the complete abolition of intermediate stocks, even though 
the queuing time of each batch of monocoque sub-components for each model in normal 
conditions was limited to just half an hour. The technical solutions implemented with 
the Robogate were almost entirely inspired by technical problems experienced by the 
firm during the early stage of robotics, which was initially introduced in order to find a 
technical solution to the bottleneck caused by the impossibility of applying hard 
automation to the finishing stage of spot welding. The change in layout, the most 
evident modification of traditional technology, reflected the need to improve the 
reliability of robotised systems once they were deployed. In fact, the second generation 
of the Robogate, which was implemented at the Mirafiori plant, was deployed according 
to a linear layout.
The established literature, on the other hand, has seen the Robogate as the most 
important outcome of a marked change in managerial knowledge. In the new managerial 
paradigm, flexibility was more important, or at least as important, than increasing total 
output per model per shift. This view implies that the routine underpinning the search 
for new technology consisted in choosing the technology which maximised flexibility 
and minimised the cycle time, as opposed to the traditional Fordist routine underpinning 
the search for new technology, which consisted of choosing the technology that
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minimised the cycle time, through the standardisation of process and product. Based on 
unpublished data and interviews with technical management, the next section shows that 
while the Robogate technology contributed to a massive cut in the basic cycle time in 
spot welding, constraints to flexibility remained substantial. This was the result of 
search for new technology and organisation influenced by the necessity of removing the 
bottleneck between basting and finishing, in the existing process.
Section three 
The Robogate and product-mix flexibility
By using data concerning the cycle time of basting and finishing in the spot-welding 
shop, this section shows that robotics allowed for a quantum leap in the acceleration of 
the finishing process. Then, by using company production data arranged by model and 
by plant, along with data concerning the optimum capacity of each line, this section 
shows that in spite of the enhanced plant flexibility, some lines were still under-used, 
while in some others extra time was implemented.
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The Robogate and cycle-time minimisation
Table 4.2 shows the cycle time of the monocoque spot-welding process of the Fiat 
126 (1972), the Fiat Panda (1980) the Ritmo and Regata (1984), the Fiat Uno and Ritmo 
(1984), and the Lancia Delta and Prisma (1984).
Table 4.2: Efficiency expressed as duration of the cycle time in welding (seconds), 
various years, various plants ________ _________________ ________________
Year Plant Number 
of lines
Model Efficiency
Factor
Technology Time cycle
Basting Finishing Minutes and seconds
1975 Cassino* 4 126 0.80 Automated Automated 6.10
1975 Mirafiori* 1 126 0.93 Automated Manual 2.04
1980 Termini-
Imerese
1 Panda 0.85 Robotics Robotics 1.32
1980 Desio 1 Panda 0.93 Automated Manual 2.51
1984 Chivasso 1 Lancia Delta 0.90 Automated Manual 2.01
1984 Chivasso 1 Lancia
Prisma
0.90 Automated Manual 2.01
1984 Mirafiori 3 Uno 0.85 Robogate Robogate 0.54
1984 Casino 1 Ritmo + 
Regata
0.83 Robogate Robogate 0.32
1984 Rivalta 1 Ritmo + Uno 0.83 Robogate Robogate 0.32
Source: Malandri and Scimone, interview with the author, 18-03-1999. * Volpato II caso Fiat, p.170. The cycle 
time must not be confused with the lead time of each monocoque (time taken by each unit to pass through the 
entire process). The cycle time is the interval time between any monocoque entering or exiting each individual 
stage of the process. In the case of Rivalta (1984), for example, one monocoque enters into the basting station 
(head-stream), and one monocoque exits out the last finishing station (end-stream) any 32 seconds in each line. 
Cycle time tells us how many cars per day can be processed by a given segment of the manufacturing process. 
Cycle time has been calculated according to a simple formula suggested by Fiat management: TC = St* e /  P , 
where TC= time cycle, P = established daily output; t = duration of each shift in the ordinary working time; e 
= efficiency factor = 0.8. The efficiency factor is established by engineers according to the expected tool life 
cycle. An efficiency factor of 0.8 implies that only 80% of each shift was actually utilised for production. Thus, 
if P= 900 minutes, P* e = 720 minutes. Note that when minutes are divided by output, TC is expressed in 
minutes and hundredths of minutes for TC > 1, and in hundredths of minutes for TC < 1. For simplicity, in this 
table the results have been converted in minutes and seconds for TC> 1, and in seconds for TC< 1.
The table analyses the whole range of Fiat technological settings. The welding line 
for the 126 at the Cassino plant featured hard automation in basting and finishing, while 
the 126 line at the Mirafiori plant featured manual finishing. The Panda was produced 
by robots at the Termini Imerese plant and by using traditional welding at the Desio 
plant. It is also interesting to compare the welding technology used to produce the 
Lancia Delta and Prisma at the Chivasso plant with the Robogate of Cassino producing 
the Ritmo and Regata, which were models competing in the same segments of those
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produced at Chivasso. As already said, the Robogate was also deployed at the Rivalta 
plant and, though with a different layout, at the Mirafiori plant. As shown by the table, 
the superiority of the Robogate - be it the version used at Cassino and Rivalta or that 
deployed at Mirafiori - over the other technologies, including robotics deployed at 
Termini Imerese, was overwhelming. It is also interesting to note that Fiat was 
producing the Lancia brand at the Chivasso rather than at any of the robotised plants. 
Lancia was supposed to be the top quality brand of the Fiat Group. In fact, the optimum 
daily production of the Delta and the Prisma was 400 cars per day. The fact that the top 
brand production was allocated to a traditional rather than robotised plant clearly 
indicated that daily output, and therefore cycle time, rather than quality, was the 
criterion adopted by management to prioritise the deployment of robotics. On the whole, 
the table shows that, through the Robogate technology, the basting and finishing cycle 
time were substantially reduced. In the next section it will be investigated whether or not 
the Robogate allowed the Fiat management to optimise product-mix flexibility.
48 The view of discontinuity is implicit in many documents and pamphlets produced by Fiat stressing the 
innovative characteristic of the system. An example is provided by a Fiat document entitled ‘II Robogate’. 
On the other hand, a leaflet printed by COMAU, entitled ‘Robogate’ makes it clear that the system was 
the outcome of a long-term evolution profiting from the Fiat experience in automation. Moreover, the 
leaflet stresses that the system has been thought to be compatible with any kind of traditional technology. 
The striking difference between the two documents depends on the authors as well as on the target 
audience of the two documents. The first document was written by Fiat engineers, who wanted to stress 
the firm's commitment to innovation, and was aimed mainly at the academic world. The second was 
produced by COMAU, and was targeted at COMAU's potential or actual clients, namely car 
manufacturers external to the Fiat group, who were interested in the reliability and compatibility of the 
system with traditional technologies. Both documents have been provided to the author by the Department 
of Technology Assessment of Fiat Auto.
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Plant flexibility and production allocation
Table 4.3 shows the average daily production of each model produced by flexible 
lines from 1978 to 1987. Both the Rivalta and Cassino Robogate had been used on a 
double model production line only after 1982 and 1983 respectively, which means four 
and five years after the deployment of the system. Moreover, from February 1986 the 
Rivalta Robogate shifted back to a single model production programme. In addition, the 
Mirafiori Robogate has been used on a multi-model production programme only after 
1984, two years after the deployment of the system. In any case, multi-model production 
was performed only by two of the three lines deployed. Until 1982, flexible capacity 
was entirely devoted to the production of a single model, the Ritmo, while after 1983 
the flexible capacity was increasingly and massively allocated to the Uno, although five 
different models were processed at Cassino, Rivalta and Mirafiori.
Table 4.3 Robogate line output per day (units), 1978 - 1987
Plant Cassino Rivalta Mirafiori
Ritmo Regata Ritmo Uno Uno Croma Thema Y 10
Robogate Robogate Robogate 
(all lines)
Robogate 
(second line)
Robogate 
(second line)
Robogate
(third
line)
Year
1978 63 0 320 0 0 0 0 0
1979 586 0 782 0 0 0 0 0
1980 643 0 778 0 0 0 0 0
1981 660 0 689 0 0 0 0 0
1982 706 0 672 117 3 0 0 0
1983 677 263 449 140 507 0 0 0
1984 133 884 536 635 1,918 0 11 0
1985 155 691 397 904 1,511 19 132 275
1986 377 628 19 1,309 1,551 311 191 349
1987 182 594 0 1,446 1,609 278 480 231
Source: Calculated from Fiat Auto ‘Libro dei numeri di marticola dei veicoli prodotti’ (Production 
File).
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This is shown more clearly by table 4.4. In 1985, five production lines produced 
more than 80% of total output, of which the Uno represents the major share. In 
particular, the Uno represented 60% of the output of flexible lines in 1985, 59% in 1986 
and 63% in 1987. Since 1983, there was a massive concentration of production on 
flexible lines. It is of extreme interest that beside a few lines producing the larger share 
of total output, there were a number of lines producing a relatively small share of output 
in a less efficient way, which allowed Fiat to keep a relatively large model range. This 
means that product differentiation was still depending on the existence of a number of 
traditional single product lines, in which robotics was deployed to a lesser degree or not 
deployed at all. Some of them produced a relatively low level of output. The Panda was 
produced in two different plants. This, along with the multi-location of the Robogate 
system, explains why the ratio of lines to models never goes below one in spite of the 
fact that multi-model production was performed by flexible lines.
Table 4.4: Flexible lines within the Fiat production system, 1978-1987
Year Total number of 
lines - Italian 
plants
Number
of
flexible
lines
Number 
of models 
produced
Ratio lines 
to models
Share of units produced 
by flexible lines out of 
total Fiat production - 
Italian plants
Share of Uno 
out of flexible 
lines output
1978 18 2 11 1.27 6.7%
1979 17 2 11 1.18 27.5%
1980 13 2 10 1.3 25.4%
1981 13 2 10 1.3 29%
1982 16 2 13 1.23 31.9%
1983 16 5 12 1.33 52.5% 31.7%
1984 15 5 12 1.25 71.8% 62%
1985 11 5 11 1 82.1% 59%
1986 11 5 11 1 74% 60.4%
1987 12 5 10 1.2 58.2% 63.2%
Source: ibid.
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From tables 4.3 and 4.4, it is clear that apart from the second line at the Mirafiori 
plant, the Fiat management did not use flexibility to increase the efficiency of batch 
production of a large number of different luxury and niche models. On the contrary, they 
exploited the remarkable technical efficiency of the Robogate mostly to mass-produce 
the Uno. The full exploitation of flexibility, therefore, was constrained by the output 
structure of Fiat, which, as will be shown in chapters 6 and 7 of the thesis, was the result 
of the strategic choices concerning the core segment in which the company aimed to 
compete during the 1980s. The output structure determined the scale of production of 
each model. The scale of production of each model affected the use of the Robogate 
system, as will be explained in the following section.
Model scale of production and capacity utilisation
According to the Fiat management, in comparison with traditional technology the 
Robogate led to the reduction of spare capacity for the same level of flexibility. The 
argument was that, in order to have the same mix flexibility of the Robogate (in the case 
of Cassino 1000 Regata and 400 Ritmo per day or vice versa) by using traditional 
technology, two traditional model-specific lines were needed, each with a production 
range49 from 400 to 1,000 cars per day. The installed total capacity would have been 
2,000 instead of 1,400 cars per day. If daily production was 1,000 cars per day between 
the two models, the under-utilisation of the traditional lines would have been 1,000 cars 
per day, while that of the Robogate only 400 cars per day. Thus, product mix flexibility 
being equal, the Robogate reduced substantially the risk of running spare capacity.50 On 
the other hand, a single Robogate line could not cope with a situation in which demand 
for both the models produced was rising simultaneously, exceeding 1,400 cars per day. 
This problem led to one of the most interesting features of the system, namely the 
production location of some models in more than one plant or line (see chart 4.6).
49 The line production range is the difference between the minimum output needed to start production and 
the saturation level of output on double shift.
50 This is one o f the most quoted arguments among those used by management to demonstrate the intrinsic 
quality of the Robogate system.
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Chart 4.6: Robogate plants and production allocation
Rivalta
Cassino
Regata + Rirmo
Ritmo + Uno
Mirafiori
Uno
1
Uno + Thema + Croma
1
Uno + Y10
Source: Based on information from Malandri and Scimone, interview with the author, 18-03- 
1999.
The multi-location of production is a key feature of the system, and must be taken 
into account for the purpose of the analysis. In theory, it gave the management the 
possibility of adjusting the output structure, keeping each line at 100% of the optimum 
capacity utilisation. Actually, as already said, the minimum efficient scale of each model 
limited the number of car types each Robogate line could produce in an economically 
efficient way. Also, once the number of models to be processed on each line was set, the 
minimum efficient scale of each type of car limited the maximum output for the others 
unless the plant shifted to a single type production programme.
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By looking at table 4.3, it is clear that the Ritmo was constantly under-produced at 
Cassino (with the exception of 1986), in spite of the fact that the overwhelming 
production of the Uno pushed the Ritmo out of the Rivalta plant, which, after February 
1986 had to shift to a single production programme. Thus, even with flexible welding 
tools it was difficult for the Fiat management to optimise the production of different 
models on the same lines. In this context, it is important to establish whether or not the 
management was able to stabilise production avoiding the under-utilisation of 
production facilities or the implementation of extra time.
Figures 4.3 (a, b, c, d and e) show the plot of the monthly capacity utilisation rate for 
the Rivalta, Cassino and Mirafiori Robogates, and for the Termini Imerese and Desio 
plants. For Mirafiori, the plot shows the capacity utilisation rate for each of the three 
lines, which have been called Mir I, Mir n, and Mir III. The monthly utilisation capacity 
rate of the Desio and Termini Imerese plants have been plotted in order to compare the 
utilisation pattern of two model-specific plants with plants using flexible lines. At the 
Termini Imerese plant, robots performed the welding, while at the Desio and Chivasso 
plants robotics was not implemented at all.
Desio and Chivasso were plants inherited by Fiat when the company took over 
Autobianchi in 1967 and Lancia in 1969. During the 1980s, the Desio plant produced 
the Panda. Technology was extremely backward since basting was performed by 
multiple automated welders and finishing was performed manually as it had been during 
the 1960s. However, output levels were relatively low and the optimum capacity was set 
at 300 cars per day. Obsolete technology was also utilised for the production of the 
Lancia Delta and Prisma at the Chivasso plant. In this case, there were two inflexible 
lines producing a model each. The optimum capacity of each model was 400 cars per 
day. It is interesting to note that the Delta and Prisma shared the same platform with the 
Ritmo and Regata and that as far as the Robogate was concerned there was no reason 
why the Delta and Prisma could not have been processed at Cassino.
The utilisation rate is an index of the actual monthly production of each line, as a 
percentage of the monthly optimum capacity on double shift. The monthly optimum 
capacity has been calculated by multiplying the daily optimum capacity on double shift
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by the number of working days of each month, from January 1984 to December 1987. 
Data on daily optimum capacity have been obtained from interviews with the Fiat 
engineers Malandri and Scimone.51
The actual monthly production has been calculated by using the Fiat Production File 
(‘Libro dei numeri di matricola dei veicoli prodotti’). This consists of the serial numbers 
of Fiat cars and is arranged by models, by plants and by lines. For example, in order to 
work out the production of a given model in February, the serial number of January 
should be subtracted from that of February. Working days vary from month by month 
ranging from 19 to 23. During the period considered, there were 232 ordinary working 
days per year and five per week. In August, there were only six working days. However, 
in many cases the Fiat production files do not provide data for the production in August 
so that the plots show gaps in some cases. Because capacity refers to double shift, any 
value in the utilisation rate above 100% denotes that extra time was added to normal 
time by the introduction of an extra shift. By including the third shift from Monday to 
Friday, and six shifts each weekend, up to 11 shifts could have been added to normal 
time each week. Finally, it should be noted that during the period considered, the 
production schedule was set on a monthly basis.52 The 1984-87 period has been chosen 
because a double production program was executed by all the flexible lines except Mir I 
and, in 1987, Rivalta.
51 Data concerning Cassino and Rivalta have also been published by The Department of External 
Relations of Fiat. However, according to Malandri and Scimone, the optimum capacity utilisation of 
Cassino was 1400 rather than the 1300 cars per day quoted by the External Relations Department. Given 
that both Rivalta and Cassino shared the identical Robogate technology and that both sources quote 1400 
cars per day for Rivalta, the figure quoted by Scimone for the Cassino plant is more credible.
52 Interview with Malandri and Scimone; see note 38.
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Figure 4.3 (a): Monthly capacity utilisation rate, Rivalta plant Uno and Ritmo,
January 1984 - December 1987
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Source: E laboration o f  data from  Fiat Archives, ‘Libro dei num eri di m atricola dei veicoli prodotti* 
(Production File).
As far as the Rivalta plant is concerned, the plot can be divided into three sub­
periods. The first, January 1984 - July 1985 was characterised by a serial peak and 
trough, denoting marked variations in the rate of capacity utilisation, which, in some 
cases, was well above 100%, in some others well below 100%, or even 75%. Notably, 
plant utilisation reached the lowest point in December 1984 and June 1987, in which the 
rate was around 40%. The second-sub period, from September 1985 to January 1987, 
shows a remarkably high and stable level of plant utilisation, with a moderate 
implementation of extra time. Utilisation never fell below 80%. However, in 1987 there 
was massive over-utilisation until May, then a remarkable slump in June to below 60%, 
and finally another peak in July, well above 100%. From September to December, 
capacity utilisation decreased from 90% to 75%. As already stated, from February 1986
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to December 1987, the plant was used to produce a single model. Between January 1984 
and December 1987, the capacity utilisation rate was on average 94%.
Figure 4.3 (b): Monthly capacity utilisation rate, Cassino plant Rimo and Regata,
January 1984 - December 1987
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Source: Ibid.
The Cassino plant shows a slightly different path. Firstly, the utilisation rate between 
January 1984 and December 1987 was on average 64%, much lower than that at Rivalta. 
It is extremely important to note that the plant break-even point was reached at 70% of 
capacity utilisation. Apart from two short periods of relative stability, March-July 1985 
and April-July 1986, the utilisation rate was unstable, and in some months very low. It 
seems therefore that in terms of capacity utilisation, the performance of Rivalta was 
much better than that of Cassino, which on the other hand, suffered from the low 
production level of the Ritmo, which was not compensated by the production of the 
Regata.
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Figure 4.3 (c): Monthly capacity utilisation rate. Mirafiori plant January 1984 -
December 1987
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Source: Ibid.
The Mirafiori plant exhibits a different regime for each line. The rate of capacity 
utilisation of Mir I was rather stable. In the first two years, 1984 and 1985, there was a 
drop below 75% in October and December, which reflects the seasonality of demand, 
but in general the utilisation was between 75% and 100%. However, from January 1986 
and December 1987 the rate is almost constantly over 100%, implying a considerable 
amount of extra time. The average rate in the whole period is 96%. Flexibility was not 
exploited at all since a single model was produced. Mir II was massively over-utilised 
from February to September 1984. On the other hand, during 1985, the rate was over 
75% only in March, June and September, in spite of the fact that both the Uno and 
Thema were produced. However, in 1986 and 1987 the rate was much better, always 
between 75% and 100%, with some extra time performed in March and July 1987. The 
rate improved in the last two years because the Croma was also processed on the second
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line. Flexibility was exploited extremely well in 1986 and 1987. Over the whole period 
the rate of capacity utilisation was 94%. Finally, Mir IE was the most stable line from 
April 1984 to December 1987. Its capacity utilisation rate falls almost always between 
75% and 100%. However, in 1987 extra time was performed during five months. On 
average, the rate was 83%.
Figure 4.3 (d): Monthly capacity utilisation rate, Desio and Termini Imerese
plants, January 1984 - December 1987
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Source: Ibid.
As far as the traditional lines of the Desio and Termini Imerese plants are concerned, 
the plot shows two different patterns: Desio was consistently under-utilised in 1984 and 
1985 and over-utilised in 1986 and 1987. In the case of Termini Imerese, utilisation in 
the first two years shows normal levels in the first six months - between 75% and 100% 
- and under-utilisation between September and December. In January 1985, extra shifts 
were implemented. In 1986 and 1987 there was a massive implementation of extra time. 
The rate of capacity utilisation was 87% for Termini Imerese and 83% for Desio.
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Finally, the Chivasso plant shows marked fluctuations of the capacity utilisation rate, 
as we would expect from two lines based on hard automation. During the period 
considered the average capacity utilisation was 37.8% for the Delta line and 72.2% for 
the Prisma.
Figure 4.3 (e): Monthly capacity utilisation rate, Chivasso plant January 1984 -
December 1987
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Source: Ibid.
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All the plants, be they based on flexible or traditional technology, exhibit periods in 
which lines were over-utilised and periods in which they were under-utilised, although 
the proportion of over- and under-utilisation varies between lines and between periods. 
Thus, the practice of changing the rate of capacity utilisation characterised the 
production setting of the Uno, the Ritmo and the Regata, which shows the persistence of 
a traditional approach to managing product-mix flexibility.
This finding departs from the conclusions reached by Volpato (1990), who claimed 
that the introduction of flexible manufacturing systems led to the minimisation of spare 
capacity. Quoting company figures, Volpato shows that on the whole, Fiat exploited 
95% of its capacity in 1986, which is perfectly in line with our analysis for that year.53 
The problem is that looking the utilisation rate of each line from January 1984 to 
December 1987, it is evident that the high rate of utilisation was obtained by 
implementing extra shifts in some lines, while some others were under-utilised. This 
means that the overall high rate of capacity utilisation was due to the positive sales cycle 
for some models rather than to the flexibility of the system. This determined the 
existence of some structural spare capacity. Structural spare capacity would include the 
spare capacity resulting from the under-utilisation of the Desio and Termini Imerese 
plants in 1984 and 1985, and the Chivasso plant.54 This was typical of the traditional 
lines in which the decrease in demand for the model produced could not be compensated 
by the production of another model. Moreover, structural over-capacity also includes 
36% of the Cassino plant capacity, which was not utilised in the whole period and 
particularly in 1987, when the Rivalta plant was consistently performing extra time.
53 Volpato, Bianchi, ‘Flexibility as the Response to Excess Capacity: The Case of the Automobile 
Industry’, in Baden-Fuller (ed.), Managing Excess Capacity, p. 241.
54 In the case of Desio and Termini Imerese, capacity utilisation recovered and even exceeded the 
optimum level after 1985, because Fiat had sold Seat to Volkswagen and the production of the Panda in 
Pamplona and Barcelona was transferred to the Italian factories.
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Even more interesting is the amount of extra time implemented by Fiat. This was 
caused by the overwhelming impact of the Uno on the Fiat output structure. It created a 
paradoxical situation, in that levels of capacity utilisation of the flexible line were still 
massively affected by a single model. In the case of Mir I during the whole period, and 
Rivalta after February 1986, flexibility was sacrificed for plant saturation.
The fact that plants had to be saturated when demand for some models was at its 
highest suggests that robotics was developed in parallel with a project of re-sizing the 
overall business and that the high level of capacity utilisation emphasised by Volpato 
was the result of this re-sizing rather than the result of flexibility maximisation. This 
fact supports the well known Harrison argument that the 1980s have to be regarded as 
the era in which Fordism has been revitalised through the re-sizing, if  not down-sizing, 
of operations, rather than the era in which the path toward “Flexible Specialisation” 
started to take place.
On the basis of the findings on the capacity utilisation rate, the Fiat technical 
management55 was asked why the company did not shift the surplus production of the 
Uno to Cassino or alternatively close the Delta line at Chivasso, moving the production 
to the plant in Southern Italy. The answer was that the platform and body welding lines 
upstream of the Robogate were still model-specific, where the technology implemented 
was similar to that used by Fiat during the late 1960s and 1970s.56 This limited the 
resetting of plants, so that it was not possible to shift the production of the Uno from 
Rivalta to Cassino, or the production of Regata to Rivalta in spite of the fact that the 
Robogate was the same. In addition, it was not possible to move the Delta to Cassino 
because of the fact that body sub-component welding lines were still model-specific. 
According to both Malandri and Simone the reason why the lines upstream of the 
Robogate had not been developed since the 1970s was that those lines were extremely 
efficient in terms of the cycle time, so that management focused on the innovation and
55 Telephone interview with Mr Malandri and Scimone; see note 38.
It is important to note that the production of the Fiat Uno was not moved to Cassino and that this 
information is based on the Fiat Production File, which specifies where and when cars were welded and 
assembled, and whether cars had been welded in one plant and assembled in another. The information has 
been also confirmed by Malandri and Scimone. This contradicts information given by Bonazzi, who says 
that some units of the Uno model where shipped to Cassino for final assembly. In any case, Bonazzi refers 
only to assembly and not to monocoque welding. The reference is to Bonazzi, II tubo di cristallo, p. 81.
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development of the basting and finishing stages of the spot welding. This would not 
have been a problem if  production was to be shifted among the Mirafiori, Rivalta and 
Chivasso plants. These were all located in the same area, namely in the periphery or in 
the hinterland of Turin, so that to perform platform and body welding in one plant while 
basting and finishing in another was economically viable. On the contrary, to ship sub­
components to Cassino would have been much less economically efficient.
Conclusions
After 1972, a major process of technological change started at Fiat. In particular, the 
implementation of robotics in the spot-welding shop has attracted the attention of 
experts in the academic and business world. Since the mid-1980s, the industrial 
relations argument has been replaced by the flexibility argument. This has been used to 
explain not only why the technological change occurred but also why it occurred after 
1973, providing the justification for managerial and technical discontinuity. The 
flexibility approach had a much longer life, since it has dominated both the management 
literature and the business history literature of the 1980s and 1990s. Based on 
unpublished data and interviews with technical management, this chapter departs from 
the established literature by setting a double stage argument. In the first place, a 
“classical argument” is posed to explain technical change, that is the maturation of 
existing technology, leading to a downward shift in the production curve. After 1968, no 
significant gains in labour productivity had been achieved by Fiat. The spot-welding 
technology deployed at the time was not helping in that matter. On the contrary, workers 
saved by the automation of basting had to be re-deployed in the finishing stage of the 
spot-welding process, in order to avoid the bottleneck between the two stages of the 
process, given that hard automation could not be extended to finishing in an efficient 
way. Once robotics was introduced, it drove a development towards reliability, which 
ended in the deployment of the Robogate system. Reliability was achieved by 
maximising system flexibility. In addition, attention was paid to the convertibility of the 
system. System flexibility and convertibility reduced tool specificity to the extent that
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Fiat could start to process monocoques of two different models on the same line, though 
this happened only in 1982, four years after the Robogate was set.
Once the reason for technological change and the development path has been set, the 
use management made of flexible lines is examined in relation to the capacity utilisation 
rate of each line. According to Bartezzaghi and Turco, the switch from inflexible to 
flexible mass production calls for management pursuing targets different from those to 
be pursued within a traditional Fordist framework, namely reset-time minimisation 
rather than flow-speed maximisation, and the utilisation of flexible capability rather 
than plant saturation. According to Volpato, this was the case with the Robogate, since 
lower tool specificity provided Fiat with the possibility of stabilising production at an 
optimal level of 90%. On the other hand, this chapter establishes that between 1984 and 
1987, over-utilisation and, in some case under-utilisation of lines represented the main 
way in which Fiat adjusted output to the demand structure. Therefore, Fiat’s utilisation 
of 90% of its total capacity on double shift reflected the particularly favourable business 
cycle for some models, rather than the flexibility of each production line.
The flexibility of the Robogate was limited by two factors: 1) the technology utilised 
before the stage of monocoque welding was still model-specific, which prevented 
management from moving the production of the Uno from Rivalta to Cassino despite 
the fact that the two plants shared the same Robogate technology in basting and 
finishing. The fact that Fiat kept the traditional technology in the segments of the 
process preceding the Robogate is explained by the fact that during the 1970s, in a 
context of financial constraints, the routine underpinning the search for new 
technologies consisted of addressing innovation in those segments of the process where 
substantial gains in cycle time minimisation had to be achieved. 2) For each flexible 
line, the minimum economically efficient output of each model limited the maximum 
output of the other model produced on the same line. This point leads directly to the 
market strategy of Fiat. The fact that during the 1980s the strategic competitive segment 
of the market was segment B (900-1100 cc.) and that a single model, the Uno, had a 
huge impact on the product structure, limited the possibility for Fiat to make the best use 
of the flexible lines. In fact, the increasing output of the Uno compelled management to 
produce that model on four of the five flexible lines, while extra time was often
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implemented to cope with demand. Thus, shifts in product mix were still based on 
variations in the rate of line utilisation with the implementation of extra time, which, on 
some occasions, was concurrent with the under-utilisation of lines elsewhere in the 
network of Fiat production plants. The use of the whole set of flexible capacity (5 lines) 
to assemble only 6 models compelled Fiat to keep a number of traditional lines that 
were indeed less efficient, but allowed the company to complete the production range. 
Traditional lines were sometimes under-utilised, at other times over-utilised. In general, 
it is possible to say that during the 1980s Fiat was not yet totally committed to the 
elimination of inflexible capacity while production management could not pursue the 
stabilisation of production given the technology available. Instead, line saturation or 
under-utilisation was still driven by the demand pattern, as was the usual case with the 
Fordist system of mass production.
In this respect, the case of Fiat fits with the view of Bartezzaghi and Turco, 
suggesting that the 1975-85 decade is the period in which the strategic target in 
manufacturing was the improvement in the quality of the process and product, while the 
1985-95 decade was that in which flexibility became the main issue in the managerial 
theory and practice.57 The efficiency of the Robogate system was remarkable in terms of 
potential output per day and the reliability of the system, and its global quality in terms 
of working conditions and its impact on the product quality are beyond question. On the 
other hand, the ability of the system to stabilise production by assembling different 
models on the same line remained in many respects theoretical.
The fact that investments in spot-welding robotics were led by cycle-time 
minimisation denotes that the routines underpinning the search for new technology 
during the late 1970s and the 1980s were Fordist in nature. The Robogate technology 
allowed for the de-bottlenecking of finishing, which had been the main unsolved 
technical problem brought about by the process of automation during the 1960s. On this 
basis, it seems safe to say that the process of technological change after 1973 denotes 
continuity rather than discontinuity in managerial knowledge.
57 Bartezzaghi, Turco, ‘Flessibilita ed Efficienza'.
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Chapter 5 
Industrial Relations at Fiat, 1960-1987
Introduction
This chapter deals with industrial relations (IR) at Fiat between 1960 and 1987, and 
builds on the most recent claims of the IR literature on the Italian company. This 
maintains that during the 1980s, technological change was maximised in the aftermath 
of a dramatic shift in bargaining power from the unions to management, rather than used 
as an instrument to exercise higher levels of managerial control over workers and 
unions. This shift was due to political and industrial relations factors. The political 
factors include a change in the overall political strategy of the Communist Party (PCI) 
after 1975, with more open attitudes towards industrialists; a reduction of the political 
power of the Christian Democrat Party (DC) and a softening of its anti-industrialist 
attitudes; and the emergence of the Socialist Party, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as 
an effective mediator between the interests of the Catholic, communist and liberal areas 
of civil society. The industrial relations factor refers to the crisis of the unions due to the 
disaffection of both the moderate and extremist wings of the so-called workers’ 
movement. After the oil crisis, unions failed to make a clear choice between the strategy 
suggested by moderate delegates, seeking for constructive bargaining with management, 
and that pursued by extremist delegates pushing for a radical challenge to managerial 
power. As a result, moderate workers felt increasingly uncomfortable with the inability 
of union leaders to control the extremists. On the other hand, the extremists felt very 
dissatisfied by any union attempt to pursue constructive bargaining with management, 
and became increasingly sympathetic with left-wing extra-parliamentary groups and 
increasingly tolerant towards acts of intimidation and terrorism. The combination of a 
more favourable political climate with the increasing divide between workers and 
unions enabled Fiat to reintroduce shop-floor discipline first, and then to re-establish the 
power of management, with a positive impact on the acceleration of technological 
change.
As has been shown in the preceding chapter, this thesis explains technological 
change in the spot welding shop as the managerial response to the technological
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inefficiency brought about by the process of automation of the 1960s, within an 
organisational framework that remained essentially “Fordist”. This argument does not 
conflict with the most recent mainstream literature on industrial relations, which no 
longer sees technological change at Fiat as a “technocratic” response of management to 
the power of unions and adversarial industrial relations.
The chapter is organised as follows: the first section provides an overview of the 
relationship between Fiat and the political establishment from the late 1950s to the late 
1980s. The second section provides an overview of IR over the same period. Both 
sections show how well the interaction between management, politics and unions 
explains why management lost control of the shop floor in the late 1960s, and regained 
it in the early 1980s. Finally, after posing the ex-post argument that technological 
change was not the main drive for improving industrial relations, the last section rejects 
the ex-ante counterfactual that technological change was actually driven by the 
expectation of Fiat management that robotics would diminish the power of the unions. 
The justification for the ex-ante argument stems from the logical argument that 
outcomes might well be independent from expectations, although the latter determine 
the technological trajectory undertaken by firms. In order to reject the ex-ante argument, 
it will been shown that given the structure of the unions and the tactics deployed during 
industrial actions, management had neither theoretical nor practical grounds to predict 
that localised deployment of robotics would have prevented unions from stopping 
production, had they so wanted.
Section one
The political sphere: The relationship between management, Government, and
political parties 1950-1987
Based on secondary literature, this section analyses the relationship between Fiat 
management, political and institutional actors. The analysis aims to provide the reader 
with a broad knowledge of the political context in which industrial relations developed 
during the 1970s. This area of investigation has attracted considerable attention, with 
Comito’s Fiat tra crisi e ristrutturazione, and Castronovo’s Fiat 1899-1999: cento anni
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di storia italiana among the most influential books analysing the political sphere.1 Both 
are based on primary company sources,2 as well as upon a precise reconstruction of 
Italian political and economic history. Here, the relationship between Fiat and the 
political authorities is described by focusing on three periods: 1953-1962, 1962-1973, 
1973-1983. Of course, the choice of these periods implies some simplification of events. 
Nevertheless, it helps the non-specialist reader to relate political events to industrial 
relations developments. A mention will be made also of the 1983-1987 period, although 
it was a time of stabilisation in which the pattern emerging in the late 1970s did not 
change.
1953-1963: The years of the “pax politica”
The 1953-1963 period was a decade in which the relationship between the Fiat 
management and the Government was extremely co-operative and constructive for both 
sides. It was in these years that the company built up the reputation of being a “highly 
politically integrated company”. There are various reasons why Fiat achieved such a 
strong political position with enormous lobbying power. Some are common to many 
other car companies in Europe and US. Others were more time-specific and determined 
by historical circumstances.
In the post-war period, steel and car manufacturing were obviously the industrial 
sectors promising extraordinary growth, with the latter being much more labour 
intensive. Thus, it was in the interest of governments to create favourable conditions for 
the growth of the car industry. These included favourable international policies 
(including export incentives, national market protection, and incentives to attract 
external capital), investments in infrastructures (mainly roads), and an industrial policy 
mainly focused on the energy, steel and rubber industries.
In terms of international politics between 1953 and 1963, there was a substantial 
similarity of views between the Fiat management and the government regarding the
1 Castronovo, Fiat 1899 -  1999; Comito, La Fiat. Those readers who need to further their knowledge in 
the area of relationships between Fiat and politics should refer to this literature.
2 The Castronovo book is based mainly on the Reports of the Meetings of the Administration Board, 
which are fully accessible up to 1966. For reports after 1966, selective access may be granted by the Fiat
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Common Market. Fiat, like many other European car manufacturers, was definitely 
pushing for a gradual abolition of tariffs, under the assumption that a creation of a 
market of continental size would have guaranteed large profits along with the expansion 
of economies of scale. Expansion plans had been already made during the 1940s, and 
the outcome of the war did not change the picture, as long as the common market 
replaced the pan-fascist European market mentioned, for example, in the 1943 Reports 
of the Administration Board. On the contrary, the Allied victory accelerated technology 
transfer from the US to Europe, making the expansion plans achievable, at least supply- 
wise. The Christian Democrats were also pro-European Market, since they saw in the 
economic unification of Europe a way towards lasting peace, and an effective way of 
preventing the expansion of Communism.
As far as infrastructure and industrial policy were concerned, there was also a 
convergence of interest in promoting full employment and economic growth. However, 
there is little doubt that the lobbying activity of Fiat management proved decisive in the 
implementation of a developmental model based mainly on the car industry, where state 
investments in infrastructure favoured the road network rather than the railways.
The convergence of interests between Fiat and political power per se does not explain 
the level of influence Valletta exercised over the Government. The size and nature of 
the Industrial Public Sector represented the principal element of a potential contrast of 
interest between the Government and Italian private industrial groups. Therefore, the 
sharing of common views in terms of development was a necessary, yet insufficient 
condition to neutralise a potential source of friction between Fiat and the DC.4 
Moreover, Valletta’s general fondness for a social model based on mass production and 
consumption did not find great support among the Christian Democrats. Thus, the 
constructive relationship between Fiat and the DC between the end of the war and the 
early 1960s is explained largely by the role Valletta played in the political integration of 
Italy into the international community after the war.
Department of External Relations, depending on the content of the reports. This is to protect the privacy 
of individuals.
3 Archivio Storico Fiat, Reports of the Administration Board Committee, March 1943.
4 The political party running the Cabinet.
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At the end of the war, in the phase of transition from monarchy to republic, the DC 
was considered a privileged partner by the US administration. However, this was a 
contingent necessity rather than political convergence and mutual trust. Americans were 
sceptical about the Christian Democrats and the whole Catholic Church, as much as the 
DC was reluctant to adopt the intrinsically materialistic American social model. On the 
other hand, because of the Fiat links with the Chase Manhattan Bank, dating back to the 
late 1920s, the American financial and political establishments trusted Valletta. He, 
therefore, became an important referee for Italian international politics.5 Thus, the 
strong relationship between Valletta and the US administration enabled Fiat to play a 
crucial role in the post-war political integration of Italy, and contributed to the 
reinforcement of the company’s lobbying power, where a convergence of interests in 
terms of international politics was combined with a bargaining power that was skewed 
towards Valletta.
On the whole, it would be correct to think that it was the combination of converging 
interests of Fiat and the Government, and the strong bargaining position of Valletta 
resulting from his international role, which enabled the company to impose a model of 
development centred around the car industry, and around Fiat. In this context, state 
investment in steel production capacity also enabled the growth of the car industry, 
without forcing Fiat to massive financial exposure in the risky steel industry, which 
typically experiences marked fluctuations in prices and output over time.6
1963-1973: The end of the co-operation between the political establishment and 
Fiat
The 1963-1973 period saw the rise and fall of the Centre Left Governments, as well 
as a marked change in the overall political backdrop to the relationship between Fiat and 
the political authorities. The change in direction did not occur overnight, but the latent 
conflict of interest between the public and private sectors of the economy, and its 
political significance became increasingly evident during the 1960s. The 1967 decision
5 Crucially, he persuaded the US Congress to grant the Italians Marshall Aid, of which 23%, 
unsurprisingly, was allocated to Fiat.
6 See D. Valeo, La strategia Fiat nel settore siderurgico (Torino, 1983), pp. 39-51.
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by the state-owned car manufacturer Alfa Romeo to invest in new capacity, the 
appointment of Cefis as Chairman of Montedison in 1969,7 and the government 
mediation following the wave of strikes in the autumn of the same year, all represented 
the turning point in the relationship between Fiat and the Christian Democrat 
component of the government.
As already mentioned, Valletta had always felt ideologically and culturally distant 
from the DC, whereas he was more sympathetic to the Republican, Liberal, and Social 
Democratic parties. It was in the specific field of direct government intervention in the 
economy that the ideological distance between Valletta and the Christian Democrats 
was destined to evolve into open conflict. The rise of the centre-left government in 1962 
was thus more than welcome to Fiat. In fact, the company hoped that Republicans and 
Liberals could counterbalance the Christian Democrats in the government, in order to 
make the Cabinet more sensitive to the needs (or the will) of industrialists, in terms of 
both the modernisation of the industrial system towards mass production, and the 
modernisation of society towards mass consumption. Moreover, Valletta hoped that the 
Social Democrat Party could effectively mediate between workers and corporations.
Nevertheless, the centre-left government did not bring good news at first, as the 
entire electricity industry was nationalised. Valletta was quick to spot the meaning of the 
move. The fact was that the DC started, under the guidance of Fanfani, to pursue greater 
independence from the industrialists - and from Fiat - by expanding political control 
over state-owned enterprises. This would have allowed the Government to promote a 
development policy not based on Fiat investment, and the DC to seek political consent
Q
by controlling recruitment in the state-owned companies. Moreover, the nationalisation 
of the electricity industry indicated that the DC was seriously considering the expansion 
of direct economic control over productive activities by promoting the shift of private 
companies into the public sector. However, Valletta still hoped to be able to negotiate 
with the government, even in the face of disagreement, as had always happened before.9
7 Cefis was the Chairman of ENI, the state-owned oil company. He was a Christian Democrat, and a 
Fanafani protege.
8 The control over recruitment as political instrument for building consent was called ‘clientelismo’.
9 In the Reports of the Board Meeting of March 4, 1962, Valletta showed his clear disappointment over 
the nationalisation of the Electricity Industry, expressing at the same time the hope that the government
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The shift in power back to the political parties was due to a combination of factors. 
The position of Italy as an established member of both NATO and the European 
Community helped the Christian Democrats to manage international relations more 
independently from the traditional channels, such as Fiat and its management. This 
meant that in the late 1960s Fiat had basically lost one of the most important assets for 
bargaining with the Government and, more in general, with the political power. The 
internal and international stabilisation of Italian politics helped give the political leaders 
the confidence to design and implement economic policies that hardly could have met 
with the favour of industrialists. The various Governments that administered Italy from 
1962 onwards implemented a strategy of public debt expansion, allowing for the growth 
of the public sector and state-owned industrial enterprises. Such an expansion would 
allow for political stabilisation via expanding clienteles and rent-seeking behaviours 
and, more in general, by expanding the political control over the labour market.
As far as the public sector was concerned, its expansion was based on a “low salary - 
safe job policy” in order to prevent the public debt from exceeding the already fat 
budget set by the Government. Therefore, the public sector expanded rapidly in 
Southern Italy, where levels of consumption had been kept lower in the North by slower 
and less effective structural change. The low salary - safe job policy was also seen with 
favour by those fringes of the DC and the Catholic Church adverse to the American 
model of work organisation based on wage growth indexed on productivity growth, and 
on mass production. Such a model was clearly divergent from the Catholic idea of social 
development because it fostered a materialistic attitude towards mass consumption in 
order to sustain the system of mass production.
As far as the industrial public sector is concerned, its expansion helped expand 
political control over access to the labour market, with clear advantages in terms of 
building political consent. Moreover, investments of state-owned companies contributed 
to the expansion of rent-seeking behaviours, which in turn provided political parties 
with an extra source of finance. Nonetheless, it would be to simplistic to consider the 
political project based on the expansion of public debt as a project exclusively driven by
would implement provisions in favour of the construction industry and agriculture, in order to boost sales 
in the lorry and agricultural machinery sector.
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political deterioration and corruption. As already said, behind the Christian Democrat 
project lay an “anti-modernisation” ideology. This ideology had been the reason for 
mutual mistrust between Valletta and the Americans on one side, and the Christian 
Democrat and the Catholic Church on the other. But during the 1960s, with the financial 
and political support of state-owned companies, and within a new international political 
context, the DC could increasingly detach its politics from both the American 
Ambassador in Rome and from the man many Christian Democrat leaders saw as his 
assistant in Turin - Valletta. At the same time, the DC was freer to pursue a policy more 
in line with social project of the Vatican.
Of course, such a negative portrait of the DC represents a simplification of a more 
complex scenario. Within the DC and the centre-left government there were many 
different actors, many of whom genuinely believed that investments in the public sector 
would trigger the development of the Southern Italian economy, particularly because of 
a certain reluctance of private companies to invest anywhere south of Rome. Moreover, 
it would be misleading to say that the whole DC was shaped by an “anti-modernisation” 
ideology. Although it was the dominant one, it was not the only ideology within the DC. 
The party was divided into different groups, most notably the so-called left wing, 
postulating the independence of the party from the Catholic Church, and the right wing, 
which was closer to the Vatican. From the Fiat management's viewpoint, the problem 
was that in the late 1960s, the pendulum of power within the DC had shifted toward the 
right.
In terms of social history, the anti-modernisation attitude of the Christian Democrats 
created friction between the party and the Catholic Church and society. This friction 
would culminate in the defeat of the Christian Democrats following the referendum for 
the abolition of the Divorce Regulating Laws in 1974.10 In terms of industrial history, 
the DC’s anti-modernisation attitude had a negative impact on industrial relations. In 
particular, the pro-worker (or more precisely the anti-management) attitude of the 
Christian Democrat Minister of Industry Carlo Donat’Cattin turned out to be a 
significant bonus for the worker movement in 1969, when government mediation 
actually left Fiat with no other choice than to accept the unions’ pay demands. This
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ended the regime of relative low salaries that had boosted the Italian economic miracle 
of the 1950s and 1960s.
Agnelli and the search for a new political equilibrium
In 1969, Gianni Agnelli had already been the President of Fiat for three years. Gianni 
and his brother Umberto showed much a more open attitude towards the left-wing 
parties, including the Socialists and, to certain extent, the PCI, than that shown by 
Valletta at the beginning of the 1960s. On the other hand, Valletta had proved to be a 
much more effective mediator with Fanfani and the Christian Democrats. This might 
have been quite an easy task for the man who, during the war, allegedly had persuaded 
the Allies not to be over-precise in bombing Mirafiori, and had persuaded the German 
Commander in Turin to speed up the settling of an outstanding bill for military 
equipment. However, the two Agnellis belonged to a different generation and perhaps to 
a different world. Their Anglo-Saxon education probably made a personality clash with 
Donat’Cattain unavoidable, but it was the broader social and economic views that were 
to separate the Agnellis from the Christian Democrats. Unusually for Fiat, the 
introduction to the 1972 balance sheet contained a political and economic analysis of the 
reasons why Italy, as a social and economic system, was running the definite risk of 
falling behind the rest of Europe once again, after continuously making up ground for 
two decades.11 The analysis referred to the modernisation of the Public Administration, 
and to the need to prevent the diffusion of rent-seeking behaviours and to invest in 
infrastructure. It warned that the most urgent problem of the Italian economic system 
was the dangerous influence of political actors on economic activities, which, in turn 
caused the lack of an industrial policy based on clearly defined economic targets and 
rigorous development theory. In the view of Fiat management, the DC was responsible 
for the degeneration of the Italian economic perspective. Nevertheless, the lack of viable 
political alternatives to the DC created a “political strategy stalemate”. The only party
10 In 1981, the DC also lost the referendum on the abolition of the anti-abortion law.
11 As pointed out by Comito, such considerations were usually made in the Reports of the Administration 
Board Meeting, whereas during the 1970s, the introduction to the balance sheets and the shareholders’ 
newsletter were often used to communicate the management's thoughts to the external world. See Comito, 
La Fiat, p. 139.
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big enough to be a political alternative to the DC was the Communist Party, which for 
obvious reasons could not be a political partner of Fiat. This political stalemate explains 
of the lack of political coherence that shaped the relationship between the Agnellis and 
the DC during the 1970s. Moreover, Fiat was to a large extent compromised with the 
political management of the Italian economy. The relationship with the DC had never 
been interrupted, and although Fiat saw its lobbying power reduced from 1962 onwards, 
Fiat was not always the losing partner. On the contrary, the relationship between Fiat 
and the DC took the form of an uncertain duel, in which, nonetheless, Fiat could still 
count upon solid contacts within the party.
On the one hand, Fiat was unable to prevent Alfa Romeo from building a new 
production plant in Southern Italy in 1967, but on the other it received subsidies to build 
its own plants in the area. Fiat took over Lancia in 1969 with the blessing of the 
government, but was unable to prevent the appointment of Cefis (already chairman of 
the state-owned ENI) as chairman of the chemical giant Montedison in the same year. 
Fiat had to accept the restrictive measures for circulation delivered by the government in 
the aftermath of the first oil crisis,12 but in 1974 the Christian Democrats lost the battle 
to get Cefis elected as chairman of Confindustria13 (the Italian Confederation of 
Industrialists). After a compromise with Cefis, Gianni Agnelli was elected, and tried to 
break the isolation of industrialists like Leopoldo Pirelli and himself.14
On the whole, Fiat was far too embodied within the Italian political system to 
become the centre of a credible political alternative to the DC, where the contradictions 
shaping the political role of the firm affected in particular the relationship between the 
Fiat Group and the PCI. Although, in theory, Agnelli shared the Communist party’s 
opposition to the collusion between politics and management in state-owned enterprises, 
Fiat always attempted to take advantage from such collusion when it came to
12 The ban on using cars on Saturday in late 1973, as a measure to preserve the national fuel stock, can be 
seen as a typical example of anti-Fiat Government attitude, given its dubious effectiveness in economic 
terms. The ban lasted four weekends.
13 The Confederation of Industrialists.
14 For a detailed reconstruction of the struggle for the control of the Confindustria, see Castronovo, Fiat 
1899 -1999, pp. 1302-1311.
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establishing joint ventures or doing business with firms run by IRI.15 Not surprisingly, 
Niccolo’ Gioia, one of the top managers close to the DC, was convinced that Fiat had to 
come up more effectively with the DC and “act like Cefis”, which meant to try to 
exploit political linkages for business purposes.16
The dialogue with the Communist Party (PCI)
At least in principle, though, Gianni Agnelli and the PCI could find an area of 
agrrement when it came to opposition to rent-seeking behaviour in politics and the 
economy. It was in this climate of possible convergence and moderate attempts to start a 
dialogue that Fiat and the unions signed the agreement of 1972, with the mediation of 
the Communist leader Amendola and the blessing of Umberto Agnelli.
The meaning of the Amendola agreement in terms of industrial relations will be 
explained in the next section of the chapter. Here it is important to stress that the new 
Fiat attitude towards the PCI resulted in a pattern of incoherent behaviours of many 
managers and, in some cases, union leaders. In fact, management remained rather 
unimpressed by Umberto Agnelli’s attitude towards the PCI. Therefore, the mutual 
diffidence between management and unions made the implementation of the Amendola 
agreement extremely difficult. This fact jeopardised any attempt to find a stable 
compromise between Fiat and the PCI, at least up the first oil crisis.
Fiat's attitude towards the PCI was ambiguous also because the company was under 
increasing pressure from the US administration not to give the PCI credibility as a 
government party. Therefore, Agnelli’s attitude was to differentiate between the local 
level, where the agreement with the PCI had to be pursued, and the national level. On 
the other hand, the PCI was not ready for such credibility. Though determined to show 
internal unity as opposed to the thousand strands within the DC, the PCI actually had
1 7  1 Qtwo souls. The first was embodied by Enrico Berlinguer and Luciano Lama, who 
shared Togliatti’s loyalty to the Yalta framework and thus accepted Italy’s role within
15 IRI is the acronym for the Institute of Industrial Reconstruction, the largest industrial holding owned by 
the state, with an Administration Board appointed by the government. On the relationship between IRI see 
Comito, La Fiat, pp. 144-154.
16 Gioia was General Director of Fiat from 1974 to 1977.
17 General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party.
182
NATO. Moreover, this component of the Communist Party saw worker participation in 
the running of firms as a way to maximise competitiveness within a free competitive 
market, rather than an instrument to undermine managerial control over the production 
function. The second soul was represented by middle-ranking unionists and activists set 
on much more extreme and anti-capitalist positions. The strength of these two wings of 
the PCI depended very much on political circumstances, where one of the political 
problems of the party was to not lose consent in favour of extreme-left parliamentary 
and extra-parliamentary groups. To use a popular expression of that time, the party had 
to avoid being overtaken from the left.
The communist union CGIL had exactly the same problem. Every time far-left 
groups fostered a localised industrial action, the CGIL had to jump in, not to lose 
control over the workers. In the long term, this would have created friction among 
workers and the progressive alienation of orthodox communists from the unions. In the 
short term, this situation prevented Fiat and unions from establishing a constructive 
dialogue.
The PCI’s attitude towards Fiat became more balanced in the immediate aftermath of 
the first oil crisis. Between 1969 and 1971, the communist union CGIL had emphasised 
wages, labour organisation and production control issues. Now the position of the PCI 
shifted towards the survival of the company in the face of a demand crisis accelerated by 
the oil shock, though actually dependent on a loss in competitiveness of the Italian 
product. The immediate reaction to the first oil shock was to reduce employment by 
implementing redundancy schemes and blocking labour turnover. The PCI did not 
oppose those measures and, in doing so, helped management to cope with the crisis. On 
the other hand, the response of government to the first oil crisis consisted of the already 
mentioned provisions to restrict circulation and to prevent prices from increasing. 
Moreover, the overall fiscal policy was inconsistent with the ongoing demand crisis.19
18 General Secretary of the Communist Union CGIL.
19 The special circulating tax on diesel cars imposed in 1974 penalised substantially the internal market for 
diesel cars and therefore Fiat. As a result the company fell behind German and French manufacturers in 
that important and rapidly growing segment of European demand.
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1973-1983: The crisis of the Christian Democrat Party (DC)
In the aftermath of the first oil crisis, thus, the DC seemed to be indifferent to, if not 
distant from the Fiat management. Nevertheless, the economic recession put pressure on 
the DC strategy of public debt expansion, which formed the basis of the party's attempt 
to contain the quest for modernisation, emerging not only from the financial and 
industrial world, but also from civil society as a whole.20 As already mentioned, in 1974 
the DC faced the worst moral defeat in its history by losing the referendum for the 
abolition of the Divorce Law. However, it was in the field of pure politics that the 
widespread dissatisfaction with the DC became evident. In 1976, the PCI almost became 
the largest party in Parliament and soon it became clear that the DC was unable to offer 
political stability.
In contrast, the PCI was on the brink of a fundamental change in its political strategy, 
in its attempt to move from being a pure Marxist opposition party to a Western 
European democratic party capable of taking up governmental responsibilities. The 
political line of the PCI leader Enrico Berlinguer, which claimed political and 
ideological independence from the USSR, was formulated more explicitly as the 
European road to communism (Eurocomunismo). Such a political line gave more 
credibility to the PCI political agenda, which included, as already mentioned, the 
permanence of Italy within NATO as a precondition for the so-called “Historical 
Compromise”. This was a strategic alliance between Communists and those Catholics 
more open to the modernisation of society.
Thus, in 1976 Gianni Agnelli could play the double card of dialogue with the PCI, 
albeit monitored by the US administration, and of political collaboration with the DC. In 
fact, Fanafani had to ask Umberto Agnelli to run for the Senate, as the DC was 
concerned about the results of the election and it seemed to be of mutual interest to 
reduce the friction between Fiat and the party. Although the collaboration of Umberto 
with the DC lasted only for a brief period, due to considerable hostility towards Fiat
20 In this respect, the 1969 Hot Autumn was not just an industrial action but represented the trigger for a 
mass protest movement in which the overall social organisation from school to university to the labour 
division were questioned, in the same fashion as had happened in Paris in 1968.
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within much of the DC, the Fanafani strategy was a sign that the balance of power was 
shifting slightly back to the company.
The PCI failed to win the elections, but from 1976 to 1978, the Christian Democrats 
could only govern with its external support. In theory, that support was consistent with 
the Berlinguer strategy of finding agreement with the left wing of the DC, and of 
preparing the transition towards a Communist government. Actually, in one of the most 
obscure periods in the history of the Republic, the PCI strategy provided political 
stability, particularly when the party participated in the Government of National 
Solidarity in 1978. This had been formed in the aftermath of the death of the Christian 
Democrat leader Aldo Moro, killed by the Marxist terrorist group Brigate Rosse (Red 
Brigades).
The PCI's attitudes to social and political stability, together with the moderate views 
of the CGIL leader Luciano Lama, certainly helped the Fiat management in the case of 
industrial relations, particularly in 1979, when the company shifted to a “zero tolerance” 
policy towards violent behaviour on the shop floor. But it was the decreasing power of 
the DC and the emergence of the Socialist Party, along with the intrinsic weakness of 
the unions that created the political conditions for Fiat to change strategy and “invest in 
strikes” in 1979 and 1980.21 Those events will be described in more detail in the next 
section of the chapter. Here it is important to outline that the 1969-1977 period, when 
the workers took the most important steps towards the control of the organisation of 
work, were the years in which Fiat received little political support, if  not open hostility, 
from the Minister of Labour, when it came to bargaining with unions for both wages and 
control of the workplace.
The political crisis of the DC was partly a reflection of the economic crisis. The oil 
crisis and the salary expansion fostered by the unions had hit state-owned companies as 
much as private ones. Therefore, the project of controlling political consent by 
controlling state-owned enterprises and, by this, the distribution of jobs, had been 
severely curtailed by the economic recession. The economic crisis had also minimised 
the capacity of state-owned companies to direct funds towards the illegal financing of
21 The expression refers to the strategy of rejecting the unions' demands under the assumption that on the 
long-term gain deriving from the defeat of the unions will outweigh losses.
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political party. Finally, the economic recession combined with large public debt had 
undermined the whole political project based on clienteles and widespread rent-seeking 
behaviours.
Since 1983, the solution to the political instability caused by the crisis of the DC was 
a coalition of five parties; the DC, the Republicans, the Liberals, the Socialists and the 
Social Democrats. The Socialists (PSI) increased their share of the vote from 9% to 
16%, becoming the third largest party. The PSI leader Bettino Craxi became the 
premier. Moreover, he imposed a new political style, which proved to be more effective 
in terms of the relationship between politics and business, even if  arguably immoral.
The conflict of interest between politics and business, generated by the politicians' 
direct control over the management of state-owned companies, was replaced by 
systematic corruption, which in pure economic terms proved to be more rational because 
it was more predictable.22 Even when the Christian Democrat Ciriaco De Mita became 
premier in 1986, supported by the same political coalition, the overall style of managing 
the business - politics relationship did not change.
However, it should be stressed that apart from some companies controlled by the Fiat 
Group in the construction sector, where it was virtually impossible to operate without 
compromising with the authorities, the company was never directly involved in the 
wave of scandals that brought down "Craxism" and the five-party coalition in the early 
1990s. Nevertheless, Fiat certainly profited from the end of what could be called 
“Fanfanism”, namely the open conflict between the Government - pursuing the 
expansion of state-owned enterprises - and private business.
Section two 
Industrial relations 1960-1987
This section deals with the developments of industrial relations from 1960 onwards, 
although the events of the late 1940s and 1950s will be also mentioned in order to 
provide a more comprehensive perspective of the shift in bargaining power from 
managers to workers occurring in the late 1960s. This section also builds on the
22 In many cases discussed in court, evidence was provided the typical brown envelope (‘tangente’ in 
Italian) was worth 5% of the investment.
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established literature on industrial relations, in particular the work of Musso, Contini, 
Berta and Castronovo.23 The aim is to underline the relationship between the broad 
political events described in the previous section and changes in industrial relations.24 
The periods used are therefore consistent with those used in the previous section.
1953-1963: From union defeat to resurgence
For the entire 1950s, industrial relations had been shaped by the fundamental 
weakness of the unions, where CISL and Sida25 guaranteed stability on the shop-floor 
and substantial collaboration with management. This had been the result of the unions’ 
defeat between 1950 and 1955. Since the end of the war, Valletta was adamant that the 
influence of the Internal Commissions26 had to be minimised. This was not only because 
they were dominated by militants of the CGIL, but also because they were perceived as
9 7an obstacle to the implementation of American mass production technology. In fact, 
the internal commissions comprised highly experienced and specialised workers, who 
were not happy to see their craft skills undermined by the deployment of mass 
production technology, and the routines of the job to which they had contributed 
dismantled in the name of a American-style job control. Valletta thus preferred to 
confront CGIL directly, rather than to pursue agreement with the Catholic union CISL, 
because he knew that in terms of technological change the position of CISL was similar 
to that of CGIL. In this respect, the events of 1950-1955 reconfirm the point stressed by 
Stefano Musso, that “the major waves of change in the history of Fiat (World War I, the 
1930s, the mid-1950s and the early 1980s) all occurred when the workers' movement
23 Musso, ‘Le relazioni industriali alia Fiat’, in Annibaldi and Berta (eds), Grande impresa e sviluppo 
italiano, 1999, pp. 165-167; Castronovo, Fiat 1899-1999; Berta, Conflitto industriale e struttura
d'impresa; G. Contini, ‘The Rise and Fall o f Shop-floor Bargaining at Fiat 1945-1980’, in Tolliday and 
Zeitlin (eds), Between Fordism and Flexibility, pp. 144-167.
24 The specialist reader might wish to explore the topic in more detail by analysing further the literature 
that has been summarised in this section.
25 UIL (Unione italiana del lavoro) was the moderate right-wing union. Sida (sindacato autonomo 
dell’automobile) was an independent union of car industry workers, the formation of which had been 
inspired by Valletta himself.
26 Commissions of representatives of unions and management. These were the basic shop-floor bargaining 
institutions.
27 See Castronovo, Fiat 1899 - 1999, pp. 850-901.
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has undergone a period of defeat, and with the legal or de facto suspension of workers’ 
rights.”28
Moreover, the business opportunity represented by the offshore contracts for the 
production of the F86 fighter aircraft helped convince Valletta to take a tough line. The 
contract was strategically important because it would have enabled Fiat to enter the 
business of NATO military contracts. However, in order to secure the first offshore 
contract, Fiat had to accept all the conditions set by the American Ambassador in Rome, 
Clare Boothe Luce. These included the careful selection of all personnel working in 
plants producing military equipment, CIA and Italian Intelligence Service supervision of 
plant security, and the elimination of communist workers from the factory. On the top of 
that, Valletta offered to create an internal union, which was to become the Sida, and a 
school for union leaders, which, in contrast, was never realised.
The systematic sacking of communist workers begun in 1951, and was usually 
anticipated by the transfer of workers to secondary shops. Nevertheless, Valletta could 
launch an open confrontation with the CGIL because of two favourable circumstances. 
The first was the stagnation of demand, which clearly provided the economic reason for 
labour reduction. The second was the crisis of CGIL itself, caused by the fact that many 
strikes between 1950 and 1952 had been started for political reasons and were detached 
from any issues directly related to workers or to the firm. The increasing politicisation 
of the CGIL was the outcome of the union’s support for the political strategy of the 
Communist Party, which was mainly centred on international pacifism in relation to the 
Korean War. Consequently, from 1950 CGIL started to lose members to the CISL, 
which was unwilling to support political strikes.
Thus, as in the case of the Japanese car industry, the 1950s saw the total defeat of the 
unions. Nevertheless, while in Japan this led to an industrial relations scheme totally 
skewed towards the interests of the firm,30 lasting for the next fifty years, in the case of 
Fiat, the unions’ defeat of the 1950s led to a temporary stabilisation of industrial
28 L. Musso, ‘Production Methods and Industrial Relations at Fiat (1930-1990)’, in H. Shiomi and K. 
Wada (eds), Fordism Transformed (Oxford, 1995), p. 263.
29 See Castronovo, Fiat 1899 - 1999, pp. 850- 963.
30 To put it in a more moderate way, industrial relations begun to be based on the concept that what is 
good for the firm was good for the worker.
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relations. The first challenge to the firm and its management did not occur until 1962, 
though it subsequently developed into permanent conflict in 1969. The Valetta-inspired 
independent union Sida did not survive the 1960s.
By the beginning the 1960s, many things were changing within and without the 
factory. In the first place, the CISL was not happy about the creation of an 
“independent” union such as Sida and, therefore, was increasingly critical of Valletta. 
Moreover, the CISL was trying to implement new forms of contracts involving higher 
levels of worker participation in production organisation, which were inspired by 
contract schemes successfully implemented by the American car industry. However, in 
this field the Fiat management, especially Valletta’s lieutenants such as Gaudenzio 
Bono, was unwilling to accept any union proposals. The sense of oppression and 
frustration, therefore, was affecting even a potentially co-operative union like the 
CISL.31
A widespread sense of dissatisfaction was mounting in the firm because of working 
conditions. Productivity had been increasing much faster than wages, along with 
turnover and net profits.32 Even the Confindustria could not deny that it could not have 
been possible to refuse a substantial pay rise. Finally, the flow of migrants from 
Southern Italy created serious problems of integration, aggravated by the lack of 
infrastructure and housing in big towns like Turin.
Although in 1961 the CGIL had not yet developed strategies to exploit the mounting 
worker dissatisfaction with the overall standard of living, it was clear that the 
opportunity was there to reinforce the role of the unions. By 1962, the strategy was 
already clear and it was that of open confrontation. Of course, the fact that two out of 
the three main confederations (CGIL and CISL) agreed a common action was not a good 
sign for Fiat. This also meant that the Christian Democrats were no longer unanimously 
backing Fiat and the Confindustria, as had appeared clear since 1960 when the Christian 
Democrat Minister of Labour Zaccagnini had backed the decision of Intersind to allow 
for firm-level bargaining to integrate national contracts.33 But the Fiat management had
31 See Castronovo, Fiat 1899 -  1999, pp. 1071-1082.
32 Ibid., p. 1040.
33 Confederation of State-Owned Companies.
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failed to detect the increasing worker disaffection with the job and with the overall 
standard of living in the factory town, aggravated by the widespread practice of mobbing 
on the shop floor.
Fiat was unwilling to recognise the success of the first wave of strikes, until the local 
police issued official statistics on strike participation. Management then reacted by 
temporarily shutting down plants, triggering two further waves of strikes. Eventually, 
Fiat and the Confindustria had to accept the unions’ wage demands and the reduction of 
the working week from 48 to 44 hours.
The outcome of the 1962 industrial conflict, though undesirable, was not considered 
a defeat by the Fiat management. In principle, Valletta had always favoured linking pay 
rises to increases in productivity, provided productivity gains were due more to labour 
effort, rather than new technology. He was convinced that in the face of higher labour 
costs, he could obtain more effort from workers. Perhaps Valletta failed to understand 
the full implications of the new alliance between the CGIL and CISL, namely the fact 
that Catholics were fighting alongside Communists and Socialists. This did not imply an 
alliance between the DC and the PCI, or even a convergence between the two within the 
centre-left government, which was actually rather divided particularly in respect to 
economic policy. However, the convergence between the CGIL and CISL certainly 
enabled the DC to pursue its own policies, which was not always consistent with the 
interests of Fiat.
The wage rises in 1963 were expected to trigger inflation. Moreover, given the 
superior quality of many imported consumer goods as compared to similar goods made 
in Italy, the expansion of wages was expected to boost imports with detrimental effects 
on the balance of payments. The government reacted by implementing anti-crisis 
measures. Fiat hoped for export incentives and property taxation, whereas the DC opted 
for consumption taxation and credit restriction, without even consulting Valletta. Fiat 
would experience this kind of isolation, not only in the field of economic policy but also 
in that of industrial relations, where the latter was instrumental in weakening Fiat's 
position with the authorities.
In terms of the relationship with the unions, Valletta did not realise one of the driving 
forces behind the CGIL-CISL alliance: that given a strong tendency towards local and
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spontaneous industrial conflicts, only a common strategy could maintain union control 
of the workforce. This tendency was due to almost unsustainable working conditions, in 
spite o f the mass recruitment of labour. Paradoxically, the reduction of the working 
week made a bad situation worse, particularly after 1964, when demand started to 
expand again. As has been shown in the previous chapter, technological change simply 
created more bottlenecks downstream from the process, where automation could not be 
implemented. Thus, the conditions were there for industrial relations to degenerate into 
permanent industrial conflict, which actually happened in 1969. In that year the workers 
started to fight the same system, for the same reasons, but with greater consciousness, 
better organisation, broader targets, particularly in terms of worker control of the 
production system, and more violence. This was to continue for 11 years.
The “Hot Autumn” and the “permanent industrial conflict”
In September 1969, as the factory gates reopened after the summer break, the big 
surprise was that, for the first time since the end of the war, the three main unions had 
agreed a unified bargaining platform. The UIL had joined forces with the CGIL and 
CISL. Even more surprisingly, the unions had incorporated into the bargaining 
framework all the points made at the plant level by the Workers’ Committees. This 
framework thus included equal pay rises regardless of the employment category of 
workers, the same health care regulations and bonuses for blue and white collars, a 
reduction of the working week to 40 hours, and limits to the implementation of extra 
time. This final demand was perhaps the most important of all, because it actually was 
the first to concern production management, and involved strategic implications beyond 
mere labour costs.
At first, management underestimated the determination of the unions, believing that 
strikes could not last for long, so that in rejecting part of the demands, there would have 
been a trade-off between lost production in the short term, and financial and efficiency 
gains in the long term. This would have minimised the predictable disappointment of 
the shareholders. However, not only did the unions prove to be sufficiently determined 
to go on for much longer than expected, but they also launched local strikes in order to 
create temporary bottlenecks, and although these strikes were not significant when taken
191
individually, they had significant cumulative effects. On the top of that, the more the 
bargaining continued, the more unions could address the various demands continuously 
coming from the shop-floor representatives within a coherent framework. It became 
increasingly clear to the unions that the central issue was the control of the production 
process from the bottom, where production targets set by management were not 
consistent with the actual capability of the system.
This fact had led to increasing pressure from the management on the shop stewards, 
which ultimately created a rift between stewards pushing for increasing productivity and 
workers. If unrealistic production targets had created an unsustainable situation on the 
shop floor, then only a more democratic participation of workers in the job and process 
capability analysis could have restored a normal relationship between the actors on the 
shop floor, once management had reckoned that production targets had to be set 
according to job analysis rather than according to demand forecasts.
Thus, the problem was two-fold. First, management had to accept the setting of 
production targets according to realistic cycle times for each task, and according to the 
number of registered workers actually present in each shop. Second, management had to 
accept the involvement of workers in the job analysis, which is the process by which the 
cycle time of each task is determined. The setting of production targets was a strategic 
issue and the exclusive prerogative of top management, while job analysis was the 
exclusive prerogative of the Time and Methods office. Therefore, to accept these latest 
union demands would have meant not only destabilising a system of production 
essentially based on the Bedoux framework, on which the definition of time and 
methods was based, but also, and above all, destabilising a system of decision-making 
power, which, from top management to engineering middle management, was the real 
structure behind the Bedoux label. Therefore, after the first wave of strikes, Gianni 
Agnelli was now running the risk of signing an agreement that would have disappointed 
his own management, along with the shareholders.
The shareholders’ disappointment came first, when the agreement concerning wages 
and working hours was signed in January 1970. The management’s disappointment was
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still to come, and inevitably, it came in 1971,34 when Fiat had to sign a new agreement 
concerning plant saturation levels and piece-work rates.35 The agreement established 
three commissions, the Job Analysis Committee, the “Piece-work Committee” and the 
“the Job Safety Committee”, all composed of representatives of workers and managers. 
Contini has underlined the modernity of the agreement, which had real potential to 
transform shop-floor bargaining into an instrument of positive co-operation between 
workers and management. On the other hand, even the bargaining on specific points was 
often very protracted, making the implementation of the agreement very difficult in 
practical terms.
Initially, middle managers thought they could dominate the bargaining because of 
their superior technical knowledge. However, they soon discovered how well-prepared 
the workers’ representatives were, and how much the top management was detached 
from the shop-floor reality, as the insufficient practical knowledge of top management 
was one of the causes preventing the smooth implementation of the job analysis system. 
Still, as Berta has pointed out,36 it is also true that between 1975 and 1977, 170 plant 
agreements were signed at the Mirafiori, Rivalta, and Lingotto works. Such a massive 
number could only result in enormous rigidity in the employment of the workforce. 
Moreover, as Musso has pointed out,37 very often, particularly after 1975, these 
agreements were ignored and replaced by unwritten agreements made on a day-by-day 
basis on the shop floor. Initially, the procedure to set production on a daily basis was 
established for exceptional cases, in which the workforce actually present on the line 
was too low to meet the production target. This was an opportunity to bypass 
management by re-scheduling production, and the bargaining was made directly by 
workers’ representatives and the shop steward.
The “beside-the-line” bargaining is one of the most important outcomes of the 
managerial defeat of the late 1960s and early 1970s. It had an enormous impact not only
34 The agreement is known as Amendola agreement since it was signed with the mediation of Giovanni 
Amendola, one of the charismatic leaders of the Communist party.
35 Note that the daily quota of production related to the normal wage was fixed. That amount was called 
by Fiat management cottimo, which in English translates as ‘piece-work ‘. However, the system was not 
based on piece-work in the strict sense, since management was using the world cottimo improperly.
36 Berta, Conflitto industriale e struttura d ’impresa, p. 180.
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on the management but also on the trade unions. An agreement considered by 
management as a defeat was also very difficult for the unions to manage. After a while, 
the unions started to lose control over this “beside-the-line” bargaining. This was one of 
the most important reasons why the whole industrial relations system started to implode, 
and why the unions lost cohesion in the second half of the 1970s.
The political meaning of the Amendola agreement was also extremely complex, and 
reflected the transition of the PCI towards being a fully-fledged European party with a 
right to govern. As already pointed out, the “European choice” was coherent with the 
strategy of the Historical Compromise. However, the European choice required a 
difficult transition towards the acceptance of an “European economic model” and, 
therefore, the acceptance of private industrial and financial enterprise. It was in this 
context that the PCI chose industrial relations as the field to prove that it was the party 
not only of the workers but also of the efficient use of inputs, which, in the Amendola 
view, was to be pursued by collaborating with management from a strong bargaining 
position.
The PCI agenda was made clear by Amendola in a seminar organised by II Mulino 
in 1973, when he stressed that the unions needed strong guidelines to avoid the 
opportunistic behaviours39 of some workers, causing a waste of resources to the 
detriment of the working class. In addition, he agreed with Umberto Agnelli that the 
expansion of the public sector was going to create rent seeking, and openly accused the 
DC of fostering corruption through the intervention of the public hand in the economy. 
But it was the reference to the necessity of bringing industrial relations back into a 
normal framework that indicated the will of the PCI to consider the business enterprise 
as an actor in social life in its own right, and with specific efficiency needs to be 
respected.
37 Musso, ‘Le relazioni industriali alia Fiat’, in Annibaldi and Berta (eds), Grande impresa e sviluppo 
italiano, pp. 212-213.
38 A review engaged in political and cultural debates.
39 Here opportunistic behaviour translates as ‘corporativism©’. The fascist unions had been called 
corporazioni (guilds). The guilds were criticised by the Communists for protecting the interests of specific 
groups of labour against the interests of others, generating rifts within the working class. In his speech, 
however, Amendola was referring to those workers who were conducting ‘beside-the-line bargaining’, 
without union permission. Such behaviour was opportunistic, rather than anything else, but Amendola
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Nevertheless, the PCI was not sufficiently unified to pursue its political strategy in a 
coherent way. As unions were struggling to keep the control over workers, the PCI was 
facing increasing pressures from radical left groups. In December 1973, the three unions 
started to bargain over the integration of the wage profile, but the CGIL line was to keep 
a low profile in terms of wage bargaining, in exchange for a Fiat commitment to invest 
in Southern Italy, and to improve working conditions. However, the situation went out 
of control as the most radical sectors of the CGIL along with extra-parliamentary groups 
took over the strike strategy. Moreover, radical unionists along with the Lotta Continua 
(LC) group pushed up wage demands by theorising that wages were an independent 
variable. The overall political context was also exacerbated by the action of the Red 
Brigades, which started to target Fiat management, as demonstrated by the kidnapping 
of Ettore Amerio, the Head of Personnel Department. Again, Fiat was ignored by the 
Government, which took part to the bargaining only to persuade Agnelli to sign the new 
contract in March 1974, although, in the aftermath of the first oil crisis, Fiat was on the 
brink of a cashflow crisis.
1973-1983: From the oil crisis to the end of the permanent conflict
The oil crisis did allow Fiat to reduce the workforce, as already pointed out in the 
previous sections. This time, in spite of several strikes against the implementation of 
temporary redundancy schemes, short time and blocks on labour turnover, unions had to 
accept the Fiat proposals. On the other hand, in 1975 Agnelli signed an agreement 
establishing a new index to be used to link wages to inflation, in the attempt to improve 
the dialogue with unions. He wanted to give a signal to the unions that for him the most 
important target was to re-establish a reasonable level of discipline on the shop floor.
Actually, the unions had already lost the control over labour, where those 
opportunistic behaviours already stigmatised by Amendola in 1973 had spread 
throughout the production shops. Workers were negotiating production levels ‘beside- 
the-lines’ without the permission of the unions, often using abusive and intimidating 
means to convince shop stewards. Many stewards had also been victims of direct
used the term ‘corporativismo’ to imply that any opportunistic behaviour was an intrinsically fascist 
behaviour.
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violence and intimidation outside the firm, and in such an environment, terrorist groups 
found fertile ground not only to recruit new people but also to target their victims in the 
firm among managers and moderate unionists.
The incentive for the unions and the PCI to normalise industrial relations were 
enormous as compared to the costs of not doing so. Unions understood that their sole 
power and legitimacy was under threat since 1973, when the co-operative bargaining 
ended in confrontation, due to the ability of radical unionists and extra-parliamentary 
groups to operate in a climate of non-existent discipline. Moreover, the credibility of the 
PCI in terms of ability to reach the political targets of the Historical Compromise 
depended on the ability to re-address industrial relations within a normal framework.
The EUR conference of January 1978 was the official occasion in which the CGIL 
leader Luciano Lama re-addressed the overall framework of industrial relations. He 
stressed that wage bargaining had to be firmly reconnected to a business economics 
framework, and denied that the CGIL had ever formally or informally supported the 
view of wages as an independent variable. The PCI was on the point of joining the 
“National Solidarity Government’’ and the new line of the party was consistent with 
political developments. Nevertheless, the Lama speech was a restatement of the same 
line expressed by Amendola five years earlier. Sadly, yet unsurprisingly, the new line 
announced by the PCI and CGIL was followed by increasing escalation of terrorism at 
Fiat.
The phenomenon of terrorism was not new, but in those years, it was accompanied 
by the rise of the influence of the extra-parliamentary group Autonomia Operaia in the 
firm. This group’s political agenda was hostile to both the firm and the unions. The 
radicalism of the Autonomia Operaia provided an even more supportive environment 
for terrorist groups. Nonetheless, in such an uncertain climate of political change and 
violence, came an historical change in industrial relations, at Fiat. In the summer of the 
1978, Fiat deployed a new set of painting cabins at Mirafiori, following a request from 
unions to improve safety and reduce effort. The break time was reduced, in accordance 
with an agreement of 1977, stating that if new technologies allowed a reduction of 
effort, the break time could be reduced accordingly. Nevertheless, some workers at the 
painting shop started a spontaneous strike. Although the local branch of the CGIL
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ordered to stop this action as unjustified, workers ignored them, also committing several 
acts of violence and damaging tools and installations. Fiat fired them.
Although the unions formally supported the firm’s position on the break issue, in 
practice they had to respond to the sacking with a strike, claiming that to fire the 
workers was too tough a measure. However, many workers had been victims of violence 
and abuse from members of Autonomia Operaia, and in particular from the workers Fiat 
had fired, and now was the time for the silent majority to speak up by not supporting the 
strike, which soon failed. Management picked up the feeling of this silent majority and 
decided that it was time to get rid of all workers who had committed violence or were 
suspected of supporting or belonging to terrorist groups.
Union leaders were unofficially informed by Cesare Romiti about Fiat’s new course. 
Luciano Lama stressed that Fiat had to provide solid evidence supporting the allegations 
of violence, and so did the leaders of the CISL, Pier Camiti, and the UIL, Giorgio 
Benvenuto. However, soon after Fiat started scrutinising workers, Carlo Ghiglieno was 
killed, and a middle manager allegedly involved in the scrutiny process was shot in the 
leg a week after.40 This last episode reinforced the management view that terrorists had 
an organised “fifth column” within the unions and the workforce. When Fiat eventually 
fired 61 workers who had committed acts of violence or were suspected of supporting 
terrorist groups, unions declared a strike and sued Fiat for infringement of contract. The 
dilemma of the CGIL and the PCI, particularly at local levels, consisted of the necessity 
of supporting Fiat and the new course of Lama, without losing the support of workers in 
favour of extreme-left groups.
On the other hand, to use the words of the head of Personnel, Maurizio Magnabosco, 
Fiat had decided to ‘invest in strikes’, and did not cancel the mass firing.41 In any case, 
the strike failed again, and on the top of that many senior members of the PCI 
condemned the use of violence by workers. In particular, Amendola publicly admitted
40 Carlo Ghiglieno was killed in March 1979 by the Marxist terrorist group Prima Linea (Front Line) As 
was typical of the strategy of terror, Ghiglieno was one of the most open-minded and moderate of the Fiat 
managers. Interestingly, he was one of the managers appointed from outside Fiat (from Olivetti) after 
1974. He was in charge of strategic planning. The Fiat manager was killed on his own threshold, in front 
of his wife and children.
41 M. Magnabosco, interview with Giuseppe Berta, quoted in Berta, Conflitto industriale e struttura 
d ’impresa,p. 197.
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that one of the worst mistakes of the Communist party had been to underestimate the 
phenomenon of terrorism on the shop floor, and not to have condemned violence of 
workers - against managers, unionists and other workers - as a vile and “intrinsically 
fascist” act against democratic institutions.
Apart from the role of the PCI and the new strategy of Fiat management, the 
development of industrial relations in 1979, and most crucially in 1980, was also 
affected by the crisis of the DC, and by the internal weakness of the three major unions, 
which, after 11 years of permanent industrial conflict had lost their identity along with 
the ability to manage industrial relations. The Christian Democrats had also lost their 
battle. As already stated, the intrinsic weakness of the DC social project derived from 
the fact that it was based upon the expansion of public debt. As soon as the expansion of 
the Public Sector was constrained by economic crisis, the DC discovered the dark side 
of political intervention in the economy. In fact, while it is extremely easy to plan the 
growth of state-owned enterprises, it is extremely difficult to downsize them without 
paying enormous political costs, particularly when the Public Sector is also the means of 
expanding political clienteles.
Moreover, once the DC lost its ability to buy social consent by directly orienting 
investments, it also lost the capacity to impose a social project intrinsically divergent 
from the Anglo-Saxon and European social model. The political meaning of the divorce 
law referendum defeat is thus the inability of the DC to propose a modem social project 
within an economic context, in which the possibility of buying consent for its own 
social project had been severely curtailed by the effect of the economic crisis, along with 
that of the political management, on the books of state-owned enterprises.
The Catholic union CISL was largely functional to the economic and social project of 
the DC. As Castronovo has pointed out, “During the 1970s, [the CISL] eventually 
denied one of the most important principles underpinning its industrial relations line of 
conduct, which was the autonomy in bargaining in respect to the DC. [...] Moreover, the 
progressive shifting of the largest sector of the CISL towards ideologically-biased 
bargaining lines (not different from those of radical left wing extra-parliamentary 
groups), was consistent with the political line of vast sectors of the DC [...]. For the 
CISL, economic democracy meant the shift of larger and larger sectors of private
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economic activity economy into the Public Sector. This would have been the long-term 
outcome [...] under the pressure of destabilising industrial actions”.42
The question of whether the DC and the CISL had the hidden agenda of forcing an 
IRI take-over of Fiat is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, there is little doubt 
that in 1974, the effect of the first oil crisis, combined with the impact of the theory of 
salary as an independent variable on the outcome of wage bargaining, pushed Fiat to the 
brink of bankruptcy. As already described in chapter 3, the shift of Fiat into the control 
of IRI was avoided only because banks accepted the extension of short-term credit with 
the permission of Banca D’ltalia,43 while long-term capital was supplied by the Libyan 
Arabian Foreign Bank. Moreover, as will be described in chapter 6, the end of price 
blocks in 1975 and the following pricing policy allowed the increase of the price of 
output more than that of input. Whatever the DC agenda was, after 1975 the party 
started to lose strength, while Fiat managed to survive. This unavoidably meant that the 
pressure from the unions was destined to decrease as managerial power increased.
The intrinsic weakness of the unions and the heroic defeat of 1980
However, the pressure of the unions on Fiat diminished not only because of 
exogenous factors such as the political line of the PCI and the crisis of the DC. Unions 
imploded also because of the difficulty in controlling the workforce, a result of the 
diffusion of opportunistic behaviours, and the anarchist attitude of extra-parliamentary 
groups, along with the devastating effect of terrorism upon the general level of life on 
the shop floor. In general terms, the crisis of the unions derived from the fact that after 
11 years of permanent industrial conflict, workers were sick and tired of the uncertainty 
and lack of direction that such an abnormal situation had created. Workers felt 
increasingly distant from the politics behind the unions’ strategy, as well as from 
political strikes. If the rhythm of production is the rhythm of workers’ life, the 
stabilisation of production means the stabilisation of life. The rhythm of production 
cannot accelerate beyond a given limit, as happened in the late 1960s under the pressure
42 Castronovo, Fiat 1899 -  1999, p. 1427.
43 The Italian Central Bank, which by law had to approve the operation. At this time, its Governor was 
Guido Carli, who replaced Agnelli at the head of the Confindustria in 1976. In 1980, Carli also became a 
member of the Administration Board of Fiat.
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of the managerial quest for higher productivity, but it also can not slow below a given 
limit, as happened in the 1970s because of union strategy. If production is the life- 
rhythm of individuals, be they workers, shop stewards or managers, to stretch an 
industrial conflict over 11 years is strategically wrong and intrinsically immoral. It is 
strategically wrong because no unions can survive the immorality of the political 
exploitation of workers and their rights. No unions, in other words, can afford to 
substitute political for economic exploitation. The unions were to pay for this mistake.
After having invested in strikes in 1979, Fiat made another huge investment in 1980, 
and this time the return was very high. Between 1977 and 1980 the workforce at Fiat 
had again reached the levels of before the oil crisis. The decision of Fiat to undertake 
mass recruitment, particularly after 1978, has been explained in various ways. The 
explanations given by management referred to demand forecasting combined with high 
levels of absenteeism and restrictive regulations of the implementation of extra time. 
Unions and workers generally believed that Fiat had miscalculated the need for labour, 
or, particularly after 1980, that Fiat had mass recruited new labour in order to be able to 
fire unionised workers en masse.44 As has been shown by Collida and Negrelli, the 
hypothesis of manpower mismanagement was the most credible.45
In any case, it was in September 1980 that Fiat informed the three main unions that 
14,490 units of labour were to be axed, due to structural labour over-capacity. 
Moreover, the effect of the second oil crisis, along with the fact that the government had 
practically ignored Fiat’s call for an organic industrial policy had made a bad situation 
worse. Although some unionists recognised that labour had to be rationalised at some 
point, the union reaction, particularly in Turin, was to point out that Fiat had recruited 
new labour as late as the beginning of January, so that by claiming structural over­
capacity, management simply wanted to hit the unions.
The point was that after the axing of 61 workers in 1979, it seems that the average 
health of the workers suddenly improved, with absenteeism dropping from 14.9% to 
7%. Fiat did not want to sustain the burden of extra labour, now that the level of
44 For the various explanations of the mass recruitment at Fiat between 1977 and 1980, see Castronovo, 
Fiat 1899 -  1999, pp. 1510-1528. See also Contini, ‘The Rise and Fall of Shop-floor Bargaining at Fiat 
1945 -  1980’, in Tolliday and Zeitlin (eds), Between Fordism and Flexibility, p. 163.
45 Collida and Negrelli, La transizione nelVindustria e nelle relazioni industrial, pp. 185-196.
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absenteeism could be reduced by restoring discipline on the shop floor.46 In any case, 
production was stopped on the initiative of the shop-floor assemblies. Unions at the 
national level were obliged to enter the process and support the workers. At the local 
level, the prevailing strategy was to block access to production plants. Although neither 
Castronovo, Berta or Musso underline this aspect, it seems to the author of the thesis 
that this strategy reflected the local delegates' awareness that a strike might fail, so that 
picketing was a much safer, and perhaps the only viable strategy 47 In any case, at the 
national level, the unions decided to support the worker movement in Turin.
The PCI had just withdrawn from the National Solidarity Government, and now, 
holding a much more critical position towards Fiat and Confmdustria, tried to mediate. 
But the visit of Berlinguer in Turin was interpreted by the local unions and shop-floor 
assemblies as PCI approval for the picketing, rather than an attempt to support the 
bargaining process. The tough confrontation started almost immediately, with workers 
blocking access to the plants.
However, the main question was: who were these workers? Many of the pickets were 
manned by members of Lotta Continua or Autonomia Operaia, and many of these were 
not even workers. This was not a secondary element of the mounting anger of workers 
and blue collars against the unions. It simply meant that a significant number of workers 
was prevented from earning their salary and cut off from any decisions concerning the 
future of Fiat by students, retired workers, and other individuals external to the firm who 
had nothing to lose. Fiat managers certainly knew this, and the company provided 
logistical support to a group of workers who had organised a meeting to protest against 
the picketing, to be held on October 14.
Meanwhile, the Minister of Labour, the Socialist Foschi, had proposed a 
compromise. This included short time for 24,000 workers, and the placing of all Fiat 
Auto workers on the state-financed temporary unemployment fund (Cassa Integrazione) 
from October 6, 1980 to January 6, 1981. The Cassa Integrazione, though, had to be
46 As was pointed out by a white-collar worker during the assembly held by middle-ranking workers 
against the unions on October 10, 1980. See Castronovo, Fiat 1899 -  1999, p. 1523.
47 The unions knew from an internal survey that the majority of workers were unimpressed by the policy 
of the unions in the early 1980s. The conclusion of the CGIL survey has been reported by Mattina, Fiat e 
Sindacati negli anni 80, Appendix.
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implemented according a rotation scheme by which each worker could not be 
unemployed for more than 6 weeks. This became the main bargaining issue. In fact, Fiat 
did not accept the principle of rotation because it would have required additional 
training each time workers had to change tasks. Unions, on the other hand, suspected 
that without rotation the temporary unemployment would have been eventually 
transformed into permanent redundancy. Other measures included incentives for early 
retirement and a freeze of labour turnover. Soon after the reassignment of the premier 
Cossiga at the end of September, Fiat proposed the Cassa Integrazione for 22,000 
workers without rotation, and the unions rejected the offer.
The stalemate was broken on October 14, when a huge number of blue collars and 
workers gathered at the assembly of the newly formed middle-rank committee 
(Coordinamento dei Capi). The meeting proceeded as a silent protest through the streets 
of Turin, and although the exact number of protesters was never established, the event 
became known as the “Protest of the 40,000”. Even here, not all the protesters were Fiat 
employees, but this reinforced the impression that the unions were losing contact with 
civil society. This time, the protesters were silent, and were not preventing anybody 
from doing their job. Nevertheless, they were visible. That night, the unions signed an 
agreement, where 24,000 workers entered the Cassa Integrazione scheme, for three years 
rather than one, without rotation. The unions could participate in the selection of 
workers. Moreover, the Minister of Labour’s proposals for incentives for early 
retirement and the block on labour turnover were also accepted by management. The 
agreement in itself, therefore was not a dramatic defeat, but it was perceived as a defeat 
of the unions by workers and public opinion. As the CGIL leader Luciano Lama pointed 
out in an interview for L'U nita\ “35 days of strike and occupation are very tough for 
workers, too tough to be compensated by just signing an agreement.”48
The “Heroic Defeat”
It is interesting to notice that the unions knew that they could not count on the mass 
participation of workers in ordinary strikes, since a survey undertaken in January 1980 
had provided them with plenty of information about the increasing divide among
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workers.49 Thus, it did not come as a surprise that after a few days, it was clear that the 
number of currently employed workers engaged in the picketing was marginal. 
Moreover, the unions knew about the ongoing market crisis, which caused the stock of 
finished goods to increase considerably. The question thus arises of why the unions 
engaged in a direct confrontation with management from a weak bargaining position.
Castronovo suggests that in the initial phase of the conflict, the local union branches 
pushed the confrontation further than the National Secretaries of the CGIL, CISL, and 
UEL would have liked. Thus, both unions and the PCI were trapped in a situation they 
could not control.50 However, Miriam Golden has suggested convincingly that the 1980 
strike was a case of Heroic Defeat.51 Golden’s analysis fits into the political and 
industrial relations context that has been described so far. In addition, it provides a 
rational explanation for the fact that the unions went for confrontational bargaining, 
knowing that they would have lost. Heroic defeats, in fact, occur exactly when union 
leaders undertake strikes, while foreseeing their defeat, in a context in which 
management pursues mass job reductions and there is non-formalised seniority scheme 
regulating the labour downsizing process.
In the case of Fiat, the unions already knew the extent of their weakness before 
management announced the 14,000 redundancies. Nevertheless, precisely because the 
unions could not prevail in the field of mass labour reduction, they had to preserve their 
own existence, by institutionalising their role in the process of mass labour reduction, 
and formalising their residual power in respect to the workers, rather than the 
management. This meant that the unions had to become involved in the process of 
selection of those workers who had to be axed, provided that there was still no 
formalised seniority scheme agreed by both unions and managers to regulate the firing 
process. This was the reason why the Ministry of Labour proposed the rotating 
temporary unemployment scheme (Cassa Integrazione). The rotation would have 
prevented Fiat from transforming the temporary unemployment into a permanent
48 Interview with Luciano Lama, L ’Unita, 19 October 1980
49 See note 47.
50 Castronovo, Fiat 1899-1999, p. 1516.
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expulsion of workers. Therefore, the rotation would have minimised the problem of who 
had to choose the redundant workers, while the unions would have been granted the 
formal privilege of organising the rotation.
Fiat, on the other hand, was ready to replace workforce reduction with temporary 
unemployment schemes only if management could choose not to take back workers after 
the end of the scheme. This requirement excluded rotation and reintroduced the problem 
of who was going to choose the redundant workers to be put in temporary 
unemployment. Eventually, the actors signed an agreement in which local public 
institutions committed themselves to relocate workers involved in the temporary 
unemployment scheme in other firms or positions. Management, on the other hand, 
committed itself to take back those workers who had not found another job during the 
period of temporary unemployment. Finally, the unions were involved in the selection of 
redundancies. As far as the re-deployment of workers is concerned, the commitment of 
both management and the institutions was not credible from the beginning. Thus, Fiat 
won its point, but the unions ensured their survival in the factory by being part of the 
redundancy scrutiny process.
After the events of 1980, the role of the unions gradually developed into a more 
normal institutionalised bargaining. Wage bargaining and extra time implementation 
were reconnected to an orthodox industrial relations logic, so that by comparing Fiat 
with any other car manufacturer in Europe, the unions could hardly be defined as 
particularly subject to managerial power. On the other hand, only 4,000 of the 24,000 
workers put into temporary unemployment schemes returned to Fiat in 1984, and many 
of them quit after a while because they had been re-deployed in marginal shops, and not 
retrained to use up-to-date machinery. The less moderate unionists were forced to quit 
or transfer to marginal shops. Technological change was no longer discussed with 
unions and returned to being a pure managerial prerogative. Nevertheless, in the field of 
job safety and working conditions management and unions achieved remarkable co­
operative results.
51 See: M. A. Golden, A Rational Choice Analysis o f Union Militancy With Application to the Cases o f  
British Coal and Fiat, Western Societies Program, Occasional Paper no 26, Centre of International 
Studies, Cornell University (Ithaca, 1990).
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Section three 
Technological change and industrial relations
The previous section explains the unions’ defeat of 1980 as the result of the intrinsic 
weakness of the unions combined with more favourable socio-political conditions 
helping management to re-establish managerial control over the production process. 
This section criticised the idea that the deterioration of industrial relations after 1969 
forced Fiat management to invest in robotics in order to reduce the strength of unions. 
Such an argument has been defined as “the technocratic” response of management to 
deteriorating industrial relations.
The unconvincing relationship between technological change and agents' 
bargaining power
By reconstructing the political and industrial relations history of Italy in the 1970s, 
this chapter highlights the reason why, from the mid-1980s, industrial relations experts 
started to acknowledge that the internal evolution of the three main unions along with 
developments in Italian politics had affected industrial relations much more than any 
other factor. Experts started to credit technological change for having helped to stabilise 
industrial relations after the defeat of the unions in the 1980s, mainly through the 
positive effect of robotics on working conditions, but they dismissed technology as the 
main drive behind the unions' collapse at the beginning of the 1980s. This was a radical 
departure from the “technocratic response” argument that had been developed in the 
1970s and early 1980s, according to which technological innovation was driven by the 
attempt of management to reduce the bargaining power of the unions. On the other 
hand, the technological response argument was not criticised from a theoretical point of 
view, nor was it tested on the empirical ground. In the absence of a theoretically 
structured criticism, it could be argued that the ex post recognition of the structural and 
political weakness of the unions as an explanatory factor of the their defeat does not 
automatically exclude the ex ante argument that when the deployment of robotics started 
in 1972, management might have expected a significant impact on industrial relations,
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and that such expectations were the real drive behind technological change, regardless 
of the actual outcomes.
It has to be pointed out that the technological response argument, which sees 
technological change as driven by the ex ante expectation of management that robotics 
would impact industrial relations, implies a technological discontinuity, which would 
appear as inconsistent with the engineering-led and evolutionary interpretation of 
technological change that has been posed in chapter 4. For these reasons, it seems 
important to criticise the idea that technological change was inspired by expectations of 
improvements in industrial relations, although this thesis does not aim to add to the 
industrial relations debate.
In order to address the question, it is important to establish whether the agents who 
actually masterminded the deployment of robotics at Fiat had theoretical or practical 
reasons to believe that the technology would decrease the bargaining power of the 
unions. This leads to the question whether the engineers who planned the investment in 
new production tools had information about industrial relations within Fiat, and whether 
that information could have suggested that robotics would improve industrial relations.
From a theoretical point of view, the impact of capital substitution for labour on 
industrial relations depends on whether it concerns the entire process or whether it is 
localised within specific stages of production, so that investments in fixed capital do not 
affect labour intensity to the extent that workers lose control over the process. 
Furthermore, if  the substitution of capital for labour is localised, the question should be 
addressed whether industrial relations are shaped by cohesive or non-cohesive unionism. 
Cohesive unionism is when workers are organised in a single union or in a set of unions 
that co-ordinate their bargaining platform and, if  necessary, their plans for industrial 
action. By contrast, non-cohesive unionism refers to a situation in which workers are 
organised in different and not necessarily allied organisations, according to their 
specialisation.53 In a context of cohesive unionism and adversarial industrial relations, a 
firm investing in retooling is exposed to the action of unions because of the low level of
52 See: G, Bamberg, ‘Technological Change and Unions’, in R. Hyman and W. Streek, New Technology 
and Industrial Relations (Oxford, 1988), 204-219.
53 A typical example of non-cohesive (or multiple) unionism is represented by the British car industry.
See: Foreman -  Peck, Bowden, McKinlay, The British Motor Industry, pp. 177-181.
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capital amortisation, unless the substitution of capital for labour is rapid and extensive. 
By contrast, with non-cohesive unionism, localised substitution of capital for labour 
should be expected to play in favour of management when it allows mangers to 
eliminate jobs in those shops in which workers are represented by unions that are more 
radical.
As has been shown in chapter 4, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the deployment of 
robotics at Fiat was localised mainly in the spot-welding and painting shops, whereas 
the final assembly remained relatively labour intensive, although rationalisation led to a 
reduction of the total labour input in the whole process. The new robotised shops were 
jointly designed by Fiat engineers and experts from the robotics supplier COMAU.54 
Thus, the Fiat production engineers knew to what extent the new technology was going 
to affect the labour intensity of the company, and the extent to which unions were going 
to retain the ability to create artificial bottlenecks along the production chain. As far as 
unions were concerned, it has been shown that during the 1970s industrial relations in 
Italy, and indeed at Fiat, were shaped by cohesive unionism, where the majority of 
workers was represented by the three main national unions regardless of their job or 
specialisation. Furthermore, the CGIL, CISL and UIL were confederated and planned 
their action together.
Given that the implementation of robotics at Fiat was localised, that industrial 
relations were characterised by cohesive unionism, and that production engineers who 
masterminded the implementation of robotics had information on both the development 
of the process and the regime of unionisation, it is reasonable to suggest that Fiat 
engineers had no sound theoretical reason to expect that the deployment of robotics was 
going to have a necessarily positive effect on industrial relations. On the contrary, they 
should have expected a deterioration of the bargaining position of management, because 
of the low level of amortisation of the fixed capital in which the company had invested. 
This is the reason why Musso’s argument that the defeat of unions was a pre-condition 
for the full deployment and maximisation of new technologies is the most theoretically 
sound, although the author does not model his argument in the theoretical terms used in 
the paragraph above.
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From theory to practice: Macro- and micro-conflicts
By suggesting that production management had no reason to expect investments in 
robotics to have a major impact on the ability of unions to stop production, this does not 
mean that Fiat engineers were not involved in a number of initiatives, including 
organisational and technical change to try to minimise that ability. It simply means that 
they could not expect robotics to have an intrinsic ability to minimise the action of the 
unions.
The measures taken by management to counteract unions should be analysed in 
relation to two different situations, the micro- and the macro-industrial conflict. Here 
micro-conflict means the action of a limited number of workers for a limited amount of 
time, aiming to create an artificial bottleneck in the production flow. Micro-conflicts 
were quite diffused at Fiat during the 1970s, although they took place in a context of 
cohesive unionism. The unions were involved both logistically and politically in micro­
conflicts, although, after 1975, they progressively lost the control over this form of 
action, as localised strikes started to be increasingly fostered by extremist and extra- 
parliamentary groups. Official unions tended, at least up to 1979, to provide ex-post 
political support to those strikes, in the fear of appearing too sympathetic to 
management and of losing the support of unionised workers. As already pointed out, this 
was a major mistake for the unions, and one of the reasons for their internal decline.
Localised strikes rarely stopped production. More often, the effect was to slow 
production down. Whether or not production was stopped or just slowed depended on 
the number of workers participating in the action. Both union and management sources 
confirm that engineers made an effort to adapt the production system in order to cope 
with partial strikes.55 However, this effort was reflected in changes in the layout of the 
production flow, rather than in the technology of the production tools. Fiat developed an 
inter-operational conveyer in order to connect together parallel lines, featuring 
homologous sets of tools. The theory underpinning the use of such a layout was that if
54 Source: author's interview with Malandri and Scimone, 18-03-1999.
55 See Germanetto, Bronzini, Guido, Fiat. See also Bonazzi, II tubo di cristall; interview with Vincenzo 
Verri, (Executive Manager), p. 151.
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multiple lines were connected together by a network of conveyors, and only some lines 
had been stopped in a given stage of production, components coming from the upstream 
stages of the process could be diverted to the operating lines, while non-operative lines 
could be bypassed. The deployment of an inter-operational conveyor aimed also to 
minimise the effect of localised absenteeism, which created bottlenecks in the same way 
micro-strikes did.
It is interesting to notice that between stamping and welding, the inter-operational 
conveyor consisted of a traditional conveyor following a non-linear layout.56 As 
described in the previous chapter, after 1976, though, in some welding and mechanical 
assembly shops, trolleys moving along a magnetic path and controlled by computers 
were used instead of inter-operational conveyors. Multiple lines were operated in 
different plants regardless of the set of tools deployed. It is reasonable to say, therefore, 
that the reaction of managers to localised strikes had more to do with process layout 
than technological change.
However, the interesting question is whether the development of non-linear layouts 
was an effective technical strategy to normalise both production and industrial relations. 
In order to address this, it is necessary to understand the context in which localised 
strikes were organised. One of the features of industrial relations at Fiat during the 
1970s was the practice of the so-called “beside-the-line” bargaining imposed by unions. 
In each line the output was decided at the beginning of each shift by unionists and 
foremen, according to the availability of labour, the technical capability of the tools 
deployed to cope with production targets, and to the consistency of production targets 
with safety requirements. In the early 1970s, the unions had introduced this practice 
initially to avoid the situation of the late 1960s, when production targets were set 
according to demand and with little consideration for the inputs actually available for 
production, which in turn exacerbated a rift between workers and managers. Later, 
though, unions increasingly utilised the ”beside-the-line” bargaining as a generalised 
means of putting pressure on management. The mechanism had been designed to 
prevent management from asking those workers actually present on the line to increase 
their effort, in order to compensate for the absence of their colleagues. Because ”beside-
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the-line” bargaining concerned the output of each specific line in which bargaining took 
place, daily production levels tended to change for every line. Clearly, this form of 
bargaining was the most serious challenge by the unions to the Fordist system of mass 
production at Fiat, in which the most complex operation had been typically hyper­
segmented, in order to keep the cycle time as close as possible to that of the most simple 
operations. Through the practice of ”beside-the-line” bargaining, the speed of 
production of each line was calibrated to that of the slowest segment in the line. The 
Fordist principle of cycle-time equalisation was also denied because the speed of 
production was even along a line, but was uneven across lines. Critically, localised 
strikes or a high rate of absenteeism in a given line represented a good reason to slow 
the pace of that line as well as the pace of subsequent lines. If the non-linear layout of 
the components flow had been efficient, the speed of production of a given line or 
segment of a line would no longer depend on the functioning of the preceding or 
subsequent line or segment, so that each stage of the process could operated at its own 
pace. As a consequence, the progressive disappearance of the ”beside-the-line” 
bargaining should have been expected. Obviously, the total output would have been still 
lower than the normal because not all the capital available was actually utilised and 
because the efficiency of the system was likely to be lower than that of a system based 
on a linear layout. However, the justification for setting the pace of each line at the 
beginning of each shift would have been removed, and a fixed or semi-fixed measure of 
production pace would have been reintroduced. Nevertheless, ”beside-the line” 
bargaining remained widespread up to the defeat of the unions in 1980,57 which 
indicates that non-linear layouts did not bring any sizeable advantage in terms of 
production flow within a context of turbulent industrial relations, and that management 
could not normalise industrial relations by exploiting technological advantage. Both 
arguments reinforce Musso’s view that a normalisation of industrial relations was a pre­
requisite for technology maximisation and vice-versa. Moreover, this consideration 
seems even more pertinent when applied to sizeable investments in robotics, which
56 Ibid.
57 Musso, ‘Le relazioni industriali alia Fiat’, in Annibaldi and Berta, Grande impresa e sviluppo italiano, 
p. 225.
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could not be profitable if  the downstream labour-intensive lines were subjected to off­
line output bargaining.
The literature concerning industrial relations during the 1970s is also full of 
information about the tactics adopted by unions during major strikes, and the counter-
f O
manoeuvres implemented by management. In providing this information, the literature 
provides the implicit empirical confirmation that in a regime of cohesive unionism, the 
localised implementation of robotics should not have been expected to have a 
significant impact. During major strikes at Fiat, a number of well-known tactics were 
put in place, such as the blocking of the plant inlet and outlet gates, in order to prevent 
workers from getting in, and finished goods from leaving the factory. On the other hand, 
managers tried to deploy those workers who had been able to enter the factory on a 
small number of lines, in order to carry on with a limited production programme. At 
other times, when the strike was supposed to last for only one of the two ordinary shifts, 
or for one hour per shift, managers decided to stop production altogether, in the hope it 
could create friction among workers.59 This was the case when the company was 
running oversized stocks of final goods. As already shown by chapter 3, after 1973 Fiat 
often ran such stocks, and therefore, management was often interested in avoiding 
artificial bottlenecks in distribution rather than production. When managers feared a 
long strike, they moved the stock of completed cars from the factory yards to the 
dealership network within and outside the Turin hinterland. This was a critical factor in 
the managerial strategy during the strike in the autumn of 1980, when the oversized 
stock of cars enabled Fiat to sustain 32 days of strike. During mass strikes at giant plants 
the size of an urban suburb, such as Mirafiori, both unions and managers were usually 
engaged in a range of military-style tactics and logistical exercises. In such a scenario, if 
it was asked whether the implementation of robotics in some stage of the process would 
really matter, the logic answer would have been no.
As already said, the political sphere of industrial relations was overwhelmingly 
important, so that the confrontation between management and workers exceeded the 
boundaries of “normal” industrial relations. The duration and frequency of strikes was
58 Castronovo, Fiat 1899-1999, pp. 1510-1528.
59 See Guidi, Bronzino, Germanetto, Fiat, pp. 36-50.
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highly affected by a political legacy shaped by a strong anti-management attitude. There 
was little scope for managers to expect technology to have an immediate effect on the 
ability of unions to slow or stop production. However, Bonazzi has argued that robotics, 
and more generally technological change had a long-term positive effect on the 
relationship between managers, foremen and workers, helping management to normalise 
industrial relations.60 The author describes the process as a long-term one. During the 
1970s, management focused on those sectors in which working conditions were 
particularly contentious, with the specific aim of minimising absenteeism and micro­
conflicts. If anything, by replacing workers with robots in welding and painting, where 
levels of noise and pollution and the amount of physical effort required by the operation 
were exceptionally high, management actually removed one of the sources of friction 
with unions.61
However, as far as the short-term perspective is concerned, it should be asked 
whether, on the grounds of safety and general working conditions, managers should 
have expected collective and individual support from workers for the replacement of 
labour with capital in some stages of the process. In fact, management chose to deploy 
new labour-saving tools rather than to improve working conditions ceteris paribus. In 
this respect, the distinction between the elimination of direct labour from the most 
distressing, dangerous and unhealthy tasks, and the improvement of working conditions 
without the actual elimination of jobs is crucial. Under normal circumstances, if output 
levels are expected to increase, unions tend to accept the replacement of labour by 
capital in the more distressing and unhealthy operations, under the assumption that 
labour saved in those operations can be re-deployed elsewhere in the process, to cope 
with the expected increase in output. If production is not expected to increase, unions 
tend not to favour the substitution of capital for labour, in order not to lose jobs. On the 
contrary, unions push for a reduction in the cycle time, as a measure to improve working 
conditions.
Crucially, conditions at Fiat were not normal. The widespread practice of ”beside- 
the-line” bargaining made the unions' response to investments in improving working
60 Bonazzi, II tubo di cristallo, pp. 104-105.
61 Ibid.
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conditions less predictable. The whole system of shop-floor output bargaining during 
the 1970s was justified by the assumption that safety and stress containment can be 
achieved only by expanding labour control over the cycle time. In this respect, 
technological innovation was seen by the unions as an attempt to take the control of the 
cycle time setting away from them. This was particularly true between 1969 and 1973, 
but after the first oil crisis, unions started to agree on the principle that technological 
innovation had to be used to improve safety, and that effort needed to be increased in the 
face of improved working conditions. Nonetheless, it was one thing to agree in 
principle, and another thing to translate a principle in practice. As has been previously 
shown, unions faced the opposition of the most radical wings of the workers’ movement 
to agreements that recognised the right of management to ask for higher effort in the 
aftermath of technological innovation.62
As was the case with the example of non-linear layout, if  technology-driven 
improvement of working conditions had a short-term positive impact on industrial 
relations, a progressive disappearance of the ”beside-the-line” bargaining should be 
expected, but this was not the case. Moreover, in the context of the 1970s, management 
could not expect unconditional consent for the substitution of capital for labour aiming 
to improve working conditions, precisely because it would have undermined the 
justification underpinning the system of ”beside-the-line” bargaining. In other words, 
management could not expect unions to give up their main instrument of control over 
production so easily. Therefore, in the short term, investment in capital would have 
caused more micro-conflict and splits between unions and managers.
Contini has pointed out that in those shops where ”beside-the-line” bargaining was 
not taken too far and the plant agreements were applied correctly and within a logic of 
mutual respect of rights and duty, innovation, be it in terms of layout, organisation or 
technology, brought positive results.63 This is another indication that management could 
expect a long-term positive effect of a technology-led improvement of working
62 The reference is to the case of ‘Luddism’, described in the previous paragraph, occurring at the 
Mirafiori plant in September 1977, when some workers rejected the principle that the total rest time per 
shift in a specific segment of the painting shop could be reduced as a consequence o f the deployment of 
new tools improving working conditions.
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conditions, once industrial relations were normalised. In the same way, management 
could have expected that technological change would contribute to the maximisation of 
overall efficiency after normalisation.
Therefore, it does not seem correct to consider industrial relations as the main drive 
behind technological change. In the short term, management could neither reasonably 
expect technological innovation to minimise the unions' ability to create artificial 
bottlenecks nor that the removal of direct labour from distressing jobs would have 
necessarily increased the workers' consent of management. However, in the long term, 
it does appear fair to say that technological change contributed to sustained improved 
industrial relations, after the political defeat of unions had occurred.
Conclusions
Building on the most recent literature on industrial relations at Fiat, this chapter has 
shown that political factors and industrial relations developments explain the defeat of 
management during the 1970s as well as the defeat of the unions in 1980. This was the 
outcome the decision to invest in strikes taken by the Fiat management in 1979. Ten 
years earlier, political conditions and a higher degree of worker cohesion would not 
have allowed the company to go that way. Developing the argument, the chapter 
highlights the complexity of industrial conflict at Fiat, and the reasons why, from the 
mid-1980s onwards, the industrial relations literature no longer explained the defeat of 
the unions in technological terms alone, suggesting instead that the recovery of 
managerial power was the precondition for maximising technological change. Following 
this line, it has been shown that given the complexity and the precariousness of 
industrial relations during the 1970s, there was neither theoretical nor practical ground 
for management to believe technological change was the way towards the stabilisation 
of industrial relations. Thus, it would be difficult to believe that technological change 
was initially inspired by management's expectation that new technology would have an 
impact on industrial relations. This view is consistent with the conclusion of the 
preceding chapters, showing that technological change in the 1970s and 1980s aimed to
63 Contini, ‘The Rise and Fall of Shop-floor Bargaining at Fiat 1945 -  1980’, in Tolliday and Zeitlin (eds), 
Between Fordism and Flexibility, p. 163.
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resolve the bottlenecks generated by the process of automation carried out by Fiat during 
the 1960s, rather than to pursue a radical shift in production management towards 
flexibility. Nevertheless, the recovery of managerial power was a necessary precondition 
for an effective implementation of new technology.
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Chapter 6
Output-Mix Optimisation Strategies at Fiat, 1960-1987
Introduction
This section of the thesis consists of two chapters both referring to output-mix 
decision-making. This is the second variable analysed by this work in order to approach 
the issue of continuity and discontinuity in management at Fiat before and after 1973. 
The section shows that output-mix optimisation strategy at Fiat was based on a routine, 
which links output-mix decision-making to the regime of competition. The regime of 
competition means price competition as opposed to collusive price leadership. This 
chapter deals with output-mix decision-making from the late 1960s to the late 1970s, 
while the next one analyses the output-mix issue in the 1980s.
Since the post-war period, Fiat had specialised in the manufacturing of small cars. 
Units above 1100 cc were produced mainly as “flagship models”, in order to enhance 
brand reputation. Yet, those models were expected simply to break even or provide 
modest shares of total profits, while the bulk of profits came from vehicles below 1100 
cc. This chapter shows that during the 1970s, Fiat adjusted its output mix upmarket 
despite its specialisation, and that the move was connected with the regime of 
competition. Under the protective umbrella of collusive behaviours,1 Fiat could set 
prices in the domestic market according to its own cost structure and desired margin of 
contribution. This means that French and German competitors, on the other hand, were 
adjusting their price upward the Fiat ones, so that their comparative advantage over Fiat 
in the manufacturing of upmarket units was minimised.
Collusion was a substitute for prerequisites to the efficient manufacturing of upper- 
range units. Here prerequisites mean efficiency-maximising factors that were 
characteristic of the German and, in part, of the French car industry. These factors 
included specialisation in the design and engineering of high quality units, specialisation 
in the supply of quality components, a reputation for quality manufacturing, and scales
1 The regime of competition in Italy during the 1970s has been analysed at industry level by Silva, who 
proved that the European industry during the 1970s suspended price competition, in that in each national 
market prices were set by the national champion while external competitors followed upward. See Silva, 
Prati, Grillo. 77 mercato Italiano dell’auto.
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of production sufficiently large to enable the maximisation of operating profits. 
Crucially, the chapter provides evidence that given price levels in any segment of the 
domestic market, per unit contribution margins of the medium and upper segments of 
the Fiat production range were higher than those yielded by Fiat’s bottom range. As 
long as the collusion held, Fiat could profit from the relative expansion of the middle 
and upper segments of demand brought about by the maturation of the Italian market.
Nonetheless, Fiat management did not exploit the opportunity offered by the 
suspension of price competition to restructure design and manufacturing processes and 
to enhance competitiveness in the upper end of the production range. On the contrary, 
Fiat management shifted back downmarket at the end of the 1970s. The final chapter of 
the thesis will show that this shift was a response to the expectation that price 
competition would be restored in the 1980s. Given that Fiat had missed the opportunity 
to enhance its competitiveness in the upper range, there was no other choice than to shift 
the output mix back downmarket where management thought Fiat still had the 
comparative advantage.
From the analysis carried out in those two chapters of the thesis, thus, it appears that 
in the late 1960s Fiat management looked at the shift upmarket as an opportunistic 
move to exploit medium-term favourable circumstances, while the basic routines 
underpinning technological and design development efforts did not change. Fiat 
remained specialised in the bottom range of the market, despite the fact that the 
progressive maturation of the Italian market and the abolition of tariffs implied that the 
medium and top range of the demand spectrum would become extremely important and 
lucrative segments of global demand. If Fiat management thought to shift upmarket only 
if collusion was in place, which means without changing the specialisation pattern of the 
company, it is possible to say that from the late 1960s to the late 1970s, the basic 
routines underpinning output-mix decision-making did not change over time.
By saying that management decided to shift the output mix up- or downmarket, it is 
meant that managers decided to focus on a given segment of the market by prioritising 
product renewal. Because market shares are influenced by product renewal, the amount 
o f resources allocated to the renewal of specific segments determined the commercial
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success of specific models and, ultimately, the output mix.2 The shift upmarket of the 
late 1960s and early 1970s was due to product renewal focusing mainly on Fiat’s top 
range and on the Lancia range. On the other hand, the shift downmarket of the late 
1970s and early 1980s was the result of a product renewal strategy, allocating the larger 
share of resources on the bottom range.
Moreover, the new Fiat and Lancia models launched in the early 1970s shared 
existing Fiat mechanical components. This indicates that in the 1970s, Fiat wanted to 
contain costs of research and development, rather than to increase its chance of being 
competitive in the top end of the market. Assembling new chasses with old components 
was clearly not the best strategy to establish Fiat as a long-term competitor in a market 
segment in which the company lacked the reputation of the German manufacturers. By 
contrast, in the early 1970s the product renewal of the bottom range included new 
chassis and engine designs, by which Fiat was able to regain the technological and 
commercial edge and to retain it in the long term.
The analysis of output-mix decision-making developed in this section of the thesis is 
mainly based on unpublished sources and brings interesting results in the context of 
Fiat’s business history. Moreover, the implications of those results are also relevant for 
the issue of discontinuity within the context of the debate on post-Fordism. It is critical 
to note that since upmarket adjustments of the output mix were made only when 
collusive behaviours were in place, the incentive to enhance efficiency in designing and 
manufacturing upper-segment units was minimal. Consequently, during the 1970s and 
1980s, the pattern of design and production skills remained rather stable and Fiat kept 
its specialisation in the manufacturing of small cars. The Fiat management’s preference 
for the bottom range of demand reflected the stock of technical and managerial 
knowledge accumulated by the company over time, as well as the Fordist approach to 
mass production, based on the containment of process and product complexity. In this 
sense, the routine underpinning output-mix decision-making at Fiat was coherent with 
the process-oriented technical culture of the Fiat technical management, which saw in 
the containment of product and process complexity the principal profit-maximising 
factor.
2 See W. J. Abernathy (ed.), The Productivity Dilemma: Roadblock to Innovation in the Automobile 
Industry (Baltimore, 1978); W. J. Abernathy, K. B. Clark, A.M. Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance:
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In this sense, output-mix decision-making was consistent with the process of 
technological change described in chapter 4. As already shown, the search for new 
technologies during the 1970s was inherently driven by the search for cycle-time 
minimisation, rather than flexibility. This was consistent with a marketing strategy 
based on an output mix skewed downmarket, because downmarket units are produced at 
a faster pace than upmarket ones. Thus, continuity in the routines underpinning 
technological change reflected continuity in the routines underpinning output-mix 
decision-making.
This chapter consists of three sections. The first exposes the theoretical rationale 
behind the routine of choosing an output mix according to the regime of competition. 
The second deals with output-mix decision-making during the 1960s, while the third 
concerns shifts in the output mix during the 1970s. Based on primary sources, the 
chapter shows that the routine of linking the output mix to the regime of competition 
had been established by Valletta, and that, contrary to common knowledge, during the 
1970s Fiat actually shifted upmarket in response to implicit collusion. By quoting 
internal unpublished documents, it will be shown that in 1975, Fiat management 
regarded the pricing behaviour of competitors as predictable, and that, given the role of 
price leader enjoyed by Fiat in Italy, the shift upmarket was profitable. The following 
chapter of the thesis will show that during the 1980s, price competition was restored, 
and Fiat shifted back downmarket. Moreover, the available evidence indicates that the 
output mix skewed downmarket was the best profit-maximising choice.
Producing a Competitive Future for America (New York, 1983).
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Section one
The economic rationale for linking output-mix decision-making to the regime of
competition
This section highlights the relationship between the regime of competition and 
output-mix decision-making. First, the problem of output-mix optimisation strategy will 
be defined in relation to the established literature. Then, the section moves on to 
analysing changes in the Fiat output mix from 1968 to 1987. Finally, starting from the 
price competition theory, the section will investigate why shifts from price competition 
to collusive price leadership and vice versa might affect output-mix decision-making. 
Based on primary sources, the following sections of the chapter will show that Fiat fits 
into the case in which the regime of competition determined the output-mix 
optimisation strategy. Moreover, it will be shown that such a decision-making routine 
remained constant over the period considered by this thesis.
Output-mix optimisation and the established literature
Since the end of the Second World War, Fiat has established a solid reputation as a 
mass producer specialising in the lowest segment of demand. This reputation derives 
from the commercial success of models such as the 500, the 600 and the 850,3 whose 
low selling price helped fuel the enormous expansion of internal demand during the 
years of the so-called “economic miracle” (1955-1969). The more recent success of the 
Uno, which, during the 1980s allowed the company to recover from the crisis of the 
1970s, has confirmed and even reinforced the traditional image of Fiat.
At beginning of the 1980s, part of the analytical contribution to the debate about the 
state and the future of the car industry consisted of isolating the effect of the two oil 
shocks, from both the weaknesses inherent to the industry and those specific to 
individual firms. The distinction between exogenous and endogenous crisis factors was, 
in fact, crucial in order to foresee medium- and long-term strategic developments. As far 
as Fiat is concerned, many observers and analysts suggested that one of the weaknesses 
of the company consisted precisely of an output mix skewed towards lower segments of 
the market. In fact, during the 1970s, medium and large segments had been growing 
faster than the lower segments of demand, as an effect of market maturation. That trend
3 All these models belong to segment A.
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was expected to continue in the 1980s. Moreover, cars competing in the medium and 
upper segments were expected to yield higher per unit margins of contribution to fixed 
costs and, therefore, larger per unit operating profits.4 The adjustment of the output 
structure upmarket was, thus, advisable and expected.
This expectation was captured by the literature of the late 1970s and early 1980s.5 At 
the end of the 1980s, nonetheless, observers were surprised by the fact that Fiat's core 
market was still the bottom end of the demand spectrum. Again, this surprise was 
reflected by the literature of the late 1980s, and although Fiat had been consistently 
profitable from 1983 onwards, there was room to suggest that Fiat could have done 
better had the company shifted upmarket.6 However, most authors maintained that the 
Fiat output mix of the 1980s had been driven by demand.7 The fact that the Fiat core 
market was still the bottom range of demand was taken as evidence of flexibility, in the 
sense that Fiat was ready to compete in any segment but had to respond to increasing
Q
demand for its low range. This interpretation was consistent with the view that Fiat had 
developed a range of products to compete in different segments of the market as well as 
the flexibility to shift the allocation of production capacity from one range of model to 
another.
As far as flexibility is concerned, the existing literature has been already criticised in 
chapter 4 of this thesis, where it has been shown that during the 1980s, flexible 
manufacturing systems had been deployed mainly in the spot-welding shops, whereas 
the machinery stock deployed upstream of the spot-welding stage was still model- 
specific. This severely curtailed output-mix flexibility. Crucially, the very fact that large 
shares of capital stock were still committed to the manufacturing of small cars indicates 
that Fiat management was not seeking a flexible output-mix optimisation strategy, as 
suggested by the established literature. On this basis, it is worth analysing output-mix 
strategy to see whether Fiat's lower-segment success during the 1980s reflected a precise
4 The expectation for upmarket units to bring larger contribution margins depends on the fact that in the 
middle and upper segments of the market, demand tends to be income elastic rather than price elastic. This 
is a relevant point in relation to output-mix strategy, and it will be discussed in more depth in the 
following sections of the chapter.
5 See Comito, La Fiat, p. 69.
6 Enrietti and Fomenego, II Gruppo Fiat, p. 172.
7 Loke and Negelli, ‘II caso Fiat Auto’, in Regini and Sable (eds), Strategic di riaggiustamento 
industriale, pp. 61-94.
8 This is basically the argument posed by Volpato, II caso Fiat; Enrietti and Fomengo, II Gruppo Fiat; 
and, with different facets, by Loke and Negrelli, ‘II caso Fiat Auto’.
221
strategy aiming to maximise its specialisation in manufacturing small cars, as opposed 
to a strategy aiming to compete in all the segments relevant for Fiat. If this was the case, 
the hypothesis of continuity will be confirmed.
The first step in the scrutiny of output-mix strategies concerns the analysis of changes 
in the output mix over time. It is interesting to note that such an analysis has not been 
carried out by the literature before. However, the database already used in chapter 4, 
namely monthly output per plant for each model from 1968 to 1987, allows the 
empirical investigation of changes in the output mix.
Figure 6.1: Segment share of total output (percentage), by grouped segments 
(A+B: C-H), 1968-87 (3-vear moving average)
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Source: See table A 6.1 in the appendix.
Figure 6.1 represents changes in the output structure of Fiat. Vehicles have been 
grouped in lower-segment units (A and B) and upper-segment units (above C). This 
reflects the same criterion used by Fiat management to distinguish between lower and 
upper segments. The 3-year moving average has been chosen to smooth the line from 
contingent peaks and troughs. Unsurprisingly, the figure shows that Fiat output was 
skewed towards the bottom range in the 1960s and in the 1980s. This is consistent with
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the picture of Fiat reported by the literature. However, the surprising feature of figure 
6.1 is that contrary to the common wisdom, during the 1970s Fiat had indeed adjusted 
its output mix upmarket. As already said, the literature of the early 1980s proposed that 
Fiat should shift upmarket to increase profitability, while the literature of the late 1980s 
acknowledged that the company had actually missed the opportunity to do so. 
Nevertheless, figure 6.1 shows that during the 1970s Fiat had already moved upmarket, 
whereas the company shifted back downmarket during the 1980s. This feature in the 
development of the Fiat output mix was not captured by the literature of the early 1980s.
The shift upmarket was consistent with the take-over of Lancia in 1969. It was also 
consistent with the product renewal strategy of the firm. This included the launch of the 
124 and 125 Special (segment D) in 1970, the 130 Coupe (segment I) in 1971, the 132 
(segment E) in 1972, and the 131 (segment D) in 1974, and the Lancia Beta range 
(segment E) from 1970 onwards. Meanwhile, in the bottom segment two models were 
launched in 1971, namely the 126 (segment A) and the 127 (segment B).9 Given the Fiat 
merger and product renewal strategies in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it should be 
asked why in the late 1970s and early 1980s Fiat management shifted back downmarket 
when it was expected to go in the opposite direction.
The point made in this chapter is that the answer lies in the routine used by Fiat 
management in order to choose the output mix. This consisted of a framework linking 
output-mix decision-making with the regime of competition. The following paragraphs 
of this section address first the theoretical relationship between output-mix decision­
making and the regime of competition, then move on to reviewing the competition 
regime during the 1970s in the European car market.
Competition and output-mix modelling
As already said, at the beginning of the 1980s, observers expected Fiat to adjust the 
output structure upmarket. This expectation, though, was based on the misconception of 
the Fiat output mix during the 1970s. In fact, the output mix had been already adjusted 
towards the medium and upper segments of the market, so that Fiat had the option either 
to stick with the output mix of the 1970s or to shift back downmarket. The firm could
9 Source: Archivio Storico Fiat (ed.), Fiat. Le fasi della crescita (Torino, 1996), pp. 50-55.
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hardly shift further upmarket, given that units above 1100 cc. already comprised almost 
50% of its output. In any case, the idea that it would be profitable for Fiat to increase 
the production of upmarket units was based on the view that the increase in sales of 
upper-range units improves the bottom line. This section, on the other hand, suggests 
this view was an oversimplification of the output-mix optimisation issue.
In order to address this point, it is useful to the review the textbook principles 
underpinning output-mix decision-making.10 Usually, the starting point of the output 
optimisation exercise consists of the standard analysis of costs versus revenues (C v R). 
The basic C v R analysis is based on a simple equation:
(USP * q) - (UVC * q) - FC = OP
Where USP stands for the per unit selling price, UVC refers to unit variable cost, q is 
the quantity produced, FC stands for fixed costs, and OP indicates total operating 
profits. From the equation shown above, a simple manipulation produces:
(USP - UVC)q = FC + OP
The term (USP - UVC) is the contribution margin (CM). The equation, therefore, can 
be also rewritten as follows:
CMq = FC + OP
Consistently, by setting OP = 0 the equation enables managers to work out the 
minimum amount of output required to cover fixed costs, namely the break-even 
number of units:
q = FC/UCM
The simplest way to run a C v R analysis is by a graphic representation (figure 6.2), 
where profits are zero at the point in which revenues cross costs (the break-even point).
10 See: C. Homgren, A. Bhimani, G. Foster, S. Datar, Management and Cost Accounting, (1999), pp. 
234-414.
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Figure 6.2: Break-even point: The graphic representation
Operating
profits
..Operating losses
Break - even
Units produced and sold
The larger the MC the more the break-even point shifts to the left. Beyond the break­
even point, the firms make profits, and the larger the sales, the higher the profits.11 This 
analysis gives managers the opportunity to work out the quantity to be produced in order 
to reach the desired OP according to market prices, and, if demand is price elastic, the 
selling price that optimises q and maximises OP. This is equal to setting the target 
operating profits TOP. Once TOP has been set, the corresponding target number of units 
to be sold (TQ) is worked out as follows:
TQ = (FC + TOP)/UCM
When TQ refers to a mix of different products and UCM is averaged for the different 
products, the above equation implies that holding (FC + TOP) constant, the more the 
output mix shifts towards the unit with higher UCM, the more the break-even point 
shifts towards the left end of the graph and, therefore, the smaller the number of units 
that has to be sold in order to reach the target operating profit. The more the output mix 
shifts towards the units with larger contribution margins, the larger the operating profits. 
This rule is not universal. In fact, manufacturers could face constraints such as capacity, 
preventing them from shifting towards the units with higher contribution margins. In
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this, the output-mix optimisation exercise would consist o f maximising the contribution 
margin in the face of constraints.
The assumption underpinning the expectation that Fiat would shift upmarket is that 
in general, upmarket units generate larger contribution margins as compared with lower- 
market units. This assumption is based on the fact that in the upmarket segments total 
demand tends to be income elastic rather than price elastic, which, in theory, leaves 
manufacturers with more room for setting prices to the desired contribution margin. 
Here, total demand means the demand for cars in a specific segment of the upper range, 
as opposed to the demand for a specific model in that segment. Critically, though, 
income elasticity of demand does not mean that in the upper segments of the market 
price competition does not take place between specific models competing in that 
segment. In fact, the most efficient manufacturer is still able to set price/quality 
standards that maximise TQ according to its own production function. If competitors are 
unable to follow, they will lose market shares without being able to maximise TQ.
This points lead directly to the discussion of barriers to segment entry and output-mix 
decision-making. The two most obvious barriers for a manufacturer specialised in a 
given segment of the demand spectrum, wishing to shift up- or downmarket, are the 
demand and supply structure, and specialisation and path dependency. The demand and 
supply structure is probably the most important constraint to shifting upmarket within 
mature oligopolies. For a given manufacturer specialised in downmarket products, it 
might be extremely risky to shift upmarket and compete for market shares with segment 
leaders. In order to erode the shares of the incumbent competitors, the newcomer in the 
upmarket segment should implement an aggressive policy of product renewal. However, 
if incumbents react by renewing their own products, market shares are likely to shift 
back to the initial position, because of the brand reputation effect. The shifting back of 
market shares to the initial levels would minimise the return of the huge investments in 
research and development made by the newcomer.
This is where specialisation and path dependency play a crucial role. Critically, 
research and development are likely to prove comparatively less expensive for the 
incumbent than for the newcomer, as the latter will be on the steep end of the learning 
curve. Furthermore, complexity costs are likely to penalise the newcomer more than the
11 Figure 6.2 simplifies the issue by assuming a linear costs function.
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incumbent player. Complexity costs are generated by the complexity in design and 
manufacturing involved in the quality-oriented production process or by quality-oriented 
component purchasing. Considering that in car manufacturing components represent 
about 60% of the value of the finished product, complexity costs associated with 
designing, manufacturing and purchasing upmarket components substantially affect 
variable costs and, ultimately output prices. The comparative advantage of the 
incumbent over the newcomer lies in the ability to control complexity costs more 
efficiently. This ability refers not only to the final assembler, but also to the chain of its 
suppliers. Ultimately, the specialisation of manufacturers and their component suppliers 
represents a constraint to output-mix shifts down- or upmarket.
A manufacturer specialised in downmarket segments, which tries to adjust the mix 
upmarket, might not maximise UCM if, in order to expand market shares, USP has to be 
set at too low a level as compared with UVC. Consequently, the shift upmarket would 
have a detrimental effect on TOP, particularly if  the increase in the upmarket units 
absorbs capacity that could be allocated to the expansion of output in the lower 
segments. If an increase in production of upmarket units leads to decreasing production 
of downmarket ones, the improvement of CM in the former might be negatively offset 
by the deterioration of CM in the latter, with no benefit for total operating profits. This 
is particularly true for those processes in which economies of scale matter, so that the 
per unit cost of components decreases along with increases in output. In this case, as 
already mentioned, managers will maximise the contribution margin in the face of 
capacity constraints.
Those observers who expected Fiat to shift upmarket at the beginning of the 1980s 
did not consider the various constraints Fiat might have faced, had the company 
implemented such a shift. However, it is interesting to note that the expectation reflected 
not only the opinion of observers in the academic world, but also the business view of 
some managers within Fiat. As already mentioned in chapter 3, during the 1970s, 
managers like Rossignolo and Mosconi had tried to promote a shift in the managerial 
culture of the company from a process- to a market-oriented business approach. One of 
the strategies reflecting such a cultural change was the shift upmarket. Nonetheless, 
when Fiat Auto was established in 1979, Ghidella was appointed chairman of the new 
company. He was a production engineer and pursued technical synergy between Fiat and
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Lancia, as opposed to the brand differentiation proposed by Rossignolo. Furthermore, 
Gidella favoured the product renewal of the bottom range over that of the upper range. 
Behind the difference in strategic thought between Rossignolo and Ghidella, there was a 
different consideration of constraints to shifting upmarket and their expected impact on 
TOP. This point will be analysed in more depth in other paragraphs of this chapter. At 
this stage, the question to be addressed is why during the 1970s did Fiat shift upmarket, 
as suggested by Rossignolo. After all, in the view of many Fiat managers, the 
comparative advantage of German and French producers in the upper-market segments 
might have already been seen as a constraint to shifting upmarket in the 1970s.
The answer to this question lies in the relationship between the contribution margin 
and the regime of competition. Recalling that UCM=USP-UVC, the manufacturer 
specialised in upmarket units will have lower UVC. This means that either it will set a 
lower USP as compared to the manufacturer specialised in lower segments of demand, 
or will offer better quality for the same price, or even much better quality for a 
reasonably higher price. However, if for whatever reason price competition is inhibited, 
the price level might be so high as to maximise the CM of the non-specialised 
manufacturer, in the face of a higher level of UVC relative to the specialised 
manufacturer. In other words, collusion is likely to remove, at least in the short term, the 
path dependency constraint to shifting upmarket. The next paragraphs address the 
regime of competition during the 1970s and investigate the relationship between the 
competition regime and output-mix decision-making. Then, based on primary 
qualitative sources, the chapter will move on to analyse the strategic thought 
underpinning output-mix decision-making at Fiat during the 1960s and 1970s.
The historical background: Infra-EC tariff abolition and collusive behaviours in 
the 1970s
By 1968, tariffs among EC countries had already been abolished for a wide range of 
products including cars. This resulted in an adjustment in the market shares of each 
producer in each of the EC countries. However, price competition played a marginal 
role in the adjustment, as non-price competition was much more effective and implicit
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collusion was in place.12 Implicit collusion of car manufacturers during the 1970s was 
investigated by Silva Grillo and Prati in early 1982.13 The authors showed that between 
1970 and 1980 the price of output in Italy increased much faster than the price of 
inputs.14 The results of this analysis have been reported in table 6.1.
Table 6.1: O utput and inputs price indexes and relative price coefficient Italian 
market, 1965-1979 ___________________________________ __________________
Years O utput price index Inputs price index Relative price 
coefficient
(a) (b) n ii
1965 94.4 87 0.92
19 66 94.6 87.3 0.92
1967 94.6 88.4 0.93
1968 94.5 90.9 0.96
1969 94.5 93.7 0.99
1970 100 100 1.00
1971 108.3 102.9 0.95
1972 116.6 105.9 0.91
1973 130.6 124.8 0.96
1974 166.5 166.5 1.00
1975 216.5 181.3 0.84
1976 274.1 216.3 0.79
1977 323.9 250.8 0.77
1978 376.1 279.8 0.74
1979 430.7 323.6 0.75
Source: Silva, Prati, Grillo, II mecato Italiano dell’Auto, p. 79.
The first column displays the index of the price of output (a), while the second 
column shows the index of the price of inputs (b). The third column reports the 
coefficient of the output relative price (C= b/a), which is the index of price of inputs 
divided by that of output. The base year is 1970. The relative price coefficient increases 
from 1965 to 1970 and then decreases for the entire decade with the exception of 1973
12 Non-price competition usually means product renewal and quality competition. However, it is better to 
distinguish between competition based on product renewal and quality competition, the former not 
necessarily being related to price since a new model could have the same quality and price as a preceding 
one and simply have a different style. However, the latter is related to price since quality is not an absolute 
concept but is relative to price. This implies that the most efficient manufacturer will increase quality 
faster than prices.
13 Silva, Prati, Grillo, II mercato Italiano dell’auto.
14 Ibid, p. 79.
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and 1974, when the Government introduced restrictive rules to contain price increases. 
Since a decrease in the coefficient of relative price indicates that the prices of output 
increase faster than those of inputs, the table shows that the total margin contribution of 
the Italian car industry increased from the 1970s onwards with the exception of 1973 
and 1974.15
Silva also showed that increases in the official prices of various manufacturers in 
Italy tended to move upward almost simultaneously, and that the same trend could be 
traced in the other EC countries.16 He estimated the output price function for Italian car 
industry, concluding that demand was not statistically significant as an explanatory 
variable of the price of output.17 Finally, he showed that the relative prices of cars 
increased faster in Italy than in the other countries,18 as shown by table 6.2.
15 Ibid, pp. 78-86.
16 Ibid, pp. 124-125.
17 Ibid, pp. 126-133.
18 Ibid, pp. 164-168.
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Table 6.2: Nominal price indexes and relative price coefficients, 1960-1978, 1970 
=100
France Germany Italy UK
Years V p.I Rp Vp.I Rp Vp.I Rp Vp.I Rp
1960 89 1.14 91.2 1.33
1961 89 1.11 84.4 1.20
1962 83 1.14 89 1.09 84.4 1.14 86 1.19
1963 84 1.09 90 1.07 88.3 1.11 84 1.14
1964 85 1.08 90 1.05 95.6 1.13 83 1.09
1965 86 1.06 92 1.03 91.8 1.04 84 1.05
1966 86 1.04 94 1.02 91.8 1.02 88 1.06
1967 86 1.01 95 1.01 91.8 1.01 89 1.05
1968 87 0.98 95 1.00 91.8 0.99 91 1.02
1969 94 0.99 98 1.01 93 1.97 98 1.04
1970 100 1.00 100 1.00 100 1.00 100 1.00
1971 108 1.03 107 1.02 107.5 1.02 110 1.01
1972 116 1.04 113 1.02 116.6 1.05 117 1.00
1973 122 1.02 118 1.00 128 1.05 123 0.96
1974 136 0.99 125 0.99 159.6 1.09 141 0.95
1975 168 1.10 136 1.01 192.2 1.12 189 1.02
1976 190 1.14 148 1.06 254 1.27 218 1.02
1977 204 1.11 151 1.04 306.6 1.30 263 1.07
1978 225 1.13 156 1.05 349.5 1.32
Source: Silva, Prati, Grillo, II mercato Italiano dell’auto, p. 165. Vp. I = vehicle price index. Rp = 
relative price coefficient = Vp. I/cost-of-living index
Here, relative price means the price of cars relative to the cost of living. It is 
represented by the coefficient C, which is obtained by dividing the output price index (a) 
by the cost-of-living index (b). The bigger the value of C, the higher the price of cars 
relative to the cost of living.
The scenario described by Silva indicates collusive behaviours. The author assumes 
that in each country pricing was regulated by the national champion playing the role of 
price setter. Although the author does not prove it, the assumption seems more than 
reasonable.
Silva does not imply that collusion was based on formal agreement among car 
manufacturers. On the contrary, he maintains that car manufacturers had no incentive to 
restore price competition, because collusion enabled them to defend and in some cases
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expand total contribution margins in the face of increasing production costs.19 
Moreover, there was no incentive to restore price competition, due to the instability of 
exchange rates, which, in a context of transparent oligopolistic competition, would have 
penalised manufacturers in those countries where the exchange rates favoured imports 
rather than exports.20 Finally, the foreign distribution network for each car manufacturer 
was not sufficiently developed to sustain a strategy of price-driven expansion of market 
share outside the domestic market. In any case, according to Silva, manufacturers were 
keen to restore price competition as soon as input prices and exchange rates stabilised, 
so that in 1980 there was already evidence of a tendency towards price competition, as 
indicated by the behaviour of prices in that year.21
The point made in this chapter is that output-mix decision-making at Fiat was 
influenced by the regime of competition, because collusion minimises the comparative 
cost advantage of manufacturers specialised in the upmarket segments, allowing non­
specialised manufacturers such as Fiat to enter the upmarket sector. In this respect, the 
question whether or not collusion was based on an opportunistic and implicit response 
to a widely recognised economic contingency, as opposed to formal agreement between 
manufacturers is irrelevant. Much more relevant, instead, is the question whether or not 
Fiat was the price setter, and whether or not management was confident that competitors 
would follow upwards each time Fiat adjusted prices. In fact, to suggest convincingly 
that the regime of competition influenced Fiat’s shift upmarket in the 1970s it is not 
sufficient to rely, as Silva did, on the assumption that Fiat was the price setter. On the 
contrary, it is necessary to show that managers were confident they could set prices and 
predict pricing behaviour. Both points will be proved in the second section of the 
chapter through the analysis of internal Fiat documents. At this stage, it is important to 
investigate further the relationship between the regime of competition and the output 
mix. The following paragraphs investigate this relationship in a context of profound 
market change. This was the shift from a situation in which individual European 
markets were protected to a situation in which tariffs had been abolished, and a new 
competitive framework took place. Under the umbrella of tariff protection, each 
individual market had developed its own market structure. The output-mix decision­
19 Ibid., p. 172.
20 Ibid., p. 176.
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making dilemma for Fiat was determined by the fact that demand in Italy started to 
develop upmarket at the same time when tariffs started to be reduced. This created a 
difference in opinions between those managers that thought a shift upmarket was the 
way forward, and those who thought that the long-term survival of Fiat would depend 
on the company’s ability to outperform competitors in the segment in which Fiat was 
more specialised.
Price leadership in price competition versus price leadership in non-price 
competition
The model of oligopolistic competition proposed by Sylos-Labini assumes that
00competitors try to maximise market shares. In this case, the competitive element is the 
selling price, while the contribution margin is maximised by cutting costs. The target 
market share represents the independent variable, per unit price is the dependent 
variable, while technology and specialisation are the endogenous elements enabling the 
firm to control costs and maximise the unit contribution margins. In accordance with 
this model, the most cost efficient manufacturer is the price leader. By definition, price 
competition for market shares takes place within transparent oligopolistic competition.
Price competition, as described by Sylos-Labini, inspired the Fiat strategy of growth 
before and after the Second World War, where growth depended on the ability to 
capture market shares in the protected domestic market at the expense of other domestic 
competitors. Certainly, price competition inspired a generation of technical managers 
and engineers at Fiat who, as mentioned in chapter 2, during the post-war period had 
developed a Fordist production ethos based on cost containment through 
process/product complexity containment.
Sylos-Labini’s model of competition is consistent with the Linder23 model of 
specialisation that postulates that any car manufacturer specialises in the strategic 
segments of the domestic market, and then exports the same product abroad, exploiting 
cost advantages from specialisation and product diversity. “Imports-driven product 
diversity” introduces elements of non-price competition, where buyers would be keen to
21 Ibid., p. 176.
22 Modigliani refers to this assumption as the postulate of Sylos-Labini, see, F. Modigliani, ‘New 
Developments on Oligopoly Front’, Journal o f Political Economy, N. 3, June, (1958), pp. 215-232.
23 See S. Linder, An essay on Trade and Transformation (New York, 1961).
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spend more money to buy a product different from that of the domestic supplier. 
Therefore, as demand diversifies, so does supply. This is known as the Barker effect,24 
where costs driven by excessive specialisation exceed those caused by diversification. 
Costs of specialisation result from the mismatch between supply and demand, while 
those caused by diversification are driven by process complexity. Once all suppliers 
have diversified their output mix, price competition within each segment of demand 
regains its significance while manufacturers compete for price leadership in each 
segment of demand. This is known as the Linder-Barker effect, due to which the most 
competitive factor is the ability of manufacturers to control costs driven by process 
complexity. This ability is commonly known as flexibility. The “Linder phase” of 
industry growth is process-oriented, whereas the “Linder-Barker” phase is market- 
oriented.
The transition from the Barker to the Linder-Barker competition framework might be 
postponed if  manufacturers collude on prices, so that the incentive to search for cost 
efficiency in any segment of the market is reduced. As already pointed out, when 
collusive behaviours take place, price leadership no longer reflects cost efficiency so 
closely, because in any national market the largest manufacturer can increase prices to a 
given extent, knowing that all the others would follow. This allows the price leader to 
“endogenise” prices. If this is the case, the target unit contribution margin becomes the 
independent variable, and market shares and prices the dependent ones. Under collusion, 
the ability of a manufacturer to control costs is still an important factor because the 
larger the cost efficiency, the larger the possibility of maximising contribution margins. 
Yet, the price leader can be slightly less efficient than its nearest competitors in some 
segments of the product range and still optimise the contribution margin. If market 
shares are stable, the advantage for the more cost-efficient competitor is relatively small 
and collusion holds. On the other hand, if market shares are destabilised by the pressure 
of quality or product differentiation and the price leader loses market shares, the 
advantage for the most cost-efficient manufacturer is enormous since it enjoys lower 
costs and the highest prices. Moreover, market shares of the price leader can be eroded 
by informal price competition through discounts or the over-evaluation of replaced
24 See: T. Barker, ‘International Trade and Economic Growth: An Alternative to the Neoclassical 
Approach’, Cambridge Journal o f Economics, N. 1 (1977), pp. 153-172.
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vehicles. If the loss of market shares is so marked that contribution margins of the price 
leader are eroded while prices cannot be increased further, collusion cannot hold for 
long. In order to survive, the price leader must regain cost efficiency and product 
competitiveness.
As already pointed out, if management believes that competitors will collude, this 
might also have an implication on product-mix decision-making. Product-mix decision­
making is essentially the problem of maximising the contribution margin in the face of 
many constraints, such as cost and availability of labour skills, cost and availability of 
components, technical specialisation etc. In the upper segments of the market, demand 
tends to be income rather than price elastic, so that contribution margins tend to be 
larger than that the contribution in the lower segments of the market. Nonetheless, the 
non-specialised producer might not be able to maximise CM at the price levels set by 
the manufacturer specialised in upmarket units. If this is the case, the shift upmarket is 
not advisable for the non-specialised manufacturers. In fact, the more the shift from the 
bottom end to the top end of the market the more UVC increases along with USP. 
Therefore, for the manufacturer having the comparative advantage in the lower segment 
of the market, the shift upmarket would only lead to total costs increasing faster than 
total revenues.
However, if collusion allows the non-specialised manufacturer to endogenise selling 
prices, price leadership will no longer reflect cost efficiency. The incentive for the price 
leader to shift towards segments in which demand is income elastic rather than price 
elastic, therefore, remains substantial because price levels would maximise CM.
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Section two 
Output-mix decision-making in the 1960s
From the inter-war period to the mid-1960s, tariffs had been protecting domestic 
demand from foreign competitors, but among Italian players, Fiat was aggressively price 
competitive. The company had been able to exploit cost advantages to dominate the 
lower segments of the domestic market and become the foremost Italian producer. This 
section of the chapter addresses the origin of the routine linking output-mix decision­
making to the regime of competition. In the late 1960s, with the upper end of the market 
starting to grow, and with the capacity of Italian upmarket producers still relatively 
small, the Fiat management saw the opportunity to expand output upmarket. It will be 
shown that assumption underpinning the shift upmarket, though, was that Fiat could 
mark up prices according to its cost structure. Such an assumption implies tariff 
protection or collusive price leadership. Moreover, it will be shown that during the 
1970s, the adjustment of the Fiat output structure upmarket was sustained by a regime of 
implicit collusion. The next chapter of the thesis will show that when in the early 1980s, 
Fiat shifted back downmarket, price competition had been restored.
Giacosa versus Minola: Product-mix decision-making at Fiat in the 1960s
As already stated, Fiat has an established reputation as a small car producer, even 
though the firm has always produced a wide range of cars from the smallest utilitarian 
models such as the Topolino (1936-55), the 500 (1957-75), the 126 (1972-90) and the 
Uno (1982-93) to luxury and sports cars such as the 2300 S (1963-67) and the 130 
(1969-77), or saloons such as the 125 (1967-72) and the Croma (1985-95). The 
reputation of Fiat as a manufacturer of small cars depends mainly on the fact that in the 
inter-war period, domestic demand was almost satisfied by models under 1100 cc., such 
as the 508, the 509, the 1100 and, after 1936, the Topolino. In the immediate post-war 
period, utilitarian cars were still the most popular but the size of the market for cars was 
small in absolute terms, while demand for personal transport was mainly satisfied by
9 Ascooters. After 1955, Fiat strategy aimed to expand domestic demand, by supplying 
households with small and cheap cars as a substitute for scooters. The 600 was launched
25 Lancia and Alfa Romeo.
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in 1955 and the New 500 in 1957. The overwhelming popularity of those models made 
them the symbol of Fiat production as well as the symbol of the Italian “economic 
miracle”. Fiat deployed the same strategy in Spain, where it started the production of the 
600 through its subsidiary SEAT, in 1962.
The ratification of the Treaty of Rome in 1958, which would lead to the abolition of 
tariffs for cars by 1970, introduced an element of uncertainty for car manufacturers 
specialised in the bottom end of the market. Increasing imports had to be compensated 
by exports. However, cars such as the 500 and 600 were not suitable for countries such 
as Germany or France, in which consumers were already used to higher standards of 
quality and different technical specifications, such as size and cubic capacity. Moreover, 
while Fiat could reasonably expect to keep its dominant position in the domestic lower 
end of the market, the management had the problem of defending the upper end of the 
domestic demand. Fiat, in fact, was producing upper-segment units, but given the scale 
of production, it was not price competitive as compared with German manufacturers 
and, therefore, more sensitive to the removal of tariffs.
In 1967, the output structure of the firm was still dominated by cars below 1000 cc. 
However, as already shown by figure 6.1, since the second half of the 1960s, Fiat 
management, and in particularly the director of the car division Antonio Minola, had 
been pushing for a shift of the output structure in favour of higher segments. Moreover, 
Gaudenzio Bono, the General Director of Fiat, had started to pay more attention to the 
renewal of top-range models. On the other hand, Dante Giacosa, the influential director 
of the technical department who had designed all Fiat cars since 1930, did not welcome 
the new strategic tendency. Giacosa’s dislike for upper-segment cars was well known to 
the top management. For this reason, in 1966, Bono did not consult Giacosa about the 
decision to commission a viability study for a car to compete with Mercedes in segment 
F (over 2300 cc.).27 Giacosa was put in charge of the project only once Bono had 
already decided the size of the car and the quantity to be produced. On the other hand, 
Giacosa tried to persuade top management to postpone the project once he was in
26 Volpato, II caso Fiat, p. 77.
27 It was not the first time that Giacosa was excluded from the basic decision-making of a luxury car 
project. It had already happened in 1958, when Valletta and Bono decided to start the viability study for a 
luxury car over 4000 cc. The programme was aborted after a few years. See Giacosa, Progetti alia Fiat, p. 
279.
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charge. Indeed, he wanted to focus on the development of new models competing in 
segments A, B, and C. Eventually, though, the new Fiat competing in segment E, the 
130, was presented in 1969 along with the Fiat 128 and Autobianchi 111 (segment C). 
The only model launched in segment B was the Autobianchi 112 (segment B). Giacosa 
retired in 1970. As already mentioned, the number of upmarket models presented 
between 1970 and 1974 outweighed those in the bottom range.
Giacosa’s opposition to the views of Bono and Minola was based on a pattern of 
interrelated arguments describing the typical lock-in imposed by path dependency. The 
first argument referred to learning costs. According to Giacosa, Fiat did not possess 
labour skills to reach a sufficient standard of quality, particularly in the final assembly, 
to be able to compete in the higher segments of the market.29 An extensive labour 
training program was necessary. There was a technical management problem too. 
According to Giacosa, the technical level of production engineers and the quality 
standard of the welding and painting shops had plenty of room for improvement. The 
second argument was related to the component supply chain, which had to be totally 
restructured if  Fiat wanted to improve the quality of components up to the level of 
competitors such as Citroen, Peugeot, Opel and Ford, not to mention Mercedes and 
BMW. Finally, Giacosa claimed that cars above 1500 cc. involved higher costs per unit 
since each unit required the processing of a larger amount of raw material, especially 
steel, the cost of which was comparatively higher than that of other inputs.
The latter argument reflected the technical culture of Fiat engineers at the time, 
according to which the most effective way to control costs consisted of limiting the use 
of steel. This resulted in a tendency to contain the weight of cars, and therefore their 
size. This routine explains why production was usually measured in both weight and 
units. This was a typical routine of manufacturing industry across Europe and in the US 
during the inter-war period, and reflected the high cost of non-labour input such as steel. 
In the post-war period, steel remained the most expensive input relative to labour, 
particularly in Europe, so that many Fiat designers kept considering the manufacturing 
of lighter units as the best way to ensure cost control. Indeed, Giacosa was convinced
28 Ibid., pp. 279-282.
29 Ibid.
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that the increase in production of upmarket, and heavier, units would have expanded 
total costs. This, combined with the lower quality of the Fiat upmarket units relative to 
German competitors, would have prevented Fiat from profiting from moving upmarket 
because the adjustment could be achieved only by setting prices at too low a level given 
Fiat's cost structure in the upper segment. He was convinced that after the abolition of 
tariffs, only those manufacturers able to transfer the savings deriving from more 
efficient production process and supply chain to better product quality would survive. 
Given the specialisation of Fiat, it would be able to realise this transfer only by 
producing small and medium cars. Throughout his career, Giacosa remained convinced 
that as far as output structure was concerned, the best move for Fiat was to stay where it 
was.
As already mentioned in chapter 3, Valletta and his managerial team had set up a
process-oriented structure, in which cost control was exercised by production engineers
These were able to superimpose process-oriented criteria on designers and marketing
staff. It is not surprising that Giacosa remained loyal to the process-oriented culture. He
had been developing his career in a managerial context in which the skills of designers
1 1
were evaluated on the basis of the ability to control complexity. Now, Giacosa was not 
prepared for a shift in the criteria by which his own designing skills were evaluated. 
Moreover, by containing complexity, Fiat had been able to be price competitive in 
respect to domestic competitors and to become the foremost Italian car producer. 
Giacosa was obviously proud of the results achieved at the time and sceptical about any 
strategic change.
Given the production-oriented culture of the Fiat management, it seems surprising 
that in 1963 Minola had been appointed Director of the Vehicle Division from the 
Marketing Division. Moreover, the U-turn of Bono, who shifted attention from mass- 
production models to the 130 model, seems even more surprising. At first glance, the 
appointment of Minola and the new attitude of Bono seem to indicate a marked change 
of direction toward a more market-oriented approach to the business. Yet, as will be 
shown in the next paragraphs of the chapter, Bono's U-turn and Minola's marketing- 
oriented approach were more apparent than real. It will be shown that the way Minola
31 Ibid.
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approached output-mix optimisation was far from a genuine marketing-oriented 
competitive approach. It was still based on the old routines traditionally used by Fiat 
management for pricing decision-making and profitability calculations and, overall, 
reflected the old pattern of Fiat managerial culture. This was the reason why Bono 
supported the views of Minola. The critical point outlined in the next section is that 
those routines were all based on the assumption that Fiat could endogenise price setting.
New ideas and old routines: The false shift towards market-oriented competition
The fact that Minola's output-mix strategy was based on the assumption that Fiat 
could set prices according to its endogenous cost structure emerges clearly from the 
analysis of primary sources such as the report of the board meeting report of January 30,
1967. Gianni Agnelli had been Chairman for a year and management had been 
encouraged to put even more emphasis on marketing issues. In the first meeting of 1967, 
Minola held the view that to move upmarket was not only necessary in order to boost 
exports, but was also beneficial for the overall performance of the firm. In particular, 
Minola constructed a double argument. Firstly, he pointed out that cars competing in the 
middle and upper segments of the market involved higher per unit revenues from sales, 
so that it was possible to increase total revenues from sales by changing output structure 
rather than by increasing output size. Secondly, he stressed that to change output 
structure rather than output size was the more profitable way to optimise output. While 
the first part of the argument is self-evident, the second part requires further 
investigation and explanations. To this end, it is useful to follow Minola’s reasoning 
from the report of that meeting:
“The number o f units produced is a good indicator of the business trend. However, tonnage is a much 
better indicator. Well, with 834,546 tons, production in 1966 exceeded that o f 1965, which reached 
691,353 tons, by about 21%. In terms of units, as already said [in the previous paragraph], the increment 
was about 16%. The larger increment of production in terms o f tonnage, compared with that in units, has 
been brought about by the production of vehicles of larger size, such as the 124 and commercial vehicles.
Concurrently [as a result], average per unit revenues from sales have increased as well: in 1966 in 
Italy, [they have increased] from ITL 691,185 in 1965 to ITL 702,800 in 1966, and abroad [they have 
increased] from ITL 691,983 in 1965, to ITL 705,729 in 1966.
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Also, revenues per kilo have not changed in Italy [remaining] at the level o f ITL 950 per kilo, in spite 
of the great development [the commercial success] of the 500, which negatively affects the average, and 
have slight increased abroad, from ITL 837 per kilo in 1965 to ITL 859 per kilo in 1966.
The task for the Fiat commercial network is clear. We do not have to feel satisfied (sic) only by the
increase in the quantity of sales but we have to increase the tone [quality] of them, and [we have to
increase] the per unit revenues from sales and, therefore, the profitability of sales. So far, our balance
32sheets [revenues from sales] have been too much affected by the sales of the 500.”
As already said, Minola developed a double argument. In his first paragraph, he 
explains that production in terms of weight had grown by a larger proportion than 
production in units, which indicated that sales of larger-sized cars had increased. In the 
second paragraph, he says that per unit revenues from sales had increased, following the 
increase in the production of larger vehicles. Here, the key word is parallelamente, 
which literally means “in a parallel way” and has to be translated as “concurrently” or 
“at the same time”. However, the Italian word not only implies a correlation between 
two phenomena, such as the parallel increase of two elements, but it implies also a 
cause/effect relationship, which Minola wanted to stress. Otherwise, he would have used 
the Italian word incidentalmente, which implies that two phenomena with the same 
features occasionally take place at the same time, though they are independent of each 
other.
In the third paragraph, Minola goes further by showing that in the European market, 
to which upper segment cars were mainly exported, not only had per unit average 
revenues increased, but also revenues per kilo. On the contrary, in the domestic market, 
which was still dominated by the 500, revenues per kilo did not increase. They did not 
decrease either, in spite of the dominance of the 500. For Minola, this was evidence that 
the global increase in the sales of larger vehicle still had a positive effect in the Italian 
market, but not to the extent to increase revenues per kilo as was the case with sales 
abroad.
Linguistically, this is the most ambiguous part of the Minola speech. Ambiguity 
derives from the fact that even negative news was never presented to the Board of
32 Archivio Storico Fiat, Administration Board Meeting Report, January 1967, Book 37, p. 155.
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Directors in a negative form.33 The true meaning of the passage is that in Italy revenue 
per kilo was stagnating due to the dominance of the 500, which was bad news. On the 
other hand, revenues per kilo had increased abroad, to which mainly medium and upper- 
segment cars were exported. This was good news, which also indicated the output 
strategy to be pursued, namely to increase production of middle- and upper-segment 
cars. However, although results achieved so far were indicating the path to be followed, 
they were not enough, since only a “slight increase” in revenues per kilo had been 
experienced by sales abroad.
This introduced the second Minolta argument: in order to increase revenues from 
sales, it was more profitable to keep total output constant, repositioning output structure 
in favour of larger cars, rather than to expand output without changing its structure. In 
the Minola view, Fiat had to push harder in that direction. This is the sense of the last 
paragraph. It contains the suggestion to be followed in the future: to reduce the impact 
of segment A (the 500) on total sales. The aim of this move was to establish in the 
domestic market the same positive trend of revenue per kilo already experienced in the 
EC market and, possibly, to improve it. More precisely, in the last paragraph, Minola 
says that
“we have to increase the per unit revenues from sales and, therefore, the profitability of sales”.
The consecutive conjunction “therefore” (e dunque in the Italian text) is the key word 
of the paragraph, because it tells us that for Minola, higher per unit revenues from the 
sale of larger vehicles cause profits to rise. It is critical to note that he stated the concept 
after having analysed revenues per kilo and having said that they increase with the share 
of large vehicles in total sales (as in the case of sales abroad). In addition, it is important 
to underline the emphasis Minola put on the necessity to reduce sales of the 500, which 
prevented revenues per kilo from expanding in the Italian market.
The general sense of the whole speech is that it is more profitable to sell large rather 
than small cars, because they provide not only larger revenues but also larger profits, 
and they do it because they provide larger revenues per kilo. In other words, in 
Minolta’s view, when revenues per unit increase with revenues per kilo, per unit profits
33 This was a well-established routine of Fiat management and it is extremely important to be aware of it 
in order to interpret the reports correctly.
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rise as well. Thus, Minola uses revenues per kilo as an indicator of per unit profit. The 
next sections explain why the methodology used by Minola was deeply inaccurate. 
Moreover, they explain why none of the other members of the Board argued with 
Minola's conclusions, on the grounds that the methodology was inaccurate.
Weight, pricing and competition
As is clear from the reports of the Board of Directors, as well as from other sources,34 
until the late 1960s, revenues from sales of many different products including spare 
parts and even raw steel were compared on the base of revenues per kilo within a well- 
established routine. For example, agricultural machinery was compared to road vehicles, 
including both cars and lorries. Minola applied the same methodology within the road 
vehicle sector. Actually, his findings that an increment of the weight of cars led to an 
increment of revenues per kilo was consistent with the result of many previous 
comparative analyses of revenues per kilo from sales of road vehicles and agricultural 
machinery. Those analyses showed that higher revenues per kilo derived from 
agricultural machinery, the average per unit weight of which was higher than that of 
road vehicles, be they cars or commercial. However, the fact that revenues per kilo 
increased with the weight of vehicles reflected the pricing routine. When the decision to 
produce a new vehicle was taken, the Chairman and the General Director decided the 
selling price, usually set at a slightly higher level than the price of the vehicle to be 
replaced. Then, designers had to choose a design of an appropriate weight in order to 
meet the target revenue per kilo. Therefore, revenues per kilo reflected the weight of the 
car and the pricing mark up.
As already said, Minola claimed that to raise revenues per kilo was important in 
order to achieve a rise in profitability. In so doing, Minola assumed a constant 
relationship between costs and weight. This implied that, for Minola, weight could be 
used as a proxy for costs. However, since weight captures only those costs driven by the 
quantity of raw material input, but does not capture the cost driven by the complexity of 
design and manufacturing, nor labour costs, the routine of using revenues per kilo as a
34.In particular see: Archivio Storico Fiat, Administration Board Meeting Report, March 1958, Book 26, 
p. 105.
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proxy for per unit profits is deeply incorrect. It is important to emphasise that both 
Giacosa and Minola shared the same idea that weight was a proxy for cost. However, 
there was a big difference between the two managers. Giacosa thought that weight could 
be used as a proxy for costs if the same manufacturer had to choose between two 
different design options for the same product. Other things equal, the design leading to 
savings in raw material would have led to savings in material costs. For example, in the 
case of the Fiat 500 and the Fiat 600, Giacosa opted for a design involving rear engine 
and rear wheel drive, instead of front engine and rear wheel drive, because the former 
was simpler and led to a substantial reduction in the weight of mechanical 
components. On the other hand, without a ceteris paribus situation, weight could not 
be used for decision-making on cost-cutting, let alone on marketing strategy involving 
cost comparisons with competitors. This is precisely because weight does not capture 
entirely complexity costs.
Minola, on the other hand, used weight as a proxy for costs to justify the shift 
upmarket. As already said, he posed the argument that larger cars had larger revenues 
per kilo, which, in his view, indicated a better per unit revenue to costs ratio. However, 
given that weight as a proxy for costs could not be used to compare costs between 
different types of car and, overall, to compare costs between different manufacturers, 
Minola was amazingly using a methodology that could only be meaningful in the 
absence of competition.
In this light it is worth asking whether the use of that measure reflected the difficulty 
Fiat management had in monitoring costs, or the simple fact that Minola did not share 
Giacosa’s concern with controlling costs. If so, it is worth asking whether Minola was 
less concerned with controlling costs than Giacosa simply because he was confident that 
after 1968, when tariffs were expected to be abolished, Fiat would have retained price 
leadership anyway, even in those segments in which the company had no comparative 
advantage. Obviously, this second option would occur either if tariff protection and 
quotas were kept, or collusive behaviours were put in place. In fact, within a domestic 
market protected either by tariffs or collusive agreement, it is possible to some extent to 
mark up the price according to the desired margin of contribution, which makes it
35 Giacosa, Progetti alia Fiat, p. 223.
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relatively less urgent to control costs. Therefore, the methodology used by Minola and 
accepted by Valletta might well reflect the fact that the manager was confident that Fiat 
would have been able to “endogenise” selling prices even after the removal of tariffs in
1968. In order to investigate this point, the next paragraphs address first the question 
whether Minola had the cost information to approach output-mix decision-making in a 
more methodologically correct way, and then will analyse the views of Valletta and his 
staff on the removal of tariffs.
Cost monitoring at Fiat during the 1960s
This section answers the question whether Minola used revenues per kilo as indicator 
of profitability simply because it was not possible to monitor costs. After a careful 
exploration of the Fiat Archives, and all the available secondary sources, it has been 
possible to trace the process of decision-making related to design, production and costs 
feedback for a new model. This is represented by chart 6.1. The Executive Committee 
consisted of the General Director of Fiat, Gaudenzio Bono, and the President and 
Chairman Valletta (Gianni Agnelli after 1966). They took all the relevant decisions 
concerning new models to be produced, their size, quantity and overall selling prices. At 
that point, the Technical Director Dante Giacosa and his staff designed the vehicle, 
including all non-electrical components of the engine, and the body and interior (seats, 
dashboard etc.), after having decided the shape of the body. For every component, a 
number of drawings - the so-called “technical specification sheets” (hereafter TSS) were 
made - each specifying dimension, material and weight. The drawings were then sent to 
the Time and Methods Department. At this level, timing and methods of production 
were established for each component, as well as the timing process for the entire car 
assembly, the typology of tools to be used at each stage of the process for each 
component, the precise timing and the number of workers to be employed in each 
sequence. The Time and Methods Department was the only department entitled to make 
changes in methods, tools, material, the number of workers, sequences, etc. It was also 
responsible for the monitoring of any stage of the process in order to certify that each 
operation was consistent with the efficiency standards set according to the Bodeaux 
System.
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Chart 6.1: Product renewal and development. The process of decision-making
Formal feed­
back
Semi-formal
feed-back
Production Production
Labour Dept. 
(Ufficio Lavoro)
Raw Material Dept. 
(Ufficio Materiali Diretti)
Production Management Dept. 
(Divisione Servizi di 
Produzione)
Times and Methods Dept. 
(Ufficio Tempi e Metodi)
Design Dept. 
(Ufficio Technico)
Executive Commette 
(Comitato Esecutivo)
Source: Based on information from various sources. Archivio Storico Fiat, Crescimone File 
(Fondo Crescimone) files 55/7; Giacosa, Progetti alia Fiat, pp. 228, 264.
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The cost analysis was performed by Antonio Crescimone, the head of the Production 
Management Department, and his staff, according to the industrial engineering method. 
This was a method of estimating the cost function by analysing the relationship between 
input and output in physical terms and then transforming physical inputs and output into 
costs. The result is an estimated cost function relating total manufacturing costs to the 
cost-driven unit o f  output. TSS contained the relevant information on physical 
input/output, namely material and time/labour units needed for the production of each 
single component and to assemble them into a vehicle. Therefore, it was possible to 
forecast the precise cost of each type of vehicle and to confront forecasts with the actual 
data from the Raw Material and Labour departments. Because cost analysis included 
time and methods analysis, complexity was captured.
The feedback was given directly to Valletta and Bono, though it is not clear whether 
Minola had access to this information.37 Giacosa had a fairly precise idea of the material 
costs as his staff engineered every single component apart from electrical devices. 
Moreover, the design staff worked in conjunction with the Time and Methods office. 
That was because designers had to take into account not only the mechanical 
characteristics and performance of each component but also the segmentation and 
timing of the production process in order to minimise complexity and optimise cycle 
times. Therefore, Giacosa should have known at least the expected cost of each vehicle.
The Crescimone collection - the set of documents and studies produced by the 
Production Department - includes a number of files concerning the cost analysis of the 
production of a wide range of components as well as the cost analysis of some models 
produced by Fiat and by competitors. The collection includes files from 1950 to 1970. 
As far as Fiat models are concerned, the cost analyses of the 850 (segment A) and the
36 In theory, by using relevant information from the TSS it was possible to work out standard costs. 
However, this technique was introduced only in 1970. See Rossignolo in. P. Gennaro, G. Scifo, Parabole 
di imprese ed impreditori, Franco Angeli, Milano, pp. 79-87.
37 Secondo agnelli solo Valletta sapeva quanto costasse una 500.
38 It was an established practice to disassemble models made by competitors, redesign the TSS and project 
the manufacturing of that model assuming the deployment of Fiat technology. The process is known as 
reverse engineering. R.E. was implemented for a number of reasons, as to check whether or not it was 
more convenient to produce models of other manufacturers under licence rather than Fiat models. Overall, 
by using this system it was possible to compare the efficiency o f Fiat technology with that of other 
competitors.
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124 (segment C) for 1968 are available.39 These provide valuable information, although 
the Minola strategy of shifting upmarket had been formalised in the Board meeting of 
January 1967. In fact, both models were already in production in 1966. Moreover, the 
information provides an immediate test for the validity of Minola’s point of view. 
According to the Crescimone analysis, the total production costs of the 124 (segment C) 
were 27.2% higher than that of the 850 (segment A).40 However, the selling price of the 
124 was 35.5% higher than that of the 850, so that the company enjoyed an extra 8.3% 
profit for each 124 sold in comparison with the 850.41 This proves that Giacosa’s 
concern about the higher costs of manufacturing larger cars was consistent with the 
actual dynamic of Fiat costs, but also proves that, given current prices, larger cars were 
providing better margins, as Minola thought.
However, another Crescimone study, concerning the production costs of the Peugeot 
204, the closest competitor of the Fiat 124, shows that the manufacturing costs of the 
French car were lower by 6.3%, and that the cost saving was mainly due to better 
design, enabling Peugeot to cut lead time.42 This means that in the context of straight 
price-based competition, the per unit margin of profit of the 124 compared with that of 
the 850 would have been just 2.3% (the difference between 8.3% and 6.3%), which, 
considering the different scale of production and sales between the two models, would 
have reduced considerably the profitability of the 124. In addition, the study 
demonstrates that in perspective, Fiat should have caught up with the technology of 
foreign competitors more specialised in the manufacturing of medium and large cars. 
Thus, Giacosa’s concern with the higher costs of producing larger cars was more than 
justified, unless tariffs were kept or collusive agreements were put in place.
It is not clear if  Giacosa discussed the output-maximisation strategy directly with 
Minola. In his book, Giacosa quotes Minola only twice 43 In any case, information on
39 Reasonably, the same cost analysis was systematically made for all models. However, only the reports 
of some models have been stored in the archive.
40 Archivio Storico Fiat, Fondo Crescimone (Crscimone File), Production Services Department corda 
55/7.
41 Ibid.
42 The information on the Peugeot 204 costs, as well as the information of costs o f many other models, 
was obtained via reverse engineering, the process of analysing the technology of competitors by analysing 
their product.
43 In Giacosa’s book there are several indications that the relationship between designers and marketing 
staff was not based on mutual respect. For example, during the 1960s engineers at Fiat used to refer to
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costs was available to the Executive Committee, as well to the board. Why, therefore, at 
the January 1967 meeting, when Minola based his proposal for a shift upmarket 
argument on the analysis of revenues per kilo, did nobody point out the inconsistency of 
the methodology, or support Giacosa’s well-known opinion that Fiat would not acquire 
upmarket competitiveness in the short or medium term? Why did Bono, the most 
“process-oriented” manager in the Fiat structure, support Minola's view, instead of 
advising Agnelli44 that the methodology was not sufficiently robust to support the 
analysis of output-mix decision-making in price-competitive markets?
It seems that those questions can be addressed only by formulating two hypotheses. 
Firstly, the members of the Board were unaware of the effects that the removal of tariffs 
would have on price competition. Secondly, they thought the removal of tariffs would 
not lead straight to price competition so they accepted the implicit assumption 
underpinning the Minola methodology, which is that Fiat would retain its position in 
any segment of the market after 1968.
The former hypothesis can be rejected on the grounds that the reports of the 
Administration Board meetings contain plenty of evidence that management was 
perfectly aware of the risks involved with the abolition of tariffs. In fact, the removal of 
tariffs and price competition had been the object of relentless discussion during the 
Board meetings between 1963 and 1965.45 From the analysis of documents, Valletta's 
views seem fairly straightforward. According to him, the Italian industry was less 
developed and it would take at least ten years for Italy to catch up with the scale of 
production already reached in the other European countries. Meanwhile, the production 
capacity of the European industry was already growing faster than demand, and, 
according to Valletta, there was the risk that Ford and General Motors could expand 
their capacity at a level not attainable by European competitors. If this were the case, 
Fiat could not sustain price competition once tariffs were removed. On this basis,
marketing management as the ‘commercials. This word was supposed to be a sort of slang translation for 
the Anglo-Saxon term ‘marketing staff. Actually, in Italian the word ‘commerciale’ is an adjective rather 
than a noun. When the adjective ‘commerciale’ refers to a product, it is synonymous with cheap. Indeed, 
by referring to marketing staff as ‘commercials, engineers did not mean to flatter them. See Giacosa, 
Progetti alia Fiat, p. 280.
44 Gianni Agnelli became President of Fiat in 1966, while Valletta became Honorary President.
45 See: Archivio Storico Fiat, Administration Board Meeting, 30th o f January 1963, book 33, pp 22-25; 
ABM, 29th of July 1963, book 34, pp. 1-7; ABM 4th of February 1964, book 34, pp. 96-99; ABM 24th of 
January 1965, book 35, pp. 179-187 and book 36, pp. 1-23 (continued). For the translation of the most 
interesting passage from the Administration Board Meetings Minutes, see the appendix to chapter 6.
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Valletta expressed the view that the European Commission should introduce quotas, to 
prevent price competition from spiralling and cutting some producers out of the 
industry. The alternative was that each individual country would reintroduce tariffs on 
the grounds of the clause of the Treaty of Rome concerning the defence of national 
interests against external competitors acquiring dominant positions. In addition, Valletta 
underlined the substantial agreement between Fiat and French manufacturers, most 
notably Renault, concerning the possible ways of avoiding the creation of a dominant 
position within the European Industry.
Given the comparative advantage of Fiat in the bottom end of the market, the concern 
of management about price competition focused particularly on the middle and top 
ranges of the demand spectrum, which, as already said, were expected to expand along 
with the maturation of Italian demand. Moreover, given the Fiat managers' concern 
about price competition up to 1965, it seems amazing that in 1967, Minola was 
discussing output-mix strategy using a methodology that assumed Fiat price leadership 
and, at the same time, overlooked completely the costs structure both within Fiat and 
across the industry. This paradox can be explained only by assuming that in 1967, one 
year before the actual removal of tariffs,46 management was no longer concerned about 
price competition after 1968. Moreover, the fact that Giacosa, who was not member of 
the Board, was still concerned about price competition suggests the legitimate suspicion 
that management and Board members did not share the same information about the 
regime of competition.
If this was the case, it seems reasonable to think that Minola could not explicitly 
report to the Board that his strategy was going to work only if tariffs or collusion were in 
place. Therefore, Minola approached output-mix optimisation through a methodology 
that implied collusive price leadership, while the Board accepted the methodology 
without addressing questions concerning costs and competition because the members 
implicitly agreed with the assumption collusive behaviours. In other words, Minola and 
the rest of the Board were sharing implicit knowledge that was not at the disposal of the 
whole managerial structure.
Whether such knowledge derived from formal agreements between manufacturers is 
impossible to say. In the light of the Administration Board reports, though, it is possible
46 Tariffs should have been removed before 1970, but had been already removed in 1968.
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to say three things. Firstly, the 1967 report shows the lack of concern of Fiat top 
management over price competition. Secondly, this lack of concern was a remarkable U- 
tum in comparison with the 1963-1965 period, when Valleta's fears over price 
competition forced him to utter many threats about joining with French manufacturers to 
lobby for the reintroduction of tariffs if price competition became unbearable.47 Finally, 
the lack of concern over price competition in 1967 was not shared by those managers, 
such as Giacosa, who were not members of the Board, suggesting different information 
and/or perceptions of the competitive regime.
It is also conceivable that the Fiat top management believed the threat to reintroduce 
tariffs would be a credible way to discourage German manufacturers from pursuing a 
price war, as long as the agreement with French manufacturers held. Moreover, 
managers expected non-tariff barriers to trade to play a substantial role in cooling down 
price competition. As has been demonstrated by Silva,48 during the 1970s, the regime of 
competition was shaped by collusive price leadership. Overall, the available evidence 
from the reports of the Administration Board suggests that such an outcome was not 
unexpected.
Section three 
Competition and output-mix decision-making during the 1970s
Silva’s analysis showed that during the 1970s, prices among competitors moved in 
the same direction at the same time. The author assumed that Fiat was the leader and the 
others were followers. According to him, implicit collusion was led by the fact that, 
given trends in the factor costs and instability in the exchange rate, there was no 
incentive for any competitor to restore price competition within and outside the national 
markets. It was logical, in that context, that in each national market, the national 
champion was the price leader, so that Silva's assumption of Fiat price leadership is 
more than reasonable. Silva’s conclusions are based on an ex post analysis of prices. In 
the previous sections of the chapter, evidence has been shown suggesting that already in 
1967 Fiat management did not expect price competition to play a role in the medium
47 In particular, Valletta refers to the President of Renault Dreyfus as a possible allied. See, 
Administration Board Meeting Report, 30th of January 1963, book, p. 24.
48 Silva, Prati, Grillo, II mercato Italian dell’auto.
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term. This section analyses the question whether Fiat management was confident about 
the predictability of competitors' pricing behaviours.
Within the implicit collusive framework set by Silva, the competitors’ response to the 
price leader was, in theoretical terms, forecastable rather than predictable. In particular, 
the time span after which competitors would follow was not predictable, nor could the 
possibility be excluded that some competitors would not collude. On the other hand, the 
point made in this chapter is that output-mix decision-making was influenced by the fact 
that collusion was in place, where the predictability of competitors' pricing behaviour 
was the necessary precondition to make output-mix adjustments towards segments in 
which Fiat was less efficient. Therefore, in order to support the argument put forward in 
the chapter, it is necessary to show that the Fiat management was confident that 
competitors would follow upwards each time Fiat adjusted prices according to its own 
output mix and target contribution margins. Based on unpublished internal Fiat 
documents, the following paragraphs of the chapter show that the Fiat management 
considered the competitors’ response to price rises predictable rather than forecastable 
and that given the price levels, contribution margins were higher in the middle and top 
segments of the Fiat production range.
The predictability of competitors’ pricing and output-mix decision-making
Obviously, in any business archive in the world it would be extremely difficult to 
find documents referring to pricing behaviours, particularly in respect to collusion- 
related issues. However, an interesting document dated September 8, 1975 has been 
found in the Fiat Archives. This sheds light on the dynamics of price changes during the 
1970s. The document consists of a memo written by the head of the car sector Niccolo 
Gioia, for the Direzione Generale del Gruppo (Group General Direction), which was run 
by Cesare Romiti at that time. Attached to the memo are the results of a sensitivity 
analysis assuming a price rise of 7%. The price rise had been also recommended by the 
Divisione Commerciale (sales department).
Gioia explained that to raise prices by 7% was the best move for the company 
because it would increase the average margin of contribution by 20%, in spite of the 
expected contraction in sales. To get the same result by boosting sales, Fiat would have
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had to increase them by 20%, which was unrealistic. It is important to note that when 
Gioia mentioned the contraction in sales, he referred to a contraction in short-term Fiat 
sales as well as a slowing of total demand in the medium term, while in the long term, 
he thought the expected growth of total demand would be restored, given that the 
increase in prices in October 1975 partly anticipated the rise in prices planned for the 
second part of 1976.49 For Gioia, short term meant one month, medium term six months, 
and long term one year. In order to explain why Gioia was not concerned with losing 
market shares in the medium term, let us follow the document in its most significant 
parts:
“The variation of our price list is possible because after the last change [of our price list] in June, other 
Houses [car manufacturers] have adjusted their own prices according to our prices, even though, as always 
happens, they [other competitors] have delayed that adjustment for one or two months in order to exploit 
the temporary position of advantage.
Obviously, our position of leader, which obliges us to take the initiative in changing the price list, 
makes us less competitive after the price rise. However, competitors could exploit their position of 
advantage only in the last quarter of the year, which is the least favourable for sales [due to the typical 
seasonality of car sales between September and December]. In any case, as has been already pointed out, 
it is thought that [competitors] should follow in the generality of cases. The commercial direction thinks 
that in the case where competitors were late in following us, and therefore the sales of our models 
decreased, we would sustain the market [our market shares] by fully implementing our plan of incentives 
[discounts as trade in overpricing].”50
The passage is fairly clear. The only concern Gioia expresses in the document is 
about the fact that other competitors usually delayed the adjustment of their prices by 
about two months. On the other hand, there was no doubt that competitors would follow 
Fiat.
When referring to the competitors’ behaviour after the June 1975 price increase, 
Gioia’s remark “as always happens” denotes the repetitiveness of the mechanism by 
which followers adjust their price list, but also sounds like a complaint that the
49 Archivio Storico Fiat, Fondo Fiat Capogruppo, Segreteria General Dottor Gioia, Corso Ferrucci, fila 
XXIII/ 98/6, (Fiat Core Companies File, General Director File, Corso Ferrucci, row XXIII, location 
98/6).
50 Ibid.
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competitors were trying to exploit a short-term advantage by delaying the adjustment of 
their own prices.
In the second paragraph, Gioia explicitly refers to the Fiat role of price leader, which 
“obliged” the company to be the first to change prices. This term (obbliga in the Italian 
text) emphasises the duty of playing according to the rules regulating the mechanism of 
price leadership, and also denotes that the rules were rigid. Interestingly, in this 
paragraph Gioia refers to price changes rather price rises, which means that Fiat was the 
only player that could take the initiative to make any change in the price list, be it a rise 
or a cut.
On the other hand, Gioia's explicit reference to a well-established and predictable 
mechanism is counterbalanced by the central sentence of the second paragraph: “it is 
thought the competitors should follow”, which sounds much more cautious. However, if 
on the one hand, it is perfectly understandable that Gioia did not want to lay too much 
stress on the predictability of the dynamics of prices, on the other hand, it refers to the 
time lag between price setting and price following as the only area of uncertainty, 
though this was limited to a maximum of two months.
It has to be emphasised that the document does not explicitly refer to agreements. 
What the document does say is that Fiat had the role of price setter and that management 
was confident the majority of competitors would follow each Fiat price rise. In addition, 
the document says that management expected competitors to follow in two months, 
which might suggest collusion was explicit. On the other hand, it could be argued that 
the two-month expectation might well be based on historical records. Moreover, it 
might be argued that it was in the interest of foreign competitors to follow upwards in 
order to exploit higher price levels, particularly if  they were unable to exploit the price 
advantage because of demand and supply constraints, such as decreasing demand in the 
aftermath of the oil crisis or an insufficient distribution network. Therefore, it seems fair 
to say that although the document might provide a strong indication that collusion was 
organised, it is not definitive evidence. However, as has already been said, the thesis is 
not about collusion, but about output-mix decision-making. In this light, the document 
is interesting because it shows that Fiat management was aware of its role as the price 
leader, and confident about its competitors' response to increases in Fiat prices.
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The predictability of the competitors* response to Fiat’s price changes made it 
perfectly rational for Fiat to shift upmarket for two reasons. Firstly, given the predictable 
price leadership, Fiat could adjust prices up to desired margins, which, to some extent, 
would minimise the disadvantage of facing higher production costs than its competitors 
in the top market segments. Secondly, given price levels, medium and higher segments 
were more profitable then the bottom end of the market. In fact, in the lowest segments 
of the market room for increasing margins by upgrading prices was tight anyway given 
the quality of those models and given that demand tended to be price elastic rather than 
income elastic.
In this regard, the document quoted above is illuminating because it contains the 
result o f a sensitivity analysis, showing the margin of contribution of all Fiat models 
once the price was increased by 7%. Table 6.3 shows the data, and they prove the point 
that given price levels, the margins of contribution were higher in the upper range.
Table 6.3: Per unit contribution margin, various models, 1975
Model Market
segment
Cubic
capacity
Output 
per year
Prices* Contribution
margin**
Variable
costs**
Operating
profits**
126 A 600 149,178 1,300,000 337,326 962,674 -44534
127 B 900-1100 302,837 1,875,000 623,067 1,251,933 140,924
128 C 1100-1300 167,347 2,100,000 677,452 1,422,548 172,161
131 D 1300-1600 161,351 2,870,833 927688 1,943,145 196,336
132 E 1600-2000 54,160 3,378,333 1,158,985 2,219,348 305,153
130 F 2300 401 8,700,000 2,550,898 6,149,102 328,254
Source: Archivio Storico Fiat, Segreteria Generate Dottor Gioia (Fiat Core Companies File, 
General Director File), XXIII, 98/6. * Current prices (ITL). Average prices calculated on the basis 
of prices of different versions of each model. ** Average costs and profits of the various versions of 
the same model, in current ITL.
As appears from the table, segment A was a source of losses. This reflected the 
relatively low level of output for the segment, which, on the other hand, reflected 
demand at the bottom end of the segment range shifting from segment A to B. In any 
case, segment C was performing definitely better than segment B, with the 128 scoring
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better per unit profits at a much lower level of output in spite of higher per unit variable 
costs. Segments D and E also perform better than segment C, with the 132 showing 
comparatively high per unit profits. Finally, segment F performed fairly well, even 
though the contribution margin increases only by a marginal extent compared to that of 
the 132. However, the table also shows that costs were increasing according to the 
competitive segment. Therefore, the reason why contribution margins were increasing 
from the bottom to the top of the production range was clearly due to pricing. The 
reason why prices were rising from the bottom to the top of the range is explained by 
two interrelated factors. The first element, obviously, is the price setting of the basic 
version of each model in each segment, according to the equilibrium price of each 
segment, and the second element was the cost and price setting of accessories, the so 
called “optional sets”. Table 6.4 shows this data from the same documentation used so 
far, which underlines the pricing behaviour and the availability of optional settings 
according to the various Fiat models.
Table 6.4: Mark up over production costs of accessories (optional settings), 1975
Model Number of accessories 
available in the optional set
Average production cost of 
accessories (current Italian lire)
Average mark up over 
production cost prices
Delete this row
126 4 3,007 700%
127 8 10,587 449%
128 9 18,857 712%
131 16 52,444 251%
132 14 54,595 414%
130 10 98,306 196%
Source: Ibid.
Unsurprisingly, but impressively, the mark up of accessories was well over 200% for 
all models except the 130. Indeed, the 128 (segment C) was more profitable than both 
the 126 (segment A) and the 127 (segment B) and even though the mark up over 
production costs was almost the same for the 128 and the 126, the latter had a much 
smaller accessory set. The 132 (segment E) was also more profitable than the 131 
(segment D) while in the case of the 130 (segment F) the decrease in both the number of
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accessories and the mark up reflects the fact that a wide range of accessories was already 
included in the basic selling price. In any case, it is clear that for Fiat it was convenient 
to push sales in the middle and upper segments as much as they could, trying also to sell 
the largest possible number of accessories.
So far, it has been shown that in the late 1960s the Fiat management decided to adjust 
the output mix upmarket, under the assumption that during the 1970s price competition 
would not be severe. Due to the expected expansion of the middle and upper segments 
of demand caused by the maturation of the Italian market, and given that in those 
segments demand tended to be income elastic rather than price elastic, the Fiat 
management saw a good opportunity to maximise total contribution margins by 
adjusting output upmarket. Such an adjustment was going to put upward pressure on 
total costs, so that the move could be expected to be profitable only if Fiat set the price 
that maximises per unit contribution margin. However, because the comparative 
advantage of German producers in the manufacturing of large cars, Fiat might have been 
a price setter only in a regime of collusive price leadership. In this respect, it has been 
shown during the 1970s Fiat management was confident that competitors would follow 
Fiat each time the company increased prices. Finally, it has been shown that given price 
levels, the upper-segment units were those with better contribution margins.
The next paragraph of the chapter deals with the contrast between marketing 
managers and engineers after 1967. As already said, when Fiat decided to concentrate 
more resources on the development of upmarket models in the late 1960s, key engineers 
such as Giacosa were unimpressed. Other engineers, such as Bono, supported the move 
because it was based on the assumption that Fiat would not face price competition in the 
short and medium terms. The disagreement between engineers and marketing mangers, 
though, was going to re-emerge in relation to long-term strategies.
Giammario Rossignolo and market-oriented management at Fiat
When in 1967 Fiat decided to shift upmarket under the assumption that after 1968 
price competition would not be severe, the company had the possibility to choose 
between two different strategies. The first was to use the umbrella of collusive 
behaviours to protect market shares in the short and medium terms. Meanwhile, the 
company would restructure production, design and engineering capabilities, in order to
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increase the efficiency in the production of upmarket models and become an upmarket 
player in its own right. The second possibility was to increase the production of 
upmarket units for as long as collusion held. Meanwhile, engineers would develop the 
production process in order to maximise specialisation, to become even stronger in the 
segment in which the company was competitive in terms of price and quality and, 
eventually, to get ready for the restoration of price competition.
The first option was consistent with the ideas of a group of relatively young 
managers, such as Giammario Rossignolo, who wanted Fiat to shift from a process- to a 
market-oriented approach to manufacturing. The latter was consistent with the ideas of 
production engineers headed by Bono, who saw the shift upmarket as an opportunistic 
medium-term move rather than a change in the specialisation pattern of the company. 
As already said, Bono supported the ideas of Minola rather than the view of Giacosa, 
only because the shift upmarket was a function of the regime of competition rather than 
a function of a change in the specialisation pattern of the company.
Rossignolo was an economist by training who had started his career in the Divisione 
Commerciale, where he tried to introduce a “modem” marketing-oriented culture. 
Minola's promotion to the Board opened the way for him to move in that direction. In 
1968, Agnelli let Rossignolo transform the Ufficio Studi (Department of Economic and 
Marketing Studies) into the Direzione Pianificazione e Strategia Aziendale (Directorate 
for Strategic Planning). From that position, Rossignolo advised Agnelli to take over 
Lancia and Citroen. The move was indeed inspired by a genuine market-oriented 
approach. Given the removal of tariffs and the significance of the middle and upper 
segments in the European market, the acquisition of Lancia and Citroen would have 
provided the Fiat Group with the right technology and branding to compete upmarket in 
its own right. As already stated in chapter 3, the outcome of the strategy was largely 
affected by the way engineers implemented it. The merger with Citroen was not 
completed because the French management did not agree with the Fiat engineers who 
wanted to use the same engines for both Fiat and Citroen ranges. The idea was driven by 
the engineers’ desire to maximise economies of scale rather than brand value and 
differentiation. However, technical synergy was implemented between Lancia and Fiat, 
with the former using the engine of the latter. Indeed, between 1969 and 1973 product 
renewal was concentrated on Lancia and the Fiat top range, but the technical sharing of
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engines reflected more the engineers' desire to maximise economies of scale and 
minimise R&D expenditure, rather than the Rossignolo idea to develop a brand capable 
of competing in the upper band of the market in terms of competitive prices relative to 
high quality standards.51
Meanwhile, as shown in chapter 3, the production process was developed in order to 
maximise the mass production of small cars or, in other words, to minimise the cycle 
time. Clearly, production engineers and Rossignolo were approaching the business 
strategy according to different strategic thinking, so that the strategy of Fiat during the 
1970s was a hybrid. Output mix was adjusted upmarket, but the production process was 
developed to maximise production pace rather than flexibility. As shown in chapter 4, 
the Robogate was eventually used to produce large batches of small cars, rather than 
small batches of a wide and differentiated upmarket production range.
In 1974, Rossignolo resigned in the aftermath of a conflict with De Benedetti over 
the restructuring of the component supply chain. He started up his own company 
specialising in the laser-cutting treatment of sheet metal. His company never became a 
Fiat supplier, although it enjoyed international success. This indicates how tense was the 
relationship between Rossignolo and the rest of the Fiat management. Nonetheless, a 
few months after De Benedetti's resignation, Umberto Agnelli offered Rossignolo the 
chairmanship of Lancia, which at that time was owned by Fiat and controlled by the Fiat 
management, although formally still a separate company. As soon as Rossignolo 
became Chairman of Lancia, he established a partnership with Saab,53 for the 
development of a common platform for cars competing in the E segment. Before 1969, 
when the company was taken over by Fiat, Lancia cars were characterised by a very 
sophisticated engine design and expensive steel and aluminium construction for the 
chassis. However, with the launch of the Beta range in 1970, Fiat engineers abandoned 
the Lancia technology for both engines and chassis. The problem of Rossignolo, 
therefore, was to regain the levels of chassis quality Lancia had achieved before being
51 In this respect it is useful to underline that collusion meant to keep the price of competitors sufficiently 
high to minimise the advantage competitors had in terms of quality. In fact, in absolute terms the Fiat 
upper range was less expensive than the upper range of German competitors. However, the quality 
differential would have shifted demand towards competitors, if  prices were set according to the cost 
structure of each player. In other words, German competitors had comparative advantage in the 
manufacturing of the upper range.
52 Gennaro, Scifo, Parabole, pp. 82-83.
53 Saab is a Swedish manufacturer specialising in segment E.
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taken over. The partnership with Saab, for the development of common parts, such as 
the platform, was supposed to reach this target at a relatively low cost.
As already pointed out in chapter 3, in 1978 Fiat Auto was established. The new 
company incorporated all the activities related to the manufacturing of cars and light 
commercial vehicles, formerly run by the Fiat Group. Vittorio Ghidella, the production 
engineer appointed chairman of Fiat Auto, decided to maximise technical synergy 
among brands and different product lines. Rossignolo did not agree with the 
incorporation of Lancia into Fiat Auto. His argument was that although there was scope 
for sharing components, design, development and marketing had to remain separate. In 
fact, the Lancia clients were different from those of Fiat, so that the development of the 
brand depended on its being distinct from the Fiat range. As soon as Ghidella rejected 
Rossignolo’s argument, the latter resigned immediately, and never returned to the 
Group.54
Thus, the appointment of Ghidella as Chairman of Fiat Auto had huge strategic 
implications with the fusion between Lancia and Fiat. Moreover, the whole product- 
renewal strategy changed. Apart from the Ritmo, launched in 1978 but designed before 
the oil crisis, product renewal focused on the bottom range, with the Panda (segment A) 
launched in 1980, and the Uno (segment B) launched in 1982. In 1980, the Lancia Delta 
(segment C) was launched, followed by the Lancia Prisma (segment D) in 1983 and the 
Regata in early 1984. However, the Delta, Prisma and Regata were all based on the 
platform and mechanics of the Ritmo, so they could not be considered as entirely new 
models, as opposed as the Panda and the Uno. Moreover, the model based on the Saab 
platform, which had been at the centre of the Rossignolo strategy, was launched only in
1984, eight years after the agreement with Saab was signed. The Lancia Thema 
(segment E) was followed by the Croma - a model based on the same platform - in
1985. The priority given to the renewal of the bottom range, along with the paucity of 
resources allocated to the renewal of segments C and D, for which neither new 
platforms nor new engines were developed, explains well why after 1980 the output mix 
shifted back upmarket.
54 Gennaro, Scifo, Parabole.
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The point made in this chapter is that the expectation of collusive pricing behaviour 
held by Fiat management in the late 1960s was the main factor underpinning the 
adjustment of the output mix during the 1970s. The next chapter will make the point 
that the shift back downmarket during the 1980s was the result of the Ghidella 
expectation that price competition would be restored. During the 1970s, in fact, Fiat had 
missed the opportunity window, offered by implicit collusion, to restructure design and 
production processes, in order to become an upmarket competitor in its own right. Once 
price competition was restored, there was no other chance than to allocate resources to 
the renewal of cars competing in those segments in which Fiat had comparative 
advantage, as this was the only way to defend market shares.
Conclusions
This chapter has examined the output-mix optimisation strategy of Fiat in the late 
1960s and 1970s. It has been shown that in the late 1960s, management was conscious 
that Fiat had its comparative advantage in the manufacturing of small rather than large 
cars. On the other hand, the Fiat management was confident that the abolition of tariffs 
would not lead straight to price competition. Management therefore expected collusive 
price leadership to give them the possibility to set prices according to their cost structure 
and their target per unit contribution margin. Because demand in the upper segments 
was expected to grow faster than demand in the bottom segments, to move upmarket 
seemed a good idea.
Already in the early 1980s, the seminal study of Silva proved that during the 1970s 
collusion was actually in place during the whole decade. Moreover, through internal Fiat 
documents and data, it has been shown that Fiat management was conscious that prices 
were behaving in a way suggesting implicit collusion and that managers were setting 
prices accordingly. Moreover, it has been shown that given the price levels, the 
upmarket units provided much better contribution margins so that the adjustment of the 
output mix upmarket was advisable. Finally, it has been shown that once Ghidella 
became Chairman of Fiat Auto, he focused effort on renewing the bottom end of the Fiat 
range. At the same time, management delayed the development of the segment E range, 
and allocated relatively small resources to the renewal of segments C and D. This 
decision affected output mix, which, as has been shown, shifted back downmarket
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during the 1980s. The next chapter will address the question why Ghidella decided to 
shift back downmarket. It will be shown that in the late 1970s there was already enough 
evidence that collusion was not holding and that implicit price competition was 
effective, since the real price of cars tended to be much lower than the official one. 
Moreover, it will be shown that during the 1980s explicit price competition was actually 
restored, as had been expected in the late 1970s. Once price competition was restored, 
Fiat had no other choice than to go back downmarket to exploit the comparative 
advantage deriving from its specialisation in the manufacturing of small cars. Finally, an 
indication was given that the Fiat output mix during the 1980s was the best profit- 
maximising one.
In term of managerial continuity, it is therefore possible to say that the Valletta 
technical management and the Ghidella management shared the view that Fiat had to 
maximise its comparative advantage in the bottom range of the market. Departure from 
this framework could have been only contemplated if  collusion or tariffs were in place. 
Overall, Ghidella and his predecessors shared the same set of routines underpinning 
product-mix decision-making. The decision to make Minola responsible for the car 
sector and to support his strategy of shifting upmarket in the late 1960s had the side 
effect of enabling innovative marketing managers to acquire remarkable weight in the 
Fiat hierarchy. Nonetheless, those managers were overtaken by production engineers in 
the late 1970s without having been able to establish a different and more market- 
oriented pattern on the Fiat design and manufacturing framework.
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Chapter 7
Output-mix decision-making at Fiat in the 1980s
Introduction
The previous chapter has shown that during the 1970s, collusion enabled Fiat to set 
prices according to its target contribution margin. This affected output-mix decision­
making. In theory, Fiat should have maximised its comparative advantage in the 
manufacturing of small cars. In practice, collusion led to price levels sufficiently high to 
maximise the contribution margin of upmarket units, which, in turn, drove Fiat's output 
mix upmarket. The previous chapter has also shown that during the 1980s, Fiat shifted 
the output mix back downmarket, because of the change in strategy pursued by 
Ghidella. In particular, the new Chairman focused on product renewal in Fiat's bottom 
range, despite the opposition of Giammario Rossignolo, who wanted to allocate more 
resources to the development of the Lancia brand in order to compete upmarket.
This chapter explains the change of strategy pursued by Ghidella, as a response to 
changes in the regime of competition in the 1980s, suggesting that the end of collusion 
during the 1980s caused the shifting of the production mix towards the lower-model 
range, in the same way as collusion during the 1970s had caused the shifting of the 
product mix towards the upper-model ranges. During the 1970s, Fiat had been 
exercising collusive price leadership throughout the demand spectrum. This meant that 
Fiat set prices and competitors followed regardless o f the comparative advantage each 
manufacturer had in specific segments of the demand. Once price competition was 
restored, though, Fiat would no longer be in the position to set prices in any segment of 
the demand spectrum. More likely, the company would be able to be the competitive 
price leader in the bottom segments of demand, where Fiat had a comparative 
advantage, and a price follower in the upper segments of demand, in which German and 
French competitors were much more specialised and produced much larger outputs. 
Looking at the Ghidella strategy ex post, it seems that Fiat had no other rational choice 
but to maximise its specialisation. After all, how could Fiat compete with Mercedes and 
BMW in the E range when it produced only one-third as many cars as each of the 
German competitors in that segment? Nonetheless, an alternative did exist. This was the 
Rossignolo strategy, based on the acquisition of upmarket brands such as Citroen, and 
on the development of the Lancia brand at the upper end of the market. However, such
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an alternative should have been pursued coherently since the late 1960s. Clearly, it was 
not.
The chapter is organised as follows: the first section shows that already by the second 
half of the 1970s, the Fiat management had all the information needed to predict that 
collusion was not going to hold. The second section shows that during the 1980s, price 
competition was actually restored, and that Fiat and Ford were the two most price- 
competitive players in the Italian market. Finally, using available data on production 
costs, the last section suggests that the Fiat output mix in the 1980s was the most cost 
efficient.
Section one
A time for colluding and a time for competing: The late 1970s and the end of the
“price truce”
This section shows that in the second half of the 1970s, collusion did not prove a 
sufficiently strong factor to keep market shares stable. On the contrary, competition 
based on product diversity played much a greater role in reshaping the structure of 
Italian demand. Within the new market structure emerging after the first oil shock, none 
of the players, Fiat included, had any incentive left to stick with collusion.
Management expectations and the dynamic factors underpinning collusion in the 
late 1970s
By definition, collusion would only hold if each of the players involved in collusive 
behaviour could pose a credible threat, in order to prevent other players from cheating. 
The credible threat usually consists of the ability to punish the cheaters by increasing 
output to a level not attainable by other players.1 This leads to a form of “collusion 
paradox”. If one of the collusive price leaders is so efficient as to put in place a credible 
threat, the temptation for him to shift back to price competition and compete for market 
shares might be significant. Given that the credible threat consists of a powerful 
incentive to shift back to price competition, collusion only holds if  the various players 
have “exogenous incentives” for colluding, or when different players are experiencing 
different endogenous problems. The first case might occur when all players within a 
given industry experience a rise in input prices. The latter might occur when, for
1 This, of course, implies that demand is price elastic.
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example, one player is experiencing low labour productivity, while the closest 
competitor is experiencing inefficiency in distribution, due to the underdevelopment of 
the sales network.
In the previous chapter, it was shown that during the 1970s the Italian management 
was confident that competitors would follow any adjustment of Fiat prices. Critically, 
this confidence did not reflect Fiat's ability to mount a credible threat, because, as 
already shown in chapter 3, in 1974 the company was on the edge of financial collapse. 
Foreign competitors were compelled to follow Fiat’s price leadership because of a set of 
externalities, over which the company had no control. Initially, competitors were 
colluding because the distribution network was not developed enough to sustain price 
competition. Then, after 1973, the increase in the price of raw materials and the 
instability of exchange rates forced the European industry to suspend price competition. 
In particular, the instability of exchange rates reduced the comparative advantage of 
German competitors, in the upper end of demand.
Critically, all these factors were dynamic rather than static. The distribution network 
of foreign competitors had been developing over time as well as Fiat's distribution 
network abroad. The instability of raw material prices and exchange rates were 
temporary phenomena linked to the international business cycle in the aftermath of the 
oil crisis. Nonetheless, the international economic and political scenario was expected to 
stabilise following the end of the Vietnam war, and those European countries such as 
Italy, which had shifted to a regime of floating exchange rates, were expected to return 
to fixed exchange rates as soon as macro-economic conditions would allow.
Italy returned to fixed exchange rates in 1979. According to Silva, this was the main 
reason why the gradual restoration of price competition in the 1980s was expected.3 
Nonetheless, during the 1970s, Fiat was in no position to pose any credible threat. To 
explain this point, it is important to return to a number of issues analysed in the previous 
chapters. In late 1967, Minola and the rest of the Fiat Board seemed convinced that the 
output mix had to shift upmarket, and did not seem worried about price competition 
after the abolition of tariffs. From the minutes of the Administration Board, it appears 
that Valletta was convinced that he could pose a credible threat to competitors, by 
lobbying for the reintroduction of tariffs if price competition proved too severe, once
2 Silva, Parati, Grillo, II mercato Italian dell’auto, pp. 174-177.
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tariffs had been removed. This would have discouraged foreign competitors from 
investing in production and distribution at a pace not attainable by Fiat. As already 
shown in chapter 6, it made sense for Fiat to shift upmarket within a collusive 
framework. Therefore, in 1967 Fiat decided to allocate resources to the renewal of the 
upper range, in accordance with what could be defined as the “Valletta theorem”. This 
theorem was based on the “political ability” of Fiat to lobby the Italian Government for 
the reintroduction of tariffs, but, after 1973, Fiat could hardly pose such a “political 
threat”. In fact, as shown in chapter 5, after 1962 the relationship between Fiat and the 
Italian Government had been gradually deteriorating, and reached its lowest point after 
1973.
In the previous chapter, it was also shown that Silva's analysis demonstrates that at 
least up to 1979 the behaviour of prices indicates that collusion was in place. This 
finding has been supported by unpublished qualitative evidence, showing that Fiat 
management was aware of the pricing behaviour of competitors and was setting Fiat 
prices accordingly. Therefore, the expectations held by Fiat management during the late 
1960s turned out to be correct. What had indeed changed by 1973 was the fact that Fiat 
managers knew they had no credible threat at their disposal. In the second half of the 
1970s, the management's confidence that competitors would collude was based on the 
already-mentioned external factors (instability of input prices, instability of exchange 
rates and under-development of the sales network) that were compelling foreign 
competitors to collude. Nonetheless, this scenario was bound to change sooner or later. 
Therefore, Fiat had to increase its competitiveness in the upper band of the production 
range or get ready to return downmarket, as soon as it was clear that collusion would not 
hold. The contrast between Rossignolo and the Fiat management reflects this strategic 
dilemma.
The “Barker effect” and Fiat market shares, 1965-19874
In the case of the Italian market during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the likelihood 
that collusion would hold depended upon incentives to collude, rather than upon the 
ability of the price setter to pose a credible threat. However, it should be pointed out that
3 Ibid. Note that the Silva book was published in 1982, but the analysis covered the period up to 1980. 
Therefore, the author expressed judgements about what was expected for the 1980s, without providing 
further investigation.
4 See: T. Barker, ‘International Trade and Economic Growth: An Alternative to the Neoclassical 
Approach’, Cambridge Journal o f Economics, 1977/1 (1977), pp. 153-172.
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even when all the players have an incentive to collude, consumers might shift their 
purchases from one supplier to another because of the intrinsic quality of the product 
(design, exotic appeal, reputation, status symbol appeal etc.). This, in turn, would 
destabilise market shares, dividing suppliers into winners and losers. If such a scenario 
occurs, collusion will soon be over. Losers will cut prices in an attempt to defend 
market shares, and winners will cut prices to prevent other winners from capturing the 
market shares lost by the less competitive players. Under the assumption that none of 
the players would sell below costs, the most efficient manufacturer will get the largest 
market share.
What the Fiat management might have underestimated, both before and after 1973, 
was the impact of the Barker effect on market shares. This was the destabilisation of 
market shares under the pressure of product-differentiation-led competition. Even if the 
various players were colluding with Fiat, the question that should be addressed is 
whether and to what extent collusion was an effective means of locking in Fiat's clients. 
Figure 7.1 shows changes in Fiat's share of the domestic market from 1965 to 1987, 
along with domestic new registrations, exports and the Fiat shares of the EC market 
form 1976 to 1987.
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Figure 7.1: Fiat shares of domestic m arket domestic registrations and export 
1965-1987
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Source: Fiat (ed.), Fiat: le fasi della crescita, 1996, pp. 131-135. Enrietti and Fornenego, II gruppo 
Fiat, 1989, pp. 70-73, tables 5/1 and 5/2. ANFIA, (ed.), L 'automobile in cifre, 1996, p. 334.
When Minola presented his plan to shift the output-mix upmarket to the board in 
1967, the Fiat share of domestic demand was 75.8%. Indeed, the removal of tariffs in 
1968 brought about structural adjustment of market shares. This was driven by the 
already-mentioned Barker effect. Between 1968 and 1970, Fiat domestic shares 
decreased by 11 percentage points. However, during the same period both domestic new 
registrations and Fiat exports increased. Plants were running at full capacity, and 
therefore the adjustment in the structure of the Italian market should not be seen as a 
negative fact. Between 1970 and 1973, domestic new registrations, Fiat shares of the 
domestic market, and exports all stabilised. Fiat managed to keep a prominent position 
in the domestic market while maintaining its level of exports. As shown in chapter 3, the 
company did not manage to reach its production target of 7,000 cars per day, even when 
plants were running at full capacity. In addition, industrial disputes led to losses in total 
output, which might suggest that market shares could have been slightly higher.5 In this 
light, therefore, it seems fair to say the new structure of Fiat sales represented a
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profitable equilibrium for the company. This is consistent with the collusive framework 
described in the previous chapter.
Between 1974 and 1978, though, another dramatic shift took place. Fiat lost 8.3 
percentage points of its share of the domestic market. This time, the domestic demand 
was experiencing a marked recession and Fiat exports were stagnating. On top of this, 
the company was running oversized stocks of finished goods. No longer would collusion 
work in Fiat’s favour.
The decrease in Fiat's market share after the first oil crisis indicates that collusion 
was not sufficient to offset the Barker effect. In that situation, the incentives of the 
various players for sticking with collusion were becoming weaker and weaker. On the 
contrary, the incentive for each foreign player to capture Fiat’s share was becoming 
stronger and stronger. German manufacturers were disadvantaged by the exchange rates, 
which did not favour German exports to Italy. As already mentioned, though, exchange 
rates were expected to stabilise, as soon as macro-economic conditions would allow. 
The last incentive to stick with collusion would disappear and the Barker-Linder effect, 
namely competition based on both product diversity and price competition in each 
segment of demand, would have severely penalised the Italian industry. Clearly, Fiat had 
to regain price competitiveness, if  it was to have any chance of defending its position in 
the internal market.
Within the new market structure, Fiat had few chances to regain its pre-oil-crisis 
market share. Rather, it had to aim for the defence and improvement of its new position. 
Therefore, to lower the break-even point was mandatory. Moreover, because Fiat could 
not regain its pre-crisis market shares, it was in the interests of the company to stimulate 
total demand. This means that within the post-oil-crisis structure of the Italian market, it 
was in Fiat's interest to return to price competition and regain competitive price 
leadership as opposed to collusive price leadership. Thus, when Ghidella became 
Chairman of Fiat Auto in 1978, his task was to reduce the break-even point and to 
regain competitive price leadership, which meant to regain cost efficiency. In this 
situation, the incentive for the management to maximise specialisation and the 
comparative advantage in the manufacturing of small cars was enormous. Thus, 
Ghidella's decision to give the priority to the renewal of the bottom range seems to be 
the most rational one.
5 See chapter 3, Table 3.4.
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In 1979, Fiat’s market share reached 50.3% - the lowest point for two decades - 
though demand was recovering along with exports. For three years demand increased, 
with Fiat keeping its share at about 51%, with slightly decreasing exports. Demand 
decreased again in 1983, but Fiat's share of the domestic market rose to 56.6%. Then, 
shares remained above 52% while demand recovered from the crisis of 1983.
As already pointed out in chapter 3, the stagnation of the Italian market after the first 
oil crisis lasted longer than in the other main European markets.6 Silva maintains that 
the prolonged stagnation was caused by the fact that after 1973 the prices of vehicles in 
Italy increased by more than in the other major EC markets.7 Given the regime of 
collusion the price spiral was determined by the Fiat price strategy. The recovery of 
demand between 1979 and 1982 can be explained by two phenomena. The first was the 
ageing of the car stock during the prolonged stagnation of demand between 1974 and 
1978, which in turn determined a massive replacement wave between 1979 and 1982. 
The second element was the gradual return to implicit price competition. As will be 
shown in the next section, Silva's analysis of “official” prices between 1973 and 1980 
shows that prices of various manufacturers were all moving in the same direction and at 
the same time, which is consistent with collusive behaviour. However, the author 
underlines that in 1980 there were already signs that manufacturers were practising 
informal price competition by offering discounts on the official selling price.
In theory, implicit price competition is not as effective as explicit price competition, 
because the collusive price leader can react to the discount policy of competitors by 
increasing official prices. If competitors follow, the real price of cars will rise anyway. 
On the other hand, if competitors do not follow, discounts lead to a reduction of real 
prices. As will be shown in the next section, after 1980 competitors stopped following 
Fiat price rises, while after 1983 Fiat and Ford started to increase their prices at about or 
even below inflation.
6 See chapter 3, pp. 79-82.
7 Silva, Grillo, Prati, 77 mercato Italian dell’auto, pp. 174-177.
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Section two 
Competition during the 1980s
The preceding section argued that in the second half of the 1970s, Fiat’s management 
had every reason to predict that the 1980s were going to see the restoration of price 
competition. This compelled Fiat to reconsider output-mix optimisation. The aim of this 
section is to see whether price competition was actually restored after 1980.
Price analysis: A comparison between the 1970s and the 1980s
As already seen, Silva has shown that the index of real prices in the Italian market
Q
increased by 134% between 1970 and 1980, within a context of implicit collusion. 
Moreover, the author produced a matrix showing the frequency with which Fiat and its 
nine closest competitors changed their prices between January 1973 and October 1980. 
In that period there were 45 price increases. Based on monthly data,9 Fiat raised prices 
31 times. Silva constructed a variable showing the frequency with which any number of 
competitors in a range of 1 to 9 followed Fiat. Then, he calculated the cumulative 
variable (FX) that shows the cumulative frequency with which any given number of 
manufacturers, among the 9 competitors, followed Fiat. If all 9 competitors increased 
prices in 22.6% of the cases in which Fiat increased prices, while 8 competitors 
followed in 12.9% of those cases, the cumulative percentage of cases in which 8 
competitors increased their prices was FX = 22.6% + 12.9% = 35.5% (see table 7.1)
Through his calculations, Silva showed that in 64.6% of the cases, two-thirds of 
competitors increased their prices in the same or the subsequent month as Fiat did, while 
in 22.6% of the cases all competitors increased their prices.10 Under the assumption that 
Fiat was the first to change price in every month in which it and its competitors changed 
price, the result suggests a strong collusive price leadership of Fiat.
Of course, this methodology has many weaknesses, as the author himself points out. 
In particular, Silva could not produce any evidence to support the assumption that Fiat 
was the first mover in changing prices. Moreover, the shift in prices of a single 
manufacturer could have been decided several months before it actually took place and, 
therefore, could be not responsive to any change in competitors' prices.
8 Silva, Grillo, Prati, U mercato Italiano dell’auto, p. 79.
9 This is to be done because data are available only on a monthly basis.
10 Silva, Grillo, Prati, II mercato Italiano dell’auto, p. 126.
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However, as already stated Silva uses this exercise to support an argument based 
mainly on the analysis of the gross total contribution margins of the industry.11 
Moreover, from qualitative evidence presented in the preceding chapter we know that 
during the 1970s the Fiat management regarded its competitors' response to its price 
changes as predictable and that the response could be expected within one or two 
months. In addition, the same qualitative evidence shows that Fiat was the first mover in 
changing prices. Thus, on the one hand, the way Silva set the exercises in 1980 implied 
a circularity in its results, namely that Fiat was a collusive price leader, once it is 
assumed that the company was the first mover in changing prices within the relevant 
time span. On the other hand, because now we know that Fiat was the collusive price 
leader, the result of the exercise holds.
Having established that Silva’s results are credible, the exercise has been replicated 
for the period between January 1981 and December 1987. Again, the assumption has 
been made that Fiat was the first mover in every month when the company and its 
competitors changed prices. The aim is to compare 1973-1980, when we know Fiat was 
the collusive price leader, with 1981-1987. Substantial similarities in the two frequency 
matrices would suggest that collusive price leadership could have been still in place 
during the 1980s. However, to confirm this requires qualitative evidence that Fiat was 
the first mover when a multiple price change occurred in the same month. On the 
contrary, substantial differences in the frequency matrix would suggest that collusion 
ended during the 1980s.
The price matrix for the January 1981 - December 1987 period has been constructed 
by calculating differences in the price list for each month for nine manufacturers
17competing in the Italian market during that period. For each manufacturer, only those 
models that are broadly comparable with Fiat models have been considered.
For each month (Mn), the average price of the various versions of each model has 
been calculated.13 Then, the price difference for each month (Mn -  Mn-1) was
11 This is an econometric estimate of the gross contribution margin of the Italian car industry according to 
the following function: log p = a + log M + log CLUP + log ImM/IMM, where: p = quarterly index of the 
output price of the Italian car industry; M = average index of input prices (non-labour input); CLUP = 
index of labour cost per unit of output; ImM/IMM = demand tension. See Silva, Grillo, Prati, II mercato 
italiano dell'auto, p. 129.
12 The competitors are Ford, Opel, Renault, Peugeot, Volkswagen, Audi, Citroen, Alfa Romeo and Volvo. 
See table A7.2. in the appendix.
13 In some cases, special versions such as the Uno Turbo, the price of which differed substantially from 
that of the standard model, have been excluded from the calculation. To keep quality constant, prices in 
Mn and Mn-1 were compared only for the same model. This means that when a new model appears in the 
price list its price is not compared with the price of the model it has replaced.
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calculated. Next, the average increase in the price list was worked out.14 This calculation 
was used to construct a data-base showing the increase in prices for each manufacturer 
as a percentage of the previous month's prices. The data matrix is shown by table A7.2 
in the appendix.
In the period considered, prices changed 28 times. In 15 cases, Fiat increased prices, 
while in eight cases prices were increased by competitors. In the remaining five cases, 
prices were actually reduced and in three cases out of five, Fiat made price cuts. The fact 
that there were price cuts already suggests a tendency towards the reintroduction of 
explicit price competition in the period considered.
Table 7.1 compares the results of the Silva analysis (1973-1980) with the frequency 
distribution of cases in which Xn competitors increased their prices in the same or in the 
subsequent month when Fiat increased its own prices in the 1981-1987 period.
Table 7.1: Frequency distribution of the number of price followers in 
the same month or within two months when Fiat increased its prices
1973 -1980 1981 -1987
Xi fXi FX Xi fXi FX
9 22.6% 22.6% 9 13.3% 13.3%
8 12.9% 35.5% 8 13.3% 26.7%
7 16.2% 51.7% 7 20% 46.7%
6 12.9% 64.6% 6 0% 46.7%
5 25.8% 90.4% 5 20% 66.7%
4 3.2% 93.6% 4 13.3% 80%
3 3.2% 96.8% 3 0% 80%
2 3.2% 100% 2 6.7% 86.7%
1 0% 100% 1 13.3% 100%
Source: 1973 - 1980, Silva, Grillo, Prati, U mercato Italiano delVauto, p. 124. 1981-1987,
elaboration of official prices, Quattroruote, monthly. See tables A 7.2 and A 7.3 in the appendix. Xi
is the number (i = 1, 2 , .......9) of competitors who increased their prices in the same or in the
subsequent month Fiat increased its own prices; f (Xi) is the frequency by which a number Xi of 
competitors increased prices when Fiat did. FX is the cumulative frequency If 9 competitors 
increase prices in the 22.6% of cases in which Fiat increase prices, while 8 competitors follows in 
12.9% of cases, FX will be = 35.5% = (22.9% +12.9%).
As already stated, the cumulative function FX shows that between 1973 and 1980, in 
64.6% of the cases two-thirds of competitors (6) increased prices when Fiat did, while 
all competitors followed Fiat in 22.6% of the cases. In comparison, between 1981 and
14 The increase in price of each model has been weighted by the number of its versions in the price list.
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1987, two-thirds of competitors (6) increased prices concurrently with Fiat only in 
46.7% of the cases, and only in 13% of the cases did all the competitors follow Fiat. 
Looking at the whole distribution the difference is significant.
As already stated, the Silva exercise was based on the assumption that Fiat was the 
first mover each month in which both Fiat and competitors increased prices, but 
qualitative evidence shows that as far as the 1970s are concerned, this assumption is 
acceptable. As far as the period 1981-1987 is concerned, there are two possibilities: a) 
Fiat was not the first mover in those months in which prices were raised by competitors, 
or at least by many of them. In this case, collusive price leadership did not take place by 
definition; b) Fiat was the first mover each time it increased prices in the same month 
with a number of competitors. Even in this case, there seems to be far less homogeneity 
in the price changes among manufacturers between 1981 and 1987 in comparison with 
the previous period. This suggests that during the 1980s collusion was replaced by a 
more transparent regime of price competition.
Monthly price data suggest that the transition to price competition started as early as 
1981. In July 1981, Fiat increased the price list by 12% compared with its prices in 
March,15 while in the same period the price index of consumer goods increased by only 
4.7%.16 Opel and Volvo increased their prices by 7.4 and 6% within the next two 
months, but the other competitors did not follow. In August, Fiat reduced its prices by 
4% but this time all the closest competitors followed. Arguably, at that point, the Fiat 
management was no longer confident that its competitors would follow increases in Fiat 
prices.
Table 7.2 shows changes in the price list of Fiat and its closest competitors, and 
compares them with the changes in the 1ST AT price index of consumer goods from 
1981 to 1987. Each observation shows the percentage by which prices increased form 
January to December each year. As already shown elsewhere in the thesis, during the 
1970s, Fiat prices rose by far more than the price index of consumer goods. On the other 
hand, during the 1980s this was not the case.
15 See tables A7.2 and A7.4 in the appendix.
16 Calculated using the ISTAT price index of consumer goods.
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Table 7.2: Changes in prices, various manufacturers, 1981 -1 9 8 7
Fiat Alfa Romeo Audi Citroen Ford Opel Peugeot Renault Volkswagen Volvo
ISTAT 
price 
index of 
consumer 
good
% % % % % % % % % % %
1981 21 9.5 13.1 5.88 15.5 21.2 20.5 13.4 19.7 1.2 18.7%
1982 18 20.9 21.3 20 15.6 15.1 13.6 17.7 16.1 24.9 16.3%
1983 6.2 9.4 24.5 11.2 6 11.9 13.6 14.4 17.5 10.2 15%
1984 13 15.2 11.4 13.2 14.2 15.1 10.6 5.8 6.1 9.5 10.6%
1985 4.4 6.7 4.2 5.56 3.51 7.9 8.1 7.7 12.3 6.1 8.6%
1986 5.2 6.1 12.9 6.2 0.3 11.2 4.4 4.91 15.4 4.4 6.1%
1987 4.2 5.64 10.5 5.98 7.36 4.58 5.7 13.3 7.4 3.4 4.6%
Sources: Elaboration of official prices, Quattroruote, monthly. ISTAT price index of 
consumer goods; See table A7.4 in the appendix.
As shown by the table above, Fiat increased prices below the ISTAT index in 1983, 
and from 1985 to 1987.17 In the same period, Ford was the most effective competitor in 
containing the annual increase in prices. As shown in chapter 3, after 1982 Fiat returned 
to profitability, improving the bottom line throughout the period considered in this 
thesis. In addition, the last chapter has shown that during the 1980s the output mix 
shifted downmarket, because of the strategy of product renewal focused on the bottom 
product range. This strategy aimed to contain production costs and increase price 
competitiveness. The fact that during the 1980s Fiat was able to contain the increase in 
prices to levels well below inflation, responding efficiently to aggressive price 
competition by Ford, suggests that the adjustment of the output mix downmarket, and 
therefore the Ghidella strategy, worked according to expectations. The next section is an 
attempt to support this view with the available data concerning costs per segment.
Section three
Economies of scale: Fiat’s output structure and typical European volumes
The preceding chapters argued that the Fiat’s output mix during the 1980s was driven 
by the company’s comparative advantage in the manufacturing of small cars, as opposed 
to the comparative advantage of French and German manufacturers in the production of 
upper-range units. Using the available data, this section investigates the relationship 
between the shift of the output mix downmarket and the behaviour of total costs.
17 ISTAT (National Institute of Statistic).
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Output-mix optimisation and the problem of data
The choice of the optimal output mix is usually taken according to a sensitivity 
analysis, which highlights the behaviour of the total margin of contribution (TCM) 
according to variations in the output of each model. The simulation of the behaviour of 
TCM, therefore, requires knowledge of the unit contribution margin (UCM) of each 
model at various levels of output. Because the contribution margin is such an important 
determinant of the performance of any company, information regarding CM tends to be 
circulated among only a restricted number of managers, and often is not recorded 
according to the normal archival procedures. Consequently, data on contribution 
margins such as those presented in the preceding chapter 5, table 5.3 are extremely rare. 
Business historians, thus, should always assume that the likelihood of finding an even 
more detailed and wider data set enabling the dynamic analysis of TCM is close to zero. 
An extensive exploration of the Fiat Archive has confirmed this assumption. This is the 
reason why this section of the chapter is mainly based on secondary sources, namely 
data from a study made by Ludvigsen and Associates Limited (LAL) in 1988, using
1 fiinformation received by motor car producers.
By using the LAL data, it will be shown how costs behave at different output levels 
and with different output mixes. It has to be made clear that the exercises run using LAL 
data will provide only an indication of how Fiat costs would have behaved assuming 
that Fiat’s cost structure reflected the average cost structure of a typical European car 
manufacturer. In the LAL study, the 'typical' car manufacturer is one for which the cost 
incurred in the production of each model are equal to the typical costs of the European 
car industry, in each segment of the market. Typical costs were defined as the weighted 
average of production costs in each segment. This has been worked out by weighting the 
production costs of each model competing in a specific segment according to its share of 
the European market.19 As will be explained in the following paragraphs, given the way 
LAL has weighted each single observation in the computation of the typical per unit 
costs in each segment, it seems reasonable to assume that these costs would be higher 
than Fiat's actual costs for the lower-segment units, and lower than Fiat’s costs in the 
upper-segment units. Therefore, if  the exercise shows that applying the European costs
18 Ludvigsen Associated Limited, The Cost o f non Europe: The Benefit o f the EC 92 in the Car Sector 
(Bruxelles, 1988).
19 Ibid., pp. 45-91.
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to Fiat, the more the output mix shifts downmarket the more total costs are minimised, 
then we can assume that the same thing happened with the actual Fiat cost structure. 
Based on the same assumption, an exercise analysing the behaviour of total operating 
profits will be run. Both exercises will be presented as an indication that the available 
data suggest that the more the mix shifted downmarket, the more Fiat optimised output. 
The results of the exercises will be supported by some Fiat data on lead times in the 
final assembly.
The LAL study forecasts the effect of the 1992 integration of the European market on
the car industry.20 In particular, the study analyses the effect of the abolition of “fiscal
and non-fiscal barriers to trade” on production costs. Non-fiscal barriers are differences
in national regulation leading to different specifications for components and complete
cars, which affect economies of scale negatively and diminish the profitability of certain 
01markets. Firstly, the study estimates the behaviour of costs for almost every vehicle 
component as well as for complete vehicles in the 1985 price condition. The analysis is 
run for each segment and costs are estimates for the typical model in each segment. Per 
unit costs of a typical model (typical costs) in each segment are estimated by using data 
from all the European manufacturers of cars and components. Finally, the study 
estimates the cost saving in the 1992 conditions, under the assumption that a more even 
fiscal policy would induce a demand-driven output expansion, while a more even 
regulation would induce a cost-saving-driven output expansion. In fact, uniform 
regulations would induce higher standardisation, which in turn would reduce both 
variable and fixed costs. The study, therefore, provides a valuable source of data about 
the cost structure of the European industry in 1985 conditions.
The relevant output-mix range
In order to establish whether Fiat’s output mix during the 1980s was the optimal one 
for the company, it is necessary to establish viable alternative output mixes. In other 
words, we need to set a range of mixes within which the Fiat output could reasonably 
shift up- or downmarket. The following paragraphs compare the actual Fiat output 
structure during the 1980s with the European average output in 1985, with the European 
“normal output” (henceforth European Norm) in 1985, and with the Fiat budget output.
20 Ibid.
21 The extreme case of such non-tariff barriers to trade is driving on the left side in the UK.
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The European average (Ea) and the European norm (En) are the two output structures 
used in the LAL study to analyse economies of scale in the European industry. The 
European average (Ea) has been calculated by dividing the European production in each 
segment by the number of platforms in each segment.22 The European norm (En) refers 
to the average output of the typical model in each segment. This has been worked out 
by weighting the output of each model in each segment by its share of the European 
market. Fiat’s budget output is the output structure, as it would have been had the 
company produced each model at the optimum output level (for instance, 1000 Regata 
per day produced at the Cassino plant, 1000 Ritmo per day produced between the 
Cassino and the Rivalta plants, and 2000 Uno per day produced between the Rivalta and 
Mirafiori plants ). This has been calculated on the basis of Fiat data.
The budget output, the European average and the European norm represent the 
alternative output structures we have to compare with the actual output structure of Fiat 
from 1984 to 1987 in order to assess the company’s output-mix strategy. The whole set 
of outputs represents the relevant output range of this investigation. The reason why 
Fiat’s actual output structure was different from that resulting from producing each 
model at its optimum level (budget output mix) will also be analysed. Once the various 
alternatives for Fiat to change the output mix have been set, the LAL data on segment 
per unit costs will be used as the basis for estimating the impact of changes in the output 
mix on Fiat’s total costs. Finally, the impact of changes in the output structure on total 
operating profits will be estimated by confronting total costs with total revenues 
generated by the various hypothetical and real output mixes.
Before comparing the Fiat output mix with the European output structure, it is 
important to make a note of the criteria utilised by LAL to classify market segments as 
compared with the criteria adopted in this thesis so far, namely the standard criteria used 
by ANFIA.24 According to those criteria, cars are grouped as follows: segment A (500- 
900 c.c.), B (900-1100 c.c.), C (1100-1300 c.c.), D (1300-1600 c.c.) and E (1600-2200 
c.c.). In the LAL study, segments are divided into utility (U), small (S), lower medium 
(LM), upper medium (UM) and large (L). The study provides examples of models 
fitting into each category.
22 Ludvigsen and Associates The Cost o f non Europe, pp. 45-91.
23 Ibid.
24 The Italian National Association of Vehicle Manufacturers and Dealers.
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In general terms, the two classifications are consistent with each other. However, the 
Lancia Prisma and Fiat Regata have been considered lower-medium units by the LAL 
study, whereas they have been considered as segment D units throughout this thesis. For 
this reason, some of the exercises presented in the subsequent sections of this chapter 
have been replicated in the appendix by assigning to the Regata and Prisma costs for 
segment C rather than segment D. As will been shown later, the results do not differ.
The reason why LAL considers the Regata and Prisma lower-medium units is that 
those cars used the same platform as the Ritmo. However, the Regata and Prisma 
engines ranged from 1300 cc to 1600 cc, as opposed to the Ritmo engines, which ranged 
from 1100 cc to 1300 cc. This means that in the case of Prisma/Regata the engine, 
namely one of the most expensive components of a car, fits into the segment D range of 
component costs (upper medium). This also means that for those two models, the level 
of finishing and body components had to be raised to the segment D level. Finally, the 
stretching of the platform involves some engineering costs, which means the cost of the 
Ritmo platform differs from the cost of the Regata platform.
For all those reasons, in this study the Prisma and Regata have been considered as 
upper-medium units. Nevertheless, as will be shown later, the use of the same platform 
damaged the image of the Fiat D segment, which was perceived by consumers and part 
of the specialised press as a sort of compromise between segments C and D.
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The Fiat production mix compared with the European output structure
Table 7.3 shows how Fiat output per segment compares to the European average, and 
European norm.
Table 7.3: Relevant range of output mixes
Segments Fiat output mix 
according to the 
budget allocation of 
capacity among 
segments
Fiat actual output (units) European 
average 
volumes (1985 
benchmark)
European 
norm: typical 
volumes (1985 
benchmark)
1984 1984 1985 1986 1987 1985 1985
A (U) 394,400 148,121 146,353 355,18
3
418,42
2
119,000 110,000
B (S) 498.800 675,614 595,922 663,61
8
708,83
4
350,000 440,000
C (LM) 348,000 185,773 151,704 130,70
5
100,31
2
505,000 525,000
D(UM) 348,000 272,304 233,713 209,87
3
200,82
7
243,000 315,000
E(L) 83,520 24,141 36,008 116,43
6
118,04
6
100,000 140,000
Sources: Elaboration of data from the Fiat Archives,( Libro dei numeri di matricola dei veicoli 
prodotti’ (Fiat Production File), and from Ludvigsen and Associates, The Cost o f non Europe, p. 33.
First of all, it should be noted that had Fiat set production according to budgets, 
segments A and B would have been substantially above both average and norm, segment 
C would have been substantially below the average and the norm, segment D would 
have been substantially above the average and slightly above the norm, while segment E 
would have been below the average and substantially below the norm. If segment D is 
added to segment C according to the LAL criteria, the Fiat budget lower-medium output 
would have been far above the European average and norm, but still below the sum of 
lower and upper-medium in both the European average and norm (see table A 7.5 in the 
appendix).
In theory, the production plan reflects the visible hand of mangers in terms of output 
choice. The budget production output was divided into 53% for lower-segment units and 
47% for upper-segment units. Therefore, if Fiat managers had stuck with the production 
budget, the output structure of the 1980s would have been less skewed downmarket 
compared with the output structure of the 1970s, than it actually was.
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Once the attention shifts to the actual output, table 7.3 shows that Fiat is far below 
the En in the upper segments, while it is well above the En in the lower segments. This 
applies also to the average, where only segment E is slightly above the average after 
1985, when the new Croma and Thema were introduced. This suggests Fiat’s 
comparative advantage in the lower segments over the European industry. Nevertheless, 
the question to be addressed is whether the actual Fiat output mix was the outcome of 
consumers’ preferences or the outcome of a deliberate strategy of output-mix 
optimisation.
Chapter 6 has addressed the relationship between output-mix strategy and product 
renewal. Here it is useful to elaborate a bit further on that relationship. The fact that 
product renewal is one of the most important factors pushing sales is the foundation of 
the product life-cycle theory. Assuming that resources are limited, it is the priority 
given to each segment in terms of product renewal that ultimately dictates the output 
mix, and the way in which the available capacity is allocated to each model. Product 
renewal means the launch of an entirely new product as opposed to the re-styling of the 
body of an existing car. In segment A, the Panda was introduced in 1980, while the Y10, 
which was based on the same platform, was launched in 1984. In segment B, the Uno 
was launched in 1982. In segment C, the Lancia Delta was launched in 1980, but it was 
based on the platform of the Ritmo, which had been designed before the first oil crisis in 
1973, and launched in 1978. In segment D, the Prisma was launched in 1983 and the 
Regata in 1984. However, these new models were based on the platform of the Ritmo, 
which had already been used for the Delta. This had two implications. Firstly, neither 
model was suited to compete properly in its own segment.27 Secondly, the Prisma was 
produced on the same line formerly producing the Beta range, which, in terms of 
segments was to be considered an E range. This actually shifted the Lancia output 
downmarket. In any case, the fact that the Prisma and Regata were based on the same 
platform as the Ritmo gave the public the impression that Fiat had devoted fewer 
resources to those models.
As far as the segment E is concerned, the Croma and Thema were based on the same 
platform, but in this case, the component had been newly designed, according to quality 
specifications of segment E. Therefore, the two models were more successful than Fiat’s
25 See Abernathy, Industrial Renaissance, p. 22.
26 Source/ Fiat: Le fasi dell crescita, Archivio Storico Fiat (ed.) (Torino, 1996).
27 The Prisma, for example, could carry just four people.
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models competing in the C and D segments. Nonetheless, it is important to point out 
that the so-called Project Four, which was based on a platform developed by Saab and 
included the Fiat Croma, the Lancia Thema, the Saab 9000 and the Alfa Romeo 164, 
was postponed by Fiat management. Therefore, the Thema and Croma were launched in 
1984, eight years after the joint venture with Saab had been established.
Platform sharing is an engineering-led cost-saving strategy. The aim is to maximise 
economies of scale in the manufacturing of platforms. Although the strategy is effective 
in terms of cost saving, it has some downsides in terms of marketing. The fact that in the 
case of the Prisma and Regata, not only did management decide to share the platform, 
but also to use an existing one, means that the resources allocated to compete in that 
segment were relatively low. The whole project was based on a cost-saving strategy 
aiming to sustain low levels of output by lowering the break-even point rather than to 
expand market shares. The same concept applies to segment C. Segment E was, in a 
way, a surprise. The demand for the Croma and the Thema exceeded the budgeted 
output so that the segment output was well above average although it remained below 
the typical output (norm).
Given the renewal strategy and the technical synergy pursued by Fiat management, it 
looks obvious that the output mix shifted downmarket during the 1980s. In this sense, 
the budgeted output mix was rather meaningless. Along with the product renewal 
strategy, the inherent characteristic of the Robogate technology had also an impact on 
the output mix. As we have seen in other parts of the thesis,28 according to the budget 
production plan, the Cassino plant should have been producing 1000 Regata and 400 
Ritmo per day, with another 600 Ritmo produced at Rivalta along with and 800 Uno per 
day, although, after 1986 the Rivalta plant produced only the Uno. In any case, all the 
units were welded by the same set of welding tools, the Robogate system, which were 
also used at the Mirafiori plant. Such flexibility did not allow the stabilisation of 
production at the optimum capacity rate over the whole set of flexible lines, since the 
production of the Uno could not be moved to the Cassino plant. Nevertheless, the 
Robogate system had the effect of lowering the commitment of management to stick 
with the initial production budget set for the Rivalta and Mirafiori plants. Since the Uno 
could be welded at Mirafiori along with the Y10, the Thema and the Croma, and at 
Rivalta along with the Ritmo, all these models were competing with each other for
28 See chapter 4, pp. 158-170.
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production capacity allocation, and there is little doubt that the older models would have 
received the smallest share of capacity
Some considerations on using the Ludvigsen data set as a proxy of Fiat costs
The LAL study estimates the typical per unit production costs per segment of the 
European car industry at different levels of output in 1985. In order to work out per unit 
costs per segment, LAL has used the following sources:
1. Manufacturers' breakdowns of fixed and variable costs of particular models.
2. Variable cost differentials between models in different segments produced by the 
same manufacturer.29
3. Research findings on manufacturers' levels of purchasing and in-house sourcing.
4. A part-by-part costing of the principal components of a particular models.
5. Comparative data on engine costs for a wide range of European passenger car 
models.30
Using the above sources, LAL has established the existing cost structure of the 
“typical” car in each segment, and how its constituent costs change at different levels of 
output. Typical costs have been calculated by averaging the per unit costs of all cars 
produced in each segment in 1985. In the computation of the average, the costs of each 
model have been weighted for its market shares.31 Typical costs at various levels of 
output are shown by table A7.5 in the appendix. From the LAL data set, typical costs 
have been derived for the Fiat relevant output range shown in table 7.2. The new data 
set allows analysing the impact of changes in output mix on Fiat’s total costs, assuming 
typical costs.32 Therefore, the relevant question is whether any useful inference on Fiat’s 
actual costs behaviour might be derived from a simulation based on the LAL typical 
costs.
Table 7.4 shows the output per segment and per manufacturer of the European car 
industry in 1985. Fiat and Peugeot had a dominant position in the lower segments, 
Volkswagen, Opel and Ford were dominant in the middle sectors, whereas BMW, 
Mercedes and Volvo were dominant in the upper segments of the market. The data 
shown by table 7.4 were used to weight individual observations and compute typical
29 Note that LAL published only the aggregate data of typical costs, since data on the costs of individual 
models are protected by a confidentiality clause.
30 Ludvigsen and Associates, The Cost o f non Europe, p. 42.
31 Ibid.
32 The data set is shown by table A7.6 in the appendix.
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costs in each segment of the European market. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that 
in the segments A and B the actual costs of Fiat and PSA should be closer to typical 
costs than the actual costs of other competitors. In addition, in segments C and D actual 
costs of Volkswagen Ford and Opel should be closer to typical costs than those of Fiat 
and PSA. Finally, typical costs in segment E should reflect the actual costs of BMW and 
Mercedes.
Table 7.4; Output (units) per segment per manufacturer, 1985
Segment A B C D £ F
C.C. 500-800 800-1100 1100-1300 1300-1600 1600-2200 Over 2200
Manufacturer
Ford 380,795 500,550 326,467 85,000
General Motors 277,101 576,351 340,504 97,912
Fiat and Lancia 205,124 555,572 140,151 223,589 34,853
Renault 87,835 454,089 537,167 91,647 137,012
Volkswagen and Audi 260,857 878,991 108,261 339,830
Austin Rover 34,974 166,536 167,618 65,844 15,920
Peugeot and Citroen 208,164 595,339 360,716 166,840
Volvo 239,180 157,838
BMW 287,158 143,927
Mercedes 211,804 290,785
Saab 98,092 13,721
Source: Ludvigsen and Associates, The Cost o f  non Europe, pp. 86-90.
Since in car manufacturing economies of scale have a significant impact on per unit 
costs, it is reasonable to assume that in the lower segments of the market Fiat and PSA 
had the lowest production costs of all manufacturers, while Volkswagen Opel and Ford 
were the most cost-competitive manufacturers in segments C and D, and BMW and 
Mercedes had the lowest costs in segment E. By contrast, the actual Fiat per unit costs 
had to be among the highest in segments C, D and E. If we accept this assumption, we 
accept that typical costs could only be equal to, or higher than, the actual costs of Fiat in 
segments A and B. By contrast, typical costs in the upper segments could only be equal 
to, or lower than, Fiat's actual costs. Therefore, even if  typical costs were different from 
Fiat’s actual costs, we can assume that to use the LAL per segment unit typical costs as
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a proxy for Fiat’s actual costs means essentially to overestimate Fiat costs in the lower 
segments at any level of output, and to underestimate costs in the higher segments at any 
level of output, as compared with the real Fiat costs. This implies that if  the LAL data 
are used to work out the effect of changes in the output mix on Fiat's total costs, and the 
results of the exercises show that the actual output structure of Fiat during the 1980s 
minimised total costs, a similar behaviour of total costs and operating profits should be 
expected if the actual Fiat costs were used, with even lower total costs.
Cost variation in the relevant range of output-mix.
Starting from the LAL database (table A 7.5), by using linear regression technique, 
typical per unit costs have been estimated in each segment according to the Fiat output 
mix from 1984 to 1987. The same exercise was repeated for the Fiat budget production 
plan. The results are shown in tables A7.6 in the appendix. The results, thus, are a proxy 
for the unit cost per segment that would have occurred by setting production according 
to any of the output mixes within the relevant range shown in table 7.3. As already 
stated, the relevant range refers to different output mixes that should be compared in 
order to assess alternative output-mix strategies. Segment costs have been calculated by 
multiplying per unit costs in table A 7.6 by the number of units in each segment, for 
each alternative output structure. Total costs have been worked out, therefore, by 
summing up all the various segment costs (see table A7.7 in the appendix). The result 
shows the effect of changes in the output level and output mix on total costs assuming 
typical European costs in static 1985 conditions.
Figure 7.2 shows that the best output mix of Fiat was that of 1987, which was also 
that most skewed towards the lower segments, with 70% of the total output consisting of 
segment A and B units. The figure is based on the data shown by table A7.7 in the 
appendix. As already stated, the table shows how changes in output mix affects total 
costs.
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Figure 7.2: Ratio of costs to output at various levels of outputs and output 
mixes, assuming typical costs -1985 prices
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Source: See table A7.7 in the appendix.
From data in table A7.7, an index of total output (in units) and total costs has been 
calculated, for each alternative output mix in the relevant range (base year 1984=100). 
The ratio of the costs index to the output index shows how rapidly costs increase 
compared with different output levels encompassing different output mixes (costs are 
expressed in 1985 ITL). Any value below 1 in the ratio scale denotes that costs increase 
more slowly than output.
As shown by figure 7.2, given the lowest ratio of costs to output, the output mix for 
1987 is the most cost efficient, among those mixes with a value lower than 1. The 
budget output mix is the second best option, and the 1986 mix the third best, the ratios 
of both falling below 1. On the other hand, with the output set at the European simple 
average and norm, costs increase much more quickly than output.33 Figure 7.2 suggests 
that by looking at the output-mix optimisation issue costs-wise, engineers were right in
33 Figure A7.1 in the appendix replicates the same exercise, adding the output of the Regata and Prisma 
and relative costs to segment C rather than D. Nonetheless, the result does not change.
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emphasising product renewal of the lower range, pushing the de facto output mix 
downmarket. This is an important piece of information, since engineers had access to 
cost-related information, which clearly affected not only their process of decision­
making, but also their own perceptions of what had to be done to maximise profits and 
run the business properly. In other words, cost accounting was the determinant of the 
engineers’ business culture.
The view of the engineers was opposite to that of some marketing managers, such as 
Rossignolo, who argued that by shifting output upmarket, revenues from sales would 
have been larger, and therefore, there was a trade-off between higher costs and larger 
revenues. In this respect, though, the effect of price competition becomes crucial. The 
relevant question, thus, is whether the output mixes most skewed downmarket were not 
only the most cost efficient, but also those ensuring the largest operating profits (total 
revenues minus total costs).
In order to address this question, the exercise previously run in figure 7.2 has been 
replicated by expressing segment and total output in terms of value rather than units. 
The value of total outputs has been calculated by multiplying the weighted average of 
per unit revenues from domestic sales in each segment by the output share of each 
segment in each of the various output mixes in the relevant range. Then, by summing up 
all the segment revenues, the total revenues of each output mix in the relevant range 
have been calculated. Table A7.8 in the appendix shows the data set so obtained.
The weighted average of per unit revenues for each segment has been obtained by 
calculating the average price of each model in each segment net of VAT and dealer 
profits. The average segment price has been weighted for the share of each model out of 
the segment output. This provides per segment revenues assuming that the whole output 
is sold in the domestic market. Revenues have been calculated using domestic prices 
and domestic dealers' profits for simplicity, but also because per unit revenues from 
domestic sales are, by definition, higher than those from external sales. In fact, in order 
to push sales abroad, relative prices are set at a lower level than domestic prices. 
Moreover, in order to encourage dealers abroad to trade foreign rather than national 
brands, they have to be offered higher margins than those offered to domestic ones. 
Finally, it is reasonable to assume that in some markets such as Germany, the 
competitive pressure for a manufacturer like Fiat is much higher in the top end of the 
market. Thus, since the exercises assume domestic revenues that are higher than
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external ones in the face of equal costs for all units of each model, whether sold in 
external or domestic markets, if  the exercises show that the best operating profit 
maximising outputs are those skewed towards the lower segments, the result has to 
stand had total revenues been adjusted for external sales.
VAT accounted for 20%, while the margin retained by the domestic dealers was 15% 
for the Fiat Croma, Regata and Ritmo and Lancia models, and 12% for the Panda Y10 
and Uno.34 The exercise assumes a static condition, in that it has been run by keeping 
prices constant in 1985 terms. The result shows how total revenues and total costs 
behave by shifting from the 1984 output to the 1985-86-87 output mixes, and to the 
budget output, the European average and the European norm outputs.
Figure 7.3 shows the effect of shifts in output mixes on costs, revenues and operating 
profits. As already said, total revenues encompass the effect of changing output mix. As 
for the previous exercise, an index of revenues has been calculated and confronted with 
the index of costs (output mix 1984 = 100). A ratio of revenues to costs has then been 
calculated. The output mix which best maximises revenues vis-a-vis costs is again the 
1987 one, where the ratio is the highest among those above 1. Thus revenues grow more 
quickly than costs, where the difference between revenues and costs (operating profits) 
is the largest among those in the relevant range of alternative output mixes. The 
exercises presented above show the effect of changes in output mixes on total costs and 
operating profits, assuming that Fiat costs were consistent with European typical costs 
and that the entire output was sold in the domestic market, where selling prices are 
usually higher. Given those assumptions, the profitability of upper- rather than lower- 
segment units has been overestimated in the simulation. Yet, the results show that most 
profitable output mix was also the most skewed towards the bottom rather than the 
upper end of the product range. The results, therefore, can be taken as indicative of the 
actual effect of changes in the output mix on the behaviour of Fiat's total operating 
profits. In the final part of the chapter, the technical capacity constraints are analysed to 
approach output-mix optimisation from an organisational point of view and show how 
quality affects both production costs and production organisation. The aim is to support 
the results of our simulation with Fiat data.
34 Source: ANFIA.
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Figure 7.3 Ratio of revenues to costs at various levels of outputs and output
mixes, assuming typical costs - 1985 prices
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Source: See Table A. 7.8 in the appendix.
The cycle time in final assembly (Uno, Croma, and Thema)
This paragraph analyses lead-time differentials in final assembly among some Fiat 
models produced between 1984 and 1987. The investigation will shed light on some of 
the reasons why the more the output mix was skewed towards lower-segment units the 
more it was cost efficient. At the state of the art in the 1980s, car assembly was labour 
intensive, where costs were a function of the time absorbed by the operation, which was 
a function of the complexity of the vehicle processed.
The total time absorbed by an assembled unit is called the lead time. Let us take the 
example of the Fiat Uno. The lead-time was 7h = 420 minutes, while the basic cycle 
time of each operation was 2 minutes. The number of assembly stations was, therefore, 
210 = (420/2 minutes). On average, there were two workers in each assembly station so 
that the total number of workers employed in the production line was about 420 units on 
double shift, for a total of 900 minutes of production per day. Each assembly line, thus, 
was processing 450 cars per day (900/2 minutes). Regardless o f the number of stations 
through which each unit had to pass, the per unit assembly cost was:
C = 2 * 420 * W
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where 2 is the number of workers per station, 420 is the duration of the lead-time 
expressed in minutes and W is the cost of labour per time unit. In other words, given a 
lead-time of 420 minutes and 2 workers per assembly station, the per unit assembly cost 
was equal to the cost of 2 workers working for 420 minutes on a single unit, even 
though each pair of workers actually worked 2 minutes on each unit. The per unit 
assembly cost, therefore, is a function of the number of workers per assembly station 
multiplied by the lead time.
By basic cycle time, we mean the minimum amount of time that each unit has to 
spend in each assembly station. The basic cycle time is a parameter set by engineers 
when a car is engineered. It depends on total output, the number of lines engineers want 
to set, the quality level established for the product and the complexity of each assembly 
operation.35 In particular, quality is determined by the length of the basic cycle time. The 
longer the cycle time, the higher the quality. Once the cycle time is set according to the 
output and the number of lines, the complexity of the vehicle determines the lead time, 
as well as the number of stations and therefore the segmentation of the process. In fact, 
the number of stations is given by the lead-time divided by the cycle time.
Table 7.5: Lead-times in final assembly for the Uno, Croma and Thema
Model Basic Cycle time Output per 
assembly line on 
double shift
Lead-time Number of Stations 
(lead time/cycle 
time)
Average Number 
of Labour Units 
per station
Minutes Minutes
Uno 2 450 420 210 2
Croma 5 180 720 144 2
Thema 5 180 720 144 2
Source: Fiat technical management. Interview with the author, 8 January 2001.
From the table above, we infer that the cost of labour in the assembly of the 
Croma/Thema was 71.4% higher than the cost of labour in the assembly of the Uno. Let 
us assume, now, that the management wants to expand output in the upper end of the 
production range. In this case, it would hardly be possible to cut the cycle time and, 
therefore, the lead-time. Management would prefer to add another line or implement 
extra time. In fact, to cut the basic cycle time is not a viable solution, because to force 
workers to speed up the assembly operation by increasing effort would inevitably affect
35 In this section, we are focusing on final assembly. However, the same concept stands for any segment of 
the process of car manufacturing.
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quality, which is a crucial determinant of competitiveness, particularly for the upper- 
segment units. In this respect, the labour-intensive final assembly differs from spot 
welding and other highly automated stages, where the operating speed of robots and 
tools can be increased without compromising quality, given advances in the technology 
deployed. Once another assembly line is added, there are two possibilities. Either 
managers can double output or make the new line work at lower speeds, by setting a 
longer basic cycle time. This second option is less cost efficient. The implementation of 
an extra shift is not cost efficient either, because labour costs per hour would be much 
higher than the cost of labour utilised during the normal shift. If management manages 
to set an extra assembly line and to run it at full capacity thus doubling production, per 
unit assembly costs do not decrease, but rather remain constant, since the lead-time of 
the second line is equal to that of the first lines. In other words, because in final 
assembly quality constrains the cycle time, economies of scale are rather exhausted.
In any case, here the emphasis is on the fact that when output increases, the final 
assembly will be optimised if the increment in output justifies the implementation of 
each extra line at full capacity. Given that the capacity of the Croma assembly line was 
180 units per day, the optimal increment of production would have been 360 cars per 
day (180x2).
If, on the other hand, output increases only by 50%, the following scenario would 
have taken place: the first 180 would have been produced by the first line with a cycle 
time of 5 minutes (900 minutes of double shift duration divided by 180 units of output), 
with a lead-time of 720 minutes and a process segmentation of 144 stations (720/5 
minutes), while the other 90 units will be processed at a cycle time of 10 minutes 
(900/90 minutes), which multiplied by 144 assembly stations would give a lead-time of 
1440 minutes, which implies double labour costs in final assembly. In other words, 
because in final assembly economies of scale are negligible, management can either 
double production having constant returns to scale or increase production by less than 
100% and have decreasing returns to scale on the extra units produced by the second 
line. The same concept applies to the cost of capital allocated to an extra line in final 
assembly. This dramatically poses the problem of demand constraint. In 1986 and 1987, 
Fiat was producing both the Croma and the Thema above the planned quota of 180 units 
per day, but never managed to double output of both Croma and Thema, where the extra 
units produced were generating decreasing returns to scale in the final assembly.
291
In this respect, it is interesting to compare the Uno with the Croma and the Thema. 
Between 1982 and 1985, the number of assembly lines of the Uno increased from 4 to 6. 
One line was added to the first two lines at the Mirafiori plant in 1984, and one line was 
added at the Rivalta plant in 1986. Assembly rate of the new lines was 450 units per day 
which was the optimal rate for that model.36 In 1986, the Thema was produced at 
Mirafiori at a rate of 231 units per day, while the Croma was processed at a rate of 277 
units per day. For each model, the units exceeding 180 cars per day were processed by a 
second assembly line whose functioning was sub-optimal. Therefore, additional units 
had a per unit assembly cost higher than the first 180 units. In this regard, it is useful to 
remember that although the final assembly stage of manufacturing was labour intensive, 
the Croma and the Thema could not share the assembly line with the Uno precisely 
because the basic cycle time of the former was much longer than that of the Uno, which 
in turn would generate bottlenecks.
Of course, costs in final assembly do not necessarily represent the whole cost 
structure of Fiat. However, the examples reported above shows how production 
constraints interact with production organisation, where for Fiat it was easier to optimise 
an extra line for the assembly of the Uno than to organise the assembly of extra units of 
the Croma and the Thema in an optimal way. In the first case, to expand production by 
about 50% in each plant fully justified the deployment of another assembly line at both 
Mirafiori and at Rivalta, whereas for the Croma and Thema an expansion of production 
by 100% would have been necessary to optimise an extra assembly line for each model.
Conclusions
This chapter has highlighted three points. Firstly, it has shown that in the second part 
of the 1970s, Fiat management had various reasons to believe that collusion could not 
hold in the long term. Secondly, it has shown that during the 1980s, price competition 
was actually restored, and that Fiat was able to be price competitive. The final part of 
the chapter provides an indication that the shift downmarket led to the minimisation of 
total costs, which explains why the company could be price competitive throughout the 
decade. The exercises on costs are based on figures that are assumed to be representative 
of Fiat per segment costs. However, the analysis of lead-times in the final assembly of
36 This paragraph refers to assembly lines which have not to be confused with the welding lines. Welding 
lines were three at the Mirafiori plant and one at the Rivalta plant.
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some Fiat models confirms that for Fiat, during the 1980s, it was more profitable to 
increase output in the lower rather than in the upper segments of demand.
In the previous chapter, it was shown that in the late 1960s Fiat management shifted 
upmarket under the assumption that price competition was not going to play a role after 
the abolition of tariffs. This would have minimised the comparative advantage held by 
German manufacturers in the upper segments of the market, as acknowledged by the 
Fiat design team. In this chapter, it has been shown that as soon as price competition 
was restored, Fiat shifted back downmarket. The routine underpinning output-mix 
decision-making was essentially the same in both cases, which undoubtedly meant a
\7kind of path dependency in the form of managerial lock-in was in place. The output 
mix was decided according to the regime of competition while the pattern of 
specialisation, and, therefore, the comparative advantage had to remain stable over time.
37 As far as the concept of path dependency is concerned see David, ‘Clio’ in Witt (ed.), Evolutionary 
Economics ( 1993), and Magnusson and Ottoson (eds), Evolutionary Economics (1997).
Chapter eight 
Conclusions
In order to contribute to academic research, scholars can either explore new topics or 
re-address issues that still require satisfactory answers. This thesis looks at the 
restructuring of Fiat during the 1970s and 1980s, when the company experienced a 
managerial turnover at the pinnacle of the organisational hierarchy and the restructuring 
of the production process. In particular the thesis addresses the question whether there 
was a discontinuity between the generation of managers who had masterminded the 
growth of the company during the 1950s and 1960s, and the generation of managers 
who gradually came to dominate the company between 1973 and 1979. Much of the 
established literature on Fiat maintains that the restructuring of the 1970s brought about 
a discontinuity in management, which has been formalised as a shift from inflexible to 
flexible mass production. Such a shift implies a drastic change in the routines 
underpinning operations and strategic management. As already stated several times in 
this thesis, Amatori maintains that the issue of discontinuity in the Fiat management has 
not been satisfactorily answered so far. This thesis fulfils the agenda set by Amatori by 
looking at two variables, namely technological change and output-mix optimisation. In 
doing so, this work departs from the view of discontinuity and shows that the set of 
routines underpinning the selection of new technologies as well as the selection of the 
output-mix optimisation strategy remained stable throughout the period considered. 
Continuity in management and stability in decision making are the two important 
elements linking the case of Fiat to the literature on path dependency and managerial 
lock-in.1
1 See David, ‘Clio’ in Witt (ed.), Evolutionary Economics ( 1993), and Magnusson and Ottoson (eds), 
Evolutionary Economics (1997).
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The question addressed by this thesis is relevant in the debate on post-Fordism. In the 
1980s and early 1990s, the response of the industrial economies to crisis of the 1970s 
attracted the interest of researchers in many disciplines, from Business History and 
Industrial Relations to Business Management and Business Economics. The crisis of the 
1970s was interpreted as the crisis of the Fordist system of mass production. The shift 
from Fordism to new production paradigms was seen not only as the outcome of the rise 
of new industries exploiting new technologies and products, but also as a consequence 
of the application of new technologies to mature industries.
As far as mature industries were concerned, car manufacturing was unsurprisingly at 
the centre of the post-Fordism debate. Flexibility was the main category used to explain 
the crisis of the 1970s, and assesses the effectiveness o f the response of the car industry 
to that crisis. In the late 1990s though, the debate on post-Fordism appeared to progress 
slowly. The shift from Fordism to post-Fordism implied a discontinuity in strategic and 
operations management. Nonetheless, such a discontinuity was assumed rather than 
proved. The main variable used to distinguish between Fordism and post-Fordism, 
namely the flexibility of the production system, was not empirically analysed in a 
satisfactory way.
In the context of the debate on the crisis of Fordism, the case of Fiat stands out as one 
of the most interesting. The established literature on the company supports the 
discontinuity view, and maintains that between the late 1970s and early 1980s Fiat 
departed from Fordist mass production by deploying flexible manufacturing systems 
based on robotics. Of particular interest was the deployment of robotics in the spot- 
welding shop. In fact, Fiat became one of the most studied cases of a firm shifting from 
inflexible to flexible mass production precisely because of its massive investments in 
robotics. Furthermore, Fiat developed robotics in house.
Crucially, the established literature on Fiat is locked in a circular argument. Firstly, it 
explains the deployment of robotics as a move in the quest for production flexibility, 
and then uses the deployment of robotics as compelling evidence that the Fiat 
production setting during the 1980s was flexible. This thesis breaks this circularity by
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testing flexibility against an independent variable, namely the rate of capacity utilisation 
of the production lines.
Such a methodology has been implemented for the first time, thanks to a set of 
unpublished data discovered during extensive fieldwork in the Fiat Archives. The theory 
underpinning the methodology is that the utilisation rate of flexible lines is less sensitive 
than that of inflexible lines to fluctuations in demand for specific models and to changes 
in the relative size of specific market segments. Therefore, if  production lines are 
flexible, the rate of capacity utilisation of each line should stabilise at about the 
optimum level. As shown in chapter 4, the first finding of this thesis is that during the 
1980s both robotised and traditional production lines experienced marked fluctuations 
in the rate of capacity utilisation, with some lines implementing considerable amounts 
of extra time, while others were under-utilised. The implication of this finding is that the 
flexibility in production assumed by the established literature was simply not there. This 
is an important contribution to the debate on post-Fordism because it shows that in the 
case of Fiat, it is not appropriate to trace the shift towards flexible mass production back 
to the late 1970s, or early 1980s. Furthermore, the findings show that the 
implementation of robotics per se does not imply flexible manufacturing.
The persistence of market fluctuations in the rate of capacity utilisation during the 
1980s, when Fiat was using fully robotised plants, raises the question whether those 
fluctuations depended on the lack of technological development or on managerial 
factors. This question is important in the debate of continuity and discontinuity in 
management and leads directly to the issue of routines underpinning the selection and 
deployment of new technologies. Chapter 4 shows that the fluctuations in the rate of 
capacity utilisation of robotised lines depended upon the way Fiat production managers 
deployed robotics, rather than upon technological constraints. Robotics was deployed 
only in those stages of the process in which traditional technologies did not allow for the 
minimisation of the cycle time. The rest of the process was left unchanged.
The important point here is that the minimisation of the cycle time was the aim of the 
Fordist managerial exercise. Cycle time was reduced by increasing the segmentation of 
the process, by decreasing the complexity of the process and product, and by deploying 
task-specific tools. Tool specificity and process segmentation led to the inflexibility of
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the system. In this sense, Fordism was consistent with the managerial paradigm 
developed by Skinner during the 1960s. This was based on the concept of trade-offs 
between quality flexibility and efficiency (expressed as duration of the basic cycle time). 
By looking at the way Fiat management selected new technologies during the 1970s and 
1980s, and by looking at the way Fiat management selected the stages of the process in 
which the new technology was to be deployed, it is evident that the main concern of Fiat 
management was to minimise the cycle time rather than maximise flexibility. 
Management made a trade-off between cycle-time minimisation and flexibility 
maximisation in spite of the fact that the technology could allow them to achieve both. . 
Therefore, it was the selective deployment of robotics, rather than the characteristic of 
the new technology, that prevented the whole production system from becoming 
flexible. The way management selected and deployed new technologies during the 
1980s mirrors Skinner’s theory of trade-offs that had inspired the development of 
inflexible automation during the 1960s.
The other important contribution of this work to the debate on post-Fordism consists 
of capturing the complex relationship between the development of production 
technology, flexibility and output-mix optimisation. The literature on post-Fordism and 
the literature on Fiat have addressed the issue of flexibility by looking at technology and 
management. Actually, flexible mass production entails complex output-mix 
optimisation issues. Output-mix optimisation consists of choosing the output mix that 
maximises total contribution margins in the face of many constraints.
Constraints usually refer to total capacity, the specialisation of a given manufacturer 
in designing and manufacturing specific type of cars, and the specialisation of the supply 
network in the manufacturing of components with specific quality standards. Those 
constraints affect the volume of production each manufacturer achieves in each of the 
segments of the market. Arguably, managerial and technical innovation towards flexible 
mass production might help to minimise capacity constraint but might have no effect on 
other constraints. Even if the production framework is flexible, and allows for shifts in 
output from one model to another and for shifts in output mixes from lower-segment 
units to upper-segment units, the output mix will be determined by the efficiency with 
which each manufacturer produces different vehicles and competes in each segment of
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the market. Therefore, a manufacturer aiming to develop the ability to adjust supply to 
fluctuations in demand for specific models, and to changes in the relative size of market 
segments should in theory develop the ability to produce both lower- and upper-segment 
units with the same efficiency. Otherwise, any reduction in the output of the most 
efficiently produced model will be detrimental to the margin of contribution.
This thesis argues that the reason why the Fiat management did not develop the entire 
production process towards flexibility, opting instead for selective deployment of 
robotics, was simply that managers were not interested in flexibility. In fact, the strategy 
of output-mix optimisation implemented by the company aimed to maximise the margin 
of contribution by acquiring a dominant position in the bottom end of the market, where 
the company was more specialised. In particular, Ghidella, the Chairman of Fiat Auto 
from 1979 onwards, was convinced that the best output-mix strategy was to maximise 
the comparative advantage of the company in the lower segments of demand. For this 
reason, he allocated the largest part of financial resources to the renewal of the models 
competing in segments A and B. As a result, the Fiat’s output mix during the 1980s was 
remarkably skewed downmarket.
Interestingly, this was also the case with Fiat during the 1960s, when the Company 
produced a range of different models, but 70% of the output consisted of cars competing 
in the bottom range of the market. During the 1960s, therefore, the need for flexibility 
was limited. The capital deployed for the production process was model-specific, while 
the technical team developed its skills specialising in the design and manufacturing of 
models competing in the bottom range of the market, in which the company intended to 
maximise profits. As long as the bottom range was successful, the lines producing small 
cars were utilised at the optimum level or even over-utilised. At the same time, the 
models competing in the segments in which Fiat was not specialised were produced at 
the break-even point or even below it.
The fact that the Fiat’s output mix in the 1980s was as skewed towards the bottom 
range of the market as it was during the 1960s indicates that the managerial culture 
inspiring output-mix decision-making during the 1980s was similar to the culture that 
had inspired output-mix decision-making twenty years before. In both decades the basic 
criterion dictating output-mix optimisation strategy was specialisation and not
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flexibility. However, the analysis of Fiat’s output structure form 1968 to 1987 
conducted in chapter 6, and the analysis of a number of unpublished documents 
concerning output-mix optimisation have revealed another unexpected result. Although 
specialisation was the principal factor affecting output-mix decision-making, the regime 
of competition was also important. It has been shown that during the 1960s the Fiat 
President Valletta held the view that a shift upmarket of the output mix could be 
considered as an option only if certain conditions hampering price competition took 
place. If collusive price leadership were in place, Fiat would have been able to set prices 
according to its own cost structure. This would have minimised the comparative 
advantage of German and French car manufacturers in the upper segments of the 
market, creating the conditions for Fiat to adjust its output mix upmarket and supply the 
expanding demand for upper-segment units. Nonetheless, the strategy of shifting 
upmarket under collusive price leadership, as theorised by Valleta and his staff, was 
conceived simply as a temporary and opportunistic move. It was not paralleled by a 
restructuring of the production process towards the enhancement of the efficiency in the 
manufacturing of upper-range units. The rationale underpinning the shifting upmarket 
under a regime of collusive price leadership depended upon the fact that demand in the 
medium and upper segment of the market tends to be income rather than price elastic. 
Assuming collusion, income elasticity of demand enables the price leader to set prices 
that maximise its per unit margin of contribution. On the other hand, if price 
competition is in place, the most efficient manufacturer in each segment will set prices. 
The analysis of changes in the Fiat output mix between 1967 and 1987 shows that from 
1970 to 1979 Fiat adjusted its output mix upmarket. In that period, collusive price 
leadership was in place. Implicit collusion had been the response of the European car 
industry to the abolition of tariffs in 1970 and, after the first oil crisis, to the instability 
of input prices and exchange rates. However, because of the gradual abolition of non­
tariff barriers to trade (such as the lack of a commercial network abroad) and because of 
the gradual stabilisation of the international economy, a return to price competition was 
expected by the late 1970s or early 1980s. The managers' response to that expectation 
was to allocate the largest part of the financial resources to the renewal of the bottom- 
range models, which, as already stated, led to a shift of the output mix back
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downmarket. This move was perfectly consistent with the views of Valetta, who thought 
Fiat could efficiently shift upmarket only under a regime of collusive leadership. The 
fact that during the 1980s Fiat recovered strongly from the crisis of the previous decade 
shows that the strategy set up by Ghidella was effective.
All in all, it appears that the turnover of top management during the 1970s did not 
bring about a change of direction towards a market-oriented approach to car 
manufacturing. This was because production engineers were still dominant in the 
structure. They had a process-oriented culture and kept their grip on process/product 
renewal decision-making throughout the period, influencing top management in 
strategic decision-making. This does not mean that the entire Fiat management shared a 
product-oriented approach to manufacturing. However, marketing managers such as 
Rossignolo were marginal, particularly in the second half of the 1970s, when the 
economic crisis suggested that top management should rationalise, rather than change 
their production system and marketing strategies.
As already said, from a methodological point of view, the contribution of this thesis 
to the debate on post-Fordism consists of testing flexibility against an independent 
variable, namely the rate of capacity utilisation of production lines. Moreover, this work 
underlines the relationship between production management, technological change and 
output-mix optimisation strategy, whereas the existing literature focused mainly on 
technological and managerial changes. In terms of findings, the thesis shows that the 
restructuring of Fiat during the 1970s did not bring about discontinuity in management. 
On the contrary, the process of technological selection and deployment and the process 
of output-mix decision-making were underpinned by the same criteria that had inspired 
technological change and output-mix decision making during the 1960s. In that period, 
operations and strategic management at Fiat were dominated by a production-oriented 
managerial culture, which had been shaped by the pattern of routines that were common 
in the Fordist approach of mass production.
Once the view of continuity is accepted, the implication follows that in the case of 
Fiat the crisis of the 1970s did not coincide with the crisis of Fordism. On the contrary 
the rescue of the company and its long-term survival were ensured by the effective use 
of the intangible capital accumulated by the company over time. This leads to the issue
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of the restructuring of the car industry after the crisis of the 1970s. The case of Fiat, in 
fact, suggests that the restructuring of the car industry after the two oil crises fits an 
interpretive model emphasising the relevance of intangible capital accumulation and 
routines, rather than an interpretive model implying the replacement of intangible 
capital along with the substitution of fixed capital via technological change. The 
accumulation of intangible capital is central to both Chandler’s approach to Business 
History and the Nelson and Winter theory of economic change, whereas the dispersion 
of intangible capital is implied by all the schools of thought within the debate on post- 
Fordism. The findings of this work, invariably suggest that Chandler and Nelson and 
Winter provide a powerful framework to explain the third industrial revolution and the 
centrality of the process of intangible capital accumulation in explaining the 
restructuring of Fiat. Such a framework is intrinsically connected to the literature on 
path dependency, be it focused on pure technological change dilemmas or broader 
concept of managerial lock-in.
The analysis of this work stops at 1987, partly because of the data set, partly because 
the acquisition of Alfa Romeo that year changed substantially many parameters, 
including the comparability of data. However, on the basis of the findings of this work, 
it is possible to underline the strengths and weaknesses of the Italian company in the late 
1980s. At the end of the decade, Fiat was very strong at the bottom end of the demand 
spectrum, particularly in the domestic market. Labour productivity had improved 
remarkably along with industrial relations, and the company had restored its reputation 
for managerial excellence, which had been badly damaged during the turmoil of the 
1970s. Fiat management had also acquired a reputation for technological excellence 
thanks to the commitment of the company to develop robotics. Nonetheless, this work 
has shown that Fiat was much less flexible than previously thought by the established 
literature. Moreover, Fiat management concentrated much of its effort on cost reduction. 
As a consequence, labour was organised and trained in order to contain cycle time rather 
than improve quality and flexibility. Finally, Fiat was extremely weak in the C and D 
segments.
Crucially, the evolution of demand and supply in Europe during the 1990s was to 
change the competitive scenario in terms of external threats and opportunities. On the
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hand, Fiat was to become more exposed to competition in the lower segments of the 
market from both the traditional European competitors and those Japanese 
manufacturers which had established new production capacity within the EC, and 
represented an entirely new threat. On the other and, given the structure of the European 
demand, opportunities were expected to emerge exactly in those segments in which the 
Italian company was weak. In such a scenario, the production-oriented culture of the 
Fiat management, and the company’s specialisation in small car manufacturing should 
be seen as a weakness.
During the 1990s, the performance of the company was not particularly brilliant, 
whereas the first few years of the new millennium have been particularly difficult. 
Nonetheless, in 1999 the Italian company celebrated a hundred years in the business. 
This work has captured important and undisclosed features of Fiat’s strategy and 
restructuring from 1960 to 1987. There is still plenty for business historians to 
investigate, especially with regard to the 1990s. The future perspective and the survival 
expectancy of the Italian company is a matter for business economists and business 
strategists to evaluate and forecast. The author of this work is convinced that a better 
understanding of the restructuring of Fiat during the 1970s and 1980s might help both 
business historians and business analysts in achieving their respective goals.
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A ppen dix  
C h a pter  3
Table A 3.1; Turnover, Net Profits and Employment, Fiat Group, 1948-1990. 
Millions of 1993 constant lire
Years Turnover Net profits Employment Years Turnover Net profits Employment
1948 1,076,101 10,141 66,365
1949 1,407,354 24,369 71,207
1950 2,132,934 48,370 72,669
1951 2,039,361 51,112 72,035
1952 2,540,362 67,763 70,000
1953 3,086,625 121,024 71,110
1954 3,526,685 136,240 71,300
1955 3,920,903 159,973 74,885
1956 4,234,367 174,705 77,316
1957 4,332,296 171,098 80,423
1958 4,674,154 208,389 79,930
1959 5,655,110 254,533 85,117
1960 5,849,600 302,609 92,891
1961 6,883,030 337,174 107,671
1962 8,320,400 293,313 119,838
1963 9,353,320 278,204 126,324
1964 8,436,000 168,020 124,336
1965 8,976,000 268,275 123,109
1966 11,591,450 265,589 134,592
1967 13,217,580 339,930 144,499
1968 14,725,050 380,268 158,445
1969 15,133,500 143,007 170,883
1970 16,931,680 53,331 184,814
1971 17,417,400 148,452 182,501
1972 19,547,130 145,623 191,510
1973 18,486,000 20,040 200,574
1974 15,711,440 2,03 198,374
1975 14,983,800 0 214,700
1976 45,776,200 275,792 267,179
1977 47,091,680 224,387 268,279
1978 51,030,240 187,439 273,053
1979 49,228,560 111,760 284,148
1980 49,262,820 120,827 274,060
1981 41,233,360 197,531 253,715
1982 36,701,820 244,394 229,571
1983 35,615,700 347,445 213,402
1984 35,005,110 449,874 186,162
1985 37,128,370 591,887 187,539
1986 40,485,060 1,111,172 179,851
1987 51,287,250 1,087,016 220,000
1988 57,157,320 1,300,492 219,677
1989 62,942,990 1,465,875 223,444
1990 64,074,080 1,587,301 241,688
Source: Archivio Storico Fiat, Fiat: le fasi della crescita, pp. 100-101.
Table A 3.2: Vehicle registrations 1950-1990 in selected countries (00’)
Years UK Italy Germany France Years UK Italy Germany France
1950 134,4 79,8 149,5 173,1 1971 1,334,7 1,435,5 2,115,6 1,468,9
1951 138,4 88,8 178,3 235,9 1972 1,702,2 1,470,4 2,143,0 1,637,6
1952 191,0 89,1 204,1 284,7 1973 1,688,3 1,449,9 2,031,0 1,745,8
1953 301,4 112,1 254,3 283,4 1974 1,273,8 1,280,7 1,693,0 1,524,8
1954 394,4 127,3 321,3 327,4 1975 1,194,1 1,050,9 2,106,0 1,482,7
1955 511,4 161,9 423,9 411,3 1976 1,285,6 1,187,6 2,112,1 1,858,3
1956 407,3 202,4 506,2 475,8 1977 1,325,5 1,219,2 2,561,3 1,907,0
1957 433,2 195,5 564,6 500,0 1978 1,591,9 1,194,4 2,663,8 1,945,0
1958 566,3 209,2 691,0 588,7 1979 1,716,3 1,397,0 2,623,4 1,976,4
1959 657,3 253,3 827,7 564,4 1980 1,513,8 1,530,5 2,426,2 1,873,2
1960 820,1 381,4 969,7 638,1 1981 1,484,7 1,808,5 2,330,3 1 ,,834,8
1961 756,1 491,8 1,095,1 717,1 1982 1,555,0 1,851,2 2,155,5 2,056,5
1962 800,2 634,7 1,217,4 912,4 1983 1,791,7 1,451,5 2,426,8 2,017,6
1963 1,030,7 951,7 1,271,0 1,047,6 1984 1,749,6 1,572,4 2,393,9 1,757,7
1964 1,215,9 832,0 1,243,0 1,053,1 1985 1,832,5 1,653,2 2,379,3 1,766,3
1965 1,148,7 889,3 1,517,6 1,057,4 1986 1,882,5 1,769,2 1,829,4 1,911,5
1966 1,091,2 1,015,0 1,506,1 1,210,1 1987 2,013,7 1,929,6 2,915,6 2,105,2
1967 1,143,0 1,162,2 1,356,7 1,230,9 1988 2,215,6 2,119,2 2,807,9 2,217,1
1968 1,144,8 1,167,6 1,425,1 1,239,8 1989 2,300,9 2,269,8 2,831,7 2,274,3
1969 1,012,8 1,217,9 1,841,0 1,365,7 1990 2,008,9 2,283,4 3,040,8 2,309,1
1970 1,126,8 1,363,6 2,107,1 1,296,9
Source: Elaboration of data from ANFIA (Italian Association o f Car Manufacturers and Traders), 
L ’automobile in cifre, pp. 232-238.
Table A 3.3: Fiat output (Italian operations) 1951-1990
Years Fiat output Years Fiat output Years Fiat output Years Fiat output
1951 108,889 1961 566,284 1971 1,560,362 1981 1,119,891
1952 101,659 1962 748,608 1972 1,591,478 1982 1,163,453
1953 132,061 1963 909,887 1973 1,568,390 1983 1,216,921
1954 163,561 1964 881,702 1974 1,382,310 1984 1,388,276
1955 218,082 1965 957941 1975 1,148,824 1985 1,316,228
1956 262,143 1966 1,110,701 1976 1,274,100 1986 1,580,637
1957 290,672 1967 1,358,438 1977 1,392,618 1987 1,668,129
1958 327,049 1968 1,315,103 1978 1,370,824 1988 1,635,791
1959 412,612 1969 1,352,232 1979 1,309,777 1989 1,721,925
1960 500,527 1970 1,506,847 1980 1,297,667 1990 1,638,580
Source: 1951-1966, Archivio Storico Fiat, Fiat: le fasi della crescita, pp. 120-121. 1967-1990 
Archivio Storico Fiat, ‘Libro dei numeri di matricola delle vetture prodotte’ (Production File). 
Note that, data in table A4. 2-21 refers to the whole Fiat production in Italy and abroad. 
Therefore, after 1979 they are different from the data in table A 3.3.
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Table A 3.4: Structure of demand in the Italian market 1960-1990 (00’)
Years Stock Vehicle
registratio
ns
Replaceme
nt
New
demand
Years Stock Vehicle
registratio
ns
Replaceme
nt
New
demand
1950 1658,8 253,3 1975 15059,7 1050,9 295 755,9
1960 1976,2 381,4 64 317,4 1976 15925,1 1187,6 322,2 865,4
1961 2449,1 491,8 28,9 462,9 1977 16476,2 1219,2 668,1 551,1
1962 3030,1 634,7 53,7 581 1978 16240,9 1194,4 1194,4 0
1963 3912,6 951,7 69,2 882,5 1979 17073,2 1397 564,7 832,3
1964 4674,6 832 70 762 1980 17686,2 1530,5 917,5 613
1965 5472,6 889,3 91,3 798 1981 18603,4 1808,5 891,3 917,2
1966 6356,6 1015 131 884 1982 19616,1 1851,2 838,5 1012,7
1967 7294,6 1162,2 224,2 938 1983 20388,6 1451,5 679 772,5
1968 8266,4 1167,6 195,8 971,8 1984 20888,2 1572,4 1072,8 499,6
1969 9173,7 1217,9 310,6 907,3 1985 22494,6 1653,2 46,8 1606,4
1970 10181,2 1363,6 356,1 1007,5 1986 23495,4 1769,2 768,4 1000,8
1971 11307,1 1435,5 309,6 1125,9 1987 24320,2 1929,6 1104,8 824,8
1972 12484,3 1470,4 293,2 1177,2 1988 25290,2 2119,2 1149,2 970
1973 13424,7 1449,9 509,5 940,4 1989 26267,4 2269,8 1292,6 977,2
1974 14303,8 1280,7 401,6 879,1 1990 27415,8 2283,4 1135 1148,4
Source: Elaboration on data, in L ’automobile in Cifre, p. 334, and p. 340. Since new demand is the 
portion of demand which makes the stock o vehicle to grow, it is calculated according to the formula ND= 
STtl - STto, where ST is the stock of vehicles. Replacement demand is calculated as RD = VR-ND, where 
VR is vehicle registrations.
Table A 3.5: Forecast of stock and new registrations 1970-1980 (00*)
Stock New Registrations N.R. Rate 
ofrowth
1960 1970 1960 1970 1960-1970
Occ. Europe 2,047,8 64,604,0 3,510,0 7,001,0 7.1%
USA 6,127,0 89,896,1 6,757,0 8,388,0 2.2%
Japan 345,0 8,779,0 129,0 2,430,0 34.1%
Other Countries 1,886,5 22,500,0 2,119,2 3,403,0 4.8%
Total 10,416,3 185,779,1 12,515,0 21,222,0 5.4%
Stock Forecast N.R. Forecast Growth
Forecast
1970 1980 1970 1980 1970-1980
CEE 42,180,0 69,000,0 5,433,0 6,800,0 2.2%
EFTA 19,397,0 30,000,0 1,868,0 2,700,0 3.7%
EEC+EFTA 61,577,0 99,000,0 7,301,0 9,500,9 2.6%
Spain and Yugoslavia 3,027,0 11,000,0 600,0 1,200,0 7.1%
Total 64,604,0 110,000,0 7,901,0 10,700,0 4.3%
Source: Fiat, Archivio Storico, Direzione Studi Economici, Fondo Pedrana, 1/VIII/5/E.
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Table A 3.6: Productivity index - blue collars- 1960-1987 (car manufacturing
sector. year base 1960=100)
Year Output (unit) Labour input Actual working 
hours per worker 
per year
Man-hours Ratio output to Productivity Index 
man-hours
1960 500,527 33,540 2,256 75,666,240 0.006615 100
1961 566,284 37,196 2,256 83,914,176 0.006748 102.0
1962 748,608 44,387 2,226 98,805,462 0.007577 114.5
1963 909,887 52,967 2,256 119,493,552 0.007615 115.1
1964 881,702 55,041 2,256 124,172,496 0.007101 107.3
1965 957,941 57,774 2,161 124,849,614 0.007673 115.9
1966 1,110701 60,642 2,146 130,137,732 0.008535 129
1967 1,253207 64,212 2,162 138,826,344 0.009027 136.4
1968 1,323707 66,818 2,144 143,257,792 0.00924 139.6
1969 1,352232 72,939 1,673 122,026,947 0.011081 167.5
1970 1,421054 77,782 1,814 141,126,883 0.010069 152.2
1971 1,490302 79,245 1,729 137,059,775 0.010873 164.3
1972 1,475791 82,442 1,623 133,834,694 0.011027 166.6
1973 1,453554 91,600 1,520 139,297,036 0.010435 157.7
1974 1,294501 94,500 1,466 138,623,940 0.009338 141.1
1975 1,075726 90,300 1,405 126,941,031 0.008474 128.1
1976 1,274100 88,800 1,405 124,832,376 0.010206 154.2
1977 1,318747 89,400 1,518 135,709,200 0.009717 146.9
1978 1,318747 86,600 1,505 130,333,000 0.010118 152.9
1979 1,254957 93,900 1,435 134,746,500 0.009313 140.7
1980 1,297667 111,200 1,381 153,567,200 0.00845 127.7
1981 1,119891 108,200 1,374 148,666,800 0.007533 113.8
1982 1,163453 95,415 1,420 135,489,300 0.008587 129.8
1983 1,246711 86,828 1,432 124,337,696 0.010027 151.5
1984 1,388276 77,666 1,415 109,897,390 0.012632 190.9
1985 1,393654 70,146 1,451 101,781,846 0.013693 206.9
1986 1,580637 63,046 1,641 103,458,486 0.015278 230.9
1987 1,668129 59,172 1,685 99,704,820 0.016731 252.9
Source: Index of ratio output to man-hours (1960 = 100). Calculation based on data from various Fiat 
sources. Data on the number of hours worked are from Fiat Archives: Fondo Sepin, 1960-77, 5/VTII/l/A; 
Personnel Department, “Relazione sullo stato del personale” in Anfia (ed.),_L ’Automobile in cifre,, Turin, 
Codex, 1988. Data on employment levels are also from various sources: Sepin file, 1960-77, 5/VTII/l/A; 
Fiat Auto, Human Resources Department; CGIL (ed.) Lavoro, condizioni di lavoro, qualita di vita e di 
lavoro in una grande fabbrica capitalista. Rapporto conclusivo della conferenza su Fiat Auto’, (Turin, 
1985). As far as output is concerned, from 1960 to 1969 the calculation is based on data from Fiat (ed.), 
Fiat: Le fasi della crescita, p. 121. From 1969 onwards, the calculation is based on data from the Fiat 
Production File. Note that output and labour refer to Italian plants.
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Table A 3.7: Fiat sales and domestic market shares 1960-1990
Years Export Domestic Domestic
shares
Years Export Domestic Domestic
shares
Years Export Domestic Domestic
shares
Units Units % Units Units % Units Units %
1960 191,844 291,168 76.3 1971 577,886 821662 57.3 1982 541,400 927,000 51.5
1961 227,787 341,357 69.4 1972 591,170 804,809 54.7 1983 564,600 930,300 55.5
1962 301,004 412,526 65 1973 547,245 781,205 53.9 1984 574,000 928,200 54.4
1963 285,282 595,317 62.6 1974 554,856 690,068 53.9 1985 1,046,335 52.3
1964 304,603 583,326 70.3 1975 510,880 510,944 48.6 1986 1,117,579 54.4
1965 289,028 655,035 73.9 1976 613,100 696,256 53.5 1987 1,191,499 53.7
1966 349,909 752,561 74.1 1977 584,886 696,107 54.5 1988 853,300 1,345,500 60.7
1967 376,219 850,929 73.2 1978 503,351 691,350 53.6 1989 865,000 1,419,200 57.8
1968 521,534 591,574 72.1 1979 773,143 820,000 50.3 1990 900,100 1,231,400 46.8
1969 545,448 764,630 62.8 1980 651,400 942,000 51.3
1970 586,496 760,417 55.8 1981 693,700 943,200 51.3
Source: Fiat (ed.), Fiat: le fasi della crescita, 1996, 130-134.
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Table A 4.1: Labour productivity index and daily production, 1960-1973
Year Labourinput
Output
(unit)
Total per 
year man - 
hours
Actual 
working hours 
per worker per 
year
Contractual 
working 
hours per 
worker per 
years
Actual
working
days
Contractual
working
days
Daily
output
(unit)
Ratio 
output 
to man- 
hours
Productivity
index
1960 25,906 500,527 58,443,936 2,256 2,256 282 282 1,775 0.0086 100
1961 27,101 566,284 61,139,856 2,256 2,256 282 282 2,008 0.0093 108.2
1962 35,442 748,608 78,893,892 2,226 2,256 278 282 2,690 0.0095 110.8
1963 41,460 909,887 93,533,760 2„256 2,256 282 282 3,227 0.0097 113.6
1964 42,530 881,702 95,947,680 2,256 2,256 282 282 3,127 0.0092 107.3
1965 38,543 957,941 83,291,423 2,161 2,162 282 282 3,399 0.0115 134.3
1966 43,734 1,110,701 93,853,164 2,146 2,162 280 282 3,968 0.0118 138.2
1967 48,732 1,253,207 105,358,584 2,162 2,162 282 282 4,444 0.0119 138.9
1968 49,353 1,323,707 105,812,832 2,144 2,162 280 282 4,733 0.0125 146.1
1969 62,593 1,352,232 104,718,089 1,673 2,022 233 282 5,795 0.0129 150.8
1970 67,000 1,421,054 121,538,000 1,814 1,991 257 282 5,530 0.0117 136.5
1971 68,300 1,490,302 118,159,000 1,730 1,976 247 282 6,038 0.0126 147.3
1972 70,700 1,475,791 114,746,100 1,623 1,886 243 282 6,080 0.0129 150.1
1973 73,300 1,453,554 111,489,300 1,521 1,856 231 282 6,291 0.013 152.3
Source: Index of ratio output to man-hours (1960 = 100). Calculations based on data from Archivio 
Storico Fiat, Fondo Sepin (Employmnet File) 1960-77, 5/VIII/l/A. Labour input includes only direct 
workers involved in stamping, machining, welding and final assembling. From 1960 to 1967, the 
calculation of output is based on data from Fiat (ed.) Fiat: Le fasi della crescita, p. 121. From 1968 
onwards, the calculation is based on data from the Fiat Auto Production File (Italian output). Daily 
production has been calculated by dividing output by the number o f days in which production actually 
took place each year. Note that Table A 3.6 refers to the productivity of all workers of the Fiat car sector 
employed in Italian plants, whereas figure A 4.1 refers to selected shops.
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Table A 4.2: Output per month, per line, per plant 1968
Months J F M A M J J A S O N D Total
Models and Plants
500, Mirafiori 16,86429,992 32,118 31,32927,23530,57428,14631,923 10,206 31,253 32,69626,499 328,835
600, Lingotto 4,364 7,104 6,348 4,916 4,604 5,201 6,446 6,836 2,460 6,750 6,410 5,512 66,951
850 Special, Mirafiori 10,74518,039 21,773 23,31824,841 30,511 28,305 31,927 10,095 32,66933,07927,541 292,843
850 Coupe, Mirafiori 1,944 3,385 5,524 5,153 6,336 7,338 6,759 7,720 2,466 7,791 8,063 6,686 69,165
850 Spider, Mirafiori 756 941 1,593 1,888 1,749 2,078 1,960 2,271 633 2,285 2,609 2,256 21,019
1100, Lingotto 5,786 8,491 8,024 8,611 7,132 9,278 9,529 9,350 3,122 10,46210,362 7,414 97,561
124 Special, Mirafiori 8,484 13,675 16,622 15,243 14,351 16,38616,001 17,878 5,245 17,573 18,370 17,380 177,208
124 Coup6, Mirafiori 1,967 3,608 4,337 5,009 4,635 5,540 4,121 4,319 1,280 3,463 3,515 3,139 44,933
124 Spider, Mirafiori 267 110 734 406 738 811 737 963 375 717 767 850 7,475
125 Special, Mirafiori 5,442 9,725 13,154 13,555 11,445 13,444 12,503 12,495 2,603 7,356 6,755 5,149 113,626
Dino Coupd, Mirafiori 155 162 167 187 174 138 172 176 71 59 134 41 1,636
Dino Spider, Mirafiori 38 44 68 67 31 8 63 52 5 57 22 M 455
600 T, Lingotto 2,546 1,646 3,901 5,038 1,724 2,122 5,024 2,090 654 1,855 1,885 4,983 33,468
1100 T, Lingotto 632 719 643 898 667 503 483 472 158 482 473 298 6,428
238, Mirafiori 349 1,075 867 1,084 880 1,162 1,526 1,546 631 1,906 2,314 2,031 15,371
241, Mirafiori 380 440 402 287 397 618 419 545 204 711 798 6,76 5,877
Campagnola Benzina, Lingotto 95 126 108 119 129 146 129 131 70 3 58 36 1,150
Campagnola Disel, Lingotto 43 31 52 36 30 42 52 53 27 64 34 0 464
850 Familiare, Mirafiori 
Total
B 5,015 3,302 1,149 894 5,968 500 536 207 979 11,171 917 30,638
1,315,103
Source: Archivio Storico Fiat, ‘Libro dei numeri di matricola dei veicoli prodotti’ (Production File).
The File reports the serial numbers of the last unit of each model produced each month in each plant and 
in each line, starting from December 1967. Abbreviations: B = Beginning of production; E = end of 
production; M = missing datum; H = holydays. The months are given in the order of the calendar year. 
Note that the Fiat Production File includes the output of Autobianchi from 1970 onwards and the output 
of Lancia from 1979 onwards. Fiat plants involved in the of car manufacturing were Mirafiori, Lingotto, 
Rivalta, Chivasso (Lancia), Desio (Autobianchi), Cassino and Termini Imerese. From 1977 onwards, the 
Production File reports the output o f Spanish., Brazilian and Polish production plants.
Note also that tables show welding lines. The final assembly was performed by more line since the cycle 
time was longer than that of the spot welding stage.
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Table A 4.3: Output per month, per line, per plant 1969
Months J F M A M J J A S O N D Total
Models and Plants
500, Mirafiori 25,941 30,049 32,023 38,327 37,865 36,316 26,726 43,653 11,964 29,040 28,643 18,588 359,135
600, Mirafiori 5,551 5,268 5,281 4,873 29,458 5,076 4,167 5,967 1,568 3,684 2,997 1,601 75,491
850 Special, Mirafiori 26,459 30,756 32,831 28,803 27,124 19,541 14,869 27,663 6,403 13,653 12,820 10,123 251,045
850 Coup6, Mirafiori 5,529 7,381 7,354 9,063 9,243 9,560 7,937 8,530 2,416 3,683 3,497 2,916 77,109
850 Spider, Mirafiori 1,912 2,873 2,466 2,664 2,554 2,751 2,504 2,930 836 1,643 2,331 1,656 27,120
1100, Lingotto B 3,070 6,579 10,887 12,114 18,121 5,107 14,297 15,135 12,842 98,152
124, Mirafiori 16,315 20,279 20,644 22,802 20,760 18,073 9,509 22,565 6,045 13,737 13,240 9,403 193,372
124 Coup6, Mirafiori 3,538 4,779 4,936 4,510 4,129 2,924 3,124 2,693 625 1,644 2,256 1,279 36,437
124 Spider, Mirafiori 653 996 1,013 1,169 1,087 1,234 1,160 1,377 268 190 1,450 378 10,975
125 Special, Mirafiori 7,956 10,135 11,363 20,569 11,963 11,331 6,225 13,143 3,241 8,215 7,928 6,488 118,557
Dino Coup6, Mirafiori B 16 36 57 109
Dino Spider, Mirafiori B 5 5 39
130, Rivalta B 75 241 276 61 230 84 217 1,184
600T, Lingotto 1,490 1,876 4,525 2,208 1,602 2,034 5,579 5,894 775 1,046 944 3,324 31,297
1100T, Lingotto 356 1,299 299 460 457 306 259 161 93 220 247 129 4,286
238, Mirafiori 2,099 2,654 2,649 3,065 2,705 2,663 2,318 2,124 738 2,082 2,142 1,777 27,016
241, Mirafiori 615 622 614 528 494 622 612 746 229 559 451 350 6,442
Campagnola Benzina, Lingotto 131 218 192 231 259 227 196 224 40 139 101 69 2,027
Campagnola Disel, Lingotto 110 99 89 105 66 55 109 53 35 63 28 15 827
850 Familiare, Mirafiori 982 5,085 1,211 8,245 1,118 943 4,238 1,581 453 418 6,752 586 31,612
Total 1,352,232
Source: Ibid.
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Table A 4.4: Output per month, per line, per plant 1970
Months J F M A M J J A S O N D Total
Models and 
Plants
500, Mirafiori 17,838 33,961 33,895 36,061 37,264 26,534 30,507 33,491 8,755 37,820 36,456 33,690 366,272
600, Miraifori 2,603 4,620 4,285 2,089 5 E 13,602
850 Special, Mirafiori 8,612 17,908 16,785 17,209 22,447 8,254 15,320 17,033 5,335 29,855 9,827 19,736 188,321
850 Coupd, Mirafiori 3,270 4,422 4,443 4,422 4,988 4,569 5,065 6,246 1,725 5,799 5,065 3,869 53,883
850 Spider, Mirafiori 1,603 2,502 2,446 2,613 2,031 1,727 2,307 2,609 640 2,478 2,498 2,116 25,570
128, Rivalta 12,144 24,339 22,180 25,026 26,940 23,359 26,195 31,719 8,353 36,923 38,735 37,421 313,334
124 Special, Mirafiori 7,529 16,062 17,341 15,584 17,355 13,963 14,098 14,546 5,098 19,858 20,145 19,813 181,392
124 Coup6, Mirafiori 1,659 2,247 2,611 2,633 2,865 2,519 2,860 3,741 1,049 4,379 4,637 4,479 35,679
124, Spider, Mirafiori 1,408 871 111 1,374 1,398 1,243 1,192 1,732 339 1,385 1,253 1,393 13,699
125 Special, Mirafiori 4,876 10,664 28,605 11,022 11,491 9,165 8,683 10,592 3,411 12,815 12,406 16,104 139,834
Dino Coup6, Mirafioiri 8 56 24 5 9 38 49 73 21 165 111 97 656
Dino Spider, Mirafiori B 5 11 12 5 27 19 9 19 32 3 142
130, Rivalta 191 286 292 253 400 329 348 400 124 388 486 577 4,074
850 Familiare, Mirafiori 2,829 2,572 1,585 4,104 3,047 3,817 17,954 M M M 4,377 1,983 24,314
1100T, Mirafiori 112 108 122 101 65 168 291 186 21 45 43 112 1,374
238, Mirafiori 9,931 2,771 2,866 2,836 3,052 2,383 2,732 2,881 797 2,750 2,703 2,297 37,999
241, Mirafiori 615 622 614 528 494 622 612 746 229 559 451 350 6,442
Campagnola Benzina, 
Mirafiori 131 218 192 231 259 227 196 224 40 139 101 69 2,027
Campagnola Diesel, Mirafiori 110 99 89 105 66 55 109 53 35 63 28 15 827
A 111, Desio B 5,081 1,538 1,264 1,884 1,974 2,331 626 2,399 2,468 1,484 21,049
A 112, Desio B 7,175 2,137 4,550 3,747 5,215 5,786 1,707 6,200 5,155 4,401 46,073
500, Termini Imerese B 555 112 837 2,227 102 2,157 738 4,885 11,613
500, Desio B 1,733 6,780 5,725 4,433 18,671
Total 1,506,847
Source: Ibid.
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Table A 4.5: Output per month, per line, per plant. 1971
Months J F M A M J J A S O N D Total
Models and 
Plants
500 L, Mirafiori 31,73929,033 21,980 27,712 21,746 18,141 16,349 21,809 5,719 22,352 23,223 21,366 261,169
500 L, Termini Imerese 4,351 3,025 3,530 4,507 3,646 3,822 3,850 4,756 1,381 4,804 4,581 3,753 46,006
500 L, Desio 4,801 4,631 4,599 4,006 5,118 5,402 4,929 4,014 1,765 5,530 5,206 5,146 55,147
850 Special, Mirafiori 18,13213,158 9,713 9,549 8,829 3,538 E 62,919
850 Coup6, Mirafiori 3,480 2,555 2,268 2,400 2,423 2,623 2,785 3,435 1,028 3,028 1,584 327 27,936
850 Spider, Mirafiori 1,892 1,603 1,690 1,666 1,109 775 1,090 1,624 425 1,263 1,063 907 15,107
127, Mirafiori B 6,272 8,374 9,639 11,625 19,576 5,410 23,281 27,079 26,304 137,560
128, Rivalta 30,82030,028 54,631 31,182 36,075 30,497 29,852 30,477 9,298 38,974 41,570 45,872 409,276
124 Special, Mirafiori 16,60416,294 13,985 19,059 18,059 13,531 13,721 20,426 5,349 19,531 20,356 17,583 194,498
124 Coupe, Mirafiori 4,352 4,241 3,689 4,857 4,376 4,122 3,733 3,545 901 3,354 3,142 2,794 43,106
124 Spider, Mirafiori 1,106 761 1,163 1,510 1,114 1,225 875 1,480 273 1,479 1,205 1,162 13,353
125 Special, Mirafiori 8,325 7,836 6,929 27,348 7,789 6,965 6,007 9,004 2,793 10,192 9,870 11,555 114,613
Dino Coup6, Mirafiori 97 69 168 81 100 99 85 158 16 170 169 75 1,287
Dino Spider, Mirafiori 37 14 40 21 10 10 27 11 1 24 18 7 220
130, Rivalta 145 249 431 M 208 35 373 190 50 85 208 337 2,311
850 Familiare, Mirafiori 4,086 1,966 3,019 3,503 3,362 2,583 3,968 2,246 618 2,329 4,619 31,950 64,249
1100T, Mirafiori 12 M M M M M M M M M M 2,370 2,382
238, Mirafiori 2,226 2,012 2,072 2,112 1,790 1,862 1,663 2,098 495 1,969 1,457 1,368 21,124
241, Mirafiori 7,453 675 463 575 582 474 520 616 232 670 619 629 13,508
Campagnola Disel, Mirafiori 1,451 194 206 182 179 174 145 198 49 150 159 153 3,240
Campagnola Disel, Mirafiori 548 21 34 25 18 16 26 48 17 50 68 42 913
A 111, Desio 1,152 1,004 787 839 670 1,159 925 686 153 1,469 1,340 1,227 11,411
A112, Desio 4,445 3,724 5,337 4,706 4,986 5,041 4,689 3,707 2,023 6,730 6,594 6,667 58,649
130 Coupd, rivalta B 1 19 68 54 131 19 86 378
Total 1,560,362
Source: Ibid.
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Table A 4.6: Output per month, per line, per plant, 1972
Months J F M A M J J A S O N D Total
Models and 
Plants
500 L, Mirafiori 21,921 16,128 17,800 19,847 15,681 15,930 6,849 3,724 2,383 3,836 E 124,099
500, Termini Imerese 2,579 2,288 4,366 5,232 4,159 5,031 4,309 4,569 1,581 4,751 4,963 2,439 46,267
500, Desio 5,275 4,810 4,404 4,880 3,457 2,374 5,264 3,805 1,334 3,670 12,025 3,651 54,949
126 .Mirafori B 5,587 5,587
850 Spider, Mirafiori 1,330 1,158 1,405 1,701 1,369 1,455 1,226 1,234 M 1,388 869 652 13,787
127, Mirafiori 24,264 27,683 29,627 36,770 30,886 33,208 29,429 34,709 10,897 33,046 35,550 27,973 354,042
128, Mirafiori 55,838 35,507 35,043 39,334 35,856 37,390 33,968 34,540 13,815 34,496 38,193 32,427 426,407
128 Coupd, Rivalta B 3,966 5,365 6,156 7,264 8,800 7,614 9,119 3,273 7,888 8,897 7,402 75,744
124 Special, Mirafiori 14,430 15,299 15,702 15,953 14,826 15,255 15,363 15,768 5,923 24,228 12,541 10,519 175,807
124 Coupd, Mirafiori 2,055 1,088 1,588 1,811 1,722 1,961 1,776 2,891 936 2,282 3,070 2,892 24,072
124 Spider, Mirafiori 1,171 1,095 1,080 1,208 996 1,222 985 1,187 434 1,098 1,333 584 12,393
125 Special, Mirafiori 29,845 8,950 6,812 5,727 E 51,334
132, Mirafiori B 4,468 4,092 6,004 2,901 6,852 8,659 6,564 39,540
130, Rivalta 251 323 192 303 278 304 210 322 161 246 451 231 3,272
130 Coup6, Rivalta 29 89 80 95 152 250 148 334 96 194 121 367 1,955
Dino Coup6, Rivalta 106 61 50 129 45 2 M M M 3 1 397
Dino Spider, Rivalta 7 18 1 M M M M 2 M M 1 E 29
850 Familiare, Mirafiori 4,486 2,140 2,785 3,609 4,097 2,429 2,269 3,456 299 3,899 2,611 3,666 35,746
238, Mirafiori 1,470 1,457 1,430 1,805 1,759 1,965 1,850 2,096 931 2,214 2,442 1,996 21,415
241, Mirafiori 689 582 605 725 370 573 578 542 239 567 633 606 6,709
Campagnola Benzina, Mirafiorii 98 149 156 94 44 36 33 20 22 18 24 13 707
Campagnola Diesel, Mirafiori 28 41 40 41 72 91 66 91 26 68 56 69 689
A 111, Desio 1,221 1,332 1,996 1,813 1,338 1,768 1,479 1,093 E 12,040
A112, Desio 6,789 6,825 7,034 8,807 6,254 8,090 7,281 7,332 3,833 9,991 10,181 8,516 90,933
A 120 F, Desio 1,622 1,609 2,622 1,291 1,129 1,326 408 1,254 696 757 E 12,714
126 Cassino B 844 844
Total 1,591,478
Source: Ibid.
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Table A 4.7: Output per month, per line, per plant, 1973
Months J F M A M J J A S O N D Total
Models and 
Plants
500, Desio 2,546 2,797 1,050 2,510 1,258 3,799 953 3,199 E 18,112
500, Termini Imerese 5,236 4,321 3,850 4,201 3,999 4,859 4,402 3,956 2,088 4,290 5,547 5,005 51,754
126, Mirafiori 5,240 7,676 4,251 5,525 7,772 11,835 10,522 12,832 4,578 6,243 7,253 6,853 90,580
126, Cassino 5,240 7,676 4,251 5,525 7,772 11,835 10,522 12,832 4,578 6,243 7,253 6,853 90,580
127, Mirafiori 73,181 24,774 20,130 18,934 27,416 36,273 39,951 24,646 17,203 33,019 39,057 39,258 393,842
850 Spider, Mirafiori 611 653 515 652 755 851 14 E 4,051
128, Rivalta 23,180 25,501 25,688 33,926 15,876 44,638 37,108 17,663 26,913 23,956 77,256 7,964 359,669
128 Coup6, Rivalta 6,198 7,077 6,385 5,482 6,555 7,807 6,544 6,600 3,083 6,177 6,937 6,467 75,312
xl/9, Lingotto B 158 185 325 352 336 1,149 1,043 586 1,199 1,629 1,401 8,363
124 Special, Mirafiori 10,884 7,856 9,788 7,416 13,005 17,087 14,853 15,378 7,795 16,345 19,168 17,504 157,079
124 Coupe, Mirafiori 2,440 3,073 2,594 2,515 3,068 3,939 3,506 3,354 1,689 3,843 4,252 3,896 38,169
124 Spider, Mirafiori 1,248 818 879 823 1,018 1,197 1,150 1,259 6 1,217 1,978 1,365 12,958
132, Mirafiori 5,232 5,063 4,632 2,974 4,633 6,676 5,540 6,010 2,626 6,397 7,560 7,444 64,787
130, Rivalta 90 315 423 1 M 265 822 M M M 236 298 2,450
130 Coupe, Rivalta 30 28 8 361 3 30 49 278 40 162 6 202 1,197
850 T, Mirafiori 1,880 1,795 4,948 455 1,793 2,021 3,954 2,072 1,133 5,651 863 2,536 29,101
238, Mirafiori 1,815 2,036 1,825 2,007 2,705 3,146 2,859 3,069 1,500 3,118 3,674 3,463 31,217
241, Mirafiori 556 593 1,091 1,067 1,124 1,266 1,333 1,324 1,030 1,051 1,546 1,529 13,510
Campagnola Benzina, Mirafiori 20 32 28 24 33 241 214 145 25 6 M M 768
Campagnola Diesesl, Mirafiori 44 46 32 63 42 50 50 47 30 3 E 407
A120F, Desio 533 550 579 630 682 955 1,038 873 M 836 1,056 832 8,564
A112, Desio 6,867 5,886 8,427 7,957 8,349 11,109 9,482 10,018 5,659 9,700 12,015 10,803 106,272
126, Desio B 2,517 1,258 5,873 9,648
Total 1,568,390
Source: Ibid.
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Table A 4.8: Output per month, per line, per plant, 1974
Months J F M A M J J A S O N D Total
Models and 
Plants
500, Termini Imerese 3,414 5,028 4,211 4,672 4,666 4,542 3,735 3,946 1,860 4,780 3,809 2,711 47,374
126 Desio. 2,289 3,414 2,196 2,425 1,643 1,270 934 891 984 3,978 3,460 2,501 25,985
126, Cassino 13,215 20,477 15,990 18,676 17,110 21,397 17,260 16,450 6,676 16,834 20,695 642 185,422
126, Mirafiori 6,234 7,628 197 4,126 E 18,185
127, Mirafiori 23,657 38,171 27,690 30,543 31,635 45,788 27,940 38,047 20,240 44,241 26,252 20,067 374,271
128, Rivalta 31,840 26,549 30,515 15,886 25,812 26,165 23,639 25,576 13,586 23,950 17,743 12,040 273,301
128 Coupd, Rivalta 4,542 5,988 4,063 3,999 3,570 2,895 3,770 2,435 1,510 3,311 2,523 1,749 40,355
xl/9, Lingotto 1,141 1,878 1,177 1,844 1,961 1,961 1,742 1,855 M 12,074 1,143 2,514 20,278
124, Mirafiori 13,154 16,181 10,526 13,665 15,748 14,957 13,110 15,459 1,809 2,819 E 117,428
124 Coup6, Mirafiori 2,550 3,355 2,017 1,832 677 2,596 1,070 1,064 463 855 716 457 17,652
124 Spider, Mirafiori 1,024 1,251 1,075 1,212 1,670 1,610 1,506 1,368 638 1,225 3 3,088 15,670
131, Mirafiori B 4,570 5,163 9,733
131, Cassino B 873 1,339 2,212
132, Mirafiori 5,586 5,472 2,884 4,731 6,852 8,635 7,566 10,723 3,363 9,396 6,530 5,525 77,263
130, Rivalta 144 288 33 96 50 266 50 37 93 54 28 39 1,178
130 Coup6, Rivalta 11 147 43 155 26 24 13 58 10 21 36 14 558
Campagnola Benzina, 
Mirafiori
M M M M M M 198 46 87 291 221 330 1,173
850 T, Mirafiori 3,835 2,285 1,938 3,452 3,173 2,586 4,098 M 2,514 3,062 2,049 4,339 33,331
238, Mirafiori 2,306 3,442 4,740 1,516 978 1,884 1,357 1,152 573 1,500 748 1,406 21,602
241, Mirafiori 442 728 547 613 603 839 664 661 319 796 552 730 7,494
242 Fiat, Mirafiori B 144 259 378 508 245 733 880 889 4,036
A120F, Desio 512 698 896 1,149 1,039 M M 1,595 477 972 313 176 7,827
A112, Desio 6,989 11,276 8,297 9,822 8,778 M M 8,144 5,549 8,711 6,594 5,822 79,982
Total 1,382,310
Source: Ibid.
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Table A 4.9: Output per month, per line, per plant, 1975
Months J F M A M J J A S O N D Total
Models and 
Plants
500, Termini Imerese 2,780 3,101 2,749 2,360 4,369 4,238 4,298 4,444 E 28,339
126 Desio 3,240 3,240 4,559 3,690 6,510 6,095 6,234 8,070 730 6,728 6,282 5,304 60,682
126, Cassino 4,912 4,529 5,972 6,739 7,441 9,320 9,006 11,515 2,782 8,977 9,617 7,686 88,496
127, Mirafiori 23,228 20,501 24,067 14,326 29,816 29,024 28,831 32,066 19,729 25,791 29,995 25,463 302,837
128, Rivalta 17,481 10,878 11,486 16,982 4,271 12,196 20,569 8,294 4,343 22,106 21,266 17,475 167,347
128 Coupe, Rivalta 2,068 2,107 1,314 1,060 2,539 3,167 2,740 3,872 1,074 4,336 4,473 3,751 32,501
xl/9, Lingotto 1,136 1,381 1,598 1,144 1,579 1,431 1,582 1,650 127 2,317 1,829 1,409 17,183
124 Coupd, Mirafiori 585 578 944 666 1,240 1,298 1,480 1,475 1 E 8,267
124 Spider, Mirafiori 919 1,200 1,366 971 1,735 1,243 1,343 1,068 63 2,140 1,110 1,363 14,521
131, Mirafiori 5,692 6,207 13,062 10,345 18,581 3,256 13,154 12,155 3,457 14,483 14,877 11,687 126,956
131, Cassino 2,138 1,974 2,756 2,712 3,363 2,770 2,711 3,707 3,600 1,193 4,295 3,176 34,395
132, Mirafiori 5,095 3,486 3,560 3,244 6,640 5,439 4,715 5,432 1,303 5,712 5,190 4,344 54,160
130, Rivalta 33 9 41 39 67 55 44 36 5 33 12 27 401
130 Coupd, Rivalaa 68 M 40 M 20 28 2 27 M 30 1 1 217
Campagnola Benzina, 
Mirafiori
271 349 294 308 414 53 100 206 68 262 142 156 2,623
850 T, Mirafiori 511 480 2,422 668 940 1,700 3,489 1,728 M 1,799 3,128 820 17,685
238, Mirafiori 1,165 979 1,379 1,078 2,214 1,803 1,512 1,812 527 1,950 2,041 1,638 18,098
241, Mirafiori 387 399 460 273 M 51,372 325 662 290 553 575 507 55,803
242 Fiat, Mirafiori 790 332 831 421 506 653 1,033 1,150 257 1,143 1,084 665 8,865
A120F, Desio M 695 M M 537 M 809 M M 1,182 919 750 4,892
A ll 2, Desio M 10,043 4,287 3,534 6,793 M 12,760 M M 16,564 8,229 5,996 68,206
131, Rivalta B 3,297 3,993 4,544 1,386 5,465 5,392 4,325 28,402
126, Termini Imerese B 2,368 2,997 2,583 7,948
Total 1,148,824
Source: Ibid.
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Table A 4.10: Output per month, per line, per plant. 1976
Months J F M A M J J A S O N D Total
Models and 
Plants
126 Desio 5,046 4,740 3,949 3,135 3,100 2,498 2,503 3,047 3,926 1,326 2,976 2,912 39,158
126, Cassino 6,892 7,670 6,585 9,428 9,797 9,008 8,370 8,998 2,976 10,603 7,917 7,289 95,533
126, Termini Imerese 3,136 3,121 3,876 4,386 4,838 4,537 4,372 5,422 1,637 7,448 4,389 3,761 50,923
127, Mirafiori 26,393 24,662 23,999 25,807 21,930 28,064 26,703 29,830 10,804 29,566 29,153 29,647 306,558
128, Rivalta 19,109 14,526 16,102 16,964 13,857 6,302 680 76 E 87,616
128, Rivalta B 26 48 33,496 17,328 22,882 7,286 23,044 19,643 20,934 144,687
128 Coupd, Rivalta 3,872 4,054 4,133 4,909 4,420 5,617 4,911 6,063 1,854 5,536 4,046 3,108 52,523
xl/9, Lingotto 1,398 1,202 1,175 1,371 1,160 353 2,355 1,652 603 1,442 1,530 1,500 15,741
124 Spider, Mirafiori 761 921 951 967 724 1,211 950 1,229 272 1,142 1,141 982 11,251
131, Mirafiorio 11,740 11,442 10,797 11,517 10,682 13,561 12,232 15,026 4,521 14,909 12,100 11,860 140,387
131, Cassino 3,271 2,846 4,064 4,449 5,609 6,448 6,417 7,706 2,669 8,246 7,924 7,370 67,019
131, Rivalta 4,505 3,581 3,529 3,566 2,845 3,912 3,642 4,118 1,376 4,154 3,540 3,286 42,054
132, Mirafiori 4,480 5,254 5,978 4,254 4,704 5,964 5,418 6,354 1,913 6,581 5,757 6,375 63,032
130, Rivalta 14 45 32 83 23 43 41 34 M 23 3 M 341
130 Coup6, Rivalta 8 21 104 60 8 1 3 42 M 6 E 253
Campagnola Benzina, Mirafiori 249 157 88 230 267 199 130 227 92 158 226 261 2,284
850 T, Mirafiori 2,324 1,454 1,714 2,612 3,373 1,323 2,745 2,510 2,299 1,640 E 21,994
238, Mirafiori 1,450 1,478 1,363 1,509 1,279 1,679 1,622 2,055 498 2,080 2,407 2,924 20,344
241, Mirafiori 410 407 462 514 497 518 483 501 151 425 410 425 5,203
242 Fiat, Mirafiori 187 366 481 641 544 929 838 1,035 349 1,015 989 984 8,358
A120F, Desio 724 1,202 238 747 1,009 1,063 206 900 386 806 704 536 8,521
A112, Desio 4,809 5,591 6,725 8,290 6,043 8,077 8,172 9,558 2,771 9,420 7,943 7,826 85,225
900 T, Mirafiori B 1,508 3,587 5,095
Total 1,274,100
Source: Ibid.
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Table A 4.11: Output per month, per line, per plant 1977
Months J F M A M J J A S O N D Total
Models and 
Plants
126, Desio 2,362 4,447 3,300 4,881 3,061 6,170 5,634 12,292 1,739 6,790 4,567 4,425 59,668
126, Cassino 7,061 8,741 10,053 12,189 9,858 15,734 12,551 15,640 1,258 4,665 4,107 4,599 106,456
126, Termini Imerese 4,428 5,168 4,789 5,541 3,529 5,686 5,135 6,540 1,286 5,180 5,882 5,843 59,007
127, Mirafiori 27,484 29,982 28,624 27,183 110,888 28,583 23,684 27,705 9,727 36,808 43,988 25,777 420,433
128, Rivalta 19,211 21,937 20,465 24,788 25,712 23,024 13,628 15,986 5,478 19,180 16,540 17,913 223,862
128 Coupd, Rivalta 2,283 2,713 2,555 3,351 1,752 2,606 2,043 1,694 612 2,617 2,090 1,672 25,988
xl/9, Lingotto 1,475 2,012 1,797 1,458 1,590 1,316 3,767 1,675 326 1,776 1,691 1,666 20,549
124 Spider, Mirafiori 1,225 1,356 1,320 1,357 1,152 1,078 2,110 1,159 308 1,333 1,293 1,192 14,883
131, Mirafiori 10,847 9,706 9,567 8,238 4,940 7,192 5,108 4,967 1,404 5,563 5,949 4,878 78,359
131, Cassino 7,654 7,680 6,020 4,884 3,898 5,326 4,520 6,361 2,524 9,160 9,569 9,243 76,839
131, Rivalta 2,773 2,763 2,623 1,711 1,055 1,607 1,388 1,470 500 2,988 2,916 204 21,998
132, Mirafiori 5,795 6,763 7,120 3,262 24,313 6,626 5,281 6,128 2,123 7,960 7,217 7,559 90,147
Campagnola Benzina, Mirafiori 54 271 280 228 284 211 233 308 25 402 279 271 2,846
238, Mirafiori 2,830 2,765 2,759 2,648 1,224 1,494 903 907 193 974 845 882 18,424
241, Mirafiori 437 581 537 631 441 721 672 635 180 734 781 734 7,084
242 Fiat, Mirafiori 481 1,221 963 1,141 311 1,245 625 1,011 277 1,546 1,172 1,191 11,184
A120 F, Desio 602 420 506 654 369 604 344 828 4,327
A112, Desio 6,858 7,113 7,217 7,843 3,979 5,875 5,200 5,462 1,438 6,667 5,047 62,699
112, Desio 1,692 1,692
112 Elegant, Desio 5,529 5,529
112 Abarth, desio 1,571 1,571
900 T, Mirafiori 1,595 3,423 1,462 2,676 1,377 2,174 3,483 3,788 171 3,404 4,792 2,226 30,571
127 Seat, (Spain) 5,392 6,256 5,981 5,043 5,030 4,940 4,272 362 2,767 4,281 4,178 48,502
Total 1,392,618
Source: Ibid.
318
Table A 4.12: Output per month, per line, per plant, 1978
Months J F M A M J J A S O N D Total
Models and 
Plants
126, Desio 3,436 5,101 5,106 5,342 4,045 4,842 4,687 4,400 871 6,262 6,780 6,114 56,986
126, Termini Imerese 4,808 8,565 6,892 10,082 9,070 9,716 11,120 9,155 2,539 10,725 10,510 10,982 104,164
127, Mirafiori 27,300 38,139 31,042 35,209 29,605 33,213 34,038 30,851 5,999 33,537 34,692 31,489 365,114
128, Rivalta 18,497 21,049 29,905 18,948 12,650 14,901 8,391 3,609 1,809 2,986 5,603 5,803 144,151
128 Coupe, Rivalta 1,615 2,053 1,877 2,137 2,079 4,277 4,171 2,956 255 6 E 21,426
xl/9, Lingotto 1,261 2,127 1,629 1,724 1,572 1,723 1,802 1,729 282 3,245 2,175 1,509 20,778
124 Spider, Mirafiori 992 1,686 1,207 1,357 1,273 1,381 1,560 1,747 317 1,494 1,496 1,830 16,340
131, Mirafiori 15,992 5,989 5,276 7,449 7,828 11,151 11,010 11,654 2,000 11,479 12,455 12,551 114,834
131, Cassino 13,944 10,510 8,851 8,354 8,354 7,899 9,600 8,223 1,585 8,858 7,456 7,502 101,136
132, Mirafiori 46,014 8,543 6,954 8,377 8,121 9,550 9,405 8,597 1,577 7,584 8,828 8,703 132,253
Campagnola Benzina, Mirafiori 254 268 362 347 294 403 393 383 83 368 402 311 3,868
238, Mirafiori 427 326 1,328 977 761 1,111 1,236 1,255 141 2,161 3,008 1,896 14,627
241, Mirafiori 540 732 625 674 629 571 678 645 131 652 663 597 7,137
242 Fiat, Mirafiori 1,026 1,197 1,195 1,245 928 998 925 710 140 975 1,235 1,050 11,624
Ritmo, Rivalta B 2,292 5,709 9,499 11,172 2,103 12,973 15,595 14,925 74,268
Ritmo, Cassino B 59 828 1,242 325 2,273 4,038 5,863 14,628
112, Desio 1,240 983 642 541 520 581 800 950 194 870 1,008 998 9,327
112 Elegant, Desio 3,591 5,762 5,565 6,284 6,406 7,054 6,733 6,202 1,183 4,662 5,340 4,906 63,688
112 Abarth, Desiso 848 1,332 1,241 1,287 1,270 1,450 1,475 1,475 330 1,465 1,421 1,469 15,063
900 T, Mirafiori 1,534 6,434 629 3,658 2,220 2,133 2,429 1,289 948 2,061 2,061 1,939 27,335
127 Seat, (Spain) 3,520 4,224 3,151 3,318 2,637 4,090 4,879 5,686 2,451 6,841 5,802 5,478 52,077
Total 1,370,824
Source: Ibid.
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Table A 4.13: Output per month, per line, per plant. 1979
Months J F M A M J J A S O N D Total
Models and 
Plants
Panda, Desio B 48 238 353 1,573 2,608 4,820
126, Desio 4,964 5,926 3,888 3,941 3,543 3,915 3,429 3,031 E 32,637
Panda, Terminin Imerese B 232 611 1,576 2,419
126, Terminin Imerese 9,200 11,204 10,763 10,227 8,871 10,612 10,442 7,057 2,602 8,417 4,951 6,093 100,439
127, Mirafiori 27,646 32,309 28,138 29,460 22,039 24,266 21,238 18,060 4,244 22,905 14,400 28,418 273,123
128, Rivalta 2,799 6,985 2,484 2,030 6,501 2,001 3,699 3,777 922 6222 4,372 6,627 48,419
xl/9, Lingotto 1,468 1,742 1,837 1,691 1,609 1,802 1,501 1,772 483 1,939 3,711 2,174 21,729
124 Spider, Mirafiori 1,504 1,701 1,530 1,510 1,212 1,824 1,503 1,608 419 1,576 3,450 1,857 19,694
131, Mirafiori 10,941 13,409 11,897 12,438 10,435 10,826 9,184 8,029 727 10294 5,418 12,390 115,988
131, Cassino 5,580 4,441 3,493 4,495 3,852 4,690 4,646 3288 851 5,804 6,796 6270 54,206
132, Mirafiori 7,836 8,903 7,781 8,211 6,734 6,789 5,021 5,009 634 6,178 38,339 7,780 109215
Campagnola Benzina, Mirafiori 346 344 21 138 0 0 48 947 40 467 407 1,516 4274
238, Mirafiori 282 1,713 1,909 1,741 1,483 1,668 1,622 1,598 382 1,938 2208 2,014 18,558
241, Mirafiori 414 468 387 298 228 196 E 1,991
242 Fiat, Mirafiori 1,130 743 637 815 555 690 547 463 125 479 406 424 7,014
Ritmo, Rivalta 14,092 17,916 16,334 17,671 15,263 17,319 14,866 13,789 4,431 18,848 10,116 20,964 181,609
Ritmo, Cassino 5,873 9,313 10,123 13,028 11,945 14,511 13,289 8,846 2,360 15,047 16,727 14,916 135,978
112, Desio 955 983 989 1,002 1,251 1,445 2,306 197 122 1,012 E E 10,262
112 Elegant, Desio 4,039 5,383 6,051 6,309 5,077 5,698 8,176 6,191 1,565 6,093 E E 54,582
112 Abarth, Desio 1,163 1,413 1,278 1,311 1,248 1,402 1,501 1,389 333 1,493 E E 12,531
112, Desi'G* B 8,155 8,155
900 T, Mirafiori 1,651 2,872 2,465 2,255 2,545 2,572 1,485 2279 591 3,063 2,095 13,441 37,314
127 Seat, (Spain) 3,030 3,851 4,076 4,383 4,341 4,031 4,053 6,344 8,877 3215 8,619 M 54,820
Total 1,309,777
Source: Ibid.*From November 1979, the serial number of all the version of the A 112 were unified and 
produced on the same line.
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Table A 4.14: Output per month, per line, per plant. 1980
Months J F M A M J J A S O N D Total
Models and 
Plants
Panda, Desio 6,903 4,625 5,185 4,999 6,066 5,951 6,356 287 4,755 4,247 5,919 5,939 61,232
Panda, Sicilia 5,259 3,994 6,014 8,648 9,908 11,639 12,783 1,007 9,629 11,451 11,591 12,659 104,582
126, Terminin Imererse 11,113 5,748 1,844 7,560 E 26,265
127, Mirafiori 49,414 28,371 28,565 26,404 28,039 23,730 25,723 72 8,687 13,825 29,045 22,583 284,458
xl/9, Lingotto 3,544 2,106 1,628 1,478 1,787 2,236 903 109 376 477 845 1 15,490
124 Spider, Mirafiori 3,599 1,563 830 964 1,185 1,864 1,283 107 661 1,064 1,124 1,238 15,482
131, Mirafiori 22,043 12,182 13,138 12,701 12,761 9,981 11,356 M 1,848 4,740 9,517 6,846 117,113
131, Cassino 11,652 6,907 6,539 6,620 6,310 6,424 6,463 M 2,044 1,829 2,424 2,246 59,458
132, Mirafiori 14,976 7,636 8,009 7,287 7,476 6,462 6,912 M 1,295 3,738 3,654 3,460 70,905
Campagnola Benzina, Mirafiori 777 412 451 433 518 456 510 15 197 727 371 363 5,230
238, Mirafiori 3,439 1,818 705 6,607 4,628 2,297 2,545 232 857 1,682 2,518 1,510 28,838
242 Fiat, Mirafiori 1,011 745 678 822 877 852 1,301 M 915 755 740 1,257 9,753
Ritmo, Rivalta 36,361 20,134 22,073 19,114 18,894 13,729 15,928 M 2,701 7,196 13,747 10,566 180,443
Ritmo, Cassino 28,011 15,445 15,404 14,893 15,151 12,447 12,408 M 3,055 6,501 13,971 11,919 149,205
112, Desio 12,711 6,959 6,349 6,197 6,654 7,393 8,247 445 6,536 5,103 7,701 7,734 82,029
Delta, Chivasso B 3,412 4,429 5,013 5,870 13,162 1,363 411 3,933 4,058 7,863 6,287 55,801
900 T, Mirafiori 4,224 3,347 2,312 3,506 2,838 2,340 3,295 M 1,890 1,129 3,467 3,035 31,383
127 Seat, (Spain) M 11,121 12,617 10,803 5,689 18,994 17,377 M 9,813 10,230 11,136 7,631 115,411
124 Seat, (Spain) M 2,406 2,372 1,746 828 930 1,232 664 676 M M M 10,854
131 Seat, (Spain) M 7,036 8,791 6,928 3,228 10,752 8,709 M 4,225 5,321 5,317 2,414 62,721
126, (Poland) B 18,868 21,990 19,213 17,632 14,787 23,122 16,969 20,510 20,549 M M 173,640
147, (Brazil) M 10,186 10,130 13,460 14,110 11,320 10,274 16,010 15,884 14,336 17,884 12,405 145,999
Total 1,806,292
Source : Ibid. Where missing, the output of August has been incorporated in that o f September.
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Table A 4.15: Output per month, per line, per plant, 1981
Months J F M A M J J A S O N D Total
Models and 
Plants
Panda, Desio 6,231 5,241 6,200 5,602 5,799 6,447 6,428 274 6,466 4,532 3,070 2,082 58,372
Panda, Terminin Imerese 10,443 12,499 13,859 14,123 12,887 14,614 15,040 450 15,037 11,092 7,311 6,031 133,386
127, Mirafiori 28,502 27,716 22,347 17,516 22,518 17,867 23,686 M 18,812 17,339 16,773 9,395 222,471
xl/9, Lingotto 829 503 432 M 151 602 15 M M 931 716 471 4,650
124 Spider, Mirafiori 1,386 1,266 120 M 802 689 112 M M 457 668 787 6,287
131, Mirafiori 9,046 8,902 11,826 8,568 10,816 7,898 8,186 M 9,608 5,545 5,759 4,759 90,913
131, Cassino 2,217 2,144 3,150 2,687 2,296 2,385 2,513 132 2,813 1,486 1,559 1,284 24,666
132, Mirafiori 3,777 3,470 884 2,016 E 10,147
Argenta, Mirafiori B 1,063 1,624 4,502 3,262 4,437 M 5,254 4,954 4,241 2,360 31,697
Campagnola Benzina, Mirafiori 483 498 382 353 368 294 93 M M 22 311 306 3,110
238, Mirafiori 4,921 2,135 1,737 1,856 1,679 1,071 1,157 M 1,307 954 M M 16,817
242 Fiat, Mirafiori 1,338 1,165 1,165 640 1,150 755 1,260 M 1,005 1,205 890 546 11,119
Ritmo, Rivalto, Mirafiori 14,235 14,339 14,792 14,759 18,302 15,389 1 6,125 M 18,654 12,415 11,273 9,644 159,927
Ritmo, Cassino, Mirafiori 14,222 15,025 17,144 15,574 16,143 14,413 16,273 762 17,738 9,613 8,954 7,180 153,041
112, Desio 8,247 6,872 7,907 7,888 7,779 8,030 8,622 106 8,552 5,716 4,115 3,435 77,269
Delta, Chivasso 8,099 7,224 5,432 6,476 6,365 4,910 6,287 M 36 1,633 1,940 859 49,261
900 T ,, Mirafiori 2,636 2,397 1,994 1,079 3,172 1,574 3,342 140 1,643 2,008 1,171 1,296 22,452
127 Seat (Spain) 3,475 3,498 3,566 3,362 3,302 3,983 1,520 1 6,881 4,669 5,331 4,718 44,306
Panda, (Spain) M 4,653 5,153 4,930 5,063 4,811 4,563 1 4,040 5,044 4,992 2,438 45,688
Panda, (Spain) M 6,833 5,714 6,850 7,090 8,689 9,971 1 4,242 7,157 3,375 2,046 61,968
131, (Spain) 2,821 M 629 894 976 690 265 1 2,106 4,028 3,888 2,382 18,680
126, (Poland) M 11,079 M 33,286 15,783 15,228 8,026 13,115 14,661 5,890 M M 117,068
147, (Brazil) 9,649 7,001 11,938 9,108 11,125 8,855 7,249 8,818 9,894 10,448 M 17,936 112,021
Total 1,475,316
Source: Ibid. Where missing, the output of August has been incorporated in that of September.
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Table A 4.16: Output per month, per line, per plant, 1982
Months J F M A M J J A S O N D Total
Models and 
Plants
Panda, Desio 4,212 4,669 7,015 4,547 5,680 5,527 6,436 593 5,957 5,356 5,490 2,945 58,427
Panda, Termini Imerese 9,871 14,170 15,254 15,311 13,791 14,453 12,575 1,565 14,31014,511 14,312 10,780 150,903
127, Mirafiori 20,517 19,052 21,925 22,077 22,041 21,959 24,195 1,995 23,402 17,01811,819 11,359 217,359
Uno, Rivalta B 739 128 2,899 5,599 7,864 9,993 27,222
Uno, Mirafiori B 739 739
xl/9, Lingotto 596 676 425 402 399 846 E 3,344
124 Spider, Mirafiori 724 442 445 277 50 79 E 2,017
131, Mirafiori 8,081 7,792 11,516 13,681 8,681 9,466 6,872 1,108 7,428 5,693 3,375 4,326 88,019
131, Cassino 2,465 3,890 3,949 2,271 1,926 2,353 1,739 317 3,095 2,853 2,719 1,402 28,979
Argenta, Mirafiori 4,088 6,072 5,343 4,861 4,557 5,327 3,376 568 3,690 2,660 1,521 1,521 43,584
Campagnola Benzina, Mirafiori 353 382 433 336 397 319 343 39 332 406 499 228 4,067
242 Fiat, Mirafiori 1,733 590 140 305 341 87 333 124 690 176 54 322 4,895
Ritmo, Rivalta 15,833 13,620 17,917 17,775 15,751 17,372 21,624 1,675 11,343 3,471 4,064 4,003 144,448
Ritmo, Rivalta B* 180 2,537 3,405 5,362 11,484
Ritmo, Cassino 11,408 14,549 17,775 14,189 12,850 15,581 13,397 1,295 21,582 10,63015,811 14,775 163,842
Beta, Chivasso M 3,498 471 753 1,528 3,737 1,050 23 2,172 2,075 444 523 16,274
112 Desio 5,195 5,474 7,782 5,003 6,394 8,139 9,161 619 8,793 8,288 8,073 4,627 77,548
Delta, Chivasso 2,888 2,222 4,277 3,769 4,835 4,927 5,222 513 5,694 4,917 2,625 2,511 44,400
Prisma, Chivasso B 89 8 47 604 1,637 2,745 5,130
900 T, Mirafiori 1,567 886 1,757 848 995 1,577 1,245 M 998 2,161 800 483 13,317
127 Seat, (Spain) 6,795 9,080 10,312 6,438 7,135 10,943 13,318 M 6,531 7,239 9,266 5,229 92,286
Panda, (Spain) 4,516 5,122 4,623 4,440 4,720 3,698 3,789 1,975 6,192 5,910 6,487 4,822 56,294
Panda, (Spain) 2,710 2,885 3,129 2,157 2,131 2,748 3,173 M 2,017 1,167 861 457 23,435
131 Seat, (Spain) 2,627 1,513 5,580 2,473 2,097 3,267 3,890 M 3,291 2,252 3,820 1,640 32,450
126, (Poland) M 12,195 14,652 11,401 11,107 12,361 19,119 11,370 25,275 1,518 19,713 22,045 160,756
147, (Brazil) 10,619 10,115 13,430 13,895 13,049 13,748 11,942 20,537 5,640 M 20,340 14,205 147,520
Total 1,618,739
Source: Ibid. Where missing, the output of August has been incorporated in that o f September. *Ritmo 
restyling: beginning of the production.
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Table A 4.17: Output per month, per line, per plant, 1983
Months J F M A M J J A S O N D Total
Models and Plants
Panda, Desio 5,286 4,624 5,109 3,868 6,028 4,616 6,640 1,018 3,866 4,490 4,573 2,948 53,066
Panda, Sicilia 12,372 15,089 16,313 13,439 9,689 13,541 14,690 M 9,705 9,355 12,190 8,899 135,282
127, Mirafiori 9,317 8,095 8,476 5,852 778 E 32,518
Uno, Rival ta 12,063 12,780 15,554 14,405 17,422 15,818 16,399 1,855 14,826 13,441 10,984 7,516 153,063
Uno, Mirafiori , 1st Line 2,771 7,013 9,264 8,670 4,392 M 9,185 1,312 17,293 14,647 8,089 11,965 94,601
Uno, Mirafiori , 2nd Line B 7,546 15,504 16,811 2,169 16,71520,961 5,942 11,039 96,687
131, Mirafiori 4,514 4,914 4,612 3,816 1,506 1,539 2,207 M 262 1,009 19 62 24,460
131 Panorama, Cassino B 781 407 1,391 768 M 118 138 27 143 3,773
Argenta, Mirafiori 1,468 1,447 2,810 1,884 39 E 7,648
Argenta Restyling Mirafiori B 1,239 2,955 3,195 M 2,074 3,076 2,360 1,320 16,219
Campagnola Benzina, Mirfiori 318 105 110 318 249 28 225 2 139 131 125 90 1,840
242 Fiat, Mirfiori 297 271 172 115 323 230 178 113 724 578 378 172 3,551
Ritmo, Rivalta 8,749 8,060 11,805 9,403 9,867 10,120 10,448 1,622 12,221 11,079 7,268 3,614 104,256
Ritmo, Cassino 19,175 12,145 18,119 16,21325,280 16,102 18,658 2,664 14,919 7,152 3,582 3,047 157,056
Regata, Cassino B 1,055 3,717 743 7,712 14,046 16,344 17,381 60,998
Beta, Chivasso 1,501 M 631 621 2,731 757 862 M 1,818 400 1,818 178 11,317
112 Desio 8,248 6,835 7,875 5,846 8,852 6,776 8,567 826 9,083 6,225 6,634 4,864 80,631
Delta, Chivasso 2,735 2,924 3,265 2,796 3,055 3,680 2,361 282 4,192 2,193 3,689 3,108 34,280
Prisma, Chivasso 3,967 4,431 5,238 4,564 5,161 5,496 5,940 622 6,715 6,533 6,327 5,732 60,726
900 T, Mirfiori 722 850 1,684 523 736 623 1,165 0 1,155 1,397 2,122 922 11,899
127 Seat, (Spain) 4,000 5,695 5,105 5,328 5,556 4,106 M M M M M M 29,790
Panda, (Spain) 3,812 5,019 6,013 3,977 M M M M M M M M 18,821
Panda, (Spain) 1,894 2,879 3,009 3,218 5,309 7,653 7,541 136 8,030 7,329 7,767 6,349 61,114
131 Seat, (Spain) 2,420 2,544 995 1,455 1,855 2,971 2,688 M 2,813 2,236 M M 19,977
126, (Poland) 17,662 22,273 11,621 11,307 24,549 8,333 17,851 13,361 13,494 16,602 15,007 22,560 194,620
147, (Brazil) 12,800 6,343 11,904 11,746 15,423 20,055 11,137 20,595 12,100 10,933 133,036
Total 1,601,229
Source: Ibid. Where missing, the output of August has been incorporated in that of September.
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Table A 4.18: Output per month, per line, per plant 1984
Months J F M A M J J A S O N D Total
Models and 
Plants
Panda, Desio 7,232 2,474 3,151 1,425 1,471 5,688 6,279 852 4,310 2,816 3,920 3,370 42,988
Panda, Sicilia 8,547 12,810 11,269 11,391 13,812 11,338 10,899 M 7,205 7,283 3,495 7,084 105,133
Uno, Rivalta 12,682 11,226 10,413 11,802 14,531 16,117 17,390 2,394 16,977 15,978 8,191 8,329 146,030
Uno, Mirafiori 1a line 13,679 15,479 17,104 12,688 16,103 15,225 17,422 2,047 15,053 11,912 12,452 9,021 158,185
Uno, Mirafiori 2nd line 12,902 32,920 29,131 30,140 34,564 34,353 19,752 14,626 21,501 17,557 15,928 7,630 260,004
Uno, Mirafiori 3rd line B 2,734 9,798 6,191 6,191 24,914
131, Mirafiori 42 263 37 26 35 3 E 406
131, Panorama 248 482 1,602 1,036 1,167 623 E 5,158
Argenta Restyling, Mirafiori 5,462 1,489 1,154 2,680 1,220 1,227 1,253 M 1,104 995 811 643 18,038
Campagnola Benzina, Mirafiori 156 159 180 177 213 210 198 45 226 273 242 176 2,255
242 Fiat, Mirafiori 569 114 326 374 572 202 301 80 486 364 549 76 4,013
Ritmo, Rivalta 7,786 14,087 12,225 14,941 17,485 14,157 15,092 1,844 9,293 6,912 6,475 2,982 123,279
Ritmo, Cassino 2,029 2,642 2,773 2,638 3,155 3,536 3,894 372 3,480 2,543 1,109 2,471 30,642
Regata, Cassino 20,149 18,788 22,017 19,493 25,284 24,846 24,722 2,955 22,039 13,777 4,402 4,800 203,272
Beta, Chivasso 323 96 1,270 269 318 52 187 M 730 201 84 E 3,530
112 TT 8,622 5,919 8,864 7,614 9,334 9,280 9,076 1,048 6,592 9,273 8,009 4,752 88,383
Delta, Chivasso 4,439 5,586 1,403 3,050 4,538 3,253 5,035 9 55 2,213 1,195 1,076 31,852
Prisma, Chivasso 6,679 6,499 5,347 5,528 6,457 14,146 394 134 5,333 6,625 3,254 3,072 63,468
900 E, Mirafiori 1,229 1,170 1,077 1,194 1,141 1,170 1,353 179 924 1,078 694 1,078 12,287
Thema, Mirafiori B 21 537 793 640 582 2,573
Panda, (Spain) 4,385 8,086 6,621 5,731 8,556 6,487 8,347 M 6,136 6,142 6,108 4,353 70,952
126, (Poland) 18,601 16,019 18,273 5,218 23,042 22,856 25,515 M 18,723 21,508 31,131 5,170 206,056
147, (Brazil) 11,867 4,729 6,981 8,993 10,103 7,304 10,724 9,541 7,115 8,996 8,164 6,447 100,964
Total 1,715,382
Source: Ibid. Where missing, the output of August has been incorporated in that of September.
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Table A 4.19: Output per month, per line, per plant 1985
Months J F M A M J J A S O N D Total
Models and 
Plants
Panda, Desio 3,624 5,379 2,814 1,397 2,725 2,824 2,258 M 900 6,044 347 244 28,556
Panda, Sicilia 16,440 8,089 10,55910,56414,736 9,822 13,341 M 6,093 5,233 8,580 9,842 113399
Uno, Rivalta 19,07317,06318,59216,71420,74417,45817,263 2,146 17,36720,74621,53920,925 209,630
Uno, Mirafiori 1“ line 15,337 12,91614,240 13,901 16,487 14,76418,195 1,676 16,386 17,294 14,39014,181 169,767
Uno, Mirafiori 2nd line 10,86510,42010,859 9,633 11,000 9,773 10,035 836 9,455 8,029 6,768 3,926 101,599
Uno, Mirafiori 3rd line 7,482 7,551 6,806 6,483 5,392 3,443 6,067 479 6,448 9,045 9,103 10,987 79,286
Argenta, Mirafiori 544 439 E 983
Campagnola Benzina, Mirafiori 259 279 304 297 319 279 326 25 314 341 281 131 3,155
242 Fiat, Mirafiori 365 -613 1,496 377 630 515 455 E 3325
Ritmo, Rivalta 11,547 6,376 8,701 9,117 22,976 8,939 4,421 M 5,495 6,186 5,167 3,159 92,084
Ritmo, Cassino 2,649 4,807 3,872 3,356 3,225 2,712 4,444 M 2,701 3363 3,835 1,148 36,012
Regata, Cassino 20,308 17,611 15,058 17,424 16,835 16,208 17,833 M 9,984 11,38913,249 4,466 160365
Croma, Mirafiori E 313 638 1,053 2,494 4,498
Y10, Mirafiori 695 2,114 4,525 6,742 9,758 9,117 9,651 816 7,805 6,104 3331 3340 63,898
112, Desio 4,812 7,121 3,827 3,514 3,816 3,221 3,360 M 1352 1,594 1,762 1,361 35,640
Delta, Chivasso 2,764 1,984 1,985 1,686 1,826 1,620 2,306 326 3,091 2321 2,337 1,462 23,608
Prisma, Chivasso 7,193 5,158 8,323 4,846 8,094 7,488 8,027 562 6,374 6343 6,517 4323 73,348
900 E, Mirafiori 1,051 675 909 547 1,501 499 1,803 146 526 1,034 841 393 9,925
Thema, Mirafiori 935 1,247 1,908 2,059 2,574 2,585 3,620 374 3,665 4,339 3,681 3,540 30,527
Panda, (Spain) 6,838 5,838 6,391 4,208 6,317 4,530 3,610 M 5,940 9,371 4,561 2,489 60,093
126, (Poland) 17,343 15,548 17,59015,39221,442 19,229 12,91520,79923,51420,458 18,061 20,226 222,517
147, Brasi(Brazil) 7,625 5,639 M 11,760 7,112 7,046 5308 4,889 7,167 7,940 7,317 5,623 77,426
Total 1,599,441
Source: Ibid. Where missing, the output of August has been incorporated in that of September.
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Table A 4.20: Output per month, per line, per plant 1986
Months J F M A M J J A S O N D Total
Models and 
Plants
Panda, Desio 10,269 7,937 7,617 9,919 10,290 10,693 12,949 M 11,280 11,921 9,960 10,302 113,137
Panda .Temini 11,789 14,054 13,723 15,143 13,992 13,826 16,913 M 15,689 15,742 13,726 14,353 158,950
Uno, Mirafiori l 14 line 16,808 18,377 20,291 20,287 19,718 18,955 23,282 M 21,258 21,606 16,624 16,436 213,642
Uno, Mirafiori 2nd line 3,595 4,698 5,569 3,852 4,000 3,788 4,839 M 4,245 3,444 2,311 2,552 42,893
Uno,Mirafiori Saline 7,824 7,492 9,227 9,604 10,347 9,723 11,060 M 10,805 11,197 9,000 7,089 103,368
Uno, Rivalta 24,231 24,999 26,862 27,359 27,376 26,918 32,792 M 31,181 30,721 25,892 25,384 303,715
Ritmo, Rivalta 3,513 1,009 E 4,522
Ritmo, Cassino 6,624 7,734 7,339 10,606 10,840 8,740 8,937 M 8,890 7,957 4,294 5,434 87,395
Regata, Cassino 17,016 14,740 11,004 14,632 12,649 13,657 18,319 M 14,180 12,312 6,462 10,737 145,708
Croma, Mirafiori 3,891 5,278 6,192 6,885 7,242 6,718 8,087 M 7,447 7,899 6,650 5,785 72,074
Thema S.W ., Mirafiori 1,183 1,183
Fiorino, Mirafiori 399 310 332 317 362 379 553 M 244 162 137 142 3,337
Campagnola Benzina, Mirafiori 173 170 179 186 188 180 206 9 193 128 2 1,441
900 E, Mirafiori 891 860 929 713 464 856 513 M 450 957 199 410 7,242
A 112 , Desio 1,338 1,871 2,001 1,460 229 E 2,230
Y10, Mirafiori 5,790 7,876 7,927 7,161 7,082 6,625 7,980 M 7,659 7,880 7,410 7,476 80,866
Delta, Chivasso 2,193 1,925 2,100 2,190 2,393 3,091 3,837 M 3,150 3,555 9,112 5,242 38,788
Prisma, Chivasso 7,244 4,697 6,468 5,849 5,701 5,487 6,317 M 5,921 5,751 5,206 5,524 64,165
Thema, Mirafiori 3,969 3,725 4,020 3,776 3,969 3,475 4,290 M 3,957 4,661 4,100 4,420 44,362
Prisma, Rivalta 1,850
Panda, (Spain) 4,502 4,007 2,295 4,456 E 15,260
126, (Poland) 13,413 27,550 20,300 18,039 19,189 M 45,961 M M 39,867 15,513 23,729 223,561
147, (Brazil) 8,518 7,691 8,160 7,515 7,295 M 10,477 7,295 M M M 56,951
Total 1,785,745
Source: Ibid. Where missing, the output of August has been incorporated in that of September.
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Table A 4.21: Output per month, per line, per plant. 1987
Months J F M A M J J A S O N D Total
Models and 
Plants
Panda, Desio 10,278 10,471 12,090 11,270 10,663 12,109 13,697 604 13,334 13,715 13,161 12,810 134,202
Panda,Temini Imerese 13,975 15,974 17,096 15,717 15,799 16,628 15,937 4,143 18,777 15,269 12,953 10,495 172,763
Tipo, Casino 87 543 1,252 1,882
Uno Mirafiori 1“ line 16,573 18,316 22,686 22,497 20,810 21,236 22,949 780 20,290 20,108 20,178 18,955 225,378
Uno, Mirafiri 2nd line 4,269 5,020 7,854 7,577 6,553 6,871 5,898 142 5,178 4,796 2,705 4,937 61,800
Uno, Mirafiori 3rd line 6,421 5,560 8,227 7,869 9,723 9,998 9,923 273 6,898 7,529 6,901 6,882 86,204
Uno, Rivalta 25,830 52,937 32,604 30,489 30,511 13,297 50,398 1,346 28,921 26,697 22,865 19,557 335,452
Ritmo, Cassino 4,527 6,234 6,702 6,003 5,810 3,376 1,538 48 1,818 2,828 2,611 635 42,130
Regata, Cassino 8,994 15,339 15,502 13,835 11,148 12,851 11,380 485 14,591 14,524 8,798 10,316 137,763
Croma, Mirafiori 5,061 4,678 5,354 5,456 5,784 6,561 6,859 375 6,351 6,424 6,059 5,485 64,447
Tipo, Rivalta 152 220 575 21 530 849 3,081 5,996 11,272
Thema S.W, Mirafiori 430 462 440 409 394 416 471 293 396 299 176 4,186
Fiorino, Mirafiori 79 276 173 179 170 228 247 174 115 100 172 1,913
900 E, Mirafiori 268 656 605 559 666 618 335 6 375 1,109 163 5,360
Y10 Mirafiori 8,508 9,900 11,855 10,754 8,977 9,007 9,702 541 10,389 10,580 10,827 10,417 111,457
Delta, Chivasso 3,651 4,003 5,829 3,575 5,581 2,471 4,290 203 3,842 2,950 3,971 4,662 45,028
Prisma, Chivasso 10,425 2,744 4,598 5,605 9,790 2,084 6,309 274 6,355 4,429 5,126 5,325 63,064
Thema, Mirafiori 4,847 5,030 6,102 4,599 5,319 4,592 5,060 208 4,875 4,654 4,551 3,762 53,599
126, (Poland) 12,347 22,037 17,847 52,231
126 Restyling, (Poland) 1,096 1,648 3,247 4,072 5,377 4,856 5,006 25,302
Duna, (Brazil) 11,043 11,905 12,700 13,042 14,658 9,581 19,460 13,714 11,794 9,766 6,740 134,403
Total 1,880,062
Source: Ibid. Where missing, the output of August has been incorporated in that o f September.
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Table A 4.22: Monthly capacity utilisation rate, Fiat pants, 1984-1987
Months Workingdays Rivalta Mir. I Mir. II Mir. Ill Cassino Desio Termini Chivasso Chivasso
Uno + 
Ritmo Uno
Uno + Croma + 
Thema
Uno + Y 
10
Ritno + 
Regata Panda Panda Delta Prisma
J 19 76.9 90 0 0 89.8 95.2 90 58.4 87.9
F 21 86.1 92.1 196 0 78.5 29.5 122 66.5 77.4
M 21 77 101.8 173.4 0 90.8 37.5 107.3 16.7 63.7
A 19 100.5 83.5 198.3 0 89.6 18.8 119.9 40.1 72.7
M 22 103.9 91.5 196.4 0 99.4 16.7 125.6 51.6 73.4
J 20 108.1 95.2 214.7 0 109.2 71.1 113.4 40.7 176.8
J 22 105.5 99 112.2 0 100.1 71.4 99.1 57.2 4.5
A 6 0 0 0 42.7 35.5 0 0 0
S 20 93.8 94.1 134.4 17.1 98.2 53.9 72.1 0.7 66.7
O 23 71.1 64.7 95.4 53.3 54.6 30.6 63.3 24.1 72
N 20 52.4 77.8 99.6 38.7 21.2 49 35 14.9 40.7
D 84 19 42.5 59.3 50.2 40.7 29.4 44.3 74.6 14.2 40.4
J 20 109.4 95.9 67.9 46.8 88.3 45.3 164.4 34.6 89.9
F 20 83.7 80.7 65.1 47.2 86.2 67.2 80.9 24.8 64.5
M 20 97.5 89 67.9 42.5 72.8 35.2 105.6 24.8 104
A 20 92.3 86.9 60.2 40.5 79.9 17.5 105.6 21.1 60.6
M 22 141.9 93.7 62.5 30.6 70.1 31 134 20.8 92
J 19 99.2 97.1 64.3 22.7 76.6 37.2 103.4 21.3 98.5
J 23 67.3 98.9 54.5 33 74.5 24.5 116 25.1 87.3
A 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S 21 77.8 97.5 56.3 38.4 46.5 10.7 58 36.8 75.9
O 23 83.6 94 43.6 49.2 49 65.7 45.5 24.1 67.9
N 20 95.4 89.9 42.3 56.9 65.7 4.3 85.8 29.2 81.5
D 85 19 90.5 93.3 25.8 72.3 22.7 3.2 103.6 19.2 59.5
Sources: The capacity utilisation rate is the actual utilisation as percentage of the optimal capacity 
utilisation. Daily optimal capacity utilisation was as follow: Rivalta = 1400 cars per day; Mirafiori = 850 
cars per day per line; Cassino = 1400 cars per day; Desio = 300 cars per day; Termini Imerese = 500 cars 
per day; Chivasso = 400 cars per say per line. Source: Mr Malandri, chief engineer at the Department of 
Technology Development, Fiat Auto, interview with the author, 18-03-1999. Fiat Fondo Sepin 
(Emplyment File), 5/VIII/l/A. The optimal monthly capacity utilisation has been calculated by 
multiplying the optimal daily capacity utilisation of each line for the number of working days of each 
month. By utilising the data on monthly production per line shown by table A4 18-21, the utilisation rate 
has been calculated.
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Table A 4.22: (continued)
Months Workingdays Rivalta Mir. I M ir .n Mir. Ill Cassino Desio Termini Chivasso Chivasso
Uno + 
Ritmo Uno
Uno + Croma + 
Thema
Uno + Y 
10
Ritno + 
Regata Panda Panda Delta Prisma
J 20 99.1 105.1 22.5 48.9 90.9 128.4 117.9 27.4 90.6
F 19 97.8 120.9 30.9 49.3 91 104.4 147.9 25.3 61.8
M 21 91.4 120.8 33.1 54.9 67.2 90.7 130.7 25 77
A 21 93.1 120.8 22.9 57.2 92.4 118.1 144.2 26.1 69.6
M 21 93.1 117.4 23.8 61.6 86 122.5 133.3 28.5 67.9
J 20 96.1 118.5 23.7 60.8 86.1 133.7 138.3 38.6 68.6
J 23 101.8 126.5 26.3 60.1 91.2 140.8 147.1 41.7 68.7
A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S 22 101.2 120.8 24.1 61.4 80.7 128.2 142.6 35.8 67.3
0 23 95.4 117.4 18.7 60.9 67.8 129.6 136.9 38.6 62.5
N 21 88.1 99 13.8 53.6 39.4 118.6 130.7 108.5 62
D 86 21 86.3 97.8 15.2 42.2 59.2 122.6 136.7 62.4 65.8
J 19 97.1 109 28.1 42.2 54.7 135.2 147.1 48 137.2
F 20 189.1 114.5 31.4 34.8 83 130.9 159.7 50 34.3
M 21 110.9 135 46.8 49 81.3 143.9 162.8 69.4 54.7
A 22 99 127.8 43.1 44.7 69.4 128.1 142.9 40.6 63.7
M 20 109 130.1 41 60.8 65.2 133.3 158 69.8 122.4
J 21 45.2 126.4 40.9 59.5 59.4 144.2 158.4 29.4 24.8
J 23 156.5 124.7 32.1 53.9 43.2 148.9 138.6 46.6 68.6
A 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S 22 93.9 115.3 29.4 39.2 57.4 151.5 170.7 43.7 72.2
0 22 86.7 114.3 27.3 42.8 60.7 155.9 138.8 33.5 50.3
N 21 77.8 120.1 16.1 41.1 41.8 156.7 123.4 47.3 61
D 87 19 73.5 124.7 32.5 45.3 44.3 168.6 110.5 61.3 70.1
Source: Ibid.
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Mr Malandri, Chief Engineer, Department of New Technology Development, Fiat 
Auto.
Interview with the author, 18-03-1999. Transcript of the most relevant parts of the 
interview, with regards to qualitative issues.
A: “Between 1984 and 1987, was it possible to shift the production of the Uno to 
Cassino?”
M: “Such a possibility was not economically viable because it would have required the 
retooling of the lines upstream the Robogate, as well as the resetting of the Robogate 
itself But the main problem was the retooling of the lines upstream the Robogate. By 
lines upstream the Robogate, I mean the stamping and welding lines processing the 
platform and body subcomponents.”
A: “Why was the retooling of the lines upstream the Robogate necessary, in order to 
shift the production of the Uno to Cassino?”
M: “Because the stamping and welding lines upstream the Robogate were, and still are, 
model specific.”
A: “In other terms, the set of tools upstream the Robogate was inflexible. Is it correct? 
M: “Yes, it is.”
A: “This is an interesting point, because it rises the question why Robotics was not 
deployed upstream the Robogate.”
M: “Well, you change technology when the old one proves inefficient. Multiple 
automated welders upstream basting and finishing were extremely efficient, with a cycle 
time smaller than a minute and low labour intensity.”
A: “Why did you not utilised multiple automated welders at the stage of the monocoque 
welding?”
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M: Before the deployment of robotics, multiple automated welders were utilised in all 
the spot welding processes upstream the stage of monocoque welding, and in the 
monocoque basting.”
A: “Why not in finishing?”
M: “Because multiple automated welders were by far too inflexible to cope with the 
high level of complexity involved by the finishing stage.”
A: “As far as I know, Fiat tried multiple automated welders for the basting and 
finishing of the 126 at the Cassino plant between 1972 and 1974 and it was a failure. Is 
this correct?”
M: “ I was not part of that project, but yes, the experiment stopped in 1974.”
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Table A 6.1; Segment share of total output (percentage). 1968-87
Years A+B C+D+E F G H I LCV 3500 Kg Total
Over
2200
Over
3000
Sport
Below
2000
Sport
Over
2000 4 WD
% % % % % % % %
1968 61.7 22 0.6 0 10.9 0 0.1 4.6 100
1969 51.8 32 0 0 11 0 0.2 5 100
1970 43.1 45.1 0.3 0 8.4 0 0.2 3 100
1971 42.5 48.5 0.1 0 6.3 0 0.3 2.3 100
1972 38.8 55.2 0.2 0 3.1 0.1 0.1 2.5 100
1973 46.9 34.1 0.2 0 13.6 0.1 0.1 5.1 100
1974 51.2 39.6 0.1 0 3.8 0 0.1 5.2 100
1975 46.6 41 0 0 3.3 0 0.2 8.8 100
1976 43.2 49.4 0 0 2 0 0.2 5.2 100
1977 52.4 40.1 0 0 2.4 0 0.2 4.9 100
1978 46.8 46 0 0 2.6 0 0.3 4.3 100
1979 39.8 53.7 0 0 2.4 0 0.2 3.8 100
1980 54 40.3 0 0 1.7 0 0.3 3.8 100
1981 58 37.7 0 0 0.7 0 0.2 3.3 100
1982 60.4 34.5 0 0 0.3 0 0.2 4.5 100
1983 58.9 35.7 0 0 0 0 0.1 5.3 100
1984 68 27.3 0 0 0 0 0.1 4.5 100
1985 69.3 25.1 0 0 0 0 0.2 5.4 100
1986 70.1 24.4 0 0 0 0 0.1 5.4 100
1987 76.5 19.1 0 0 0 0 0 4.4 100
Source: Elaboration of data from Archivio Fiat, ‘Libro dei mimeri di matricola dei veicoli prodotti’ 
(Production File). Before 1977, Lancia output has been extrapolated by Fiat (ed.) Le fasi della crescita, 
1996 pp 120-121. Lancia did not produce cars below segment C. Segments are defined as follows: A 
(500-900 cc.), B (900-1100 cc.), C (1100-1300 cc.), D (1300-1600 cc.), E (1600-2200 cc.). Note: 4WD = 
four wheel drive; LCV = light commercial vehicles.
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Translation of relevant parts of the Administration Board Meetings Report, 30th of
January 1963, book 33, pp 22-25.
Speaker: Vittorio Valletta, President of Fiat.
“Within the European Common Market, and in particular within the car industry, the 
problems that we were expecting are now emerging. [....] In 1965 the production 
capacity of the European industry will exceed demand by 20% [....]. [There is also] 
evidence of severe price competition caused by the dominant position of the two 
American champions Ford and General Motors. [...] Within the EEC there are, and will 
be in the future, Countries with similar production capacity -  Germany, France, and in 
the future the UK -  and Countries with inferior production capacity, such as Italy. It
will take at least ten years for Italy to catch up. [..... ] The Italian view [on the removal
of tariffs] has to be re-considered in order to prevent the Italian economy from suffering 
the competition of those who have the dominant position in terms of production 
capacity.
As far as the car industry is concerned, Ford and General Motors are in the position to 
profit from the experience and financial means of their American partners, in order to 
pursue a strategy based on unbeatable price competition [meaning that Fiat could not be 
as price competitive as Ford and General Motors]. Actually, there is already evidence 
that both manufacturers are pursuing such a strategy [...] Asked by the France 
newspaper L’Equipe (October 1962), Mr. Dreyfus, President of Renault, stated that the 
European car industry should cooperate in order to achieve a common policy to prevent 
specific countries or specific manufacturers, either within or outside the EC, to acquire a 
dominant position in the EEC market. Fiat, through his President Valletta, intends to 
stress her unconditional agreement with Mr Dreyfus.”
Translation of relevant parts of the Administration Board Meeting Report of the 
29th of July 1963, book. 34, pp. 1-7.
Speaker: Speaker: Vittorio Valletta, President of Fiat.
“Nobody should believe that the “price war” will resolve the current crisis of 
overcapacity [here Valletta refers the problem of overcapacity quoted in the preceding 
meeting of the Board]. We are already at the limit. At the moment, the prices of the 
Italian cars are competitive, but there is no doubt that the American manufacturers can 
cut costs to an extent not attainable by the European industry. [...] It has to be stressed 
that the defence of the economy of individual EEC countries can be already 
implemented based on the Chapter of the Treaty of Rome concerning the defence of 
national market against dominant positions.”
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Translation of relevant parts of the Administration Board Meeting Report of the
4th of February 1964, book 34, pp. 96-99.
Speaker: Vittorio Valletta.
“In 1963, the threat of severe price competition become an actual price war between 
European and domestic manufacturers in the Italian market. [....] In particular, were not 
impressed by the unnecessary price reduction of some manufacturers -  namely Ford and 
Volkswagen -  who were enjoying a normal [literal translation of the Italian text] 
success in the Italian market but decided to go for an unnecessary price cut which we 
interpreted as dumping.”
Translation of relevant parts of the Administration Board Meeting Report of the 
24th of January 1965, book 35, pp. 179-187.
Speaker: Vittorio Valletta.
“Within the EEC there is even stronger concern about the future of the car industry [due 
to two main problems]:
1) The overcapacity of the industry in relation to the size of demand and its rate of 
growth;
2) The severe price competition that overcapacity will induce. In particular, the 
European subsidiaries of Ford and General Motors would be the leader in the 
price war.
In order to pursue a collective defence of the European car industry, we have proposed 
the introduction of production quotas within a regulatory framework similar to that 
regulating the production of steel. If such a framework cannot be implemented, [our 
view is that] each individual country will defend the domestic market by applying the 
chapter of the Treaty of Rome concerning dominant positions.
During meetings with Italian and French authorities [not specified in the text] it has 
been recognised that the situation is serious and that the matter should be discussed also 
with the European manufacturers in order to find a common solution.”
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Table A7.1: New registrations. Fiat exports, and the Fiat share of the domestic and
EC markets, 1965-1987
Year New registrations 
(units)
Exports Fiat share of the domestic market 
(units)
Fiat Share of the EC market
1965 889,300 289,028 73.66 %
1966 1,015,000 349,909 74.14 %
1967 1,162,200 376,219 75.82 %
1968 1,167,600 521,534 74.55 %
1969 1,217,900 545,448 70.14 %
1970 1,363,600 586,496 63.54 %
1971 1,435,500 577,886 64.39 %
1972 1,470,400 591,170 63.00 %
1973 1,449,900 547,245 61.40 %
1974 1,280,700 554,856 61.90 %
1975 1,050,900 510,880 56.58 %
1976 1,187,600 613,100 53.52 % 11.15%
1977 1,219,200 584,886 54.52 % 11.23%
1978 1,194,400 503,351 53.60 % 11.44%
1979 1,397,000 773,143 50.33 % 10.77%
1980 1,530,500 651,400 51.36 % 12.11 %
1981 1,808,500 693,700 51.30 % 12.78%
1982 1,851,200 541,400 51.52 % 12.4%
1983 1,451,500 564,600 55.56 % 12.17%
1984 1,572,400 574,000 54.44 % 12.78%
1985 1,653,200 620,494 52.31 % 12.37%
1986 1,769,200 670,754 54.40 % 12.59%
1987 1,929,600 725,085 53.73 % 14.13%
Source: Archivio Storico Fiat, (ed), Fiat: le fasi della crescita, pp. 131-135. Enrietti and Fomenego, 77 
gruppo Fiat, 1989, pp. 70-73, tables 5/1 and 5/2. ANFIA (ed), L ’automobile in cijre, p. 334.
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Table A7.2: Monthly variation in prices (%) in the Italian market various
manufacturers, 1981-1987
Year Month Fiat Alfa Romeo Audi Citroen Ford Opel Peugeot Renault Volkswagen Volvo Number of 
followers in the 
same or in the 
subsequent 
month
1981 Jan.
1981 Feb. 4.7
1981 March 2.1 2.6 5.2 4.9 5.9 6 1.7 7
1981 April
1981 May 12.3 3.1 5.2
1981 June 2.2 6.3 4
1981 July 5.5 0.76 5.5 4.5 5.9 9
1981 Aug. -5.4 0 0.8 -0.47 -2.8 -3.1 -0.4 -0.9 -2.1
1981 Sept.
1981 Oct. 0.39 3.6 4.14 8.2 3.4 5.6 -3
1981 Nov. 7.9 2.4
1981 Dec. 1.6 1.9 4.2 4.3 3.8 4.9 4.5 4.3 9
1982 Jan. 5.6 15.1
1982 Feb.
1982 March 5.3 4.1 3.2 5.9 2.3 9
1982 April 3.3 8.1 4 1.3 2.6
1982 May 5.2 7.5 1.8 2.1
1982 June 4.9 4.6 5.6
1982 July 8 4.7 3.3 4.8
1982 Aug. 3.9
1982 Sept. 14.7 7.9 5.4
1982 Oct. 4.8 7.2 1.5 3.4 4.8 10
1982 Nov. 3.3
1982 Dec. 0.3 3.1 1
1983 Jan.
1983 Feb. -6.7 6.7 2.5 0.6 2.4 3.4 -0.1
1983 March 1 4.6 4
1983 April 6.9 2 7.3 2.1 0.9 2.1 7
1983 May 7.6 4.3
1983 June
1983 July 2.7 3.8
1983 Aug.
1983 Sept. 6.1 10.5 6.6 1.4 3.6 8
1983 Oct. -0.1 6.5 8.6 10 1.9
1983 Nov. -0.1 5.1
1983 Dec. 0 1.3 2.8 2.6
Source: Elaboration of prices from Quattroruote, Monthly, 1980-1987.
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Table A7.2 (continued)
Year Month Fiat Alfa Romeo Audi Citroen Ford Opel Peugeot Renault Volkswagen Volvo Number of 
followers in the 
same or in the 
subsequent 
month
1984 Jan. 2.6 9.8 2.5 5.8
1984 Feb. 0.7 6.3 2.45 3.3
1984 March
1984 April 5.4 2.5 5.6 2.5 7
1984 May 2.6 2.2 8.7 1.6
1984 June 2.6 2.6
1984 July 2.3
1984 Aug. 2.3
1984 Sept. 1.6 8.6 3.6 0.1
1984 Oct. 5.3 4.3 1.9 0.2
1984 Nov. 0 1.2 3.7 6.8 4.6
1984 Dec. -0.4 -1.5
1985 Jan. 0.41
1985 Feb. 1.2 2 -6.8 4.2 2.8 -0.3 5
1985 March 1.65 1.1
1985 April 6.1
1985 May 5.7 -0.8 1.8 1.4
1985 June 1 2.6 0.21 2.4
1985 July 5.3 3.3
1985 Aug. 1.4 3.8 2
1985 Sept. 6.3
1985 Oct. 2.1 1.5 0.7 3.5 4.7
1985 Nov. 0 1.2
1985 Dec. 0.8 2.2 1.8 1.2 5
1986 Jan. 0.2 0.9 2.6
1986 Feb. 2.5 3 6.1 1.91 8.3
1986 March -1.1
1986 April 3.5 0
1986 May 5.2 1
1986 June 1.5 1.1 4.3 2.9 5.1 1.7 5
1986 July -2.1
1986 Aug. 1.8
1986 Sept. -0.1 9.3 3.8 1.4 5.4
1986 Oct. 0.2 0.8 0.8 0.6
1986 Nov. 0 -0.6
1986 Dec. 0.5 0.9 3.8 5
Ibid.
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Table A7. 2 (continued)
Year Month Fiat Alfa Romeo Audi Citroen Ford Opel Peugeot Renault Volkswagen Volvo Number of followers in the
same or in the subsequent 
month
1987 Jan. 1.4
1987 Feb. 0.8 4.6 3.3 9.4 1.9 5.2 0.9 1.2 8
1987 March 1.7
1987 April 2.4
1987 May
1987 June 2 1.05 1 0.96 -1.9 4
1987 July 1.4
1987 Aug. 6.5 2.2
1987 Sept. 0.8 4.9 3.1 -4.82 10
1987 Oct. 3.79
1987 Nov. 4.28
1987 Dec.
Ibid.
Table A7.3: Frequency distribution of the number of followers in the 
same month or within two months when Fiat increased its prices
Number of Number of Frequency with which a certain Percentage of each Cumulative frequency
competitors price changes number of competitors followed Fiat observation in the distribution
when Fiat was price rises frequency distribution
the first mover out of the total number
of price rises
Number o f Frequency
followers
9 2 13.3% 13.3%
8 2 13.3% 26.7%
7 3 20% 46.7%
6 0 0% 46.7%
5 3 20% 66.7%
4 2 13.3% 80%
3 0 0% 80%
2 1 6.7% 86.7%
1 2 13.3% 100%
Source: ibid.
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Table A7.4: Changes prices, 1984 - 1987
Fiat Ford Opel Peugeot Renault Volkswagen Price index of consumer goods*
1981 21.1% 15.5% 21.2% 20.5% 13.4% 19.7% 18.7%
1982 18.4% 15.6% 15.1% 13.6% 17.7% 16.1% 16.3%
1983 6.2% 6% 11.9% 13.6% 14.4% 17.5% 15%
1984 13.3% 14.2% 15% 10.6% 5.8% 6.1% 10.6%
1985 4.4% 3.51% 7.9% 8.1% 7.7% 12.3% 8.6%
1986 5.2% 0.3% 11.2% 4.4% 4.91% 15.4% 6.1%
1987 4.2% 7.3% 4.58% 5.7% 13.3% 7.4% 4.6%
♦Calculated from the ISTAT price index of consumer goods. Each observation shows the percentage 
increment on the previous year. Source: ibid.
Table A7.5: Relevant output range, considering the Prisma and the Regata as C 
segment models
Segments Fiat actual output Fiat output mix European average European norm: typical
according to the volumes (1985 volumes (1985 
budget allocation benchmark) benchmark)
of capacity among 
models
1984 1985 1986 1987
A 148121 146353 355183 418422 394400 119000 110000
B 675614 595922 663618 708834 498800 350000 440000
C 458077 385417 340578 301139 696000 505000 525000
E 24141 36008 116436 118046 83520 100000 140000
Sources: Elaboration of data from Archivio Storico Fiat ‘Libro dei numeri di matricola dei veicoli 
prodotti’, ( Fiat Production File), and from Ludvigsen and Associates, The Cost o f  non Europe, p. 33.
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Table A7.6: Per unit factory costs at typical annual volumes, segments A - E
Value in 1985 ECU Value in 1985 ITL
Segment A B C D E A B C D E
Volumes 119,000 350,000 505,000 243,000 100,000 119,000 350,000 505,000 243,000 100,000
Variable
costs
Engine and 
transmissio
575 715 810 1,040 1,550 837,775 1,041,755 1,180,170 1,515,280 2,258,350
n
Electrical 130 225 450 680 1,160 189,410 327,825 655,650 990,760 1,690,120
Chassis 355 540 855 1040 1,545 517,235 786,780 1,245,735 1,515,280 2,251,065
Interior 250 370 610 835 1,235 364,250 539,090 888,770 1,216,595 1,799,395
Exterior 70 110 205 315 465 101,990 160,270 298,685 458,955 677,505
Body in 
white
445 535 550 730 925 648,365 779,495 801,350 1,063,610 1,347,725
Pint and 
assembly
255 3,40 485 575 850 371,535 495,380 706,645 837,775 1,238,450
Total V.C. 2,080 2,835 3,965 5,215 7,730 3,030,560 4,130,595 5,777,005 7,598,255 1,126,2610
Fix costs 1,170 1,375 1,465 1,960 2,370 1,704,690 2,003,375 2,134,505 2,855,720 3,453,090
Total Costs 3,250 4,210 5,430 7,175 10,100 473,5250 6,133,970 7,911,510 10,453,97
5
14,715,700
Sources: Ludvigsen and Associates, The Cost o f non Europe, p. 47. The conversion rate is 1 ECU = ITL 
1475.
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Table A7.7: Per unit factory costs at various levels of output. 1985 ITL
iK B <C 10 E
Volumes TC Volumes TC Volumes TC Volumes TC Volumes TC
50,000 7,350,565 50,000 18,941000 50,000 28,344,478 50,000 22,525,220 50,000 18,872,521
100,000 5,060,161 100,000 11,495,730 100,000 17,137,234 100,000 14,969,218 100,000 14,715,700
110,000 4,735,250 200,000 7,720,643 200,000 11,435,993 200,000 11,341,288 140,000 13,437,911
160,000 4,153,907 350,000 6,133,970 300,000 9,541,893 243,000 10,453,975 200,000 12,476,291
200,000 3,874,163 500,000 5,386,529 500,000 7,911,510 300,000 9,779,384 220,000 12,199,461
300,000 3,483,687 650,000 4,998,967 525,000 7,596,798 315,000 9,655,539 300,000 11,731,764
500,000 3,123,808 435,000 5,641,504 348,000* 9,050,884 380,000 9,192,213 500,000 10,962,468
394,400* 3,256,395 498,800* 5,401,099 185,773* 11,975,083 500,000 8,589,015 83,520* 15,474,797
148,121* 431,8548 675,614* 4,869,294 151,704* 13,274,727 348,000* 9,441,360 116,436* 14,052,765
146,353* 4,324,376 595,922* 5,098,043 130,705* 14,463,639 272,304* 10,124,693 118,046* 13,974,087
355,183* 3,355,471 663,618* 4,924,660 100,312* 16,994,448 233,713* 10,663,783 24,141* 26,488,260
119,000* 4,722,137 708,834* 4,828,498 209,873* 11,095,240 36,008* 21,594,197
415,280* 3,209,771 200,827* 11,235,509
Source: Elaboration of data from Archivio Storico Fiat, ‘Libro dei numeri di matricola dei veicoli prodotti’. (Fiat Production File). 
Costs for Fiat output data have been extrapolated by using the linear regression technique based on costs at various levels of output 
as reported by Ludvigsen. The Cost o f Non Europe, pp. 68-72.
Table A7.8: Behaviour of total costs in the relevant output-mix ranges
Costs 1984 1985 1986 1987 Budgret Ea En
A 6,395,864,780 6,328,303,720 11,916,389,650 13,414,609,320 12,841,664,000 5,619,180,000 5,194,200,000
B 32,895,645,660 30,380,103,560 32,676,550,320 34,222,505,520 26,940,188,000 21,465,500,000 24,820,400,000
C 22,246,316,750 20,137,188,960 18,903,864,150 17,047,021,280 31,494,000,000 39,950,550,000 39,879,000,000
D 27,568,056,960 24,920,817,190 23,285,409,350 22,562,913,450 32,854,680,000 25,400,790,000 30,803,850,000
E 6,394,468,080 7,775,567,520 16,361,586,720 16,495,748,040 12,923,884,800 14,715,000,000 18,811,800,000
Total 95,500,352,230 89,541,980,950 103,143,800,200 103,742,797,600 117,054,416,800 107,151,020,000 119,509,250,000
Output
1,305,953 1,163,700 1,475,815 1,546,441 1,672,720 1,317,000 1,530,000
Keys: Ea= European average; En= European norm. Source: ibid.
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Figure A7.1: Ratios of costs to output at various levels of output and output mixes, 
assuming typical costs, and considering the Prisma and the Regata as C segment 
units - 1985 prices
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Table A7.9: Behaviour of costs, revenues and operating profits in the relevant 
output-mix ranges, ITL
1984 1985 1986 1987 Budget Ea En
Revnues 
A 9,642,677,100 9,527,580,300 23,122,413,300 27,239,272,200 25,675,440,000 7,746,900,000 7,161,000,000
B 52,900,576,200 46,660,692,600 51,961,289,400 55,501702,200 39,056,040,000 27,405,000,000 34,452,000,000
C 17,299,181,760 14,126,676,480 12,171,249,600 9,341,053,440 32,405,760,000 47,025,600,000 48,888,000,000
D 29,033,052,480 24,918,480,060 22,376,659,260 21,412,174,740 37,103,760,000 25,908,660,000 33,585,300,000
E 4,000,887,930 5,967,605,840 19,296,938,280 19,563,763,580 13,841,769,600 16,573,000,000 23,202,200,000
Tot. 112,876,375,500 101,201,035,300 128,928,549,800 133,057,966,200 148,082,769,600 124,659,160,000 147,288,500,000
Costs
A 6,395,864,780 6,328,303,720 11,916,389,650 13,414,609,320 12,841,664,000 5,619,180,000 5,194,200,000
B 32,895,645,660 30,380,103,560 32,676,550,320 34,222,505,520 26,940,188,000 21,465,500,000 24,820,400,000
C 22,246,316,750 20,137,188,960 18,903,864,150 17,047,021,280 31,494,000,000 39,950,550,000 39,879,000,000
D 27,568,056,960 24,920,817,190 23,285,409,350 22,562,913,450 32,854,680,000 25,400,790,000 30,803,850,000
E 6,394,468,080 7,775,567,520 16,361,586,720 16,495,748,040 12,923,884,800 14,715,000,000 18,811,800,000
Tot. 95,500,352,230 89,541,980,950 103,143,800,200 103,742,797,600 117,054,416,800 107,151,020,000 119,509,250,000
OP 17,376,023,240 11,659,054,330 25,784,749,650 29,315,168,550 31,028,352,800 17,508,140,000 27,779,250,000
Source: See table A 7.7. Price data from Quattroruote, Monthly. Dealers margins have been obtained by 
ANFIA (Italian Association of Manufactures and Traders).
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